foundation doctrine in Kentucky

2011Furthermore, in addition to using the fact pattern of Fenwick as the foundation for the analysis, Pennington's author, Justice Noble, found particular merit in Fenwick's "excellent discussion of" our Kentucky courts' "struggle[] with what part physical or residential possession of the child plays in each type of custody." Id. at 767 fn. 5. [12] At times, Father argues that Texas was merely a "second residence" and not a relocation.

2011Furthermore, in addition to using the fact pattern of Fenwick as the foundation for the analysis, Penningtons author, Justice Noble, found particular merit in Fenwick’s "excellent discussion of” our Kentucky courts’ "struggle[] with what part physical or residential possession of the child plays in each type of custody.” Id. at 767 fn. 5. .

1934Central Life Insurance Co. v. Roberts, 165 Ky. 305 , 176 S. W. 1139 ; Home Insurance Co. v. Ballew, 96 S. W. 878 , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1059 ; Morgan v. Home Insurance Co., 216 Ky. 589 , 288 S. W. 321 .

1934Central Life Insurance Co. v. Roberts, 165 Ky. 305 , 176 S. W. 1139 ; Home Insurance Co. v. Ballew, 96 S. W. 878 , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1059 ; Morgan v. Home Insurance Co., 216 Ky. 589 , 288 S. W. 321 .

1934Central Life Insurance Co. v. Roberts, 165 Ky. 305 , 176 S. W. 1139 ; Home Insurance Co. v. Ballew, 96 S. W. 878 , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1059 ; Morgan v. Home Insurance Co., 216 Ky. 589 , 288 S. W. 321 .

1930Central Life Insurance Co. v. Roberts, 165 Ky. 305 , 176 S. W. 1139 ; Home Life Insurance Co. v. Ballew, 96 S. W. 878 , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1059 ; Morgan v. Home Insurance Co., 216 Ky. 589 , 288 S. W. 321 .

2011In fact, protection of the discretionary powers of our public officials and employees, exercised in good faith, is the very foundation of our doctrine of “qualified official immunity.” Although we consider Turner’s conduct in this case to be discretionary, we recognize the apparent incongruity with our precedent regarding a supervisory duty in the public school setting, as “we have held that a claim of negligent supervision may go to a ministerial act or function in the public school setting.” Id. at 244 .

2011However, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky.2001) and Williams , 113 S.W.3d 145—the cases relied upon in enunciating the public school distinction—have quite different facts from those before us.

2011However, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky.2001) and Williams , 113 S.W.3d 145—the cases relied upon in enunciating the public school distinction—have quite different facts from those before us.

2007After the Commonwealth rested its case, Lewis moved to strike the results of the BAC test, arguing that a proper foundation for the test had not been laid under Commonwealth v. Roberts, 122 S.W.3d 524 (Ky.2003), because no aspect of the test reflected an “alcohol simulator analysis.” The trial court overruled this motion stating that the calibration check, as testified to and shown on the printout, constituted an “alcohol simulator analysis.” At the conclusion of the trial, Lewis was found guilty and received a $200 fine.

2003In Wirth , we stated that the standards set forth in Marcum v. Commonwealth, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 122 (1972) and Owens v. Commonwealth, Ky., 487 S.W.2d 897 (1972) remain the principal foundation requirement for admission of a breath test.

2003In Wirth , we stated that the standards set forth in Marcum v. Commonwealth, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 122 (1972) and Owens v. Commonwealth, Ky., 487 S.W.2d 897 (1972) remain the principal foundation requirement for admission of a breath test.

1994This Court’s recent decision in Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713 (1992), provides the foundation for our analysis of the qualifications of these jurors and the correctness of the trial court’s rulings.

1990In an apparent retreat from the broad event-oriented position taken in Rosen-bloom and in an effort to achieve a consensus, the United States Supreme Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the decision which forms the foundation of our analysis of the issue now before this Court.

1990In an apparent retreat from the broad event-oriented position taken in Rosen-bloom and in an effort to achieve a consensus, the United States Supreme Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the decision which forms the foundation of our analysis of the issue now before this Court.

1987In Hall v. Hamlin, Ky., 484 S.W.2d 853 (1972), wherein the witness was confronted with a prior contradictory statement at a deposition which was later used in evidence, this foundation requirement was fully complied with — “[the witness] was cross-examined ... regarding certain statements, inconsistent with his deposition, allegedly made by [the witness] shortly after the accident ... [and] categorically denied any such inconsistent statements.” Id., at 854 .

1987In Hall v. Hamlin, Ky., 484 S.W.2d 853 (1972), wherein the witness was confronted with a prior contradictory statement at a deposition which was later used in evidence, this foundation requirement was fully complied with — “[the witness] was cross-examined ... regarding certain statements, inconsistent with his deposition, allegedly made by [the witness] shortly after the accident ... [and] categorically denied any such inconsistent statements.” Id., at 854 .

1937But it is argued that necessary governmental expenses of the taxing unit, including salaries of its officers, are not to be taken into consideration in determ *253 ining whether or not the limitation of indebtedness prescribed in section 157 of the Constitution has been exceeded, and in support of that proposition counsel cite and rely on the cases of Breathitt County v. Cockrell, 250 Ky. 743 , 63 S. W. (2d) 920 , 92 A. L.

1937But it is argued that necessary governmental expenses of the taxing unit, including salaries of its officers, are not to be taken into consideration in determ *253 ining whether or not the limitation of indebtedness prescribed in section 157 of the Constitution has been exceeded, and in support of that proposition counsel cite and rely on the cases of Breathitt County v. Cockrell, 250 Ky. 743 , 63 S. W. (2d) 920 , 92 A. L.

1935Co., 182 Ky. 455 , 206 S. W. 794 .

1935Co., 182 Ky. 455 , 206 S. W. 794 .

1934The here applicable rule of waiver and resulting estoppel is well stated in the case of Boggess v. Insurance Co. of North America, 235 Ky. 529 , 31 S. W. (2d) 899 , 900 as follows : “The foundation of the doctrine of waiver is that the company by its conduct, or its authorized words, has induced the insured to believe that the insurance would not be affected by a variation from the strict letter and rigid requirements of the policy.

1934The here applicable rule of waiver and resulting estoppel is well stated in the case of Boggess v. Insurance Co. of North America, 235 Ky. 529 , 31 S. W. (2d) 899 , 900 as follows : “The foundation of the doctrine of waiver is that the company by its conduct, or its authorized words, has induced the insured to believe that the insurance would not be affected by a variation from the strict letter and rigid requirements of the policy.

1930The foundation for defense (c) was and is that after the issuing of the policy there was a judgment rendered by the Washington circuit court directing the sale of the *553 property to satisfy some liens on it, and that the property had been advertised by the master commissioner pursuant to directions in that judgment; but before the advertised day, of sale the fire occurred and destroyed the insured building’, and it is insisted that the judgment directing the sale ipso facto worked a “change of interest” of the insured in and to the property so as to forfeit the policy under one of its provis

1930The foundation for defense (c) was and is that after the issuing of the policy there was a judgment rendered by the Washington circuit court directing the sale of the *553 property to satisfy some liens on it, and that the property had been advertised by the master commissioner pursuant to directions in that judgment; but before the advertised day, of sale the fire occurred and destroyed the insured building’, and it is insisted that the judgment directing the sale ipso facto worked a “change of interest” of the insured in and to the property so as to forfeit the policy under one of its provis

1930The foundation for defense (c) was and is that after the issuing of the policy there was a judgment rendered by the Washington circuit court directing the sale of the *553 property to satisfy some liens on it, and that the property had been advertised by the master commissioner pursuant to directions in that judgment; but before the advertised day, of sale the fire occurred and destroyed the insured building’, and it is insisted that the judgment directing the sale ipso facto worked a “change of interest” of the insured in and to the property so as to forfeit the policy under one of its provis

1930The foundation for defense (c) was and is that after the issuing of the policy there was a judgment rendered by the Washington circuit court directing the sale of the *553 property to satisfy some liens on it, and that the property had been advertised by the master commissioner pursuant to directions in that judgment; but before the advertised day, of sale the fire occurred and destroyed the insured building’, and it is insisted that the judgment directing the sale ipso facto worked a “change of interest” of the insured in and to the property so as to forfeit the policy under one of its provis

1930The foundation for defense (c) was and is that after the issuing of the policy there was a judgment rendered by the Washington circuit court directing the sale of the *553 property to satisfy some liens on it, and that the property had been advertised by the master commissioner pursuant to directions in that judgment; but before the advertised day, of sale the fire occurred and destroyed the insured building’, and it is insisted that the judgment directing the sale ipso facto worked a “change of interest” of the insured in and to the property so as to forfeit the policy under one of its provis

1930The foundation for defense (c) was and is that after the issuing of the policy there was a judgment rendered by the Washington circuit court directing the sale of the *553 property to satisfy some liens on it, and that the property had been advertised by the master commissioner pursuant to directions in that judgment; but before the advertised day, of sale the fire occurred and destroyed the insured building’, and it is insisted that the judgment directing the sale ipso facto worked a “change of interest” of the insured in and to the property so as to forfeit the policy under one of its provis

1930The trial court also relied on the ease of Pruett v. Com., 199 Ky. 33 , 250 S. W. 131 , as well as other cases to the same effect.

1930The trial court also relied on the ease of Pruett v. Com., 199 Ky. 33 , 250 S. W. 131 , as well as other cases to the same effect.

1928East Tennessee Telephone Co. v. Jeffries, 153 Ky. 133 , 154 S. W. 1112 .

1928East Tennessee Telephone Co. v. Jeffries, 153 Ky. 133 , 154 S. W. 1112 .

1927The ascertainment of the latter is the cardinal rule, or rather the end and object, of all construction, and where the real design of the Legislature in ordaining a statute, although it be not precisely expressed, is yet plainly perceivable, or ascertained with reasonable certainty, the language of the statute must be given such construction as will carry that design into effect, even though in so doing the exact letter of the law be sacrificed, or though the construction be, indeed, contrary to the letter.’ See, also Bowman v. Hamlett, 159 Ky. 184 ( 166 S. W. 1008 ).” Such being the foundatio

1927The ascertainment of the latter is the cardinal rule, or rather the end and object, of all construction, and where the real design of the Legislature in ordaining a statute, although it be not precisely expressed, is yet plainly perceivable, or ascertained with reasonable certainty, the language of the statute must be given such construction as will carry that design into effect, even though in so doing the exact letter of the law be sacrificed, or though the construction be, indeed, contrary to the letter.’ See, also Bowman v. Hamlett, 159 Ky. 184 ( 166 S. W. 1008 ).” Such being the foundatio

1926What we have said involves none of the questions raised and discussed in the case of Ritter v. County Board of Education, 150 Ky. 847 , and the response to the petition for rehearing in the same case reported in 151 Ky. 578 , as growing out of and emanating from the provisions of section 4437, supra, of our present statutes, since whatever may be the limitations on the right of defendant, county board of education, to raise funds by taxation and expend them for improvements on the lot as between it and a taxpayer of the district because of the reverter clause in the deed, it certainly had the

1926What we have said involves none of the questions raised and discussed in the case of Ritter v. County Board of Education, 150 Ky. 847 , and the response to the petition for rehearing in the same case reported in 151 Ky. 578 , as growing out of and emanating from the provisions of section 4437, supra, of our present statutes, since whatever may be the limitations on the right of defendant, county board of education, to raise funds by taxation and expend them for improvements on the lot as between it and a taxpayer of the district because of the reverter clause in the deed, it certainly had the

1920Cases supporting proposition (a) are Davies’ Exor. v. City of Louisville, 159 Ky. 252 ; Merritt v. Cravens, 168 Ky. 155 ; Graziani v. Ernst, 169 Ky. 751 ; Taulbee v. Hargis, 173 Ky. 433 ; Smith v. Young, 178 Ky. 376 , and Johnson v. Johnson, 183 Ky. 421 .

1920Cases supporting proposition (a) are Davies’ Exor. v. City of Louisville, 159 Ky. 252 ; Merritt v. Cravens, 168 Ky. 155 ; Graziani v. Ernst, 169 Ky. 751 ; Taulbee v. Hargis, 173 Ky. 433 ; Smith v. Young, 178 Ky. 376 , and Johnson v. Johnson, 183 Ky. 421 .

1920Cases supporting proposition (a) are Davies’ Exor. v. City of Louisville, 159 Ky. 252 ; Merritt v. Cravens, 168 Ky. 155 ; Graziani v. Ernst, 169 Ky. 751 ; Taulbee v. Hargis, 173 Ky. 433 ; Smith v. Young, 178 Ky. 376 , and Johnson v. Johnson, 183 Ky. 421 .

1920Cases supporting proposition (a) are Davies’ Exor. v. City of Louisville, 159 Ky. 252 ; Merritt v. Cravens, 168 Ky. 155 ; Graziani v. Ernst, 169 Ky. 751 ; Taulbee v. Hargis, 173 Ky. 433 ; Smith v. Young, 178 Ky. 376 , and Johnson v. Johnson, 183 Ky. 421 .