totality of the circumstances analysis in Vermont

2022Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 14 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96A, ¶ 10, 186 Vt. 389 , 987 A.2d 939 (“Our task . . . is not to pigeonhole each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious, but to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention.” (quoting State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276, 1282 (Kan. 1998))). ¶ 22.

2022State v. Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 14 , 200 Vt. 423 , 132 A.3d 716 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96A, ¶ 10, 186 Vt. 389 , 987 A.2d 939 (“Our task . . . is not to pigeonhole each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious, but to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention.” (quotation omitted)).

2022Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 14 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96A, ¶ 10, 186 Vt. 389 , 987 A.2d 939 (“Our task . . . is not to pigeonhole each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious, but to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention.” (quoting State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276, 1282 (Kan. 1998))). ¶ 22.

2022Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 14 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96A, ¶ 10, 186 Vt. 389 , 987 A.2d 939 (“Our task . . . is not to pigeonhole each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious, but to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention.” (quoting State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276, 1282 (Kan. 1998))). ¶ 22.

2022Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 14 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96A, ¶ 10, 186 Vt. 389 , 987 A.2d 939 (“Our task . . . is not to pigeonhole each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious, but to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention.” (quoting State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276, 1282 (Kan. 1998))). ¶ 22.

2022Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 14 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Mara, 2009 VT 96A, ¶ 10, 186 Vt. 389 , 987 A.2d 939 (“Our task . . . is not to pigeonhole each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious, but to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention.” (quoting State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276, 1282 (Kan. 1998))). ¶ 22.

2022See, e.g., State v. Davis, 2007 VT 71, ¶ 7 , 182 Vt. 573 , 933 A.2d 224 (“The totality-of-the-circumstances standard in reasonable suspicion determinations allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” (quotation omitted)).

2022See, e.g., State v. Davis, 2007 VT 71, ¶ 7 , 182 Vt. 573 , 933 A.2d 224 (“The totality-of-the-circumstances standard in reasonable suspicion determinations allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” (quotation omitted)).

2019We have concluded “that the odor of marijuana, detected by a trained and experienced police officer, can provide a reasonable basis to believe that marijuana is present,” but also “that the odor alone may not always be sufficient [to provide probable cause] to arrest an individual.” Guzman, 2008 VT 116, ¶ 14 (noting caution by other courts that “the odor of marijuana will not always produce probable cause to search or to arrest,” but rather is one factor “within the context of the entire factual situation” under which “the grounds for probable cause must be examined”); see Zuniga, 2016 CO 52,

2019We have concluded "that the odor of marijuana, detected by a trained and experienced police officer, can provide a reasonable basis to believe that marijuana is present," but also "that the odor alone may not always be sufficient [to provide probable cause] to arrest an individual." Guzman , 2008 VT 116 , ¶ 14, 184 Vt. 518 , 965 A.2d 544 (noting caution by other courts that "the odor of marijuana will not always produce probable cause to search or to arrest," but rather is one factor "within the context of the entire factual situation" under which "the grounds for probable cause must be examin

2014United States v. Porter , 986 F.2d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1993), and its progeny have relied primarily on two textual bases for adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances standard.

2014United States v. Porter , 986 F.2d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1993), and its progeny have relied primarily on two textual bases for adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances standard.

2019We have concluded "that the odor of marijuana, detected by a trained and experienced police officer, can provide a reasonable basis to believe that marijuana is present," but also "that the odor alone may not always be sufficient [to provide probable cause] to arrest an individual." Guzman , 2008 VT 116 , ¶ 14, 184 Vt. 518 , 965 A.2d 544 (noting caution by other courts that "the odor of marijuana will not always produce probable cause to search or to arrest," but rather is one factor "within the context of the entire factual situation" under which "the grounds for probable cause must be examin

2019We have concluded "that the odor of marijuana, detected by a trained and experienced police officer, can provide a reasonable basis to believe that marijuana is present," but also "that the odor alone may not always be sufficient [to provide probable cause] to arrest an individual." Guzman , 2008 VT 116 , ¶ 14, 184 Vt. 518 , 965 A.2d 544 (noting caution by other courts that "the odor of marijuana will not always produce probable cause to search or to arrest," but rather is one factor "within the context of the entire factual situation" under which "the grounds for probable cause must be examin

2023In fact, this multi-factor analysis comports with the spirit of Judge Lucero’s concurrence, which recognizes that “the central assumption of Matlock,” that a joint occupant’s consent is valid against a co-occupant, “falters when applied to children.” Sanchez, 608 F.3d 685, 697 (Lucero, J., concurring).

2019We have concluded "that the odor of marijuana, detected by a trained and experienced police officer, can provide a reasonable basis to believe that marijuana is present," but also "that the odor alone may not always be sufficient [to provide probable cause] to arrest an individual." Guzman , 2008 VT 116 , ¶ 14, 184 Vt. 518 , 965 A.2d 544 (noting caution by other courts that "the odor of marijuana will not always produce probable cause to search or to arrest," but rather is one factor "within the context of the entire factual situation" under which "the grounds for probable cause must be examin

2016See Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 68 n.9 (noting court’s holding “[did] not address the situation where there is independent evidence in the record suggesting” admission and waiver of a hearing or attendant rights “was not knowing and voluntary — a situation that does not exist in the instant case.”); United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding defendant’s claim “fails under the totality of the circumstances standard” where there was record evidence that defendant reviewed supervised release violation report, “discussed it with his attorney and confirmed with the magistrate

2016See Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 68 n.9 (noting court’s holding “[did] not address the situation where there is independent evidence in the record suggesting” admission and waiver of a hearing or attendant rights “was not knowing and voluntary—a situation that does not exist in the instant 13 case.”); United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding defendant’s claim “fails under the totality of the circumstances standard” where there was record evidence that defendant reviewed supervised release violation report, “discussed it with his attorney and confirmed with the magistrate

2016See Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 68 n.9 (noting court’s holding “[did] not address the situation where there is independent evidence in the record suggesting” admission and waiver of a hearing or attendant rights “was not knowing and voluntary — a situation that does not exist in the instant case.”); United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding defendant’s claim “fails under the totality of the circumstances standard” where there was record evidence that defendant reviewed supervised release violation report, “discussed it with his attorney and confirmed with the magistrate

2016See Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 68 n.9 (noting court’s holding “[did] not address the situation where there is independent evidence in the record suggesting” admission and waiver of a hearing or attendant rights “was not knowing and voluntary—a situation that does not exist in the instant 13 case.”); United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding defendant’s claim “fails under the totality of the circumstances standard” where there was record evidence that defendant reviewed supervised release violation report, “discussed it with his attorney and confirmed with the magistrate

2016See Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 68 n.9 (noting court’s holding “[did] not address the situation where there is independent evidence in the record suggesting” admission and waiver of a hearing or attendant rights “was not knowing and voluntary — a situation that does not exist in the instant case.”); United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding defendant’s claim “fails under the totality of the circumstances standard” where there was record evidence that defendant reviewed supervised release violation report, “discussed it with his attorney and confirmed with the magistrate

2016See Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 68 n.9 (noting court’s holding “[did] not address the situation where there is independent evidence in the record suggesting” admission and waiver of a hearing or attendant rights “was not knowing and voluntary—a situation that does not exist in the instant 13 case.”); United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding defendant’s claim “fails under the totality of the circumstances standard” where there was record evidence that defendant reviewed supervised release violation report, “discussed it with his attorney and confirmed with the magistrate

2016In assessing the effect of a promise under the totality of the circumstances, relevant factors include “the nature of the promise, the context in which the promise was made, the characteristics of the individual defendant, whether the defendant was informed of his rights, and whether counsel was present.” Pillar, 820 A.2d at 13-14 (quotation and additional citations omitted). ¶ 17.

2016See Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 68 n.9 (noting court’s holding “[did] not address the situation where there is independent evidence in the record suggesting” admission and waiver of a hearing or attendant rights “was not knowing and voluntary — a situation that does not exist in the instant case.”); United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding defendant’s claim “fails under the totality of the circumstances standard” where there was record evidence that defendant reviewed supervised release violation report, “discussed it with his attorney and confirmed with the magistrate

2016See Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 68 n.9 (noting court’s holding “[did] not address the situation where there is independent evidence in the record suggesting” admission and waiver of a hearing or attendant rights “was not knowing and voluntary—a situation that does not exist in the instant 13 case.”); United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding defendant’s claim “fails under the totality of the circumstances standard” where there was record evidence that defendant reviewed supervised release violation report, “discussed it with his attorney and confirmed with the magistrate

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997).

2015United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997).

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3

2015See, e.g., Jones, 701 F.3d at 1314-15 (finding no seizure where officers followed defendant home, approached him while he sat in his truck, introduced themselves as officers investigating narcotics, and told him they were there for his marijuana plants); United States v. Vera, 457 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no seizure where officers approached vehicle parked at rest stop, asked defendant if he would mind stepping out of vehicle and entering patrol car, and asked him in patrol car if he had any drugs, weapons, or large amounts of money in his possession); United States v. Ringold, 3