foundation principle in Nebraska

2024MONTERROSO Cite as 33 Neb.

2021The foundation requirement under Martinez is an initial showing that the translator is “qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to perform such translation.” 306 Neb. at 530 , 946 N.W.2d at 458 .

2021The foundation requirement under Martinez is an initial showing that the translator is “qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to perform such translation.” 306 Neb. at 530 , 946 N.W.2d at 458 .

2019First, Cavanaugh argues that Shelley has waived most of her arguments on appeal, because she did not object to the authority of the district court to appoint the directors in question, but instead took issue only with the quali- fications of two of the four directors suggested by Cavanaugh and ultimately appointed by the court. 1 Randy S. v. Nicolette G., 302 Neb. 465 , 924 N.W.2d 48 (2019). - 143 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports IN RE STUEVEN CHARITABLE FOUNDATION Cite as 304 Neb. 140 A review of the record shows that Shelley’s motion to dis- miss specifically no

2019First, Cavanaugh argues that Shelley has waived most of her arguments on appeal, because she did not object to the authority of the district court to appoint the directors in question, but instead took issue only with the quali- fications of two of the four directors suggested by Cavanaugh and ultimately appointed by the court. 1 Randy S. v. Nicolette G., 302 Neb. 465 , 924 N.W.2d 48 (2019). - 143 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports IN RE STUEVEN CHARITABLE FOUNDATION Cite as 304 Neb. 140 A review of the record shows that Shelley’s motion to dis- miss specifically no

2019Id. [W]hen a claimant uses a neighbor’s driveway or road- way without interfering with the owner’s use or the driveway itself, the use is to be presumed permissive.

2019First, Cavanaugh argues that Shelley has waived most of her arguments on appeal, because she did not object to the authority of the district court to appoint the directors in question, but instead took issue only with the quali- fications of two of the four directors suggested by Cavanaugh and ultimately appointed by the court. 1 Randy S. v. Nicolette G., 302 Neb. 465 , 924 N.W.2d 48 (2019). - 143 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports IN RE STUEVEN CHARITABLE FOUNDATION Cite as 304 Neb. 140 A review of the record shows that Shelley’s motion to dis- miss specifically no

1959I have set it out in detail here because it goes to the foundation of the rule in Reynolds v. Warner, supra, which rests upon an "ancient judicial rule," as the Wisconsin court held [ 163 Wis. 411 , 158 N.W. 76 ], which is not applicable in this state because of our reformed procedure provisions above set out.

1937“Fraudulent intent may be established by proof of facts from which such inference may be reasonably drawn.” Peterson v. Wahlquist, 125 Neb. 247 , 249 N. W. 678 .

1937“Fraudulent intent may be established by proof of facts from which such inference may be reasonably drawn.” Peterson v. Wahlquist, 125 Neb. 247 , 249 N. W. 678 .

1917This is the foundation of the rule, necessary to the public safety, that notice to an agent in the course of his employment is notice to his principal.” The following cases in this and other jurisdictions seem fairly to support the rule invoked by defendant: Pringle v. Modern Woodmen of America, 76 Neb. 384, 388 ; Modern Woodmen of America v. Lane, 62 Neb. 89 ; Knights of Pythias v. Withers, 177 U. S. 260 ; Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall.

1917This is the foundation of the rule, necessary to the public safety, that notice to an agent in the course of his employment is notice to his principal.” The following cases in this and other jurisdictions seem fairly to support the rule invoked by defendant: Pringle v. Modern Woodmen of America, 76 Neb. 384, 388 ; Modern Woodmen of America v. Lane, 62 Neb. 89 ; Knights of Pythias v. Withers, 177 U. S. 260 ; Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall.

1917This is the foundation of the rule, necessary to the public safety, that notice to an agent in the course of his employment is notice to his principal.” The following cases in this and other jurisdictions seem fairly to support the rule invoked by defendant: Pringle v. Modern Woodmen of America, 76 Neb. 384, 388 ; Modern Woodmen of America v. Lane, 62 Neb. 89 ; Knights of Pythias v. Withers, 177 U. S. 260 ; Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall.

1903The facts in this case bring it within the doctrine as announced in Maher v. Lanfrom, 86 Ill. 513: “If a party purchases from a mortgagor without any deduction from the price on account of the incumbrance, the grantee thereby becomes invested with the right to interpose the same defenses as might have been made by the mortgagor.

1895(Kelsey v. McLaughlin, 10 Neb., 6 ; Dinsmore v. Stimbert, 12 Neb., 433 ; School District v. Holmes, 16 Neb., 486 .) One of the defenses stated in the answer, and relied upon by the company, was the fact that the insured had not furnished the proofs of the loss required by the terms of the policy of insurance.

1895(Kelsey v. McLaughlin, 10 Neb., 6 ; Dinsmore v. Stimbert, 12 Neb., 433 ; School District v. Holmes, 16 Neb., 486 .) One of the defenses stated in the answer, and relied upon by the company, was the fact that the insured had not furnished the proofs of the loss required by the terms of the policy of insurance.

1895(Kelsey v. McLaughlin, 10 Neb., 6 ; Dinsmore v. Stimbert, 12 Neb., 433 ; School District v. Holmes, 16 Neb., 486 .) One of the defenses stated in the answer, and relied upon by the company, was the fact that the insured had not furnished the proofs of the loss required by the terms of the policy of insurance.

1894The following cases in this court have fully developed and established this proposition: Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S., 1 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S., 460 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S., 530 ; Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S., 411 ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S., 640 ; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 230 ; Philadelphia & S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326 .” Mr. Justice Miller then-states the case and the conclusion of the supreme court of Alabama to the effect that the statute was

1894The following cases in this court have fully developed and established this proposition: Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S., 1 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S., 460 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S., 530 ; Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S., 411 ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S., 640 ; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 230 ; Philadelphia & S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326 .” Mr. Justice Miller then-states the case and the conclusion of the supreme court of Alabama to the effect that the statute was

1894The following cases in this court have fully developed and established this proposition: Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S., 1 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S., 460 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S., 530 ; Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S., 411 ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S., 640 ; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 230 ; Philadelphia & S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326 .” Mr. Justice Miller then-states the case and the conclusion of the supreme court of Alabama to the effect that the statute was

1894The following cases in this court have fully developed and established this proposition: Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S., 1 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S., 460 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S., 530 ; Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S., 411 ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S., 640 ; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 230 ; Philadelphia & S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326 .” Mr. Justice Miller then-states the case and the conclusion of the supreme court of Alabama to the effect that the statute was

1894The following cases in this court have fully developed and established this proposition: Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S., 1 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S., 460 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S., 530 ; Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S., 411 ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S., 640 ; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 230 ; Philadelphia & S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326 .” Mr. Justice Miller then-states the case and the conclusion of the supreme court of Alabama to the effect that the statute was

1894The following cases in this court have fully developed and established this proposition: Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S., 1 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S., 460 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S., 530 ; Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S., 411 ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S., 640 ; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 230 ; Philadelphia & S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326 .” Mr. Justice Miller then-states the case and the conclusion of the supreme court of Alabama to the effect that the statute was

1894The following cases in this court have fully developed and established this proposition: Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S., 1 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S., 460 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S., 530 ; Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S., 411 ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S., 640 ; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S., 230 ; Philadelphia & S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326 .” Mr. Justice Miller then-states the case and the conclusion of the supreme court of Alabama to the effect that the statute was