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6 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Callen v. Callengreen2 sentences2018Code Ann. § 62-2-802 (Supp. 2017) (providing "if the action is commenced after the death of the decedent, proof must be by clear and convincing evidence"); Callen, 365 S.C. at 624 , 620 S.E.2d at 62 ("[W]hen the proponent proves that the parties participated in 'apparently matrimonial' cohabitation, and that while cohabiting the parties had a reputation in the community as being married, a rebuttable presumption arises that a common-law marriage was created." (quoting Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 166-67 , 177 S.E.2d 537, 539-40 (1970))); Jeanes, 255 S.C. at 167 , 177 S.E.2d at 539 ("Where t 2018Code Ann. § 62-2-802 (Supp. 2017) (providing "if the action is commenced after the death of the decedent, proof must be by clear and convincing evidence"); Callen, 365 S.C. at 624 , 620 S.E.2d at 62 ("[W]hen the proponent proves that the parties participated in 'apparently matrimonial' cohabitation, and that while cohabiting the parties had a reputation in the community as being married, a rebuttable presumption arises that a common-law marriage was created." (quoting Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 166-67 , 177 S.E.2d 537, 539-40 (1970))); Jeanes, 255 S.C. at 167 , 177 S.E.2d at 539 ("Where t | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Bakergreen2 sentences2018Code Ann. § 62-2-802 (Supp. 2017) (providing "if the action is commenced after the death of the decedent, proof must be by clear and convincing evidence"); Callen, 365 S.C. at 624 , 620 S.E.2d at 62 ("[W]hen the proponent proves that the parties participated in 'apparently matrimonial' cohabitation, and that while cohabiting the parties had a reputation in the community as being married, a rebuttable presumption arises that a common-law marriage was created." (quoting Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 166-67 , 177 S.E.2d 537, 539-40 (1970))); Jeanes, 255 S.C. at 167 , 177 S.E.2d at 539 ("Where t 2018Code Ann. § 62-2-802 (Supp. 2017) (providing "if the action is commenced after the death of the decedent, proof must be by clear and convincing evidence"); Callen, 365 S.C. at 624 , 620 S.E.2d at 62 ("[W]hen the proponent proves that the parties participated in 'apparently matrimonial' cohabitation, and that while cohabiting the parties had a reputation in the community as being married, a rebuttable presumption arises that a common-law marriage was created." (quoting Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 166-67 , 177 S.E.2d 537, 539-40 (1970))); Jeanes, 255 S.C. at 167 , 177 S.E.2d at 539 ("Where t | 1 | 1 |
Jeanes v. Jeanesgreen2 sentences2018Code Ann. § 62-2-802 (Supp. 2017) (providing "if the action is commenced after the death of the decedent, proof must be by clear and convincing evidence"); Callen, 365 S.C. at 624 , 620 S.E.2d at 62 ("[W]hen the proponent proves that the parties participated in 'apparently matrimonial' cohabitation, and that while cohabiting the parties had a reputation in the community as being married, a rebuttable presumption arises that a common-law marriage was created." (quoting Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 166-67 , 177 S.E.2d 537, 539-40 (1970))); Jeanes, 255 S.C. at 167 , 177 S.E.2d at 539 ("Where t 2018Code Ann. § 62-2-802 (Supp. 2017) (providing "if the action is commenced after the death of the decedent, proof must be by clear and convincing evidence"); Callen, 365 S.C. at 624 , 620 S.E.2d at 62 ("[W]hen the proponent proves that the parties participated in 'apparently matrimonial' cohabitation, and that while cohabiting the parties had a reputation in the community as being married, a rebuttable presumption arises that a common-law marriage was created." (quoting Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 166-67 , 177 S.E.2d 537, 539-40 (1970))); Jeanes, 255 S.C. at 167 , 177 S.E.2d at 539 ("Where t | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Griggs Rainesgreen2 sentences2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Amir X.S.green2 sentences2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 | 1 | 1 |
Curtis v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 | 1 | 1 |
In re the Estate of Garnergreen2 sentences1998Ct.1913) (“ ‘The law indulges in presumptions from the necessities of the case, in the absence of sufficient evidence to establish the fact to be proved.’ ”); In re Gamer’s Estate, 59 Misc. 116 , 112 N.Y.S. 212, 218 (N.Y.Sur.Ct.1908) (“Where there is enough to create a foundation for the presumption of marriage, it can be repelled only by the most cogent and satisfactory evidence.”) (emphasis added). 1 The question this Court must resolve, therefore, is whether Barker presented evidence sufficient to trigger the presumption. 1998Ct.1913) (“ ‘The law indulges in presumptions from the necessities of the case, in the absence of sufficient evidence to establish the fact to be proved.’ ”); In re Gamer’s Estate, 59 Misc. 116 , 112 N.Y.S. 212, 218 (N.Y.Sur.Ct.1908) (“Where there is enough to create a foundation for the presumption of marriage, it can be repelled only by the most cogent and satisfactory evidence.”) (emphasis added). 1 The question this Court must resolve, therefore, is whether Barker presented evidence sufficient to trigger the presumption. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Town of Mount Pleasant v. Chimento
green
2 sentences2014“Standing is not a separate issue when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged under the due process clause, but is instead the foundation of the inquiry.” Id. 2014“One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.” Id. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ; accord Curtis, 345 S.C. at 572 , 549 S.E.2d at 598 ; see also In re Amir X.S., 371 S.C. 380 , 385 n. 2, 639 S.E.2d 144 , 146 n. 2 (2006) (stating the traditional rule of standing for constitutional attacks is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional may not attack the statute on the ground that it might be unconstitutional when applied to other people or situations (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Lyles v. Fellers
green
1 sentence1948The case of Lyles v. Fellers, 138 S. C. 31, 136 S. E. 13 , is such a case. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
State v. Weldon
neutral
1 sentence1926State v. McNinch, supra. State v. Weldon, 91 S. C., 29; 74 S. E., 43 ; 39 L. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Moore v. State
green
2 sentences1911Cases (Ark.) 531, appears the following quotation from Roberts v. Roberts , 115 Ga. 259 : "The reasons at the foundation of the rule, which forbid a juror from sitting in a case, where he is related to some one pecuniarily interested, in the result of the suit, would also apply in the case of a Judge, who was in a similar situation." Turning to the case of State v. Robertson , 54 S.C. 147 , 31 S.E. 868 , we find that the rule is thus stated, in regard to the disqualification of a juror: "While it is true, that in the cases of Kennedy v. Williams , and Garrett v. Weinberg, supra , some stress i 1911Cases (Ark.) 531, appears the following quotation from Roberts v. Roberts, 115 Ga. 259 : “The reasons at the foundation of the rule, which forbid a juror from sitting in a case, where he is related to some one pecuniarily interested, in the result-of the suit, would also apply in the case of a Judge, who was in a similar situation.” Turning to the case of State v. Robertson, 54 S. C. 147, 31 S. E. 868 , we find that the rule is thus stated, in regard to the disqualification of a juror: “While it is true, that in the cases of Kennedy v. Williams, and Garrett v. Weinberg, supra, some stress is l | 1 | 1911–1911 |
State v. Robertson
neutral
2 sentences1911Cases (Ark.) 531, appears the following quotation from Roberts v. Roberts , 115 Ga. 259 : "The reasons at the foundation of the rule, which forbid a juror from sitting in a case, where he is related to some one pecuniarily interested, in the result of the suit, would also apply in the case of a Judge, who was in a similar situation." Turning to the case of State v. Robertson , 54 S.C. 147 , 31 S.E. 868 , we find that the rule is thus stated, in regard to the disqualification of a juror: "While it is true, that in the cases of Kennedy v. Williams , and Garrett v. Weinberg, supra , some stress i 1911Cases (Ark.) 531, appears the following quotation from Roberts v. Roberts , 115 Ga. 259 : "The reasons at the foundation of the rule, which forbid a juror from sitting in a case, where he is related to some one pecuniarily interested, in the result of the suit, would also apply in the case of a Judge, who was in a similar situation." Turning to the case of State v. Robertson , 54 S.C. 147 , 31 S.E. 868 , we find that the rule is thus stated, in regard to the disqualification of a juror: "While it is true, that in the cases of Kennedy v. Williams , and Garrett v. Weinberg, supra , some stress i | 1 | 1911–1911 |
State v. Rafe
green
2 sentences1911Cases (Ark.) 531, appears the following quotation from Roberts v. Roberts , 115 Ga. 259 : "The reasons at the foundation of the rule, which forbid a juror from sitting in a case, where he is related to some one pecuniarily interested, in the result of the suit, would also apply in the case of a Judge, who was in a similar situation." Turning to the case of State v. Robertson , 54 S.C. 147 , 31 S.E. 868 , we find that the rule is thus stated, in regard to the disqualification of a juror: "While it is true, that in the cases of Kennedy v. Williams , and Garrett v. Weinberg, supra , some stress i 1911Cases (Ark.) 531, appears the following quotation from Roberts v. Roberts , 115 Ga. 259 : "The reasons at the foundation of the rule, which forbid a juror from sitting in a case, where he is related to some one pecuniarily interested, in the result of the suit, would also apply in the case of a Judge, who was in a similar situation." Turning to the case of State v. Robertson , 54 S.C. 147 , 31 S.E. 868 , we find that the rule is thus stated, in regard to the disqualification of a juror: "While it is true, that in the cases of Kennedy v. Williams , and Garrett v. Weinberg, supra , some stress i | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.