foundation claim in North Carolina

1955Co., 212 N.C. 646 , 194 S.E. 99 .

1955Co., 212 N.C. 646 , 194 S.E. 99 .

1932In Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C., 120 , 126 S. E., 307 , it is said by Adams, J., “In Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp., 493, Lord Mlenborough said: ‘In a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury/ Whatever the foundation on which this rule is made to rest — whether on the ground that a' personal right of action dies with the person, or that the value of a human life may not become the subject of judicial computation, or that the relation of the parties is terminated by death — it is true as stated in Insurance Company v. Brame, 95 U. S., 754 , 24 L.

1932In Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C., 120 , 126 S. E., 307 , it is said by Adams, J., “In Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp., 493, Lord Mlenborough said: ‘In a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury/ Whatever the foundation on which this rule is made to rest — whether on the ground that a' personal right of action dies with the person, or that the value of a human life may not become the subject of judicial computation, or that the relation of the parties is terminated by death — it is true as stated in Insurance Company v. Brame, 95 U. S., 754 , 24 L.

2001The record also contains a memorandum of the agreement between plaintiff and defendant which reflects that defendant agreed to sign an employment contract with a non-compete provision. *471 Additionally, Yolanda Chavis, an employee with plaintiff, testified that she prepared a customer list for defendant at his request just prior to his leaving the company and that the list is no longer with plaintiff. “ ‘He who comes into equity must come with clean hands,’ is a well-established foundation principle upon which the equity powers of the courts of North Carolina rest.” Creech v. Melnik, 347 N.C.

1996Recognizing the Collins case as one of first impression, our Court relied on the decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), as the foundation for its analysis.

1996Recognizing the Collins case as one of first impression, our Court relied on the decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), as the foundation for its analysis.

1980In Industrial Lithographic Company v. Mills, 222 N.C. 516 , 23 S.E. 2d 913 (1943), this Court reversed a lower court’s order of *639 compulsory reference in an accounting action for damages for breach of an exclusive dealership contract where there was some evidence that the plaintiff had known that defendant dealer was selling products other than the plaintiffs and had acquiesced to that breach.

1980In Industrial Lithographic Company v. Mills, 222 N.C. 516 , 23 S.E. 2d 913 (1943), this Court reversed a lower court’s order of *639 compulsory reference in an accounting action for damages for breach of an exclusive dealership contract where there was some evidence that the plaintiff had known that defendant dealer was selling products other than the plaintiffs and had acquiesced to that breach.

1980The Danville Manufacturing Court did not require additional consideration or evidence of estoppel to enforce the contract but instead concluded that the foundation of the doctrine was intention which “should be proven and found as a fact and is rarely to be inferred as a matter of law.” Id., 97 S.E. at 720 .

1980The Danville Manufacturing Court did not require additional consideration or evidence of estoppel to enforce the contract but instead concluded that the foundation of the doctrine was intention which “should be proven and found as a fact and is rarely to be inferred as a matter of law.” Id., 97 S.E. at 720 .

1978The foundation of a claim seeking to set aside a deed as a fraudulent conveyance can be established in accordance with principles clearly set forth in the landmark case of Aman v. Walker, 165 N.C. 224 , 81 S.E. 162 (1914).

1978The foundation of a claim seeking to set aside a deed as a fraudulent conveyance can be established in accordance with principles clearly set forth in the landmark case of Aman v. Walker, 165 N.C. 224 , 81 S.E. 162 (1914).

1957Waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner, and to operate as such it must in all cases be designed, or one party must have so acted as to induce the other to believe that he intended to waive, when he will be forbidden to assert the contrary." "Election is simply what its name imports; a choice, shown by an overt act, between two inconsistent rights, either of which may be asserted at the will of the chooser alone." Mr. Justice Holmes in Bierce v. Hutchins, 205 U.S. 340 , 27 S.Ct. 524, 525 , 51 L.Ed. 828 .

1957Waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner, and to operate as such it must in all cases be designed, or one party must have so acted as to induce the other to believe that he intended to waive, when he will be forbidden to assert the contrary." "Election is simply what its name imports; a choice, shown by an overt act, between two inconsistent rights, either of which may be asserted at the will of the chooser alone." Mr. Justice Holmes in Bierce v. Hutchins, 205 U.S. 340 , 27 S.Ct. 524, 525 , 51 L.Ed. 828 .

1932In Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C., 120 , 126 S. E., 307 , it is said by Adams, J., “In Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp., 493, Lord Mlenborough said: ‘In a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury/ Whatever the foundation on which this rule is made to rest — whether on the ground that a' personal right of action dies with the person, or that the value of a human life may not become the subject of judicial computation, or that the relation of the parties is terminated by death — it is true as stated in Insurance Company v. Brame, 95 U. S., 754 , 24 L.

1932In Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C., 120 , 126 S. E., 307 , it is said by Adams, J., “In Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp., 493, Lord Mlenborough said: ‘In a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury/ Whatever the foundation on which this rule is made to rest — whether on the ground that a' personal right of action dies with the person, or that the value of a human life may not become the subject of judicial computation, or that the relation of the parties is terminated by death — it is true as stated in Insurance Company v. Brame, 95 U. S., 754 , 24 L.

1922The want of this demonstration of feeling or `involuntary outburst' is treated of as a circumstance tending to show consent on her part; but it is nowhere held that this female instinct is so strong and unerring as to have been made the foundation of a rule of law, as distinguished from a rule in respect to evidence and the weight to which it is entitled, which is a matter for the jury." S. v. Smith , 138 N.C. 700 .

1915The Carib Prince, 170 U. S., 655 , 42 L.

1915The Carib Prince, 170 U. S., 655 , 42 L.

1912R., 143 N. C., 539 , is in illustration of the same view.

1898In the words of my old Scottish ancestors, I do not think they should be permitted to “Approbate and reprobate”, the same deed; or in the homely Anglo-Saxon of a great English Judge, to “blow hot and cold with the same breath.” In Sigmon v. Hawn, 87 N. C., 450, 453 , this court, in speaking of the doctrine of election, says: “The foundation of the rule is that no one can be permitted to accept and reject the same instrument.” This rule, originally invoked chiefly in relation to wills, has become practically of universal application to all written instruments in any way operating as conveyances

1896R. , 116 N.C. 940 ); but while he might have been without fault in incurring risk at the command of such a superior, he was not free from culpability if he exposed himself contrary to his orders.

1896The plaintiff laid the foundation for the claim that ho was not culpable in exposing himself when he offered testimony .tending to show that the section master was a vice-principal (Logan v. Railroad, 116 N. C., 940 ,) but, while he might have been without fault in incurring risk at the command of such a superior, he was not free from culpability if he exposed himself contrary to his orders.

1893There is no elasticity in such statutes, and it is beyond the power of the courts to so stretch them as to make them cover cases not fully and clearly within their scope.” “The rule, however,” remarks the same author (supra, 374), “docs not so limit the authority as to exclude the necessary incidents of the principal power, provided that such power is clearly conferred.” Raleigh v. Peace, supra. Another principle equally -well established is that where the statute from which the authority is derived prescribes the mode in -which it shall be exercised that mode must, except as to entirely immat

1880In State v. Durham, 72 N. C., 447 , in reviewing an exception of the prisoner to the refusal of the court “to instruct the jury that if-they were not satisfied of the commission of the felony as charged ” (rape) “they might find the prisoner guilty of an assault and battery,” ByNüm, J., thus states the rule: “ The rule of the common law' is, that in an indictment for a felony, there could not be a conviction of a minor offence included within it, if such minor offence be a misdemeanor; and this is the foundation of the rule, that an acquittal of a felony is no bar to another indictment for the