foundation claim in California

2017Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 .) We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) “If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.]” (Hylton, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272 .)

2017Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 111 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 ].) We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-causing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494 ].) “If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.]” (Hyl

2021We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.]” [Citation].’ (Tuszynska [v. Cunningham (2011)] 199 Cal.App.4th [257,] 267.) ‘[T]he critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act i

2020Citing and quoting numerous cases, they began with this: “The First Step of the Anti-SLAPP Analysis: “In applying section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), the mode of proceeding and the applicable analysis at the often-elusive first step have been worked out in some detail in the case law. ‘[T]he court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) ‘To determine whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, we disregard its label and instead examine its gravamen “by identifyi

2021However, we are reminded by our Supreme Court . . . that the ‘focus’ of the statute ‘is not the form of plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability.’ ” (Id. at p. 1483.) “ ‘To determine whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, we disregard its label and instead examine its gravamen “by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ ” [citation], i.e., “ ‘the acts on which liability is based,’ ” not the damage flowing from that conduct.’

2018The First Step of the Anti-SLAPP Analysis In applying section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), the mode of proceeding and the applicable analysis at the often-elusive first step have been worked out in some detail in the case law. "[T]he court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based." ( § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) "To determine whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, we disregard its label and instead examine its gravamen 'by identifying "[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct .

2017Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 111 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 ].) We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-causing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494 ].) “If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.]” (Hyl

2017Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 111 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 ].) We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-causing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494 ].) “If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.]” (Hyl

2015Evidence Code section 1240 provides, "Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception." In People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 (Poggi), our Supreme Court stated, " 'The foundation for this exception is that if the declarations are made under the immediate influence of the occurrence to which they relate, they are deemed sufficientl

2008The prosecutor properly introduced Easley’s descriptions of her attacker at the scene as excited utterances under Evidence Code section 1240. 3 “ ‘The foundation for this exception is that if the declarations are made under the immediate influence of the occurrence to which they relate, they are deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be presented to the jury. [Citation.] [f] The basis for this circumstantial probability of trustworthiness is “that in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of one’

2021(Id. at p. 748.) 15 Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574 , 586–587 (Okorie); City of Colton v. Singletary, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 .) “ ‘ “We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.” ’ ” (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (

2021(Id. at p. 748.) 15 Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574 , 586–587 (Okorie); City of Colton v. Singletary, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 .) “ ‘ “We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.” ’ ” (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (

2014Did Young's court action for a writ of administrative mandate to compel 8 a hearing on the validity of his summary suspension necessarily 'arise out of' protected free speech conduct, in the hospital peer review context?" ( Young, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 53-54.) On the anti-SLAPP issues, our prior opinion applied these tests: "The principal thrust of the claim, in terms of any 'allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim,' will determine the applicability of the anti- SLAPP statutory scheme. [Citation.] If the core injury-producing con

2014Did Young's court action for a writ of administrative mandate to compel 8 a hearing on the validity of his summary suspension necessarily 'arise out of' protected free speech conduct, in the hospital peer review context?" ( Young, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 53-54.) On the anti-SLAPP issues, our prior opinion applied these tests: "The principal thrust of the claim, in terms of any 'allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim,' will determine the applicability of the anti- SLAPP statutory scheme. [Citation.] If the core injury-producing con

2017The principal thrust and gravamen analysis In determining whether a cause of action is based on protected activity, we "examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies." ( *587 Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510 , 519-520, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 381 .) 4 "We assess the principal thrust by identifying '[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct ... that provides the foundation for the claim.' " ( Hylton v. Frank E.

2017The principal thrust and gravamen analysis In determining whether a cause of action is based on protected activity, we "examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies." ( *587 Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510 , 519-520, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 381 .) 4 "We assess the principal thrust by identifying '[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct ... that provides the foundation for the claim.' " ( Hylton v. Frank E.

2017A. Wayans’s burden In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, “ ‘we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiffs cause of action [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiffs claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activit

2017A. WAYANS’S BURDEN In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, “ ‘we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . . .” . . . [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’’ [Citation.] If the core injury- producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions t

2021(Id. at p. 748.) 15 Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574 , 586–587 (Okorie); City of Colton v. Singletary, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 .) “ ‘ “We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.” ’ ” (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (

2021(Id. at p. 748.) 15 Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574 , 586–587 (Okorie); City of Colton v. Singletary, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 .) “ ‘ “We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.” ’ ” (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (

2022(Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 209 (Finton).) “In doing so, ‘[w]e examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies….’ ” (Ibid.) This requires “ ‘identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct … that provides the foundation for the claim,” ’ ” keeping in mind “ ‘the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.’ ” (Id. at pp. 209‒ 210.) Section 425.16, subdivision (e) expr

2015In determining “whether the challenged claims arise from acts in furtherance of the defendant[’s] right of free speech or right of petition,” a court must “‘examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies,’” which is accomplished “‘by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.”’” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 209 .) In Flatley, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a motion to strike a cause of

2017Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 111 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 ].) We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-causing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494 ].) “If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.]” (Hyl

2017A. WAYANS’S BURDEN In assessing whether a cause of action arises from protected activity, “ ‘we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead “examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . . .” . . . [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’’ [Citation.] If the core injury- producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions t

2024(People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 [evidentiary challenge forfeited where party stipulated to challenged evidence]; Baskin v. Hughes Realty, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 184, 197, fn. 6 [“an appellant forfeits the right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure objected to on appeal”].) Stelmach claims she did not forfeit this issue because once the trial court ruled the DNA report was admissible with the proper foundation and defense counsel told the jury about the negative report in his opening statement, she had to employ the best trial strategy

2024(People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 [evidentiary challenge forfeited where party stipulated to challenged evidence]; Baskin v. Hughes Realty, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 184, 197, fn. 6 [“an appellant forfeits the right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure objected to on appeal”].) Stelmach claims she did not forfeit this issue because once the trial court ruled the DNA report was admissible with the proper foundation and defense counsel told the jury about the negative report in his opening statement, she had to employ the best trial strategy

2024(People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 [evidentiary challenge forfeited where party stipulated to challenged evidence]; Baskin v. Hughes Realty, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 184, 197, fn. 6 [“an appellant forfeits the right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure objected to on appeal”].) Stelmach claims she did not forfeit this issue because once the trial court ruled the DNA report was admissible with the proper foundation and defense counsel told the jury about the negative report in his opening statement, she had to employ the best trial strategy

2024(People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 [evidentiary challenge forfeited where party stipulated to challenged evidence]; Baskin v. Hughes Realty, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 184, 197, fn. 6 [“an appellant forfeits the right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure objected to on appeal”].) Stelmach claims she did not forfeit this issue because once the trial court ruled the DNA report was admissible with the proper foundation and defense counsel told the jury about the negative report in his opening statement, she had to employ the best trial strategy

2017Rogozienski, Inc . (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1272, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 , italics added.) In determining "whether the challenged claims arise from acts in furtherance of the defendants' right of free speech or right of petition under one of the categories set forth in section 425.16, subdivision (e).... '[w]e examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies.' " ( Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200 , 209, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( Finton Construction ).) The "gravamen is defined by t

2017Rogozienski, Inc . (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1272, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 , italics added.) In determining "whether the challenged claims arise from acts in furtherance of the defendants' right of free speech or right of petition under one of the categories set forth in section 425.16, subdivision (e).... '[w]e examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies.' " ( Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200 , 209, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( Finton Construction ).) The "gravamen is defined by t

2015(Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1042-1043 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ].) In doing so, “[w]e examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the antiSLAPP statute applies . . . .” (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 519-520 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 381 ], citation omitted.) “We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.]” (Hylton v. Frank E.

2015(Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1042-1043 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ].) In doing so, “[w]e examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the antiSLAPP statute applies . . . .” (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 519-520 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 381 ], citation omitted.) “We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.]” (Hylton v. Frank E.

1988Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 460, 468 [ 106 P.2d 895 ]; accord, People v. Washington, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1176 .) “The foundation for this exception is that if the declarations are made under the immediate influence of the occurrence to which they relate, they are deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be presented to the jury. [Citation.] [i[] The basis for this circumstantial probability of trustworthiness is ‘that in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of one’s actual impressions and belief.’” (

1988Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 460, 468 [ 106 P.2d 895 ]; accord, People v. Washington, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1176 .) “The foundation for this exception is that if the declarations are made under the immediate influence of the occurrence to which they relate, they are deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be presented to the jury. [Citation.] [i[] The basis for this circumstantial probability of trustworthiness is ‘that in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of one’s actual impressions and belief.’” (

2000We have recognized that the trial court has “considerable discretion . . . to contain voir dire within reasonable limits” (People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 408 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 317 , 628 P.2d 869 ]; see also People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1158 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ]).

2000We have recognized that the trial court has “considerable discretion . . . to contain voir dire within reasonable limits” (People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 408 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 317 , 628 P.2d 869 ]; see also People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1158 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ]).

1981As there are no counteraffidavits, we are relegated, therefore, to a determination of whether Foundation’s affidavits are sufficiently supportive of the summary judgment (Goldstein v. Hoffman (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 803, 810 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 334 ]. 3 In the absence of counteraffidavits, the court is required to grant a motion for summary judgment where the affidavits of the moving party satisfy the following requirements: 1) the affidavits must contain facts sufficient to entitle the moving parties to a judgment, i.e., facts establishing every element necessary to sustain a judgment; 2) the facts

1981As there are no counteraffidavits, we are relegated, therefore, to a determination of whether Foundation’s affidavits are sufficiently supportive of the summary judgment (Goldstein v. Hoffman (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 803, 810 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 334 ]. 3 In the absence of counteraffidavits, the court is required to grant a motion for summary judgment where the affidavits of the moving party satisfy the following requirements: 1) the affidavits must contain facts sufficient to entitle the moving parties to a judgment, i.e., facts establishing every element necessary to sustain a judgment; 2) the facts

1945The foundation for this claim is the testimony of four witnesses, namely, the appellant, the nurse, the lawyer who drew the deed and the notary, combined with *713 the fact that when the doctor was asked by the court whether, in view of their testimony he adhered to his former opinion, he answered frankly that the decedent "must have had a clear space during that time." (He had not seen the patient between November 30 and December 7.) The appellant in this contention relies on the rule that "the actual mental condition of the testatrix at the time of the execution of the will is the question t

1945The foundation for this claim is the testimony of four witnesses, namely, the appellant, the nurse, the lawyer who drew the deed and the notary, combined with the fact that when the doctor was asked by the court whether, in view of their testimony he adhered to his former opinion, he answered frankly that the decedent “must have had a clear space during that time. ’ ’ (He had not seen the patient between November 30 and December 7.) The appellant in this contention relies on the rule that “the actual mental condition of the testatrix at the time of the execution of the will is the question to

2021(Id. at p. 748.) 15 Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574 , 586–587 (Okorie); City of Colton v. Singletary, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 .) “ ‘ “We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.” ’ ” (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (

2021(Id. at p. 748.) 15 Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574 , 586–587 (Okorie); City of Colton v. Singletary, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 .) “ ‘ “We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.” ’ ” (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (

2017Rogozienski, Inc . (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1272, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 , italics added.) In determining "whether the challenged claims arise from acts in furtherance of the defendants' right of free speech or right of petition under one of the categories set forth in section 425.16, subdivision (e).... '[w]e examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies.' " ( Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200 , 209, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( Finton Construction ).) The "gravamen is defined by t

2014(Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169 , 1190–1191.) In making this analysis, “we disregard the labeling of the claim [citation] and instead ‘examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action . . .’ . . . [Citation.] We assess the principal thrust by identifying ‘[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.’ [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protec

2022(Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 .) “ ‘Any act’ includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action[,]” including “qualifying acts committed by attorneys in representing clients in litigation.” (Ibid.; see Coretronic Corp. v. Cozen O’Connor (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1388 [“[t]he anti-SLAPP statutes protect not only the litigants, but also their attorneys’ litigation-related statements”].) Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it rel

2015Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 .) We review the parties’ pleadings, declarations, and other supporting documents at this stage of the analysis only “to determine what conduct is actually being challenged, not to determine whether the conduct is actionable. [Citation.]” (Coretronic Corp. v. Cozen O’Connor (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1389 .) In this case, the allegation that Howard and Lewenfus conspired to suppress all other bids at the sheriff’s sale of Ana’s residence, thus enabling Lewenfus to acquire Ana’s residence at a grossly inadequate price, serves as the foundati

2017(Id. at pp. 270, 272.) The trial court denied the motion, ruling that “ ‘the gravamen of this case is a business dispute between owners and not activity protected by ... the anti-SLAPP statute.’ ” (Id. at p. 270.) In affirming the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, the Baharian-Mehr court sought to determine whether the challenged claims arose from protected activity by examining the “ ‘principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s *1169 cause of action.’ ” (Baharian-Mehr, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 .) The court stated, “ ‘We assess the principal thrust by identifying “[t]he allegedly wron

2013(Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 265, 272 (Baharian-Mehr).) "In deciding whether an action is a SLAPP, the trial court should distinguish between (1) speech or petitioning activity that is mere evidence related to liability and (2) liability 14 that is based on speech or petitioning activity." (Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1214-1215 .) Hence, the court must focus on " '[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim.' [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct up

2017Rogozienski, Inc . (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1272, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 , italics added.) In determining "whether the challenged claims arise from acts in furtherance of the defendants' right of free speech or right of petition under one of the categories set forth in section 425.16, subdivision (e).... '[w]e examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff's cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies.' " ( Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200 , 209, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( Finton Construction ).) The "gravamen is defined by t

2017Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 , italics added.) In determining “whether the challenged claims arise from acts in furtherance of the defendants’ right of free speech or right of petition under one of the categories set forth in section 425.16, subdivision (e). . . . ‘[w]e examine the principal thrust or gravamen of a plaintiff’s cause of action to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies.’ ” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 209 (Finton Construction).) The “gravamen is defined by the acts on which liability is based, not s

2000We have recognized that the trial court has “considerable discretion . . . to contain voir dire within reasonable limits” (People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 408 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 317 , 628 P.2d 869 ]; see also People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1158 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ]).

2000We have recognized that the trial court has “considerable discretion . . . to contain voir dire within reasonable limits” (People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 408 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 317 , 628 P.2d 869 ]; see also People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1158 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ]).