foundation claim in Illinois

2015The reason 47 No. 1-13-0657 for presenting the substance of the earlier statement to the witness is to "avoid unfair surprise and to give the witness an opportunity to explain." Smith, 78 Ill. 2d at 304-05 . ¶ 138 Defendant cites People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312 (1970), to support his position that, because the minor denied ever having a conversation with his father in front of his uncle, his denial was sufficient to lay the foundation for defense counsel's later introduction of the uncle's impeaching testimony.

2015Since, in this case, defense counsel only asked Dickerson generally if, while at the county jail, he had spoken to Wicks about the defendant's case, the foundation requirement was not met." Smith, 78 Ill. 2d at 305 . ¶ 140 The case at bar is indistinguishable from Smith.

2021Instead, “[t]he dispositive issue in every case is the accuracy and reliability of - 20 - No. 1-18-1227 the process that produced the recording.” Taylor, 2011 IL 110067, ¶ 35 .

2021Instead, “[t]he dispositive issue in every case is the accuracy and reliability of - 20 - No. 1-18-1227 the process that produced the recording.” Taylor, 2011 IL 110067, ¶ 35 .

2015To the extent that O'Neal would allow admission of expert opinion testimony of an identification by firearm/toolmark examination experts based solely on testimony as to the methodology and examination procedure they used, -35- 1-12-1016 without laying any foundation as to any facts they observed that led to their expert conclusion of a match we do not follow it, as we hold that such testimony does not satisfy the foundation requirement. " '[T]he admission of an expert's testimony requires the proponent to lay an adequate foundation establishing that the information upon which the expert bases

2015To the extent that O'Neal would allow admission of expert opinion testimony of an identification by firearm/toolmark examination experts based solely on testimony as to the methodology and examination procedure they used, without laying any foundation as to any facts they observed that led to their expert conclusion of a match we do not follow it, as we hold that such testimony does not satisfy the foundation requirement. " '[T]he admission of an expert's testimony requires the proponent to lay an adequate foundation establishing that the information upon which the expert bases his opinion is

2015App. 3d at 221 (quoting Hiscott, 324 Ill.

2015App. 3d at 221 (quoting Hiscott, 324 Ill.

2017Id. at 589-90 . ¶ 28 During his closing and rebuttal arguments, defendant argued that there was no evidence that the Breathalyzer machine had been calibrated or was properly working before the officer administered the test.

2017Id. at 589-90 . -9- No. 1-15-0091 ¶ 28 During his closing and rebuttal arguments, defendant argued that there was no evidence that the Breathalyzer machine had been calibrated or was properly working before the officer administered the test.

2017Id. at 1088 .

2017Id. at 1088 .

2016Id. ¶ 46 The Hedgspeth court found as follows: “The right to have one’s trial completed by a particular tribunal is within the protection of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, since it is that ‘right’ that lies at the foundation of the rule that jeopardy attaches when the whole jury is empaneled and sworn.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 154-55 (citing Crist, 437 U.S. 28 ).

2016Id. ¶ 46 The Hedgspeth court found as follows: “The right to have one’s trial completed by a particular tribunal is within the protection of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, since it is that ‘right’ that lies at the foundation of the rule that jeopardy attaches when the whole jury is empaneled and sworn.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 154-55 (citing Crist, 437 U.S. 28 ).

2016Id. ¶ 46 The Hedgspeth court found as follows: “The right to have one’s trial completed by a particular tribunal is within the protection of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, since it is that ‘right’ that lies at the foundation of the rule that jeopardy attaches when the whole jury is empaneled and sworn.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 154-55 (citing Crist, 437 U.S. 28 ).

2016Id. ¶ 46 The Hedgspeth court found as follows: “The right to have one’s trial completed by a particular tribunal is within the protection of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, since it is that ‘right’ that lies at the foundation of the rule that jeopardy attaches when the whole jury is empaneled and sworn.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 154-55 (citing Crist, 437 U.S. 28 ).

2011The Supreme Court, however, then found that the three-year deadline in section 1635(f) was not a statute of limitations but a statute of repose, "operat[ing], with the lapse of time, to extinguish the right which is the foundation for the claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beach, 523 U.S. at 416 , 118 S.Ct. 1408 .

2011The Supreme Court, however, then found that the three-year deadline in section 1635(f) was not a statute of limitations but a statute of repose, "operat[ing], with the lapse of time, to extinguish the right which is the foundation for the claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beach, 523 U.S. at 416 , 118 S.Ct. 1408 .

2006It was not necessary that an employee from each of the medical providers testify. “[L]ack of personal knowledge by [the record’s] entrant or maker goes to the weight but not to the admissibility of the record.” Preski v. Warchol Construction Co., 111 Ill.

2006It was not necessary that an employee from each of the medical providers testify. "[L]ack of personal knowledge by [the record's] entrant or maker goes to the weight but not to the admissibility of the record." Preski v. Warchol Construction Co., 111 Ill.

2005The foundation for the rule, according to the Court, was that “no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong” and it was based upon “common honesty.” Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159 , 25 L.

2005The foundation for the rule, according to the Court, was that “no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong” and it was based upon “common honesty.” Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159 , 25 L.

2002To better illustrate the independent nature of an attorney’s claim under the common fund doctrine, and to demonstrate that its assertion does not involve the provisions of this plan, we need only look to this court’s decision in Baier v. State Farm Insurance Co. , 66 Ill. 2d 119 (1977), which served as a foundation for our analysis in Scholtens .

2002To better illustrate the independent nature of an attorney’s claim under the common fund doctrine, and to demonstrate that its assertion does not involve the provisions of this plan, we need only look to this court’s decision in Baier v. State Farm Insurance Co., 66 Ill. 2d 119 (1977), which served as a foundation for our analysis in Scholtens.

2001Bynum, 257 Ill.

2001Bynum , 257 Ill.

1998The State argues that People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326 , 530 N.E.2d 210 (1988), notes the foundation requirement for breathalyzer results as (1) evidence that the breathalyzer test was performed according to standards adopted by the Illinois Department of Public Health, (2) evidence that the operator was certified by that department, (3) evidence that the machine was an approved model regularly tested for accuracy and properly working at the time of the test, (4) evidence that the defendant was observed for the required 20 minutes, and (5) evidence that the results of the machine’s printout can

1998The State argues that People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326 , 530 N.E.2d 210 (1988), notes the foundation requirement for breathalyzer results as (1) evidence that the breathalyzer test was performed according to standards adopted by the Illinois Department of Public Health, (2) evidence that the operator was certified by that department, (3) evidence that the machine was an approved model regularly tested for accuracy and properly working at the time of the test, (4) evidence that the defendant was observed for the required 20 minutes, and (5) evidence that the results of the machine’s printout can

1998As this court has previously observed, "[a]n attorney's obligation to follow these Rules of Professional Conduct should not be the foundation for a claim of retaliatory discharge." Balla, 145 Ill.2d at 505 , 164 Ill.Dec. 892 , 584 N.E.2d 104 .

1998As this court has previously observed, “[a]n attorney’s obligation to follow these Rules of Professional Conduct should not be the foundation for a claim of retaliatory discharge.” Balla, 145 Ill. 2d at 505 .

1927In Morrison v. King, 62 Ill. 30 , the court said: “The foundation of the doctrine of easement in this and similar classes of cases is a disposition and arrangement of the premises as to the uses of the different parts by him having the unity of seizin, and then a severance.

1906Again, in Morrison v. King, 62 Ill. 30 , it is held that an easement may be created by the disposition made of premises by the owner of the estate, and that upon a severance of the title the owners will take their respective shares as they existed in the hands of the former owner, and in this connection it is said (p. 35) : “The foundation of the doctrine of easement in this and similar classes of cases is a disposition and arrangement of the premises as to the uses of the different parts, by him having the unity of seizin, and then a severance.

1910“The foundation of the doctrine of easement in this and similar classes of cases is a disposition and arrangement of the premises as to the uses of the different parts by him having the unity of possession, and then a severance.” Clarke v. Gaffeney, 116 Ill. 362 ; Morrison v. King, 62 id. 30; Martin v. Murphy, supra. When Mahannah sold to Tade the premises now owned by the appellee, the court arid alley were used not only for access to these premises but to all adjacent premises.

1906It being a general principle in relation to grants that every grant of a thing naturally and necessarily imports a grant of it as it actually exists, unless the contrary is provided for, it would seem to follow that each portion of the severed premises should pass subject to all the burdens and advantages imposed or conferred by the proper owner.” The same language is found in Clarke v. Gaffeney, 116 Ill. 362 .

2015The reason 47 No. 1-13-0657 for presenting the substance of the earlier statement to the witness is to "avoid unfair surprise and to give the witness an opportunity to explain." Smith, 78 Ill. 2d at 304-05 . ¶ 138 Defendant cites People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312 (1970), to support his position that, because the minor denied ever having a conversation with his father in front of his uncle, his denial was sufficient to lay the foundation for defense counsel's later introduction of the uncle's impeaching testimony.

2011Amato, 287 Ill.

2011Amato, 287 Ill.

2006As explained by the court in Ilsley, 133 Wis. at 24-26 , 113 N.W. at 426 -27: “The whole foundation for that privilege is the interest of the public to know the conduct of judicial officers and legislators, to the end that misconduct or incapacity may be promptly discovered and remedied. *** The fundamental reason is the same which demands that proceedings of courts and legislatures shall be open to the public. [Citations.] When this reason is understood, it obviously fails wholly to justify publication of defamatory contents of mere pleadings and other preliminary papers which have simply bee

2006As explained by the court in Ilsley, 133 Wis. at 24-26 , 113 N.W. at 426 -27: “The whole foundation for that privilege is the interest of the public to know the conduct of judicial officers and legislators, to the end that misconduct or incapacity may be promptly discovered and remedied. *** The fundamental reason is the same which demands that proceedings of courts and legislatures shall be open to the public. [Citations.] When this reason is understood, it obviously fails wholly to justify publication of defamatory contents of mere pleadings and other preliminary papers which have simply bee