foundation claim in Wisconsin

2006Baumeister, 277 Wis.2d 21, ¶ 6 , 690 N.W.2d 1 .

2006Baumeister, 277 Wis.2d 21, ¶ 6 , 690 N.W.2d 1 .

2003In fact, the legislature has chosen to exclude from exemption under § 70.11 (4m) (a) (applicable to nonprofit hospitals) any "property used for commercial purposes ... [such] as a doctor's office." 9 Although the Foundation notes that its bylaws require it to provide medical care to patients "without regard to ... ability to pay for services," Wisconsin courts have long held that " 'a corporation's declared objects are not controlling in determining whether its property is exempt.1" Frank Lloyd Wright Found, v. Town of Wyoming, 267 Wis. 599, 605 , 66 N.W.2d 642 (1954) (citation omitted).

2003In fact, the legislature has chosen to exclude from exemption under § 70.11 (4m) (a) (applicable to nonprofit hospitals) any "property used for commercial purposes ... [such] as a doctor's office." 9 Although the Foundation notes that its bylaws require it to provide medical care to patients "without regard to ... ability to pay for services," Wisconsin courts have long held that " 'a corporation's declared objects are not controlling in determining whether its property is exempt.1" Frank Lloyd Wright Found, v. Town of Wyoming, 267 Wis. 599, 605 , 66 N.W.2d 642 (1954) (citation omitted).

2003Subsection (4) authorizes a property tax exemption for "[p]roperty owned and used exclusively *518 by... benevolent associations." 5 The supreme court has explained that -in order "to qualify for a total exemption under Wis. Stat. § 70.11 (4), an organization must show three facts: (1) that it is a benevolent organization, (2) that it owns and exclusively uses the property, and (3) that it uses the property for exempt purposes." Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 81-82 . ¶ 19.

1924Co. 105 Wis. 25 ( 80 N. W. 88 , 81 N. W. 118 ), at p. 31 it is said: “The foundation principle upon which all rules for determining damages in a case of actionable fraud rests, is that the wronged party is to be compensated for the loss he sustained by the fraud to the extent of the natural and proximate consequences.of the wrong, — for such results ‘as happen in the natural course of things and were to be expected to ensue according to the general experience of mankind.’ ” Subordinate to this general principle, sub-rules by which damages for various kinds of fraud are to be measured have been

1924Co. 105 Wis. 25 ( 80 N. W. 88 , 81 N. W. 118 ), at p. 31 it is said: “The foundation principle upon which all rules for determining damages in a case of actionable fraud rests, is that the wronged party is to be compensated for the loss he sustained by the fraud to the extent of the natural and proximate consequences.of the wrong, — for such results ‘as happen in the natural course of things and were to be expected to ensue according to the general experience of mankind.’ ” Subordinate to this general principle, sub-rules by which damages for various kinds of fraud are to be measured have been

1898So, if the situation of the title to lands adjacent to navigable streams is stated with strict accuracy in Jones v. Pettibone, 2 Wis. 308 , to the effect that it extends to the thread of the stream, subject to the right of navigation, which statement has often been referred to and may be said to form the foundation of the doctrine that the state has parted with the title it formerly possessed to the beds of such streams, then they are private for the purpose of fishing.

1896Wentworth v. Summit, 60 Wis. 281 ; Sheel v. Appleton, 49 Wis. 125 ; Benware v. Pine Valley, 53 Wis. 527 .

1896And that a claim to recover back illegal taxes paid under protest is not an action on contract is ruled by Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, supra. And that, the foundation for such a claim being the -wrongful possession of money belonging to the claimant, notwithstanding the fiction of the law that there is an implied promise for its repayment, which supports an action in form as for money had and received, it must be classed as an action sounding in tort and not on contract, is ruled by Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, supra, and Bradley v. Eau Claire, supra. From the foregoing, whether the claim is classed as

1896And that a claim to recover back illegal taxes paid under protest is not an action on contract is ruled by Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, supra. And that, the foundation for such a claim being the -wrongful possession of money belonging to the claimant, notwithstanding the fiction of the law that there is an implied promise for its repayment, which supports an action in form as for money had and received, it must be classed as an action sounding in tort and not on contract, is ruled by Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, supra, and Bradley v. Eau Claire, supra. From the foregoing, whether the claim is classed as

1896Wentworth v. Summit, 60 Wis. 281 ; Sheel v. Appleton, 49 Wis. 125 ; Benware v. Pine Valley, 53 Wis. 527 .

1896And that a claim to recover back illegal taxes paid under protest is not an action on contract is ruled by Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, supra. And that, the foundation for such a claim being the -wrongful possession of money belonging to the claimant, notwithstanding the fiction of the law that there is an implied promise for its repayment, which supports an action in form as for money had and received, it must be classed as an action sounding in tort and not on contract, is ruled by Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, supra, and Bradley v. Eau Claire, supra. From the foregoing, whether the claim is classed as

1896Wentworth v. Summit, 60 Wis. 281 ; Sheel v. Appleton, 49 Wis. 125 ; Benware v. Pine Valley, 53 Wis. 527 .

1889Dailey v. Kastell, 56 Wis. 444 ; Smith v. Smith, 60 Wis. 329 ; Ashcraft v. De Armond, 44 Iowa, 229 ; Robinson v. Hutchinson, 26 Vt. 47 .

1889Dailey v. Kastell, 56 Wis. 444 ; Smith v. Smith, 60 Wis. 329 ; Ashcraft v. De Armond, 44 Iowa, 229 ; Robinson v. Hutchinson, 26 Vt. 47 .

1889Dailey v. Kastell, 56 Wis. 444 ; Smith v. Smith, 60 Wis. 329 ; Ashcraft v. De Armond, 44 Iowa, 229 ; Robinson v. Hutchinson, 26 Vt. 47 .

1882Had this been the only evidence in the case, and had the plaintiff rested his right to recover upon proof that his barn was burned by fire communicated by the passing engine, without giving any positive proofs as to how the fire was communicated from the engine to the barn, there would have been a foundation for the claim of the learned counsel for the appellant that a nonsuit should have been granted, and the case would probably have been brought within the rule laid down by this court in Spaulding v. Railway Co., 30 Wis., 110 , and 83 Wis., 582 .

1875We considered the foundation of this claim when the case was here on demurrer, and held that upon the facts stated the plaintiff acquired no such prescriptive right. 35 Wis., 229 .