totality of the circumstances test in Connecticut

2021On appeal, the defendant urged this court to overrule our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Barton ( 219 Conn. 529 ), in which the court adopted a totality of the circumstances analysis for the determination of probable cause under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution and rejected the rigid analytical standards previously required by State v. Kimbro ( 197 Conn. 219 ).

2021On appeal, the defendant urged this court to overrule our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Barton ( 219 Conn. 529 ), in which the court adopted a totality of the circumstances analysis for the determination of probable cause under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution and rejected the rigid analytical standards previously required by State v. Kimbro ( 197 Conn. 219 ).

2022Accordingly, we hereby amend § 7-3 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence to incor- porate an exception to the ultimate issue rule for lay opinion testimony that relates to the identification of persons depicted in surveillance video or photographs, and overrule State v. Finan, supra, 275 Conn. 60 .3 As we explain in part I of this opinion, we adopt a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether lay opinion testimony identifying a person in surveillance video or photographs is admissible.

2022Accordingly, we hereby amend § 7-3 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence to incor- porate an exception to the ultimate issue rule for lay opinion testimony that relates to the identification of persons depicted in surveillance video or photographs, and overrule State v. Finan, supra, 275 Conn. 60 .3 As we explain in part I of this opinion, we adopt a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether lay opinion testimony identifying a person in surveillance video or photographs is admissible.

2026In so concluding, Justice Ecker and Justice Alexander both found instructive our Supreme Court’s previous decision in State v. Hodge, 153 Conn. 564 , 568–69, 219 A.2d 367 (1966), in which the court applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether the defendant had established an unreasonable seizure under the state constitution as a result of a three week delay between the commission of the offense and the defendant’s arrest.

2026In so concluding, Justice Ecker and Justice Alexander both found instructive our Supreme Court’s previous decision in State v. Hodge, 153 Conn. 564 , 568–69, 219 A.2d 367 (1966), in which the court applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether the defendant had established an unreasonable seizure under the state constitution as a result of a three week delay between the commission of the offense and the defendant’s arrest.

2024In other words, there must be an essential link between [the] coercive activity of the [s]tate, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant, on the other . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Christopher S., 338 Conn. 255 , 280–81, 257 A.3d 912 (2021); see also State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 670 (‘‘the totality of the circumstances test [for voluntariness] depend[s] [on] a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing’’ (inter- nal quotation marks omitted)). ‘‘[As for the scope of our re

2024In other words, there must be an essential link between [the] coercive activity of the [s]tate, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant, on the other . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Christopher S., 338 Conn. 255 , 280–81, 257 A.3d 912 (2021); see also State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 670 (‘‘the totality of the circumstances test [for voluntariness] depend[s] [on] a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing’’ (inter- nal quotation marks omitted)). ‘‘[As for the scope of our re

2021This court declined the defendant’s invitation to overrule our Supreme Court’s decision in Barton to adopt a totality of the circumstances analysis for the determination of probable cause under article first, § 7; this court, as an intermediate appellate tribunal, was not at liberty to modify, reconsider or overrule the precedent of our Supreme Court, a bedrock precept that the defendant misconstrued in arguing that this court nonetheless could conduct its own thoughtful review of Kimbro and Barton, and, apart from that fundamental deficiency, the defendant provided no federal or state precede

2021This court declined the defendant’s invitation to overrule our Supreme Court’s decision in Barton to adopt a totality of the circumstances analysis for the determination of probable cause under article first, § 7; this court, as an intermediate appellate tribunal, was not at liberty to modify, reconsider or overrule the precedent of our Supreme Court, a bedrock precept that the defendant misconstrued in arguing that this court nonetheless could conduct its own thoughtful review of Kimbro and Barton, and, apart from that fundamental deficiency, the defendant provided no federal or state precede

2019Although it is true under the federal constitution that the nature of the area where a person was detained may be consid- ered as part of the totality of the circumstances analysis; State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620 , 634–35, 899 A.2d 1 (2006); we have cautioned against overreliance on an individu- al’s location in a neighborhood plagued by crime.

2019Although it is true under the federal constitution that the nature of the area where a person was detained may be consid- ered as part of the totality of the circumstances analysis; State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620 , 634–35, 899 A.2d 1 (2006); we have cautioned against overreliance on an individu- al’s location in a neighborhood plagued by crime.

2014Whether the motive accomplished— of accomplishing the act was either need—was need or greed, the defen- dant’s degree of involvement, the violence and/or its potential for violence, physical injury to the victim, the mental injury to the victim, the relationship between the [d]efendant and the victim, the degree of planning, and the statutory seriousness of the offense convicted of. ‘‘ ‘Mitigating factors which I have considered are age of the defendant, intelligence, school record or work record, prior criminal record, record since the offense in question, remorse, either drug addiction or al

2001See, e.g., United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1202 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Medina-Cervantes, 690 F.2d 715, 716-17 (9th Cir. 1982); Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 840 , 102 S. Ct. 148 , 70 L.

2014Whether the motive accomplished— of accomplishing the act was either need—was need or greed, the defen- dant’s degree of involvement, the violence and/or its potential for violence, physical injury to the victim, the mental injury to the victim, the relationship between the [d]efendant and the victim, the degree of planning, and the statutory seriousness of the offense convicted of. ‘‘ ‘Mitigating factors which I have considered are age of the defendant, intelligence, school record or work record, prior criminal record, record since the offense in question, remorse, either drug addiction or al

2001See, e.g., United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1202 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Medina-Cervantes, 690 F.2d 715, 716-17 (9th Cir. 1982); Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 840 , 102 S. Ct. 148 , 70 L.

2014Whether the motive accomplished— of accomplishing the act was either need—was need or greed, the defen- dant’s degree of involvement, the violence and/or its potential for violence, physical injury to the victim, the mental injury to the victim, the relationship between the [d]efendant and the victim, the degree of planning, and the statutory seriousness of the offense convicted of. ‘‘ ‘Mitigating factors which I have considered are age of the defendant, intelligence, school record or work record, prior criminal record, record since the offense in question, remorse, either drug addiction or al

2001See, e.g., United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1202 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Medina-Cervantes, 690 F.2d 715, 716-17 (9th Cir. 1982); Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 840 , 102 S. Ct. 148 , 70 L.

2013“In cases in which a police stop is based on an informant’s tip, corroboration and reliability are important factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torelli, 103 Conn. App. 646, 652-53 , 931 A.2d 337 (2007).

2013“In cases in which a police stop is based on an informant’s tip, corroboration and reliability are important factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torelli, 103 Conn. App. 646, 652-53 , 931 A.2d 337 (2007).

2002“When hearsay information from third parties is relied on by the affidavit, the ‘veracity’ or ‘reliability’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of those persons are ‘highly relevant’ in determining the existence of probable cause.” State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 146 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994). “[Statements made by an informant are entitled to greater weight if corroborated by evidence independently gathered by the police.” State v. Rodriguez, 223 Conn. 127, 136 , 613 A.2d 211 (1992).

2002“When hearsay information from third parties is relied on by the affidavit, the ‘veracity’ or ‘reliability’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of those persons are ‘highly relevant’ in determining the existence of probable cause.” State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 146 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994). “[Statements made by an informant are entitled to greater weight if corroborated by evidence independently gathered by the police.” State v. Rodriguez, 223 Conn. 127, 136 , 613 A.2d 211 (1992).

1992Ed. 2d 527 , reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 , 104 S. Ct. 33 , 77 L.

1985Ed. 2d 527 , reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 , 104 S. Ct. 33 , 77 L.

1992Ed. 2d 527 , reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 , 104 S. Ct. 33 , 77 L.

1985Ed. 2d 527 , reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 , 104 S. Ct. 33 , 77 L.

1992Ed. 2d 527 , reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 , 104 S. Ct. 33 , 77 L.

1985Ed. 2d 527 , reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 , 104 S. Ct. 33 , 77 L.

2026Rather, if the record demonstrates that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, ‘no particular ritual or showing on the record is required.’ United States v. McWilliams, 730 F.2d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984).”); People v. Tyrell, 22 N.Y.3d 359, 365 , 4 N.E.3d 346 , 981 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2013) (“we have repeatedly rejected a formalistic approach to guilty pleas and have steered clear of a uniform mandatory catechism of pleading defendants in favor of broad discretions controlled by flexible standards” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 4 The totality of the circumstances standard is described in th

2026Rather, if the record demonstrates that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, ‘no particular ritual or showing on the record is required.’ United States v. McWilliams, 730 F.2d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984).”); People v. Tyrell, 22 N.Y.3d 359, 365 , 4 N.E.3d 346 , 981 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2013) (“we have repeatedly rejected a formalistic approach to guilty pleas and have steered clear of a uniform mandatory catechism of pleading defendants in favor of broad discretions controlled by flexible standards” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 4 The totality of the circumstances standard is described in th

2025See, e.g., State v. Castillo, 329 Conn. 311 , 326–28, 186 A.3d 672 (2018) (concluding that Appellate Court correctly considered, among other factors, defendant’s age in analyzing voluntariness of his statements).15 This factor, however, is not dispositive and can be outweighed by other compelling factors.16 15 See also State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 18 , 818 A.2d 1 (2003) (‘‘[t]he totality of the circumstances test, which, we emphasize, must be applied with special care to confessions made by children . . . adequately protects the rights of children because it affords a court the necessary f

2025See, e.g., State v. Castillo, 329 Conn. 311 , 326–28, 186 A.3d 672 (2018) (concluding that Appellate Court correctly considered, among other factors, defendant’s age in analyzing voluntariness of his statements).15 This factor, however, is not dispositive and can be outweighed by other compelling factors.16 15 See also State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 18 , 818 A.2d 1 (2003) (‘‘[t]he totality of the circumstances test, which, we emphasize, must be applied with special care to confessions made by children . . . adequately protects the rights of children because it affords a court the necessary f

2025See, e.g., State v. Castillo, 329 Conn. 311 , 326–28, 186 A.3d 672 (2018) (concluding that Appellate Court correctly considered, among other factors, defendant’s age in analyzing voluntariness of his statements).15 This factor, however, is not dispositive and can be outweighed by other compelling factors.16 15 See also State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 18 , 818 A.2d 1 (2003) (‘‘[t]he totality of the circumstances test, which, we emphasize, must be applied with special care to confessions made by children . . . adequately protects the rights of children because it affords a court the necessary f

2025See, e.g., State v. Castillo, 329 Conn. 311 , 326–28, 186 A.3d 672 (2018) (concluding that Appellate Court correctly considered, among other factors, defendant’s age in analyzing voluntariness of his statements).15 This factor, however, is not dispositive and can be outweighed by other compelling factors.16 15 See also State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 18 , 818 A.2d 1 (2003) (‘‘[t]he totality of the circumstances test, which, we emphasize, must be applied with special care to confessions made by children . . . adequately protects the rights of children because it affords a court the necessary f

2025See, e.g., State v. Castillo, 329 Conn. 311 , 326–28, 186 A.3d 672 (2018) (concluding that Appellate Court correctly considered, among other factors, defendant’s age in analyzing voluntariness of his statements).15 This factor, however, is not dispositive and can be outweighed by other compelling factors.16 15 See also State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 18 , 818 A.2d 1 (2003) (‘‘[t]he totality of the circumstances test, which, we emphasize, must be applied with special care to confessions made by children . . . adequately protects the rights of children because it affords a court the necessary f

2025The determination of probable cause is reached by applying a totality of the circumstances test. . . . ‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has recognized that because of our constitutional preference for a judicial determi- nation of probable cause, and mindful of the fact that [r]easonable minds may disagree as to whether a partic- ular [set of facts] establishes probable cause . . . we evaluate the information contained in the affidavit in the light most favorable to upholding the issuing 10 Article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘The people shall be secure in their persons, houses

2025The determination of probable cause is reached by applying a totality of the circumstances test. . . . ‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has recognized that because of our constitutional preference for a judicial determi- nation of probable cause, and mindful of the fact that [r]easonable minds may disagree as to whether a partic- ular [set of facts] establishes probable cause . . . we evaluate the information contained in the affidavit in the light most favorable to upholding the issuing 10 Article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘The people shall be secure in their persons, houses