foundation standard in Connecticut

2021As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 740 , 785 A.2d 197 (2001). ‘‘Notwithstanding t

2021As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 740 , 785 A.2d 197 (2001). ‘‘Notwithstanding t

2021As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 739 , 638 A.2d 1060 (1994). ‘‘Appellate review of a factual finding, therefore, is limited both as a practical matter and as a matter of the fundamental difference between the role of the trial court and an appellate court. . . .

2021As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 739 , 638 A.2d 1060 (1994). ‘‘Appellate review of a factual finding, therefore, is limited both as a practical matter and as a matter of the fundamental difference between the role of the trial court and an appellate court. . . .

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

2012As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schade v. Schade, 110 Conn. App. 57, 62 , 954 A.2d 846 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 945 , 959 A.2d 1009 (2008).

2012As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schade v. Schade, 110 Conn. App. 57, 62 , 954 A.2d 846 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 945 , 959 A.2d 1009 (2008).

2012As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schade v. Schade, 110 Conn. App. 57, 62 , 954 A.2d 846 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 945 , 959 A.2d 1009 (2008).

2012As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schade v. Schade, 110 Conn. App. 57, 62 , 954 A.2d 846 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 945 , 959 A.2d 1009 (2008).

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

2002In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 174-75 , 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “[I]n determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and eveiy reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 534 , 710 A.2d 757 (1998). “[W]e do not

1998As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the patties at the hearing.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982); see also Rostain v. Rostain, 213 Conn. 686, 693 , 569 A.2d 1126 (1990).

1998As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the patties at the hearing.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982); see also Rostain v. Rostain, 213 Conn. 686, 693 , 569 A.2d 1126 (1990).

2024As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 87 , 995 A.2d 1 (2010). ‘‘The question of . . . to what extent . . . the child support guidelines apply . . . is a question of law over which this court should exercise plenary review.’’ Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 367 , 999 A.2d 721 (2010).

2024As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta- geous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 87 , 995 A.2d 1 (2010). ‘‘The question of . . . to what extent . . . the child support guidelines apply . . . is a question of law over which this court should exercise plenary review.’’ Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 367 , 999 A.2d 721 (2010).

2021As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 740 , 785 A.2d 197 (2001). ‘‘Notwithstanding t

2021As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 740 , 785 A.2d 197 (2001). ‘‘Notwithstanding t

2019In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . ‘‘[Further, in] determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evi- dence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn. Ap

2019In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . ‘‘[Further, in] determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evi- dence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn. Ap

2019In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . ‘‘[Further, in] determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evi- dence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn. Ap

2019In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . ‘‘[Further, in] determining [whether there has been an abuse of discretion] the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. . . . [W]e do not review the evi- dence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Stewart, 57 Conn. Ap

2018Such evidence is admissible to prove the victim's character for violence "irrespective of whether the accused knew of the [victim's] violent character or of the particular evidence adduced at the time of the ... encounter." State v. Miranda , 176 Conn. 107 , 114, 405 A.2d 622 (1978) ; see also State v. Carter , 228 Conn. 412 , 422-23, 636 A.2d 821 (1994).

2018Such evidence is admissible to prove the victim's character for violence "irrespective of whether the accused knew of the [victim's] violent character or of the particular evidence adduced at the time of the ... encounter." State v. Miranda , 176 Conn. 107 , 114, 405 A.2d 622 (1978) ; see also State v. Carter , 228 Conn. 412 , 422-23, 636 A.2d 821 (1994).

1984See, e.g., Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 624 , 427 A.2d 432 (1980); Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 180-81 , 425 A.2d 592 (1979); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63 , 413 A.2d 854 (1979).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, supra. This appeal presents one of the rare cases in which the trial court abused its broad discretion by misapplying the law and by making crucial findings which were not reasonably supported by the facts.” McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982). 4 The test is whether the court could rea *421 sonably conclude as it did; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492

1984See, e.g., Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 624 , 427 A.2d 432 (1980); Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 180-81 , 425 A.2d 592 (1979); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63 , 413 A.2d 854 (1979).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, supra. This appeal presents one of the rare cases in which the trial court abused its broad discretion by misapplying the law and by making crucial findings which were not reasonably supported by the facts.” McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982). 4 The test is whether the court could rea *421 sonably conclude as it did; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492

1984See, e.g., Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 624 , 427 A.2d 432 (1980); Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 180-81 , 425 A.2d 592 (1979); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63 , 413 A.2d 854 (1979).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, supra. This appeal presents one of the rare cases in which the trial court abused its broad discretion by misapplying the law and by making crucial findings which were not reasonably supported by the facts.” McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982). 4 The test is whether the court could rea *421 sonably conclude as it did; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492

1984See, e.g., Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 624 , 427 A.2d 432 (1980); Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 180-81 , 425 A.2d 592 (1979); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63 , 413 A.2d 854 (1979).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, supra. This appeal presents one of the rare cases in which the trial court abused its broad discretion by misapplying the law and by making crucial findings which were not reasonably supported by the facts.” McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177 , 440 A.2d 274 (1982). 4 The test is whether the court could rea *421 sonably conclude as it did; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492

2008As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007); Doody v. Doody, 99 Conn. App. 512, 516 , 914 A.2d 1058 (2007).

2008As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502 , 927 A.2d 894 (2007); Doody v. Doody, 99 Conn. App. 512, 516 , 914 A.2d 1058 (2007).

1988State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107 , 405 A.2d 622 (1978).’ State v. Delgado, 8 Conn. App. 273, 286 , 513 A.2d 701 (1986).” State v. Delgado, 13 Conn. App. 139, 149 , 535 A.2d 371 (1987).

1988State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107 , 405 A.2d 622 (1978).’ State v. Delgado, 8 Conn. App. 273, 286 , 513 A.2d 701 (1986).” State v. Delgado, 13 Conn. App. 139, 149 , 535 A.2d 371 (1987).

1984Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 50 , 440 A.2d 782 (1981).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 13 , 440 A.2d 804 (1981). ‘As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hearing.

1984Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 50 , 440 A.2d 782 (1981).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 13 , 440 A.2d 804 (1981). ‘As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hearing.

1984Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 50 , 440 A.2d 782 (1981).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 13 , 440 A.2d 804 (1981). ‘As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hearing.

1984Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 50 , 440 A.2d 782 (1981).’ McGuinness v. McGuinness, 185 Conn. 7, 13 , 440 A.2d 804 (1981). ‘As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hearing.

2021A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Anderson, 160 Conn. App. 341 , 344, 125 A.3d 606 (2015). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2021A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Anderson, 160 Conn. App. 341 , 344, 125 A.3d 606 (2015). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2021A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Anderson, 160 Conn. App. 341 , 344, 125 A.3d 606 (2015). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2021A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Anderson, 160 Conn. App. 341 , 344, 125 A.3d 606 (2015). ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

2019Notwithstanding the great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a trial court's ruling ... may be reversed if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies the wrong standard of law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gabriel v. Gabriel , 324 Conn. 324 , 336, 152 A.2d 1230 , 152 A.3d 1230 (2016).

2019Notwithstanding the great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a trial court's ruling ... may be reversed if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies the wrong standard of law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gabriel v. Gabriel , 324 Conn. 324 , 336, 152 A.2d 1230 , 152 A.3d 1230 (2016).

2018I "Section 4-4 (a) (2) [of the Connecticut Code of Evidence] permits the accused in a homicide or criminal assault case to introduce evidence of the victim's violent character, after laying the foundation for a claim of self-defense, in order to prove that the victim was the aggressor. 5 *6 Subsection (b) of § 4-4 provides that proof **280 of the victim's violent character may be made through reputation or opinion testimony or by evidence of the victim's conviction of a violent crime." (Footnotes added and omitted.) State v. Whitford , 260 Conn. 610 , 638, 799 A.2d 1034 (2002).

2018I "Section 4-4 (a) (2) [of the Connecticut Code of Evidence] permits the accused in a homicide or criminal assault case to introduce evidence of the victim's violent character, after laying the foundation for a claim of self-defense, in order to prove that the victim was the aggressor. 5 *6 Subsection (b) of § 4-4 provides that proof **280 of the victim's violent character may be made through reputation or opinion testimony or by evidence of the victim's conviction of a violent crime." (Footnotes added and omitted.) State v. Whitford , 260 Conn. 610 , 638, 799 A.2d 1034 (2002).

2017As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case .... [U]nless the trial court applied the wrong standard of law, its decision is accorded great deference because the trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mundell v. Mundell , 110 Conn.App. 466 , 472, 955 A.2d 99 (2008).

2017As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case .... [U]nless the trial court applied the wrong standard of law, its decision is accorded great deference because the trial court is in an advantageous position to assess the personal factors so significant in domestic relations cases ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mundell v. Mundell , 110 Conn.App. 466 , 472, 955 A.2d 99 (2008).

2016"As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.