totality of the circumstances test in Georgia

2020We then review the search warrant “to determine the existence of probable cause using the totality of the circumstances analysis[.]” Palmer, 285 Ga. at 78 (citation omitted).

2012When this Court thereafter reviews the trial court’s grant or denial of the motion to suppress, we apply the totality of the circumstances analysis enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), and we ask whether the magistrate “had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant,” always mindful that the magistrate’s conclusion is to be afforded “substantial deference.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Palmer, 285 Ga. at 78 .

2026See also id. at 429 , 434-35 & n.16 (stating that “any prescriptive or fixed list of factors by its very nature risks undermining a totality-of-the-circumstances test” and dis- approving any language in prior cases indicating that a specific nine-factor framework to determine whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is required or exclusive). 4 When reviewing whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we generally “review a trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error and apply the law de novo.” Sinkfi

2026As discussed in our recent opinion affirming Hill’s convictions on appeal, Hill v. State, 322 Ga. 700 , 702-03 (2025), the waiver inquiry has two distinct requirements: first, the “waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and, second, it must be “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370 , 382-83 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]rial courts are to use a totality-of-the

2023As we noted in Luna-Galacia I, the Elliott Court “recognize[d]” that its holding “may affect a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry into whether a defendant voluntarily submitted to a breath test where the State first threatened that, if [he] refused, that would be evidence against [him] at trial.” Id. at 223 (IV) (E).

2023As a corollary of that, the Supreme Court “recognize[d] that [its] holding . . . may affect a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry into whether a defendant voluntarily submitted to a breath test where the State first threatened that, if [he] refused, that would be evidence against [him] at trial.” Id. at 223 (IV) (E).

2019On appeal, [o]ur appellate courts will review the search warrant to determine the existence of probable cause using the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 [ 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 ] (1983).

2019On appeal, [o]ur appellate courts will review the search warrant to determine the existence of probable cause using the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 [ 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 ] (1983).

2019See Aiken, 282 Ga. at 135 (2).

2013See Aiken, supra, 282 Ga. at 135 (2); State v. Stanfield, 290 Ga. App. 62, 63 (2) ( 658 SE2d 837 ) (2008).

2013See Powers v. State, 261 Ga. App. 296, 303 (4) ( 582 SE2d 237 ) (2003). 2.

2013See Powers v. State, 261 Ga. App. 296, 303 (4) ( 582 SE2d 237 ) (2003). 2.

2013This burden upon the state is satisfied by production of the warrant and its supporting affidavit, and by showing either by those documents or by other evidence that the warrant is not subject to the statutory challenge alleged.3 Our appellate courts will review the search warrant to determine the existence of probable cause using the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates.[4] The duty of the appellate courts is to determine if the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 2 Browner v. State, 265 Ga. App. 788, 789 (1) ( 595 SE2d 610 ) (2004) (citations om

2013This burden upon the state is satisfied by production of the warrant and its supporting affidavit, and by showing either by those documents or by other evidence that the warrant is not subject to the statutory challenge alleged.3 Our appellate courts will review the search warrant to determine the existence of probable cause using the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates.[4] The duty of the appellate courts is to determine if the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 2 Browner v. State, 265 Ga. App. 788, 789 (1) ( 595 SE2d 610 ) (2004) (citations om

2005“In determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes probable cause, we employ the totality of the circumstances analysis enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), and adopted by this court in State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181 ( 311 SE2d 823 ) (1984).” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Elom v. State, 248 Ga. App. 273 -274 (1) ( 546 SE2d 50 ) (2001).

2005“In determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes probable cause, we employ the totality of the circumstances analysis enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), and adopted by this court in State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181 ( 311 SE2d 823 ) (1984).” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Elom v. State, 248 Ga. App. 273 -274 (1) ( 546 SE2d 50 ) (2001).

2026“We have previously explained that when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a suppression issue, an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court.” State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39, 39 (2024) (quotation marks omitted).

2025Thus, lists of specific 9 factors that we have previously considered “are neither required nor exhaustive.” State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39, 42 (3) n.6 ( 897 SE2d 432 ) (2024) (involving factors we have considered in determining whether the statement made by an adult defendant while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs was voluntary as a matter of constitutional due process).

2026See also id. at 429 , 434-35 & n.16 (stating that “any prescriptive or fixed list of factors by its very nature risks undermining a totality-of-the-circumstances test” and dis- approving any language in prior cases indicating that a specific nine-factor framework to determine whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is required or exclusive). 4 When reviewing whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we generally “review a trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error and apply the law de novo.” Sinkfi

2025When reviewing whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we generally “review a trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error and apply the law de novo.” Sinkfield v. State, 318 Ga. 531, 540 (2024).

2019See Dickerson , 530 U.S. at 444 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 (experience suggests that the totality-of-the-circumstances test of voluntariness under the federal Due Process Clause "is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner").

2019See Dickerson, 530 U. S. at 444 (experience suggests that the totality-of-the-circumstances test of voluntariness under the federal Due Process Clause “is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in Accordingly, we overrule Price and other Georgia appellate decisions to the extent that they hold that either OCGA § 24-5-506 (a) or the Georgia Constitution requires law enforcement to warn suspects in custody of their right to refuse to perform an incriminating act.14 We also disapprove language in other decisions that is inconsistent with ou

2016See, e.g., In re A. W., 94 A3d 1161, 1167-68 (¶ 21) (Vt. 2014) (“[CJourts addressing the question of‘temporary absence’have noted that the term is not defined under the UCCJAor its successor the UCCJEA, and many, therefore, have adopted a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test, looking to whether all of the facts as found by the trial court, including the parent’s purpose in removing the child from one state to another and the duration of the absence, support a conclusion that a child’s absence was temporary.”); In re S. M., 938 SW2d910, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that, in “resolving the t

2016K.’s time in Texas was not a temporary absence from Georgia.19 It follows, then, that 18 See, e.g., In re A. W., 94 A3d 1161, 1167-68 (¶ 21) (Vt. 2014) (“[C]ourts addressing the question of ‘temporary absence’ have noted that the term is not defined under the UCCJA or its successor the UCCJEA, and many, therefore, have adopted a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test, looking to whether all of the facts as found by the trial court, including the parent’s purpose in removing the child from one state to another and the duration of the absence, support a conclusion that a child’s absence was tempor

2016“A consent to search will normally be held voluntary if the totality of the circumstances fails to show that the officers used fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or lengthy detention to obtain the consent.” Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga. App. 43, 47 (2) ( 663 SE2d 396 ) (2008).

2016“A consent to search will normally be held voluntary if the totality of the circumstances fails to show that the officers used fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or lengthy detention to obtain the consent.” Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga. App. 43, 47 (2) ( 663 SE2d 396 ) (2008).

2013See Aiken, supra, 282 Ga. at 135 (2); State v. Stanfield, 290 Ga. App. 62, 63 (2) ( 658 SE2d 837 ) (2008).

2013See Aiken, supra, 282 Ga. at 135 (2); State v. Stanfield, 290 Ga. App. 62, 63 (2) ( 658 SE2d 837 ) (2008).

2013It is simply a characterization of the analytical framework currently being used by this Court in determining whether a roadblock is well identified.19 the circumstances.” (punctuation omitted)). 18 Cf. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 ( 101 SCt 690 , 66 LEd2d 621 ) (1981) (holding an investigatory stop valid when totality of circumstances gives officers “particularized and objective basis” for suspicion of criminal activity); Darden v. State, 293 Ga. App. 127, 130 ( 666 SE2d 559 ) (2008) (describing the totality-of- circumstances test as being one that takes “the whole picture . . . into acc

2013We recognize that in Baker, 252 Ga. App. at 701-02 (1), we overruled a line of cases that employed a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether a roadblock still complied with LaFontaine despite the lack of evidence of supervisory oversight.

2012See Neil, supra. 6 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Jones, supra at 216 (2). 5 Because Raissian’s testimony that she had the opportunity to see her attacker in the lighted hallway prior to her attack conflicts with testimony from responding officers who interviewed her directly after the attack when she said that she had been grabbed from behind ; because Raissian did not have the opportunity to see her attacker during the assault since they were in a darkened office and her attention was focused on her own survival ; because the ER physician who treated Raissian testified that the injury t

2012See Neil, supra. (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Jones, supra at 216 (2).

2002Perkins v. State, 220 Ga. App. 524, 525 (2) ( 469 SE2d 796 ) (1996).

2002Perkins v. State, 220 Ga. App. 524, 525 (2) ( 469 SE2d 796 ) (1996).

1994“In making a determination as to probable cause pursuant to the totality of the circumstances test enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place. [Cits.]” (Punctuation omitted.) Hand v. State, 206 Ga. App. 501

1994“In making a determination as to probable cause pursuant to the totality of the circumstances test enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place. [Cits.]” (Punctuation omitted.) Hand v. State, 206 Ga. App. 501

1991“In making a determination as to probable cause pursuant to the totality of the circumstances test enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, [ 462 U. S. 213 ] (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Mize v. State, 173 Ga. App. 327, 328 ( 326 SE2d 782 ) (198

1991“In making a determination as to probable cause pursuant to the totality of the circumstances test enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, [ 462 U. S. 213 ] (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Mize v. State, 173 Ga. App. 327, 328 ( 326 SE2d 782 ) (198

2025See State v. Henderson, 356 Ga. App. 473 , 476 ( 847 SE2d 833 ) (2020) (“it is clear that when a defendant seeks to suppress evidence of a chemical test, the appropriate inquiry remains whether the defendant’s consent to the test was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.”).

2025See State v. Henderson, 356 Ga. App. 473 , 476 ( 847 SE2d 833 ) (2020) (“it is clear that when a defendant seeks to suppress evidence of a chemical test, the appropriate inquiry remains whether the defendant’s consent to the test was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.”).

2023See Riley, 237 Ga. at 128. 26 factor framework is required or exclusive. 16 Moreover, we make 16 See, e.g., Williams, 238 Ga. at 302-303 (explaining that Riley held that whether a juvenile knowing and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances (as noted above), but saying that “the totality of the circumstances is to be determined by consideration of the nine factors set out in West” and listing those factors); Crawford, 240 Ga. at 323-325 (explaining and applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test (as noted above), and stating that “[t]he court

2023See Riley, 237 Ga. at 128 . 25 to determine whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, is in tension with the totality-of-the-circumstances test itself—and thus with this Court’s holding in Riley—because such a test requires that trial courts consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the juvenile’s interview with law enforcement officials.

2026As discussed in our recent opinion affirming Hill’s convictions on appeal, Hill v. State, 322 Ga. 700 , 702-03 (2025), the waiver inquiry has two distinct requirements: first, the “waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and, second, it must be “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370 , 382-83 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]rial courts are to use a totality-of-the

2025The waiver inquiry has two distinct requirements: first, the “waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and, second, it must be “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370, 382-83 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]rial courts are to use a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rig

2024“The question of what constitutes a waiver of the right of arbitration depends on the facts of each case.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) USA Payday Cash Advance Center #1 v. Evans, 281 Ga. App. 847, 850 ( 637 SE2d 418 ) (2006).

2024“The question of what constitutes a waiver of the right of arbitration depends on the facts of each case.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) USA Payday Cash Advance Center #1 v. Evans, 281 Ga. App. 847, 850 ( 637 SE2d 418 ) (2006).

2024See Lofton v. State, 310 Ga. 770, 777 (2) n.6 (854 SE2d 690) (2021); Macon-Bibb County Hosp.

2024See Lofton v. State, 310 Ga. 770, 777 (2) n.6 (854 SE2d 690) (2021); Macon-Bibb County Hosp.

2024Cf. Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 20 (829 SE2d 99) (2019) (observing the “fundamental principle that this Court is bound by the Constitution of the United States as its provisions are construed and applied by the Supreme Court of the United States” (cleaned up)).

2024Cf. Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 20 (829 SE2d 99) (2019) (observing the “fundamental principle that this Court is bound by the Constitution of the United States as its provisions are construed and applied by the Supreme Court of the United States” (cleaned up)).