15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1899–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2014And, the omission of such an instruction did not deprive Leibly of a “right essential to his defense,” Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d at 607 , or impact the foundation of his defense, which was that he had not committed an assault. 2014And, the omission of such an instruction did not deprive Leibly of a “right essential to his defense,” Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d at 607 , or impact the foundation of his defense, which was that he had not committed an assault. | 2 | 2 |
State of Arizona v. Easton Courtney Murraygreen1 sentence2024See Murray, 250 Ariz. at 552–53, ¶¶ 31–34 (concluding that a reasonable jury could have reached a different result without the prosecutor’s error because the error went the foundation of the defense, which otherwise had considerable evidence to support it). 2 As the reply brief makes clear, Jones does not claim prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2017When determining whether an argument is misconduct, “we consider two factors: (1) whether the prosecutor’s statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” State v. Nelson, 229 Ariz. 180 , 189 ¶ 39, 273 P.3d 632, 641 (2012). 2017When determining whether an argument is misconduct, “we consider two factors: (1) whether the prosecutor’s statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors were in fact influenced by the remarks.” State v. Nelson, 229 Ariz. 180 , 189 ¶ 39, 273 P.3d 632, 641 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Moodygreen2 sentences2017He asserts this error was fundamental because it went to the foundation of his defense. ¶10 “Counsel is given wide latitude in closing argument to comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences from it.” State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 464, ¶ 180 , 94 P.3d 1119, 1159 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). 2017He asserts this error was fundamental because it went to the foundation of his defense. ¶10 “Counsel is given wide latitude in closing argument to comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences from it.” State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 464, ¶ 180 , 94 P.3d 1119, 1159 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sepahigreen2 sentences2005See State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321 , 78 P.3d 732 (2003). ¶ 18 At the outset, the state argues that Chiappetta has waived any challenge to his sentence under Blakely because the foundation for his claim existed well before Blakely was decided but he failed to raise any right-to-jury-trial issues at sentencing or in his opening brief. 2005See State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321 , 78 P.3d 732 (2003). ¶ 18 At the outset, the state argues that Chiappetta has waived any challenge to his sentence under Blakely because the foundation for his claim existed well before Blakely was decided but he failed to raise any right-to-jury-trial issues at sentencing or in his opening brief. | 1 | 1 |
Aragon v. Wilkinsongreen2 sentences2005In addition, the court in Conn concluded that, even though “A.R.S. § 13-702(B) requires a trial judge to find aggravating factors,” that “does not mean that, post-Blakely, juries cannot do so without a legislative change to the statute.” Id. ¶ 6; see also Aragon v. Wilkinson, 209 Ariz. 61, ¶ 15 , 97 P.3d 886, 891 (App. 2004) (“the court may utilize its inherent authority to convene a jury trial on the existence of facts that may support imposition of an aggravated sentence”). 13 ¶24 Preliminarily, relying on both Arizona8 and federal cases,9 the state contends Aleman waived any Sixth Amendment 2005In addition, the court in Conn concluded that, even though “A.R.S. § 13-702(B) requires a trial judge to find aggravating factors,” that “does not mean that, post-Blakely, juries cannot do so without a legislative change to the statute.” Id. ¶ 6; see also Aragon v. Wilkinson, 209 Ariz. 61, ¶ 15 , 97 P.3d 886, 891 (App. 2004) (“the court may utilize its inherent authority to convene a jury trial on the existence of facts that may support imposition of an aggravated sentence”). 13 ¶24 Preliminarily, relying on both Arizona8 and federal cases,9 the state contends Aleman waived any Sixth Amendment | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gibsongreen2 sentences1979See State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); People v. Stevenson, 60 Mich. App. 614 , 231 N.W.2d 476 (1975). 1979See State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); People v. Stevenson, 60 Mich. App. 614 , 231 N.W.2d 476 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Aguilar
green
1 sentence2023Long directs us to State v. Aguilar, which held that the superior court erred by admitting other act evidence based solely on the grand jury proceedings. 209 Ariz. 40 , 49–51, ¶¶ 30, 33, 37–38 (2004). ¶20 The State counters that the failure to make specific findings on the charged acts is not fundamental error when the superior court makes an adequate record that would support admission of the evidence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (emphasis added). [5] This constitutional right to cross-examine one's accusers based not on rules of evidence or judicial notions of reliability forms the foundation of our analysis in this opinion. ¶ 11 The State cannot produce the criminalists who actually performed the tests on the sample of Moss's blood. 2007Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (emphasis added). [5] This constitutional right to cross-examine one's accusers based not on rules of evidence or judicial notions of reliability forms the foundation of our analysis in this opinion. ¶ 11 The State cannot produce the criminalists who actually performed the tests on the sample of Moss's blood. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Worcester v. Georgia
green
2 sentences1991The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 , 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832). 1991The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 , 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Stevenson
green
2 sentences1979See State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); People v. Stevenson, 60 Mich. App. 614 , 231 N.W.2d 476 (1975). 1979See State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); People v. Stevenson, 60 Mich. App. 614 , 231 N.W.2d 476 (1975). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Vallejos
green
2 sentences1974The evidence that the defendant committed the acts charged was so overwhelming that the state could reasonably anticipate that defendant’s plea of innocent was based on a defense of entrapment.” 89 Ariz. at 81 , 358 P.2d at 181 . 1974The evidence that the defendant committed the acts charged was so overwhelming that the state could reasonably anticipate that defendant’s plea of innocent was based on a defense of entrapment.” 89 Ariz. at 81 , 358 P.2d at 181 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Hatten R. Co. v. Baylies Et Ux.
green
2 sentences1951For this doctrine to be applied, it is commonly required that the parties be the same, and that the same questions be involved. * *” And in 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 117, p. 378: “ * * * The elements of reliance and injury which are éssential to the operation of equitable estoppel do not enter into ju: dicial estoppel, at least not to the same extent; and while some authorities in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel have taken cognizance of the presence or absence of such elements, this has been said to be the result of confusing the two doctrines. % * * » The foundation of the doctrine of 1951For this doctrine to be applied, it is commonly required that the parties be the same, and that the same questions be involved. * *” And in 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 117, p. 378: “ * * * The elements of reliance and injury which are éssential to the operation of equitable estoppel do not enter into ju: dicial estoppel, at least not to the same extent; and while some authorities in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel have taken cognizance of the presence or absence of such elements, this has been said to be the result of confusing the two doctrines. % * * » The foundation of the doctrine of | 1 | 1951–1951 |
McCall v. Porter
green
2 sentences1926No distinction in this respect exists between waters running under the surface in well-defined and known channels and those running in distinct channels upon the surface.” In McCall v. Porter, 42 Or. 49, 57 , 70 Pac. 820, 823 , it is said: “The foundation of the doctrine of prior appropriation of water is, prior in time, prior in right, and therefore he whose appropriation is first in time *103 acquires rights against subsequent appropriators, locators, or grantees, to the extent of his appropriation. 1926No distinction in this respect exists between waters running under the surface in well-defined and known channels and those running in distinct channels upon the surface.” In McCall v. Porter, 42 Or. 49, 57 , 70 Pac. 820, 823 , it is said: “The foundation of the doctrine of prior appropriation of water is, prior in time, prior in right, and therefore he whose appropriation is first in time *103 acquires rights against subsequent appropriators, locators, or grantees, to the extent of his appropriation. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Ramírez v. Muñoz
neutral
1 sentence1912If, therefore, appellee is relying on the fact that he negotiated an optional sale of the said mining stock as a compliance with his contract to negotiate an actual sale of the same, as the foundation of his claim for a commission, he must allege, further, that the option he procured resulted in an actual sale, for “the procurement by a broker of a mere optional contract of sale does not entitle him to recover a commission in advance of a sale, when his undertaking is to effect ’an actual sale”: Lawrence v. Pederson, 34 Wash. 1 , 74 Pac. 1011 ; Dwyer v. Raborn, 6 Wash. 213 , 33 Pac. 350 ; Jone | 1 | 1912–1912 |
People v. Suro Picó
neutral
1 sentence1912If, therefore, appellee is relying on the fact that he negotiated an optional sale of the said mining stock as a compliance with his contract to negotiate an actual sale of the same, as the foundation of his claim for a commission, he must allege, further, that the option he procured resulted in an actual sale, for “the procurement by a broker of a mere optional contract of sale does not entitle him to recover a commission in advance of a sale, when his undertaking is to effect ’an actual sale”: Lawrence v. Pederson, 34 Wash. 1 , 74 Pac. 1011 ; Dwyer v. Raborn, 6 Wash. 213 , 33 Pac. 350 ; Jone | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Brackenridge v. Claridge & Payne
green
1 sentence1912If, therefore, appellee is relying on the fact that he negotiated an optional sale of the said mining stock as a compliance with his contract to negotiate an actual sale of the same, as the foundation of his claim for a commission, he must allege, further, that the option he procured resulted in an actual sale, for “the procurement by a broker of a mere optional contract of sale does not entitle him to recover a commission in advance of a sale, when his undertaking is to effect ’an actual sale”: Lawrence v. Pederson, 34 Wash. 1 , 74 Pac. 1011 ; Dwyer v. Raborn, 6 Wash. 213 , 33 Pac. 350 ; Jone | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Lawrence v. Rhodes
green
2 sentences1912If, therefore, appellee is relying on the fact that he negotiated an optional sale of the said mining stock as a compliance with his contract to negotiate an actual sale of the same, as the foundation of his claim for a commission, he must allege, further, that the option he procured resulted in an actual sale, for “the procurement by a broker of a mere optional contract of sale does not entitle him to recover a commission in advance of a sale, when his undertaking is to effect ’an actual sale”: Lawrence v. Pederson, 34 Wash. 1 , 74 Pac. 1011 ; Dwyer v. Raborn, 6 Wash. 213 , 33 Pac. 350 ; Jone 1912If, therefore, appellee is relying on the fact that he negotiated an optional sale of the said mining stock as a compliance with his contract to negotiate an actual sale of the same, as the foundation of his claim for a commission, he must allege, further, that the option he procured resulted in an actual sale, for “the procurement by a broker of a mere optional contract of sale does not entitle him to recover a commission in advance of a sale, when his undertaking is to effect ’an actual sale”: Lawrence v. Pederson, 34 Wash. 1 , 74 Pac. 1011 ; Dwyer v. Raborn, 6 Wash. 213 , 33 Pac. 350 ; Jone | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Arthur D. Jones & Co. v. Eilenfeldt
neutral
1 sentence1912If, therefore, appellee is relying on the fact that he negotiated an optional sale of the said mining stock as a compliance with his contract to negotiate an actual sale of the same, as the foundation of his claim for a commission, he must allege, further, that the option he procured resulted in an actual sale, for “the procurement by a broker of a mere optional contract of sale does not entitle him to recover a commission in advance of a sale, when his undertaking is to effect ’an actual sale”: Lawrence v. Pederson, 34 Wash. 1 , 74 Pac. 1011 ; Dwyer v. Raborn, 6 Wash. 213 , 33 Pac. 350 ; Jone | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Lawrence v. Pederson
red
2 sentences1912If, therefore, appellee is relying on the fact that he negotiated an optional sale of the said mining stock as a compliance with his contract to negotiate an actual sale of the same, as the foundation of his claim for a commission, he must allege, further, that the option he procured resulted in an actual sale, for “the procurement by a broker of a mere optional contract of sale does not entitle him to recover a commission in advance of a sale, when his undertaking is to effect ’an actual sale”: Lawrence v. Pederson, 34 Wash. 1 , 74 Pac. 1011 ; Dwyer v. Raborn, 6 Wash. 213 , 33 Pac. 350 ; Jone 1912If, therefore, appellee is relying on the fact that he negotiated an optional sale of the said mining stock as a compliance with his contract to negotiate an actual sale of the same, as the foundation of his claim for a commission, he must allege, further, that the option he procured resulted in an actual sale, for “the procurement by a broker of a mere optional contract of sale does not entitle him to recover a commission in advance of a sale, when his undertaking is to effect ’an actual sale”: Lawrence v. Pederson, 34 Wash. 1 , 74 Pac. 1011 ; Dwyer v. Raborn, 6 Wash. 213 , 33 Pac. 350 ; Jone | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Dwyer v. Raborn
neutral
1 sentence1912If, therefore, appellee is relying on the fact that he negotiated an optional sale of the said mining stock as a compliance with his contract to negotiate an actual sale of the same, as the foundation of his claim for a commission, he must allege, further, that the option he procured resulted in an actual sale, for “the procurement by a broker of a mere optional contract of sale does not entitle him to recover a commission in advance of a sale, when his undertaking is to effect ’an actual sale”: Lawrence v. Pederson, 34 Wash. 1 , 74 Pac. 1011 ; Dwyer v. Raborn, 6 Wash. 213 , 33 Pac. 350 ; Jone | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Ahrend v. Odiorne
green
1 sentence1899In Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261 , Mr. Justice Gray, now of the supreme court of the United States, after an elaborate examination of the question, concluded that the foundation of the doctrine was that justice required that the vendor should he enabled, by some form of judicial process, to charge the land in the hands of the vendee, as security for the unpaid purchase money, and that the restriction of the doctrine to real estate suggested the inference that the court of chancery was induced to interpose by the consideration that by the law of England real estate could not be attached on m | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.