Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
24 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1866–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Killeleagreen2 sentences2018The probative value of such 18 questioning is at its zenith where, as here, "the purpose of cross-examination is 'to shake the foundation of the defense experts' opinions rather than to focus on the defendant's prior criminality.'" Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 425 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 650 (1976). 2017The probative value of such questioning is at its zenith where, as here, "the purpose of cross-examination is 'to shake the foundation of the defense experts' opinions rather than to focus on the defendant's prior criminality.' " Commonwealth v. Colleran , 452 Mass. 417 , 425, 895 N.E.2d 425 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Killelea , 370 Mass. 638 , 650, 351 N.E.2d 509 (1976). | 3 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Collerangreen2 sentences2018The probative value of such 18 questioning is at its zenith where, as here, "the purpose of cross-examination is 'to shake the foundation of the defense experts' opinions rather than to focus on the defendant's prior criminality.'" Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 425 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 650 (1976). 2017The probative value of such questioning is at its zenith where, as here, "the purpose of cross-examination is 'to shake the foundation of the defense experts' opinions rather than to focus on the defendant's prior criminality.' " Commonwealth v. Colleran , 452 Mass. 417 , 425, 895 N.E.2d 425 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Killelea , 370 Mass. 638 , 650, 351 N.E.2d 509 (1976). | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Anestalgreen2 sentences2018See Anestal, supra at 670 . 2017See Anestal , supra at 670, 978 N.E.2d 37 . | 2 | 2 |
Regis College v. Town of Westongreen1 sentence2019See Regis College, 462 Mass. at 285-286, 291 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Saletinogreen1 sentence2011See Commonwealth v. Saletino, supra at 672-673 . | 1 | 1 |
Bartoni's Casegreen1 sentence2008L. c. 152, § 1(1). 6 See note 1, supra. The reviewing board in Bunnell v. Wequasset Inn, supra, distinguished Bartoni’s Case, 225 Mass. 349, 352 (1916), where time was lost by the employee, a granite worker, because of inclement weather. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Darbygreen1 sentence2005As we stated in Commonwealth v. Darby, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 650, 654 (1994), “[w]e agree that evidence demonstrating a child’s inappropriate sexual knowledge may be relevant in a sexual abuse case.” Where such evidence is introduced, a defendant is entitled (provided an appropriate foundation for inquiry has been established, see Commonwealth v. Savage, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 500, 504 [2001]) to demonstrate the existence of alternative sources of such knowledge, including especially prior instances of abuse. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Scheffergreen1 sentence2005See Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811, 815 (1987); Commonwealth v. Scheffer, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 399 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Savagegreen1 sentence2005As we stated in Commonwealth v. Darby, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 650, 654 (1994), “[w]e agree that evidence demonstrating a child’s inappropriate sexual knowledge may be relevant in a sexual abuse case.” Where such evidence is introduced, a defendant is entitled (provided an appropriate foundation for inquiry has been established, see Commonwealth v. Savage, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 500, 504 [2001]) to demonstrate the existence of alternative sources of such knowledge, including especially prior instances of abuse. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ruffengreen1 sentence2005See Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811, 815 (1987); Commonwealth v. Scheffer, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 399 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Torresgreen1 sentence1999The foregoing discussion explains the foundation of our rule that, once a stopped driver has produced the necessary papers and they are found to be in order, he and his passengers are to be promptly released, Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 (1997), and why we choose not to follow Mimms-Wilson. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bryergreen1 sentence1993He thereby “opened the issue of his credibility and was subject to scrutiny on that ground.” Commonwealth v. Bryer, 398 Mass. 9, 12 (1986). 8 There is no merit to Graves’s attempt to benefit from the prosecutor’s initial argument to the judge (during a bench conference regarding the propriety of her cross-examination inquiry into Graves’s not having called the alibi witnesses) that no foundation had to be established because her argument was that “these people never existed.” By the time the judge gave the “missing witness” instruction attacked in this appeal, a proper foundation for the instr | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. LeBlancgreen1 sentence1976See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 364 Mass. at 14 (“Nor need counsel advance defences for which he can find no evidential support in order to fend against later charges of incompetence or ineffectiveness”). | 1 | 1 |
Harvey-Watts Co. v. Worcester Umbrella Co.green1 sentence1915See Harvey-Watts Co. v. Worcester Umbrella Co. 193 Mass. 138 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Foster v. Richard Busteed
green
2 sentences1938“The doctrine of res adjudicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this, that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by any competent tribunal, cannot afterwards be litigated by new proceedings either before the same or any other tribunal.” Foster v. Busteed, 100 Mass. 409, 412 . 1923The foundation of the rule of res judicata is that when a final verdict or decree has been entered on the merits of the case by a court of competent jurisdiction, the judgment or decree is conclusive. “ The doctrine of res adjudicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this, that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by any competent tribunal, cannot afterwards be litigated by new proceedings either before the same or any other tribunal.” Foster v. Busteed, 100 Mass. 409, 412 . | 2 | 1923–1938 |
Newcomb v. Boston Protective Department
green
2 sentences1933In each of the cases where either the motor vehicle or its operator was characterized as an “outlaw” the decision rested upon principles of nuisance, trespass or negligence or, perhaps, as stated in another connection in Newcomb v. Boston Protective Department, 146 Mass. 596, 602 , the plaintiff was “precluded from recovering, on the ground that the court will not lend its aid to one whose violation of law is the foundation of his claim.” The principles governing the present case are to be found within those categories. 1905It is further to be observed that while the violation of law by a defendant, although evidence of his negligence, is not conclusive even when the illegal act contributes to the injury, (Hanlon v. South Boston Horse Railroad, 129 Mass. 310 , and cases there cited,) yet such violation on the part of the plaintiff, which contributes directly and proximately to the injury received by him, is in general a bar to his recovery. “ He is precluded from recovering, on the ground that the court will not lend its aid to one whose violation of law is the foundation of his claim.” Knowlton, J. in Newcomb v. | 2 | 1905–1933 |
Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp.
green
1 sentence2011As the Supreme Judicial Court has noted, “an intention to ratify is ‘an essential element and is at the foundation of the doctrine of waiver or ratification.’ ” Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 448 Mass. at 645 , quoting from Annot., Ratification of Contract Voidable for Duress, 77 A.L.R.2d 426 , 434 (1961). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. SCHATVEN
green
1 sentence1999Commonwealth v. Schatvet, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 135 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Commonwealth v. Whynaught
green
1 sentence1984Although we do not at this time specify an exclusive method, see Commonwealth v. Whynaught, supra at 19 , we believe a showing that the breathalyzer used was, at the time of the examination, “hardened” according to the procedure approved by Smith & Wesson, would satisfy the foundation requirement. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Harlow v. Putnam
green
1 sentence1911In connection with the general proposition see also Cabot v. Haskins, 3 Pick. 83 , 92, 93; Tobey v. Wareham Bank, 13 Met. 440 , 449; Lester v. Palmer, 4 Allen, 145 ; Harlow v. Putnam, 124 Mass. 553 . | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Hawley v. Inhabitants of Northampton
green
1 sentence1908Gray, Restraints on Alienation, sec. 21; Hawley v. Northampton, 8 Mass. 3, 31 ; Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 283 ; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362 . | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Winsor v. Mills
green
1 sentence1908Gray, Restraints on Alienation, sec. 21; Hawley v. Northampton, 8 Mass. 3, 31 ; Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 283 ; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362 . | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Hanlon v. South Boston Horse Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1905It is further to be observed that while the violation of law by a defendant, although evidence of his negligence, is not conclusive even when the illegal act contributes to the injury, (Hanlon v. South Boston Horse Railroad, 129 Mass. 310 , and cases there cited,) yet such violation on the part of the plaintiff, which contributes directly and proximately to the injury received by him, is in general a bar to his recovery. “ He is precluded from recovering, on the ground that the court will not lend its aid to one whose violation of law is the foundation of his claim.” Knowlton, J. in Newcomb v. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Safford v. Knight
neutral
1 sentence1891Safford v. Knight, 117 Mass. 281 , and cases cited. | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Hall v. Corcoran
green
1 sentence1888Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251 . | 1 | 1888–1888 |
Paxton v. Daniell
green
1 sentence1866Currier v. Silloway, 1 Allen, 19 . | 1 | 1866–1866 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.