foundation rule in Oklahoma

1930Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal 633; Odgen v. Larrabee, 70 Ill. 510 ; First Nat.

1925Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633 ; Ogden v. Larrabee, 70 Ill. 510 ; First Nat.

1998Id. at ¶ 6, 521 P.2d at 807 . ¶ 8 Seeking and using toilet facilities are certainly acts for personal comfort and convenience.

1997Recognizing that an Indian tribe is immune from an action for damages absent its consent and citing United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 , 60 S.Ct. 653 , 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940), Justice Stevens expressed doubt that the immunity extends to cases arising from a tribe's conduct of commercial activity outside its own territory. [4] *1147 Neither the opinion, nor the concurring opinion, in the Citizen Band Potawatomi case teaches that a federally recognized Indian tribe is absolutely immune from suit for money judgment as we allowed and affirmed in Aircraft I.

1997Recognizing that an Indian tribe is immune from an action for damages absent its consent and citing United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 , 60 S.Ct. 653 , 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940), Justice Stevens expressed doubt that the immunity extends to cases arising from a tribe's conduct of commercial activity outside its own territory. [4] *1147 Neither the opinion, nor the concurring opinion, in the Citizen Band Potawatomi case teaches that a federally recognized Indian tribe is absolutely immune from suit for money judgment as we allowed and affirmed in Aircraft I.

1992A material fact remains in controversy as to when the defendant Vick last performed on his separate contract, and is one to be decided by a fact-finder. 5 Id.

1962Co., 320 U.S. 356 , 64 S.Ct. 128 , 88 L.Ed. 96 , where it was held in an action by a carrier against a shipper that an agreement to waive the limitation period provided in Sec. 16(3) (a) was invalid; that the section operates to extinguish a claim and not to bar the right which is the foundation of the claim.

1962Co., 320 U.S. 356 , 64 S.Ct. 128 , 88 L.Ed. 96 , where it was held in an action by a carrier against a shipper that an agreement to waive the limitation period provided in Sec. 16(3) (a) was invalid; that the section operates to extinguish a claim and not to bar the right which is the foundation of the claim.

1960The technical reason given is that a covenantee or promisee must be held to have dispensed with the performance of a condition precedent, as such, if, with knowledge that the condition was not being fully performed, he treats the contract as continuing and takes the benefit of a part performance.’ ” And again in the opinion at page 632 of 245 P. this Court said: “In the case of Friar v. Baldridge, 120 S.W. 989 , 91 Ark. 133 , the court in the syllabus said: “ ‘Where there has been a breach of a contract of sale of land sufficient to cause a forfeiture, and the party entitled thereto either exp

1960The technical reason given is that a covenantee or promisee must be held to have dispensed with the performance of a condition precedent, as such, if, with knowledge that the condition was not being fully performed, he treats the contract as continuing and takes the benefit of a part performance.'" And again in the opinion at page 632 of 245 P. this Court said: "In the case of Friar v. Baldridge, 120 S.W. 989 , 91 Ark. 133 , the court in the syllabus said: "`Where there has been a breach of a contract of sale of land sufficient to cause a forfeiture, and the party entitled thereto either expre

1960The technical reason given is that a covenantee or promisee must be held to have dispensed with the performance of a condition precedent, as such, if, with knowledge that the condition was not being fully performed, he treats the contract as continuing and takes the benefit of a part performance.'" And again in the opinion at page 632 of 245 P. this Court said: "In the case of Friar v. Baldridge, 120 S.W. 989 , 91 Ark. 133 , the court in the syllabus said: "`Where there has been a breach of a contract of sale of land sufficient to cause a forfeiture, and the party entitled thereto either expre

1960The technical reason given is that a covenantee or promisee must be held to have dispensed with the performance of a condition precedent, as such, if, with knowledge that the condition was not being fully performed, he treats the contract as continuing and takes the benefit of a part performance.'" And again in the opinion at page 632 of 245 P. this Court said: "In the case of Friar v. Baldridge, 120 S.W. 989 , 91 Ark. 133 , the court in the syllabus said: "`Where there has been a breach of a contract of sale of land sufficient to cause a forfeiture, and the party entitled thereto either expre

1960The technical reason given is that a covenantee or promisee must be held to have dispensed with the performance of a condition precedent, as such, if, with knowledge that the condition was not being fully performed, he treats the contract as continuing and takes the benefit of a part performance.’ ” And again in the opinion at page 632 of 245 P. this Court said: “In the case of Friar v. Baldridge, 120 S.W. 989 , 91 Ark. 133 , the court in the syllabus said: “ ‘Where there has been a breach of a contract of sale of land sufficient to cause a forfeiture, and the party entitled thereto either exp

1960The technical reason given is that a covenantee or promisee must be held to have dispensed with the performance of a condition precedent, as such, if, with knowledge that the condition was not being fully performed, he treats the contract as continuing and takes the benefit of a part performance.'" And again in the opinion at page 632 of 245 P. this Court said: "In the case of Friar v. Baldridge, 120 S.W. 989 , 91 Ark. 133 , the court in the syllabus said: "`Where there has been a breach of a contract of sale of land sufficient to cause a forfeiture, and the party entitled thereto either expre

1957This appears to have begun in United States Gypsum Co. v. McMichael, 146 Okl. 74 , 293 P. 773 , where this court held that our Workmen’s Compensation Act makes “a casualty” the foundation of a claim for compensation on account of accidental injury.

1957This appears to have begun in United States Gypsum Co. v. McMichael, 146 Okl. 74 , 293 P. 773 , where this court held that our Workmen’s Compensation Act makes “a casualty” the foundation of a claim for compensation on account of accidental injury.

1951This last distinction lays the foundation for the rule stated in the case of Whitten v. Kroeger, 183 Okla. 327 , 82 P. 2d 668 , as follows: “Where a cause is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts it is the duty of this court on appeal to apply the law to such facts as a court of first instance and direct judgment accordingly.” In the brief of defendant in error, the Prohibition Ordinance of the Okla *372 homa Constitution and sections 1, 72, 82, 84 and 85, of Title 37, O.S. 1941, are cited and quoted and are relied upon as authority for an order authorizing the sheriff to destroy the whi

1951This last distinction lays the foundation for the rule stated in the case of Whitten v. Kroeger, 183 Okla. 327 , 82 P. 2d 668 , as follows: “Where a cause is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts it is the duty of this court on appeal to apply the law to such facts as a court of first instance and direct judgment accordingly.” In the brief of defendant in error, the Prohibition Ordinance of the Okla *372 homa Constitution and sections 1, 72, 82, 84 and 85, of Title 37, O.S. 1941, are cited and quoted and are relied upon as authority for an order authorizing the sheriff to destroy the whi

1951No case involving a similar question as here has been called to our attention other than the Carlisle case, supra, except a case recently before the Oregon court styled Nanny v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 179 Ore. 274 , 171 P. 2d 360 .

1951No case involving a similar question as here has been called to our attention other than the Carlisle case, supra, except a case recently before the Oregon court styled Nanny v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 179 Ore. 274 , 171 P. 2d 360 .

1934Springer v. Bien, 128 N. Y. 99 .” A judgment does not exist until it is of-fically pronounced, “expressed, or made known in some appropriate way.” Goldreyer v. Cronan, 76 Conn. 113 , 55 Atl. 594 ; Appeal of Bulkeley (Conn.) 57 Atl. 113 .

1934Springer v. Bien, 128 N. Y. 99 .” A judgment does not exist until it is of-fically pronounced, “expressed, or made known in some appropriate way.” Goldreyer v. Cronan, 76 Conn. 113 , 55 Atl. 594 ; Appeal of Bulkeley (Conn.) 57 Atl. 113 .

1934Springer v. Bien, 128 N. Y. 99 .” A judgment does not exist until it is of-fically pronounced, “expressed, or made known in some appropriate way.” Goldreyer v. Cronan, 76 Conn. 113 , 55 Atl. 594 ; Appeal of Bulkeley (Conn.) 57 Atl. 113 .

1934Springer v. Bien, 128 N.Y. 99 ." A judgment does not exist until it is offically pronounced, "expressed, or made known in Some appropriate way." Goldreyer v. Cronan, 76 Corm. 113, 55 Atl, 594; Appeal of Bulkeley (Conn.) 57 Aft. 113.

1928But the foundation falls, and the rule of verity ceases, when it appears that the judgment adjudicated matters beyond the issues and upon which the. parlies were not heard.” In the case of Beckett v. Cuenin, 15 Colo. 281 , 25 Pac. 167 , judgment was rendered in a cause wherein no' written comprint or formal pleading had been filed.

1927Indeed, the presumption is stronger in the case of a wife than a child; for she cannot, at law, be the trustee of her husband.” In the case of Stickney v. Stickney, 131 U. S. 227 , 33 L.

1927Indeed, the presumption is stronger in the case of a wife than a child; for she cannot, at law, be the trustee of her husband.” In the case of Stickney v. Stickney, 131 U. S. 227 , 33 L.

1925Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633 ; Ogden v. Larrabee, 70 Ill. 510 ; First Nat.

1921As was said by Mr. Justice Sharp in Chancey v. Whinnery, 47 Okla. 272 , 147 Pac. 1036 : “The law is astute to preserve the sanctity of the marriage relation, the legitimacy of' children and stability of descent and distribution, and therefore presumes innocence + * * in the absence, of proof to the contrary. * * * The law is so positive in requiring a party who asserts the illegality of a marriage to take the burden of proving it that such requirement is in force, even though it involved the proving a negative.” I As stated by another court: *127 "Wliere there is enough to create a foundation

1921As was said by Mr. Justice Sharp in Chancey v. Whinnery, 47 Okla. 272 , 147 Pac. 1036 : “The law is astute to preserve the sanctity of the marriage relation, the legitimacy of' children and stability of descent and distribution, and therefore presumes innocence + * * in the absence, of proof to the contrary. * * * The law is so positive in requiring a party who asserts the illegality of a marriage to take the burden of proving it that such requirement is in force, even though it involved the proving a negative.” I As stated by another court: *127 "Wliere there is enough to create a foundation

1921As was said by Mr. Justice Sharp in Chancey v. Whinnery, 47 Okla. 272 , 147 Pac. 1036 : “The law is astute to preserve the sanctity of the marriage relation, the legitimacy of' children and stability of descent and distribution, and therefore presumes innocence + * * in the absence, of proof to the contrary. * * * The law is so positive in requiring a party who asserts the illegality of a marriage to take the burden of proving it that such requirement is in force, even though it involved the proving a negative.” I As stated by another court: *127 "Wliere there is enough to create a foundation