foundation analysis in Iowa

2017The foundation for analysis of an automobile stop is provided in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 8 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.

2017The foundation for analysis of an automobile stop is provided in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 8 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.

2019Our conclusion is not an indictment of all survey evidence offered to reinforce an expert’s confidence in his or her opinion under rule 5.703.11 We 11 “Our rules of evidence are patterned after the federal rules, and we give considerable weight to their rationale and the cases interpreting them.” Brunner, 480 N.W.2d at 35 .

1962(We assume, as defendants contend, Boggs’ testimony related to custom.) Eamiello v. Piscitelli, supra; Napolitano v. Eastern Motor Express, 3d Cir., N. J., 246 F.2d 249, 253 ; Edgarton v. H.

1962(We assume, as defendants contend, Boggs' testimony related to custom.) Eamiello v. Piscitelli, supra; Napolitino v. Eastern Motor Express, 3d Cir., N.J., 246 F.2d 249, 253 ; Edgarton v. H.

1941That was a joint tort-feasor case, but after stating the rule as given in Bonney v. Bonney, supra, the court said (at page 372 of 43 Iowa) : “It is true this case was in relation to a joint liability arising on contract, but this can make no difference, for the foundation of the rule rests in both cases on the joint liability, and the effect of the release in both is the same.” In Farmers Savings Bank v. Aldrich, 153 Iowa 144, 153 , 133 N. W. 383 , a joint wrongdoer case, we held that a creditor could not by expressly or impliedly reserving the right to recover an additional amount from others

1941That was a joint tort-feasor case, but after stating the rule as given in Bonney v. Bonney, supra, the court said (at page 372 of 43 Iowa) : “It is true this case was in relation to a joint liability arising on contract, but this can make no difference, for the foundation of the rule rests in both cases on the joint liability, and the effect of the release in both is the same.” In Farmers Savings Bank v. Aldrich, 153 Iowa 144, 153 , 133 N. W. 383 , a joint wrongdoer case, we held that a creditor could not by expressly or impliedly reserving the right to recover an additional amount from others

1941That was a joint tort-feasor case, but after stating the rule as given in Bonney v. Bonney, supra, the court said (at page 372 of 43 Iowa) : “It is true this case was in relation to a joint liability arising on contract, but this can make no difference, for the foundation of the rule rests in both cases on the joint liability, and the effect of the release in both is the same.” In Farmers Savings Bank v. Aldrich, 153 Iowa 144, 153 , 133 N. W. 383 , a joint wrongdoer case, we held that a creditor could not by expressly or impliedly reserving the right to recover an additional amount from others

1937Mau v. Rice Bros., 216 Iowa 864 , 249 N. W. 206 ; Beck v. Minnesota & Western Grain Co., 131 Iowa 62 , 107 N. W. 1032 , 7 L.

1937Mau v. Rice Bros., 216 Iowa 864 , 249 N. W. 206 ; Beck v. Minnesota & Western Grain Co., 131 Iowa 62 , 107 N. W. 1032 , 7 L.

1937Mau v. Rice Bros., 216 Iowa 864 , 249 N. W. 206 ; Beck v. Minnesota & Western Grain Co., 131 Iowa 62 , 107 N. W. 1032 , 7 L.

1937Mau v. Rice Bros., 216 Iowa 864 , 249 N. W. 206 ; Beck v. Minnesota & Western Grain Co., 131 Iowa 62 , 107 N. W. 1032 , 7 L.

1930In 8 Ruling Case Law 65, Section 16, it is said: “A married woman’s status being what it is at the present time, the presumption should not, and generally does not, exist. ’ ’ In Morton v. State, 141 Tenn. 357 ( 209 S. W. 644 ), it is held that, by reason of the emancipation of women from the responsibilities and disabilities of coverture, the foundation on which this presumption rested having been swept away, it carried with it this presumption.

1926Nevertheless, the equitable estate of the vendee in the land contracted for, — his equitable ownership, the foundation principle of the English and American cases which gives rise to the vendor’s lien, and, on refusal of the vendor to perform, raises a vendee’s lien, — has been the law of this state since the decision of Pierson v. David, 1 Iowa 23 , to be presently referred to.

1926In In re Estate of Miller, 142 Iowa 563, 566 , it is said: “The interest acquired by the vendee is ‘land,’ and the right and interest conferred by the contract upon the vendor is ‘personal property.’ In case of the death of the vendee, his interest in the land would descend to his heirs.

1918For the same reason, this rule should be extended to those who operate elevators for carrying passengers. * * * The condition of a passenger caged in a suspended car is one not only of utter ignorance of what has been done or ought to be done for his safety, but of absolute passiveness and pitiable helplessness, when confronted with danger against which human knowledge, skill, and foresight ought to have guarded.” Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127 .

1916When shown, it may be considered as an. admission of title, or as an agreement in settlement of-the'-controversy between the parties, or as the basis of an estoppel, or, as in this ease, the foundation of a claim of right, which, if followed by possession for 10 years, will ripen into.title.” See also Palmer v. Osborne, 115 Iowa 714 .

1916It-.is true that it.is said in Keller v. Harrison, 139 Iowa 383 : “An. agreement to a, boundary is to be inferred from long acquiescence”; but it must be shown that both parties acquiesced in the line.

1914See, also, Palmer v. Osborne, 115 Iowa, 713 ; Biglow v. Ritter, 131 Iowa, 213 .

1872In Onstott v. Murray, 22 Iowa, 457 (i.e., 468), it is said : “We are of opinion that long use, and long acquiescence in such use by the owner of the land, are, in and of themselves, evidence of a dedication.” Whenever the question of dedication by mere user is discussed, the idea of acquiescence is coupled with it as an essential element.

1872In Manderschid v. City of Dubuque, 29 Iowa, 73 , it is said: “ The intention of the owner to set apart the lands for the use of the public as a highway — the anmrns dediccmcU — is the foundation principle, the very life of dedication.” This intention can never arise from mere occupancy alone, if the party against whom the occupancy is claimed has no knowledge of it.

1864In support of the foundation principle upon which our decision rests, viz: that the judgment lien of Thode was exhausted by the sale as against a redemptioner, and all other parties except the judgment defendant, and the assignee specifically of his right to redeem, or of his equity of redemption in the land, we refer to Wood v. Colvin, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 228; Titus v. Lewis, 3 Barb., 72 ; Hewson v. Deygert, 8 Johns., 333 ; Van Rensselaer v. Sheriff &c., 1 Cow., 443, 501, 510 ; Stoddard v. Forbes et al., 13 Iowa, 296 ; Curtis v. Millard & Co., 14 Id., 128, 131, and cases cited ; Crosby v. Elkader

1864In support of the foundation principle upon which our decision rests, viz: that the judgment lien of Thode was exhausted by the sale as against a redemptioner, and all other parties except the judgment defendant, and the assignee specifically of his right to redeem, or of his equity of redemption in the land, we refer to Wood v. Colvin, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 228; Titus v. Lewis, 3 Barb., 72 ; Hewson v. Deygert, 8 Johns., 333 ; Van Rensselaer v. Sheriff &c., 1 Cow., 443, 501, 510 ; Stoddard v. Forbes et al., 13 Iowa, 296 ; Curtis v. Millard & Co., 14 Id., 128, 131, and cases cited ; Crosby v. Elkader