88 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 25 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences2009See also State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶ 9 , 248 Wis.2d 865 , 637 N.W.2d 774 ("probable cause to arrest may be based on hearsay information that is `shown to be reliable and emanating from a credible source'" (quoted source omitted))0; Lopez, 207 Wis.2d at 425 , 559 N.W.2d 264 (trial court must consider all circumstances including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information). [13] The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), adopted the totality of the circumstances test in place of the rigidl 2009The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982), adopted the totality of the circumstances test in place of the rigidly applied two-prong test in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). | 3 | 11 |
United States v. Tuckergreen2 sentences2015This evidence, which seemingly had been around for years and likely otherwise exists in cyberspace, did not appear to be "volatile" and no reason is readily apparent to explain why executing the warrants in a more traditional manner, by far less forceful means, would pose any "risk of personal injuries and property damage." See Tucker, 313 F.3d at 1266 (upholding a nighttime search because "there was not just risk of destruction of the evidence but also risk of personal injuries and property damage due to the volatile nature of the chemicals and the process of methamphetamine manufacture"). ¶3 2015This evidence, which seemingly had been around for years and likely otherwise exists in cyberspace, did not appear to be "volatile" and no reason is readily apparent to explain why executing the warrants in a more traditional manner, by far less forceful means, would pose any "risk of personal injuries and property damage." See Tucker, 313 F.3d at 1266 (upholding a nighttime search because "there was not just risk of destruction of the evidence but also risk of personal injuries and property damage due to the volatile nature of the chemicals and the process of methamphetamine manufacture"). ¶3 | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Steven Boldgreen2 sentences2022The unlawful use of a firearm presents an "imminent danger," see United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (Meskill, J., concurring), which may be considered in "the totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining reasonable suspicion" because of "the government's need for a prompt investigation." See Bold, 19 F.3d at 104 (citation omitted). ¶42 In this case, ShotSpotter reported four gunshots in a highly residential neighborhood. 2022The unlawful use of a firearm presents an "imminent danger," see United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (Meskill, J., concurring), which may be considered in "the totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining reasonable suspicion" because of "the government's need for a prompt investigation." See Bold, 19 F.3d at 104 (citation omitted). ¶42 In this case, ShotSpotter reported four gunshots in a highly residential neighborhood. | 2 | 3 |
People v. N.A.S.green2 sentences2026See, e.g., B.A., 100 N.E.3d at 234 (determining a student was in custody where “no one called his mom until after his interview”); People v. N.A.S., 329 P.3d 285, ¶¶2, 13 (Colo. 2014) (no custody where a parent and uncle were in the room). ¶25 We note that the Miranda custody analysis remains a totality of the circumstances test, and our list of considerations here is non- exhaustive. 3. 2026See, e.g., B.A., 100 N.E.3d at 234 (determining a student was in custody where “no one called his mom until after his interview”); People v. N.A.S., 329 P.3d 285, ¶¶2, 13 (Colo. 2014) (no custody where a parent and uncle were in the room). ¶25 We note that the Miranda custody analysis remains a totality of the circumstances test, and our list of considerations here is non- exhaustive. 3. | 2 | 2 |
B.A. v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., B.A., 100 N.E.3d at 234 (determining a student was in custody where “no one called his mom until after his interview”); People v. N.A.S., 329 P.3d 285, ¶¶2, 13 (Colo. 2014) (no custody where a parent and uncle were in the room). ¶25 We note that the Miranda custody analysis remains a totality of the circumstances test, and our list of considerations here is non- exhaustive. 3. 2026See, e.g., B.A., 100 N.E.3d at 234 (determining a student was in custody where “no one called his mom until after his interview”); People v. N.A.S., 329 P.3d 285, ¶¶2, 13 (Colo. 2014) (no custody where a parent and uncle were in the room). ¶25 We note that the Miranda custody analysis remains a totality of the circumstances test, and our list of considerations here is non- exhaustive. 3. | 2 | 2 |
Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commissiongreen2 sentences2022LULAC, 548 U.S. at 436 ; accord Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249 ("We have identified as relevant to the totality analysis several factors enumerated in the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments to the VRA, as well as [proportionality]."). 2022LULAC, 548 U.S. at 436 ; accord Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 142 S. Ct. at 1249 ("We have identified as relevant to the totality analysis several factors enumerated in the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments to the VRA, as well as [proportionality]."). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Walter Harrell and Lawrence Dunhamgreen2 sentences2022The unlawful use of a firearm presents an "imminent danger," see United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (Meskill, J., concurring), which may be considered in "the totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining reasonable suspicion" because of "the government's need for a prompt investigation." See Bold, 19 F.3d at 104 (citation omitted). ¶42 In this case, ShotSpotter reported four gunshots in a highly residential neighborhood. 2022The unlawful use of a firearm presents an "imminent danger," see United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (Meskill, J., concurring), which may be considered in "the totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining reasonable suspicion" because of "the government's need for a prompt investigation." See Bold, 19 F.3d at 104 (citation omitted). ¶42 In this case, ShotSpotter reported four gunshots in a highly residential neighborhood. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. City of Euclidgreen2 sentences2022Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-45 ; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426 ; see, e.g., City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 604-12 (providing a totality of the circumstances analysis). 2022Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-45 ; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426 ; see, e.g., City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 604-12 (providing a totality of the circumstances analysis). | 2 | 2 |
Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T.green2 sentences2021This subsection “prescribes a totality-of-the-circumstances test,” in which “the fact-finder should consider any support or care, or lack thereof, the parent provided the child throughout the child’s entire life.” Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶3 , 333 Wis. 2d 273 , 797 N.W.2d 854 . 2021This subsection “prescribes a totality-of-the-circumstances test,” in which “the fact-finder should consider any support or care, or lack thereof, the parent provided the child throughout the child’s entire life.” Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶3 , 333 Wis. 2d 273 , 797 N.W.2d 854 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jerrell C.J.green2 sentences2015Juveniles and the mentally retarded are the most vulnerable to modern psychological interrogation techniques." Jerrell C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶104 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 6 No. 2013AP127-CR.ssa • The cumulative effect of these factors under the totality of the circumstances test weighs against the voluntariness of the confession. ¶125 In sum, the defendant, a 15-year-old eighth grader of borderline intelligence, was in custody for roughly 11 hours; was interrogated for periods totaling nearly six hours; was subject to psychological interrogation methods; had no parent, attorney, or int 2015Juveniles and the mentally retarded are the most vulnerable to modern psychological interrogation techniques." Jerrell C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶104 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 6 No. 2013AP127-CR.ssa • The cumulative effect of these factors under the totality of the circumstances test weighs against the voluntariness of the confession. ¶125 In sum, the defendant, a 15-year-old eighth grader of borderline intelligence, was in custody for roughly 11 hours; was interrogated for periods totaling nearly six hours; was subject to psychological interrogation methods; had no parent, attorney, or int | 2 | 2 |
State v. Clappesgreen2 sentences2010"The ultimate determination of whether a confession is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances standard requires the court to balance the personal characteristics of the defendant against the pressures imposed upon him by police in order to induce him to respond to the questioning." Id. [C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but coercive activity does not, in and of itself, establish involuntariness.... [A] trial court should not undertake the balan 2002In Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 236 , this court applied a totality of the circumstances test in order to assess whether confessions are involuntary. | 1 | 4 |
City of West Bend v. Wilkensgreen2 sentences2021See City of West Bend v. Wilkens, 2005 WI App 36, ¶1 , 278 Wis. 2d 643 , 693 N.W.2d 324 ; see also State v. Krumm, No. 2019AP243-CR, unpublished slip op. ¶18 (WI App May 5, 2020) (“We are not persuaded that the deficient administration of the HGN test in this case renders the test results so devoid of probative value that they cannot be considered within the totality of the circumstances analysis.”). ¶19 The officer saw clues of intoxication on two of the three standard FSTs. 2021See City of West Bend v. Wilkens, 2005 WI App 36, ¶1 , 278 Wis. 2d 643 , 693 N.W.2d 324 ; see also State v. Krumm, No. 2019AP243-CR, unpublished slip op. ¶18 (WI App May 5, 2020) (“We are not persuaded that the deficient administration of the HGN test in this case renders the test results so devoid of probative value that they cannot be considered within the totality of the circumstances analysis.”). ¶19 The officer saw clues of intoxication on two of the three standard FSTs. | 1 | 2 |
1325 North Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd.green2 sentences2008A totality of the circumstances analysis is required before the predominant purpose of a contract can be determined when a contract provides both a product and services. 1325 N. Van Burén, 293 Wis. 2d 410, ¶ 29 ; Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, ¶ 22 . ¶ 111. 2008A totality of the circumstances analysis is required before the predominant purpose of a contract can be determined when a contract provides both a product and services. 1325 N. Van Buren, 293 Wis.2d 410, ¶ 29 , 716 N.W.2d 822 ; Linden, 283 Wis.2d 606, ¶ 22 , 699 N.W.2d 189 . ¶ 111 The majority opinion also errs because it ignores both the facts and the law that apply to the question presented. | 1 | 2 |
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.green2 sentences2026We explain the relevant authorities, and then turn to the debate. ¶14 The Supreme Court has said that whether a private actor acts as an instrument or agent of government “turns on the degree of the Government’s participation” and must be resolved “in light of all the circumstances.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614 (quoting another source). ¶15 In Skinner, the Supreme Court considered regulations surrounding railroad-employee intoxication testing and held that railroads acted as instruments or agents of the government. 2026See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614 ; Payano-Roman, 290 Wis. 2d 380 , ¶¶27–28.3 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Industrial Risk Insurers & Quad Graphics, Inc. v. American Engineering Testing, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Mark G. Sertichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Terry L. Woodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Arvizugreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Postgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Patrick I. Hogangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Quarzenskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ambrosegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Samson v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michael Belleau v. Edward Wallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sampson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Clarence Richardson, Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dubosered | 1 | 1 |
| National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. H. Walter Hendrix, III and Jean K. Hendrixgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDonald v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vale v. Louisianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jensengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Richardsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McAtteegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wyrick v. Fieldsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hoppe
green
2 sentences2025Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶38 . 2008Id. ¶ 37 This court applies a totality of the circumstances standard to determine whether a statement was made voluntarily. | 4 | 2004–2025 |
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry
green
2 sentences2022Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-45 ; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426 ; see, e.g., City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 604-12 (providing a totality of the circumstances analysis). 2022Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-45 ; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426 ; see, e.g., City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 604-12 (providing a totality of the circumstances analysis). | 4 | 2022–2022 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2016Instead, he argued that a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis applied under Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _ , 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), and that, under the totality of the circumstances, no exigent circumstances justified the war-rantless blood draw. 2016Instead, he argued that a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis applied under Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___ , 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), and that, under the totality of the circumstances, no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. | 4 | 2014–2016 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences2009See also State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶ 9 , 248 Wis.2d 865 , 637 N.W.2d 774 ("probable cause to arrest may be based on hearsay information that is `shown to be reliable and emanating from a credible source'" (quoted source omitted))0; Lopez, 207 Wis.2d at 425 , 559 N.W.2d 264 (trial court must consider all circumstances including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information). [13] The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), adopted the totality of the circumstances test in place of the rigidl 2009The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982), adopted the totality of the circumstances test in place of the rigidly applied two-prong test in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). | 4 | 1987–2009 |
State v. Boggess
green
2 sentences1988In State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 453-57 , 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983), we adopted the totality of the circumstances test for determining probable cause enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 1988In State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 453-57 , 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983), we adopted the totality of the circumstances test for determining probable cause enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). | 4 | 1986–1988 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
2 sentences2009See also State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶ 9 , 248 Wis.2d 865 , 637 N.W.2d 774 ("probable cause to arrest may be based on hearsay information that is `shown to be reliable and emanating from a credible source'" (quoted source omitted))0; Lopez, 207 Wis.2d at 425 , 559 N.W.2d 264 (trial court must consider all circumstances including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information). [13] The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), adopted the totality of the circumstances test in place of the rigidl 2009The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982), adopted the totality of the circumstances test in place of the rigidly applied two-prong test in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). | 3 | 1987–2009 |
Linden v. Cascade Stone Company, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008A totality of the circumstances analysis is required before the predominant purpose of a contract can be determined when a contract provides both a product and services. 1325 N. Van Burén, 293 Wis. 2d 410, ¶ 29 ; Linden, 283 Wis. 2d 606, ¶ 22 . ¶ 111. 2008A totality of the circumstances analysis is required before the predominant purpose of a contract can be determined when a contract provides both a product and services. 1325 N. Van Buren, 293 Wis.2d 410, ¶ 29 , 716 N.W.2d 822 ; Linden, 283 Wis.2d 606, ¶ 22 , 699 N.W.2d 189 . ¶ 111 The majority opinion also errs because it ignores both the facts and the law that apply to the question presented. | 3 | 2006–2008 |
Thornburg v. Gingles
green
2 sentences2022Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-45 ; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426 ; see, e.g., City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 604-12 (providing a totality of the circumstances analysis). 2022Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-45 ; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426 ; see, e.g., City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 604-12 (providing a totality of the circumstances analysis). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Allen
green
2 sentences2021See Hogan, 364 Wis. 2d 167, ¶47 (experience of officer is “a plus”); State v. Allen, 226 Wis. 2d 66, 74 , 593 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1999) (training and experience of an officer is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis). ¶21 A second factor is that the deputy learned during the stop, before requesting the field sobriety tests, that Adell had four prior operating while intoxicated convictions. 2021See Hogan, 364 Wis. 2d 167, ¶47 (experience of officer is “a plus”); State v. Allen, 226 Wis. 2d 66, 74 , 593 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1999) (training and experience of an officer is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis). ¶21 A second factor is that the deputy learned during the stop, before requesting the field sobriety tests, that Adell had four prior operating while intoxicated convictions. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
State v. Bohling
red
2 sentences2014The United States Supreme Court "granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on the question whether the natural 10 As explained above, probable cause to arrest "substitutes for the predicate act of lawful arrest." State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529 , 534 n.1, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993) (citation omitted). 2014The United States Supreme Court "granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on the question whether the natural 10 As explained above, probable cause to arrest "substitutes for the predicate act of lawful arrest." State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529 , 534 n.1, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Wisumierski
green
2 sentences1988In State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 519-20 , 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982), and State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 727-28 , 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982), we repudiated the doctrine of automatic standing for persons accused of possessary offenses, in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 1988In State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 519-20 , 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982), and State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 727-28 , 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982), we repudiated the doctrine of automatic standing for persons accused of possessary offenses, in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). | 2 | 1986–1988 |
State v. Callaway
green
2 sentences1988In State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 519-20 , 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982), and State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 727-28 , 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982), we repudiated the doctrine of automatic standing for persons accused of possessary offenses, in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 1988In State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 519-20 , 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982), and State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 727-28 , 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982), we repudiated the doctrine of automatic standing for persons accused of possessary offenses, in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). | 2 | 1986–1988 |
United States v. Salvucci
green
2 sentences1988In State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 519-20 , 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982), and State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 727-28 , 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982), we repudiated the doctrine of automatic standing for persons accused of possessary offenses, in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 1988In State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 519-20 , 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982), and State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 727-28 , 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982), we repudiated the doctrine of automatic standing for persons accused of possessary offenses, in accord with the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). | 2 | 1986–1988 |
State v. Payano-Roman
green
1 sentence2026See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614 ; Payano-Roman, 290 Wis. 2d 380 , ¶¶27–28.3 2. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. James Timothy Genous
green
1 sentence2026But that’s not how the law works, and the supreme court made that clear when it previously rejected the “divide-and-conquer” tactic of “isolating various factors, attacking them one by one, and then excluding each factor from the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” See id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Artic
green
2 sentences2026He further contends the totality of the circumstances factors set forth in State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶33 , 327 Wis. 2d 392 , 786 N.W.2d 430 , support his position. 2026He further contends the totality of the circumstances factors set forth in State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶33 , 327 Wis. 2d 392 , 786 N.W.2d 430 , support his position. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Schilling v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Sisk green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Waldner green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Silverstein green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Matter of Parental Rights to Sueann Am green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Grady green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. David M. Hay green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Medical Air Technology Corp. v. Marwan Investment, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Eason green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. Samuel Berkowitz green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. Thomas Callahan and Thomas Kapatos green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Schneckloth v. Bustamonte green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Holt v. State green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. McGuire green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Edmunds green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Holtz green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Miller green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Deets green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Kerr green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Lopez green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Swanson green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.