foundation claim in Montana

1978The foundation for this presumption was set by the Court in Sullivan v. City of Butte (1922), 65 Mont. 495, 498 , 211 P. 301, 303 , when it stated: “While our Constitution does not forbid the enactment of retrospective laws generally, it is a rule recognized by the authorities everywhere that retrospective laws are looked upon with disfavor.

1978The foundation for this presumption was set by the Court in Sullivan v. City of Butte (1922), 65 Mont. 495, 498 , 211 P. 301, 303 , when it stated: “While our Constitution does not forbid the enactment of retrospective laws generally, it is a rule recognized by the authorities everywhere that retrospective laws are looked upon with disfavor.

1973In Sullwan at p. 259, 73 P.2d at p. 209 , this Court held: “Thus, it will be observed that the foundation of the claim of plaintiff and the character of the land in question determine the degree and character of possession or occupancy necessary to satisfy the statutes.” (Emphasis supplied.) In 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 14, p. 94, it is said:, “* * # The rule of actual possession is to be applied reasonably in view of the location and character of the land claimed.

1969The fact that plaintiffs could not acquire a different title under another legal doctrine is no answer to plaintiffs’ claim. “* * * the foundation of the claim of plaintiff and the character of the land in question determine the degree and character of possession or occupancy necessary to satisfy the statutes.” Sullivan v. Neel, 105 Mont. 253, 259 , 73 P.2d 206, 209 .

2012Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 301 , 105 S. Ct. at 1961 . ¶34 The Court further rejected the Foundation’s claim that application of the generally applicable minimum wage and recordkeeping requirements failed to rise to the level of a prohibition on religious conduct.

2012Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 301 , 105 S. Ct. at 1961 . ¶34 The Court further rejected the Foundation’s claim that application of the generally applicable minimum wage and recordkeeping requirements failed to rise to the level of a prohibition on religious conduct.

2008As in Harrison , we looked to the gravamen of the complaint and concluded that “sexual harassment is at the foundation of her claim of negligent retention.” Bruner, 272 Mont. at 267 , 900 P.2d at 905 .

2008As in Harrison , we looked to the gravamen of the complaint and concluded that “sexual harassment is at the foundation of her claim of negligent retention.” Bruner, 272 Mont. at 267 , 900 P.2d at 905 .

1992Co. v. Galveston (1922), 258 U.S. 388, 395 , 42 S.Ct. 351, 354 , 66 L.Ed. 678, 683 , was cited as the foundation for the rule.

1992Co. v. Galveston (1922), 258 U.S. 388, 395 , 42 S.Ct. 351, 354 , 66 L.Ed. 678, 683 , was cited as the foundation for the rule.

1987The very foundation of the doctrine is that one had paid more and another less than his share, and where such is not the fact the right does not exist.” Worthington v. Keely (1917), 64 Colo. 91 , 170 P.194, 197.

1981The foundation of his challenge is State v. Stumpf (1980), 187 Mont. 225 , 609 P.2d 298 , 37 St.Rep. 673 , which states that a trial court is required to articulate the basis upon which its sentencing discretion is exercised.

1981The foundation of his challenge is State v. Stumpf (1980), 187 Mont. 225 , 609 P.2d 298 , 37 St.Rep. 673 , which states that a trial court is required to articulate the basis upon which its sentencing discretion is exercised.

1979In the analogous context of prescriptive easements, we stated in McDonnell v. Huffine (1912), 44 Mont. 411, 421 , 120 P. 792, 794 , that “although the verbal grant was ineffectual to pass title to the easements because of the statute of frauds, it did furnish a sufficient foundation upon which to lay a claim of adverse user.” See also, Ferguson v. Standley (1931), 89 Mont. 489, 501 , 300 P. 245, 250 (overruled on other grounds), In re Dolezilek’s Sr. Estate v. Dolezilek (1970), 156 Mont. 224, 228 , 478 P.2d 278, 280 .

1979In the analogous context of prescriptive easements, we stated in McDonnell v. Huffine (1912), 44 Mont. 411, 421 , 120 P. 792, 794 , that “although the verbal grant was ineffectual to pass title to the easements because of the statute of frauds, it did furnish a sufficient foundation upon which to lay a claim of adverse user.” See also, Ferguson v. Standley (1931), 89 Mont. 489, 501 , 300 P. 245, 250 (overruled on other grounds), In re Dolezilek’s Sr. Estate v. Dolezilek (1970), 156 Mont. 224, 228 , 478 P.2d 278, 280 .

1979As this Court stated in Morrison v. Linn (1915), 50 Mont. 396, 402-403 , 147 P. 166 , 168: “While it is *440 indispensable to defeat the holder of the legal title that the disseisor [adverse claimant] shall maintain his adverse possession throughout the entire statutory period, under either color of title or claim of title, it is not necessary that his initial entry into possession should be made under any pretense of right or title.” (Emphasis added.) We conclude that a parol grant of real property can serve as a foundation for a claim of title by adverse possession, notwithstanding the statu

1979As this Court stated in Morrison v. Linn (1915), 50 Mont. 396, 402-403 , 147 P. 166 , 168: “While it is *440 indispensable to defeat the holder of the legal title that the disseisor [adverse claimant] shall maintain his adverse possession throughout the entire statutory period, under either color of title or claim of title, it is not necessary that his initial entry into possession should be made under any pretense of right or title.” (Emphasis added.) We conclude that a parol grant of real property can serve as a foundation for a claim of title by adverse possession, notwithstanding the statu

1979In the analogous context of prescriptive easements, we stated in McDonnell v. Huffine (1912), 44 Mont. 411, 421 , 120 P. 792, 794 , that “although the verbal grant was ineffectual to pass title to the easements because of the statute of frauds, it did furnish a sufficient foundation upon which to lay a claim of adverse user.” See also, Ferguson v. Standley (1931), 89 Mont. 489, 501 , 300 P. 245, 250 (overruled on other grounds), In re Dolezilek’s Sr. Estate v. Dolezilek (1970), 156 Mont. 224, 228 , 478 P.2d 278, 280 .

1979In the analogous context of prescriptive easements, we stated in McDonnell v. Huffine (1912), 44 Mont. 411, 421 , 120 P. 792, 794 , that “although the verbal grant was ineffectual to pass title to the easements because of the statute of frauds, it did furnish a sufficient foundation upon which to lay a claim of adverse user.” See also, Ferguson v. Standley (1931), 89 Mont. 489, 501 , 300 P. 245, 250 (overruled on other grounds), In re Dolezilek’s Sr. Estate v. Dolezilek (1970), 156 Mont. 224, 228 , 478 P.2d 278, 280 .

1978It is a maxim said to be as old as the law itself that a new statute ought to be prospective, not retrospective, in its operation. * * * The maxim has its foundation in the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make a new rule for past transactions and every reasonable doubt will be resolved against a retrospective operation. * * *” See also: Williams v. Wellman-Power Gas, Inc. (1977), 174 Mont. 387 , 571 P.2d 90 ; Penrod v. Hoskinson (1976), 170 Mont. 277 , 552 P.2d 325 ; Dunham v. Southside National Bank of Missoula (1976), 169 Mont. 466 , 548 P.2d 1383 .

1978It is a maxim said to be as old as the law itself that a new statute ought to be prospective, not retrospective, in its operation. * * * The maxim has its foundation in the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make a new rule for past transactions and every reasonable doubt will be resolved against a retrospective operation. * * *” See also: Williams v. Wellman-Power Gas, Inc. (1977), 174 Mont. 387 , 571 P.2d 90 ; Penrod v. Hoskinson (1976), 170 Mont. 277 , 552 P.2d 325 ; Dunham v. Southside National Bank of Missoula (1976), 169 Mont. 466 , 548 P.2d 1383 .

1978It is a maxim said to be as old as the law itself that a new statute ought to be prospective, not retrospective, in its operation. * * * The maxim has its foundation in the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make a new rule for past transactions and every reasonable doubt will be resolved against a retrospective operation. * * *” See also: Williams v. Wellman-Power Gas, Inc. (1977), 174 Mont. 387 , 571 P.2d 90 ; Penrod v. Hoskinson (1976), 170 Mont. 277 , 552 P.2d 325 ; Dunham v. Southside National Bank of Missoula (1976), 169 Mont. 466 , 548 P.2d 1383 .

1978It is a maxim said to be as old as the law itself that a new statute ought to be prospective, not retrospective, in its operation. * * * The maxim has its foundation in the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make a new rule for past transactions and every reasonable doubt will be resolved against a retrospective operation. * * *” See also: Williams v. Wellman-Power Gas, Inc. (1977), 174 Mont. 387 , 571 P.2d 90 ; Penrod v. Hoskinson (1976), 170 Mont. 277 , 552 P.2d 325 ; Dunham v. Southside National Bank of Missoula (1976), 169 Mont. 466 , 548 P.2d 1383 .

1978It is a maxim said to be as old as the law itself that a new statute ought to be prospective, not retrospective, in its operation. * * * The maxim has its foundation in the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make a new rule for past transactions and every reasonable doubt will be resolved against a retrospective operation. * * *” See also: Williams v. Wellman-Power Gas, Inc. (1977), 174 Mont. 387 , 571 P.2d 90 ; Penrod v. Hoskinson (1976), 170 Mont. 277 , 552 P.2d 325 ; Dunham v. Southside National Bank of Missoula (1976), 169 Mont. 466 , 548 P.2d 1383 .

1978It is a maxim said to be as old as the law itself that a new statute ought to be prospective, not retrospective, in its operation. * * * The maxim has its foundation in the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make a new rule for past transactions and every reasonable doubt will be resolved against a retrospective operation. * * *” See also: Williams v. Wellman-Power Gas, Inc. (1977), 174 Mont. 387 , 571 P.2d 90 ; Penrod v. Hoskinson (1976), 170 Mont. 277 , 552 P.2d 325 ; Dunham v. Southside National Bank of Missoula (1976), 169 Mont. 466 , 548 P.2d 1383 .

1964In Hogan v. Thrasher, 72 Mont. 318 , 233 P. 607 , we referred to fraud “which is said to be the foundation of the doctrine of part performance of a parol agreement * * (Emphasis supplied).

1964In Hogan v. Thrasher, 72 Mont. 318 , 233 P. 607 , we referred to fraud “which is said to be the foundation of the doctrine of part performance of a parol agreement * * (Emphasis supplied).

1960In Wehrkamp v. Burnett, 82 Colo. 5 , 256 P. 630 , it is said: "It is objected that there is not the usual statement of attestation by the witnesses, but such statement is merely a memorandum of facts which if they exist without it, are sufficient, and is perhaps prima facie evidence, but no more." In Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399, 408 , 33 S.W. 61, 63 , the court held that under a statute providing that every will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator, the signatures of the witnesses, without the attestation clause i

1960In Wehrkamp v. Burnett, 82 Colo. 5 , 256 P. 630 , it is said: "It is objected that there is not the usual statement of attestation by the witnesses, but such statement is merely a memorandum of facts which if they exist without it, are sufficient, and is perhaps prima facie evidence, but no more." In Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399, 408 , 33 S.W. 61, 63 , the court held that under a statute providing that every will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator, the signatures of the witnesses, without the attestation clause i

1960In Wehrkamp v. Burnett, 82 Colo. 5 , 256 P. 630 , it is said: "It is objected that there is not the usual statement of attestation by the witnesses, but such statement is merely a memorandum of facts which if they exist without it, are sufficient, and is perhaps prima facie evidence, but no more." In Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399, 408 , 33 S.W. 61, 63 , the court held that under a statute providing that every will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator, the signatures of the witnesses, without the attestation clause i

1960In Wehrkamp v. Burnett, 82 Colo. 5 , 256 P. 630 , it is said: "It is objected that there is not the usual statement of attestation by the witnesses, but such statement is merely a memorandum of facts which if they exist without it, are sufficient, and is perhaps prima facie evidence, but no more." In Berberet v. Berberet, 131 Mo. 399, 408 , 33 S.W. 61, 63 , the court held that under a statute providing that every will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator, the signatures of the witnesses, without the attestation clause i

1960The foundation of the presumption is the proof of genuineness of the signatures, for the instrument is then on its face a valid will." In re Chambers' Estate, 187 Wash. 417 , 60 P.2d 41 , at page 43, it is said: "The document now before us contains no attestation clause whatsoever, but, if competent witnesses present before the court testify that they subscribed their names to a document in the presence of the testator, and to facts which amount in law to an attestation, under the law of this jurisdiction it is not essential that formal words of attestation be attached to the will." In re Akin

1960The foundation of the presumption is the proof of genuineness of the signatures, for the instrument is then on its face a valid will." In re Chambers' Estate, 187 Wash. 417 , 60 P.2d 41 , at page 43, it is said: "The document now before us contains no attestation clause whatsoever, but, if competent witnesses present before the court testify that they subscribed their names to a document in the presence of the testator, and to facts which amount in law to an attestation, under the law of this jurisdiction it is not essential that formal words of attestation be attached to the will." In re Akin

1960The foundation of the presumption is the proof of genuineness of the signatures, for the instrument is then on its face a valid will." In re Chambers' Estate, 187 Wash. 417 , 60 P.2d 41 , at page 43, it is said: "The document now before us contains no attestation clause whatsoever, but, if competent witnesses present before the court testify that they subscribed their names to a document in the presence of the testator, and to facts which amount in law to an attestation, under the law of this jurisdiction it is not essential that formal words of attestation be attached to the will." In re Akin

1960The foundation of the presumption is the proof of genuineness of the signatures, for the instrument is then on its face a valid will." In re Chambers' Estate, 187 Wash. 417 , 60 P.2d 41 , at page 43, it is said: "The document now before us contains no attestation clause whatsoever, but, if competent witnesses present before the court testify that they subscribed their names to a document in the presence of the testator, and to facts which amount in law to an attestation, under the law of this jurisdiction it is not essential that formal words of attestation be attached to the will." In re Akin

1949Delmoe v. District Court, 100 Mont. 131 , 46 Pac. (2d) 39 , 44: “If a judgment is rendered by default resting solely upon allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as conclusively to negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, it is void and may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim. ’ ’ Again in Crawford v. Pierse et al., 56 Mont. 371 , 185 Pac. 315, 317 , -where judgment was awarded after default, this court said: “Of course, if the judgment was void, the contention must be susta

1949Delmoe v. District Court, 100 Mont. 131 , 46 Pac. (2d) 39 , 44: “If a judgment is rendered by default resting solely upon allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as conclusively to negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, it is void and may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim. ’ ’ Again in Crawford v. Pierse et al., 56 Mont. 371 , 185 Pac. 315, 317 , -where judgment was awarded after default, this court said: “Of course, if the judgment was void, the contention must be susta

1949Delmoe v. District Court, 100 Mont. 131 , 46 Pac. (2d) 39 , 44: “If a judgment is rendered by default resting solely upon allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as conclusively to negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, it is void and may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim. ’ ’ Again in Crawford v. Pierse et al., 56 Mont. 371 , 185 Pac. 315, 317 , -where judgment was awarded after default, this court said: “Of course, if the judgment was void, the contention must be susta

1949Delmoe v. District Court, 100 Mont. 131 , 46 Pac. (2d) 39 , 44: “If a judgment is rendered by default resting solely upon allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as conclusively to negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, it is void and may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim. ’ ’ Again in Crawford v. Pierse et al., 56 Mont. 371 , 185 Pac. 315, 317 , -where judgment was awarded after default, this court said: “Of course, if the judgment was void, the contention must be susta

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1937(Mantle v. Casey, 31 Mont. 408 , 78 Pac. 591 ; Donlan v. Thompson Falls Copper & Milling Co., 42 Mont. 257 , 112 Pac. 445 ; Canning v. Fried, 48 Mont. 560 , 139 Pac. 448 ; Federal Land Bank v. Gallatin County, 84 Mont. 98 , 274 Pac. 288 ; Meyer v. Lemley, 86 Mont. 83 , 282 Pac. 268 .) ' The foundation of the rule that relief will not be accorded where the mistake is one of law is the common-law maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one.

1935Miller (& Co., 169 Cal. 341 , 146 Pac. 880 ; O’Connor v. Board of Trustees, 247 Ill. 54 , 93 N. E. 124 ; Winningham v. Trueblood, 149 Mo. 572 , 51 S. W. 399 ; In re Nelson’s Estate, 81 Neb. 363 , 115 N. W. 1087 .) However, if a judgment is rendered by default resting solely upon allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as conclusively to negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, it is void and may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim.

1935Miller (& Co., 169 Cal. 341 , 146 Pac. 880 ; O’Connor v. Board of Trustees, 247 Ill. 54 , 93 N. E. 124 ; Winningham v. Trueblood, 149 Mo. 572 , 51 S. W. 399 ; In re Nelson’s Estate, 81 Neb. 363 , 115 N. W. 1087 .) However, if a judgment is rendered by default resting solely upon allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as conclusively to negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, it is void and may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim.

1935Whenever a judgment transfers a title, or is the foundation of a claim to possession, it is admissible upon the same principle as a voluntary conveyance.” In 2 Freeman on Judgments, fifth edition, page 2171, it is written: “Whenever a judgment transfers a title, or is the foundation of a claim to possession, it is admissible, upon the same principle as a voluntary conveyance.” In the case of Lower Latham Ditch Co. v. Louden Irrigating Canal Co., 27 Colo. 267 , 60 Pac. 629 , 83 Am.

1935Whenever a judgment transfers a title, or is the foundation of a claim to possession, it is admissible upon the same principle as a voluntary conveyance.” In 2 Freeman on Judgments, fifth edition, page 2171, it is written: “Whenever a judgment transfers a title, or is the foundation of a claim to possession, it is admissible, upon the same principle as a voluntary conveyance.” In the case of Lower Latham Ditch Co. v. Louden Irrigating Canal Co., 27 Colo. 267 , 60 Pac. 629 , 83 Am.

1935Miller (& Co., 169 Cal. 341 , 146 Pac. 880 ; O’Connor v. Board of Trustees, 247 Ill. 54 , 93 N. E. 124 ; Winningham v. Trueblood, 149 Mo. 572 , 51 S. W. 399 ; In re Nelson’s Estate, 81 Neb. 363 , 115 N. W. 1087 .) However, if a judgment is rendered by default resting solely upon allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as conclusively to negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, it is void and may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim.

1935Miller (& Co., 169 Cal. 341 , 146 Pac. 880 ; O’Connor v. Board of Trustees, 247 Ill. 54 , 93 N. E. 124 ; Winningham v. Trueblood, 149 Mo. 572 , 51 S. W. 399 ; In re Nelson’s Estate, 81 Neb. 363 , 115 N. W. 1087 .) However, if a judgment is rendered by default resting solely upon allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as conclusively to negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, it is void and may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim.