totality of the circumstances test in New York

2025Although the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Illinois v Gates ( 462 US 213 [1983]) in exchange for a totality of the circumstances test, this Court has long continued to apply it in the probable cause context ( see Johnson , 66 NY2d at 400 ). [FN2] Although some members of the Argyris Court reached different conclusions as to whether the anonymous tips at issue were sufficiently reliable to allow the police to initiate the car stops, a majority of the Court concluded that the heightened test applies in the reasonable suspicion context, just as that required for probable ca

2025Although the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Illinois v Gates ( 462 US 213 [1983]) in exchange for a totality of the circumstances test, this Court has long continued to apply it in the probable cause context ( see Johnson , 66 NY2d at 400 ). [FN2] Although some members of the Argyris Court reached different conclusions as to whether the anonymous tips at issue were sufficiently reliable to allow the police to initiate the car stops, a majority of the Court concluded that the heightened test applies in the reasonable suspicion context, just as that required for probable ca

2025We have continued to apply the principles of Aguilar-Spinelli in the probable cause context, even after the United States Supreme Court abandoned it in favor of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach ( see Illinois v Gates , 462 US 213, 233 [1983] [limiting the reliability and basis-of-knowledge prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli to "relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations"]), in recognition that Aguilar-Spinelli is more protective of our citizens' rights under the State Constitution ( see Griminger , 71 NY2d

2025Although the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Illinois v Gates ( 462 US 213 [1983]) in exchange for a totality of the circumstances test, this Court has long continued to apply it in the probable cause context ( see Johnson , 66 NY2d at 400 ). [FN2] Although some members of the Argyris Court reached different conclusions as to whether the anonymous tips at issue were sufficiently reliable to allow the police to initiate the car stops, a majority of the Court concluded that the heightened test applies in the reasonable suspicion context, just as that required for probable ca

2025We have continued to apply the principles of Aguilar-Spinelli in the probable cause context, even after the United States Supreme Court abandoned it in favor of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach ( see Illinois v Gates , 462 US 213, 233 [1983] [limiting the reliability and basis-of-knowledge prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli to "relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations"]), in recognition that Aguilar-Spinelli is more protective of our citizens' rights under the State Constitution ( see Griminger , 71 NY2d

2025Although the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Illinois v Gates ( 462 US 213 [1983]) in exchange for a totality of the circumstances test, this Court has long continued to apply it in the probable cause context ( see Johnson , 66 NY2d at 400 ). [FN2] Although some members of the Argyris Court reached different conclusions as to whether the anonymous tips at issue were sufficiently reliable to allow the police to initiate the car stops, a majority of the Court concluded that the heightened test applies in the reasonable suspicion context, just as that required for probable ca

2023More particularly, with respect to the reliability prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the court properly determined that, despite her age and unsworn hearsay statement recounted by one of the police officers, the 10-year-old witness was "[a]n identified citizen informant" who "is presumed to be personally reliable" ( People v Parris , 83 NY2d 342, 350 [1994]; see People v Hetrick , 80 NY2d 344, 349 [1992]; People v Walker , 278 AD2d 852 , 852 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 869 [2001]).

2023More particularly, with respect to the reliability prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the court properly determined that, despite her age and unsworn hearsay statement recounted by one of the police officers, the 10-year-old witness was "[a]n identified citizen informant" who "is presumed to be personally reliable" ( People v Parris , 83 NY2d 342, 350 [1994]; see People v Hetrick , 80 NY2d 344, 349 [1992]; People v Walker , 278 AD2d 852 , 852 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 869 [2001]).

2023More particularly, with respect to the reliability prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the court properly determined that, despite her age and unsworn hearsay statement recounted by one of the police officers, the 10-year-old witness was "[a]n identified citizen informant" who "is presumed to be personally reliable" ( People v Parris , 83 NY2d 342, 350 [1994]; see People v Hetrick , 80 NY2d 344, 349 [1992]; People v Walker , 278 AD2d 852 , 852 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 869 [2001]).

2023More particularly, with respect to the reliability prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the court properly determined that, despite her age and unsworn hearsay statement recounted by one of the police officers, the 10-year-old witness was "[a]n identified citizen informant" who "is presumed to be personally reliable" ( People v Parris , 83 NY2d 342, 350 [1994]; see People v Hetrick , 80 NY2d 344, 349 [1992]; People v Walker , 278 AD2d 852 , 852 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 869 [2001]).

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v DeBour -- also sometimes called a level-three stop under DeBour or, in federal - 14 - - 15 - No. 198, 199, 210 constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, __US__, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 36

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2025We have continued to apply the principles of Aguilar-Spinelli in the probable cause context, even after the United States Supreme Court abandoned it in favor of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach ( see Illinois v Gates , 462 US 213, 233 [1983] [limiting the reliability and basis-of-knowledge prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli to "relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations"]), in recognition that Aguilar-Spinelli is more protective of our citizens' rights under the State Constitution ( see Griminger , 71 NY2d

2025Notably, this approach provides heightened protection against harassment by malevolent individuals who hide behind a shroud of anonymity, addressing the Court's longstanding concern that the totality of the circumstances test is insufficiently protective ( Argyris , 24 NY3d at 1163 [Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring]; id. at 1173-1174 [Rivera, J., [*6]concurring in part and dissenting in part]; see also People v Griminger , 71 NY2d 635, 641 [1988] [explaining that continuing to apply the Aguilar-Spinelli test "will . . . prevent the disturbance of the rights of privacy and liberty upon the word of

2025The following considerations inform the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry: the nature and terms of the waiver; the age and background of the defendant; the defendant's consultation with counsel; the [*4]defendant's on-the-record acknowledgments of understanding the consequences of waiving the right to appeal; a written appeal waiver that supplements or clarifies the court's oral advice; and the defendant's experience, if any, with the criminal justice system ( Thomas , 34 NY3d at 559-560; Sanders , 25 NY3d at 340-341 ).

2025The trial court bears the paramount responsibility "to ensure that each defendant's 'full appreciation of the consequences' and understanding of the terms and conditions of the plea and appeal waiver are 'apparent on the face of the record'" ( Thomas , 34 NY3d at 560 [citation omitted]; see Sanders , 25 NY3d at 340 ; Lopez , 6 NY3d at 256 ). [FN6] Second, a defendant cannot waive appellate review of certain fundamental issues of which society demands correct resolutions.

2024First, the court must determine whether “the witness has had sufficient contact with the defendant to achieve a level of familiarity that renders the lay opinion helpful” (United States v Fulton, 837 F3d 281, 297-298 [3d Cir 2016], citing United States v Beck, 418 F3d 1008, 1014 [9th Cir 2005]).

2024First, the court must determine whether “the witness has had sufficient contact with the defendant to achieve a level of familiarity that renders the lay opinion helpful” (United States v Fulton, 837 F3d 281, 297-298 [3d Cir 2016], citing United States v Beck, 418 F3d 1008, 1014 [9th Cir 2005]).

2014It is evident from the opening paragraph of the Appellate Division order that it intended to focus solely on the deceptive techniques employed by the police as opposed to applying the totality of the circumstances test: “This case presents us with an opportunity to decide under what circumstances the police, while interrogating a suspect, exceed permissible deception, such that a suspect’s statements to the police must be suppressed because they were unconstitutionally coerced” (100 AD3d at 231).

2014In Dickerson , the Court rejected a congressional attempt to revive the former totality-of-the-circumstances test, holding that Miranda is “constitutionally based” and reaffirming that it governs the admissibility of statements in federal and state courts (Dickerson, 530 US at 432, 440 ).

2014In Dickerson , the Court rejected a congressional attempt to revive the former totality-of-the-circumstances test, holding that Miranda is “constitutionally based” and reaffirming that it governs the admissibility of statements in federal and state courts (Dickerson, 530 US at 432, 440 ).

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v DeBour -- also sometimes called a level-three stop under DeBour or, in federal - 14 - - 15 - No. 198, 199, 210 constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, __US__, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 36

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v DeBour -- also sometimes called a level-three stop under DeBour or, in federal - 14 - - 15 - No. 198, 199, 210 constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, __US__, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 36

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2014In Navarette v California (572 US —, 134 S Ct 1683 [2014]), a divided Court applied the totality of the circumstances test, and concluded that while police failed to observe any criminal conduct, they had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendants based on a 911 caller’s description of defendants’ pickup truck which the caller alleged had minutes before run her off the road. 1 According to the majority, the call had sufficient indicia of reliability because the informant had been an eyewitness to the event, whereas in J.L., “the tip provided no basis for concluding that the tipster had actual

2014In Navarette v California (572 US —, 134 S Ct 1683 [2014]), a divided Court applied the totality of the circumstances test, and concluded that while police failed to observe any criminal conduct, they had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendants based on a 911 caller’s description of defendants’ pickup truck which the caller alleged had minutes before run her off the road. 1 According to the majority, the call had sufficient indicia of reliability because the informant had been an eyewitness to the event, whereas in J.L., “the tip provided no basis for concluding that the tipster had actual

2008As such sales “typically involve small, easily concealable packages, utilization of a totality of the circumstances analysis is both reasonable and necessary” (People v Graham, 211 AD2d 55, 59 [1995]).

2008Indeed, persons engaging in street-level narcotics transactions “should not enjoy an immunity from arrest or search merely because they are able to conceal their wares during the exchange [as] concealment is itself a common characteristic of illegal conduct” (id.; see also People v Thompson, 4 Misc 3d 126[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50611[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004], citing People v Jones, 90 NY2d 835, 837 [1997]).