12 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Montoya v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2017The statute “allows a prior inconsistent statement to be used as substantive evidence of the fact to which the statement relates,” and it “does not include the foundation requirement that a witness must have denied or failed to remember the prior statement before it can be proved by extrinsic evidence.” Montoya, 740 P.2d at 996 . 2015COLJI-Crim. 3-4:01 (2014). 5 CRE 405 addresses methods of proving character. 6 We note that the district court appears to have based its ruling on CRE 613, which in contrast to section 16-10-201, C.R.S. 2015, “include[s] the foundation requirement that a witness must have denied or failed to remember the prior statement before it can be proved by extrinsic evidence.” Montoya v. People , 740 P.2d 992, 996 (Colo. 1987). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Russogreen2 sentences2007People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356, 361 (Colo.1986); see also People v. Fultz, 761 P.2d 242, 243 (Colo.App.1988)(defendant's argument that his challenge for cause was improperly denied failed because "[dlefense counsel not only failed to lay a proper foundation for a challenge but also failed to state a reason for the challenge"), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993). 1988Vol. 8A) and People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356 (Colo.1986). | 1 | 2 |
DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.green2 sentences2026Generally, Rule 26 (b) "defines the permissible scope of discovery in any given case." DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. , 2013 CO 36 , ¶ 5 , 303 P.3d 1187 , 1190 . 2026Generally, Rule 26 (b) "defines the permissible scope of discovery in any given case." DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. , 2013 CO 36 , ¶ 5 , 303 P.3d 1187 , 1190 . | 1 | 1 |
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Charles K. DORSEYgreen1 sentence2025See People v. Dorsey, 2021 COA 126, ¶ 31 (noting that the proponent of the hearsay evidence must establish the foundation for the exception), aff’d on other grounds, 2023 CO 51 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fultzgreen1 sentence2007People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356, 361 (Colo.1986); see also People v. Fultz, 761 P.2d 242, 243 (Colo.App.1988)(defendant's argument that his challenge for cause was improperly denied failed because "[dlefense counsel not only failed to lay a proper foundation for a challenge but also failed to state a reason for the challenge"), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wiedemergreen1 sentence2007People v. Russo, 713 P.2d 356, 361 (Colo.1986); see also People v. Fultz, 761 P.2d 242, 243 (Colo.App.1988)(defendant's argument that his challenge for cause was improperly denied failed because "[dlefense counsel not only failed to lay a proper foundation for a challenge but also failed to state a reason for the challenge"), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Denver Foundation v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
neutral
2 sentences2007Id. at 82 . 2007Id. at 82 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Stone v. Currigan
green
1 sentence1960Sequiturs that emanated from the doctrine such as `immunity from suit,' `immunity from paying interest,' `immunity from the statute of limitations,' etc. have with the demise of the doctrine become non-sequiturs. * * *" [ 138 Colo. 442 , 334 P.2d 743 .] I am for a declaration by this court to the effect that sovereign immunity should never have been recognized in Colorado since the foundation for the rule never existed in this state. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
People ex rel. Alexander v. District Court
neutral
2 sentences1942In the latter the following- statement appears: “The foundation of the rule being the respect and- consideration. due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation.” By way of exceptions, this general rule has been held not to be controlling where, inter alia, the lack of jurisdiction of the inferior court is apparent on the face of the pleadings (People ex rel. v. District Court, 29 Colo. 182 , 68 Pac. 242 ), where the proceedings in the lower court were ex parte and opportunity to object was thus precluded; where the applicant was prevented by artifice or fraud f 1942In the latter the following statement appears: "The foundation of the rule being the respect and consideration due to the lower *Page 290 court and the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation." By way of exceptions, this general rule has been held not to be controlling where, inter alia, the lack of jurisdiction of the inferior court is apparent on the face of the pleadings ( People ex rel. v. District Court , 29 Colo. 182 , 68 Pac. 242 ), where the proceedings in the lower court were ex parte and opportunity to object was thus precluded; where the applicant was prevented by artifice o | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Hillen v. People
green
2 sentences1934Fairly, I think, we could properly put into effect the principle suggested in Hillen v. People, 59 Colo. 280, 283 , 149 Pac. 250 , where we said: “Good practice, it would seem, in view of the danger that this kind of evidence may be misapplied to the injury of the accused, might require the state to offer the confession first, and if received, to put in no further evidence * * * unless clearly necessary.” Finally, I object to “piling Ossa on Pelion.” The defendant pleaded guilty in open court, a confession made out of court was detailed by witnesses, and he corroborated it all by his own testi 1934Fairly, I think, we could properly put into effect the principle suggested in Hillen v. People, 59 Colo. 280, 283 , 149 Pac. 250 , where we said: “Good practice, it would seem, in view of the danger that this kind of evidence may be misapplied to the injury of the accused, might require the state to offer the confession first, and if received, to put in no further evidence * * * unless clearly necessary.” Finally, I object to “piling Ossa on Pelion.” The defendant pleaded guilty in open court, a confession made out of court was detailed by witnesses, and he corroborated it all by his own testi | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Marshall v. Chicago & Great Eastern Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1934“The true foundation of the rule, that they were admissible in cases of felonious homicide, were pol icy and necessity, since that crime is usually committed in secret, and it can not he allowed to such an offender to commit the crime, and, by the same act, still forever the tongue of the only person in the world which could speak his crime.” Marshall v. Railway Company, 48 Ill. 475 . | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Johnson v. . Lawrence
green
1 sentence1903(Ex parte Richardson, 3 Madd. 138 ; Thompson v. Andrews, 1 Myl. & K. 116 ; Cutbush v. Cutbush, 1 Beav. 185 ; M'Neillie v. Acton, 4 DeG., M. & G. 744.) ” Johnson v. Lawrence ( 95 N. Y. 154 ) arose upon this will. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.