20 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Toler v. Stategreen2 sentences2020“The foundation requirement pertains to establishing the reliability of the dog, which may be accomplished by introducing evidence of the dog’s breed, training, past performance, and other indicia of reliability.” Id.; accord Toler v. State, 457 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); see also Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1994) (allowing evidence to be admitted where “the character and dependability 12 of the dog were established, the officer who handled the dog was trained, and the evidence was relevant”). 2020“The foundation requirement pertains to establishing the reliability of the dog, which may be accomplished by introducing evidence of the dog’s breed, training, past performance, and other indicia of reliability.” Id.; accord Toler v. State, 457 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); see also Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1994) (allowing evidence to be admitted where “the character and dependability of the dog were established, the officer who handled the dog was trained, and the evidence was relevant”). | 3 | 3 |
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences2020“The foundation requirement pertains to establishing the reliability of the dog, which may be accomplished by introducing evidence of the dog’s breed, training, past performance, and other indicia of reliability.” Id.; accord Toler v. State, 457 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); see also Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1994) (allowing evidence to be admitted where “the character and dependability 12 of the dog were established, the officer who handled the dog was trained, and the evidence was relevant”). 2020“The foundation requirement pertains to establishing the reliability of the dog, which may be accomplished by introducing evidence of the dog’s breed, training, past performance, and other indicia of reliability.” Id.; accord Toler v. State, 457 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); see also Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1994) (allowing evidence to be admitted where “the character and dependability of the dog were established, the officer who handled the dog was trained, and the evidence was relevant”). | 2 | 2 |
Stewart v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2016See Stewart, 194 So. at 870 . 2015See Stewart, 194 So. at 870 . | 2 | 2 |
Thomas v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Brinson v. State, 153 So. 3d 972, 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (citing McArthur v. State, 801 So. 2d 1037, 1039-40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)) (The parties are permitted to “advance all legitimate arguments and draw logical inferences from the evidence.”); see also Thomas v. State, 838 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“[T]he trial court’s comment was not harmless error because the trial court commented on the evidence that went to the very foundation of the defense.”). | 1 | 1 |
McArthur v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Brinson v. State, 153 So. 3d 972, 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (citing McArthur v. State, 801 So. 2d 1037, 1039-40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)) (The parties are permitted to “advance all legitimate arguments and draw logical inferences from the evidence.”); see also Thomas v. State, 838 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“[T]he trial court’s comment was not harmless error because the trial court commented on the evidence that went to the very foundation of the defense.”). | 1 | 1 |
Brinson v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Brinson v. State, 153 So. 3d 972, 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (citing McArthur v. State, 801 So. 2d 1037, 1039-40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)) (The parties are permitted to “advance all legitimate arguments and draw logical inferences from the evidence.”); see also Thomas v. State, 838 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“[T]he trial court’s comment was not harmless error because the trial court commented on the evidence that went to the very foundation of the defense.”). | 1 | 1 |
Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.green1 sentence2014See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1259 (Fla.2006); see also Smith v. Time Customer Servs., 132 So.3d 841, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Time Customer Servicesgreen1 sentence2014See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1259 (Fla.2006); see also Smith v. Time Customer Servs., 132 So.3d 841, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2003In Brown v. State, 678 So.2d 910, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the State's case "depended entirely on the testimony of two witnesses whose accounts differed from one another in several respects. | 1 | 1 |
Rigsby v. Stategreen1 sentence2003The harmless error rule applies to this issue, see Millett v. State, 460 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and the State carries the burden "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction," Rigsby v. State, 639 So.2d 132, 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 , *1196 1138 (Fla.1986)). [2] From a complete review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's comment was not harmless error because the trial c | 1 | 1 |
Donnell v. Industrial Fire and Casualty Co.green1 sentence1980The decretal portion of the order under review states: “ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be hereby granted.” We have recently held, based on a long line of authority, that an order “which merely grants a motion — and does not go further and actually dismiss the complaint, the cause, or a party, or enter judgment for the movant — is nothing more than an interlocutory one which cannot provide the foundation for a claim of res judicata.” Donnell v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Co., 378 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) and cases collected. | 1 | 1 |
Kessler v. Gumenickgreen1 sentence1980Edwards v. Kings Point Housing Corp., 351 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); see, e.g., Kessler v. Gumenick, 358 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Shupack v. Allstate Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Harris
green
2 sentences2020In Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court opined on the reliability of scent detection dogs. 2020In Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court opined on the reliability of scent detection dogs. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Hayes v. State
green
2 sentences2024The foundation for our analysis in Hayes was our recognition that “the prohibition against double jeopardy does not prohibit multiple convictions and punishments [when] a defendant commits two or more distinct criminal acts,” id. at 700—that is, when the offenses are not the same “in fact.” We also recognized that in deciding whether criminal conduct constitutes a single criminal act as opposed to multiple distinct acts, “it is difficult to formulate a bright-line rule because the determination is often fact-specific.” Id. at 705 . 2024The foundation for our analysis in Hayes was our recognition that “the prohibition against double jeopardy does not prohibit multiple convictions and punishments [when] a defendant commits two or more distinct criminal acts,” id. at 700—that is, when the offenses are not the same “in fact.” We also recognized that in deciding whether criminal conduct constitutes a single criminal act as opposed to multiple distinct acts, “it is difficult to formulate a bright-line rule because the determination is often fact-specific.” Id. at 705 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Batlemento v. Dove Fountain, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008The foundation for the claim is the language found in section 501.203(3), Florida Statutes (2005), that states, among other things, that the term "violation of this part" means any violation of the FDUTPA and may be based on rules promulgated pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act or the standards of "unfairness and deception set forth and interpreted by the Federal Trade Commission or the federal courts." The trial court dismissed count I with prejudice saying first that: [C]hapter 559.801 et seq. (2005), Florida's Sale of Business Opportunities Act ("The Act") "defines a `business oppo | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Witt v. State
green
1 sentence2004As we acknowledged there, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 was originally patterned after the federal *945 habeas corpus rule and was promulgated to provide "a method of reviewing a conviction based on a major change of law, where unfairness was so fundamental in either process or substance that the doctrine of finality had to be set aside." Witt, 387 So.2d at 927 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. DiGuilio
green
1 sentence2003The harmless error rule applies to this issue, see Millett v. State, 460 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and the State carries the burden "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction," Rigsby v. State, 639 So.2d 132, 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 , *1196 1138 (Fla.1986)). [2] From a complete review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's comment was not harmless error because the trial c | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Millett v. State
green
1 sentence2003The harmless error rule applies to this issue, see Millett v. State, 460 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and the State carries the burden "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction," Rigsby v. State, 639 So.2d 132, 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 , *1196 1138 (Fla.1986)). [2] From a complete review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's comment was not harmless error because the trial c | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Amato v. Greenquist
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Schmidt
green
1 sentence1998In support of its position, appellant cites Publix Super Markets v. Schmidt, 509 So.2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) as a "similar case." However, in the ribbon-matching process which serves as the foundation for the doctrine of stare decisis, the Publix case is far from similar. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Webb v. Fury
green
1 sentence1993The court held: Although the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine arose in the context of antitrust litigation, and most Noerr-Pennington applications involve antitrust suits, it is apparent that the foundation of the doctrine, and of the sham exception rest upon solid First Amendment grounds rather than upon a limited construction of the Sherman Act. * * * * * * Clearly the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is a principle of constitutional law which bars litigation arising from injuries received as a consequence of First Amendment petitioning activity, regardless of the underlying cause of action asserted by th | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Agrico Chemical Co. v. STATE, ETC.
green
1 sentence1985We reject, therefore, appellants' first point because the record contains competent, substantial evidence to show that these rules are not "arbitrary or capricious." Agrico Chemical Co. v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Edwards v. Kings Point Housing Corp.
green
1 sentence1980Edwards v. Kings Point Housing Corp., 351 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); see, e.g., Kessler v. Gumenick, 358 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Shupack v. Allstate Ins. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Floberg v. Floberg
neutral
2 sentences1953The appellant urges that the cases of In re Schriver’s Estate, 289 Ill.App. 581 , 7 N.E.2d 611 , and Floberg v. Floberg, 358 Ill. 626 , 193 N.E. 456, 457 , are authority for the proposition that the pendency of an action for separate maintenance is “time out” in calculating the period of desertion. 1953The appellant urges that the cases of In re Schriver’s Estate, 289 Ill.App. 581 , 7 N.E.2d 611 , and Floberg v. Floberg, 358 Ill. 626 , 193 N.E. 456, 457 , are authority for the proposition that the pendency of an action for separate maintenance is “time out” in calculating the period of desertion. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Schriver v. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank
green
2 sentences1953The appellant urges that the cases of In re Schriver’s Estate, 289 Ill.App. 581 , 7 N.E.2d 611 , and Floberg v. Floberg, 358 Ill. 626 , 193 N.E. 456, 457 , are authority for the proposition that the pendency of an action for separate maintenance is “time out” in calculating the period of desertion. 1953The appellant urges that the cases of In re Schriver’s Estate, 289 Ill.App. 581 , 7 N.E.2d 611 , and Floberg v. Floberg, 358 Ill. 626 , 193 N.E. 456, 457 , are authority for the proposition that the pendency of an action for separate maintenance is “time out” in calculating the period of desertion. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Roche v. McDonald
green
2 sentences1947McDonald, 136 Wash. 322 , 239 Pac. 1015 , 44 A.R.L. 444, the court said: “It has become the settled law of this state, and we think generally elsewhere in this country, that a judgment rendered by default, rested solely upon the allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as to conclusively negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, is •void, or in any event voidable, and that such a judgment may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim of right. 1947McDonald, 136 Wash. 322 , 239 Pac. 1015 , 44 A.R.L. 444, the court said: “It has become the settled law of this state, and we think generally elsewhere in this country, that a judgment rendered by default, rested solely upon the allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as to conclusively negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, is •void, or in any event voidable, and that such a judgment may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim of right. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Hay v. Salisbury
green
1 sentence1931Salisbury, 92 Fla. 446 , 109 Sou. 617 , this Court held: "The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of' the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with them in law or estate. 15 R. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Crute v. State
green
1 sentence1931Salisbury, 92 Fla. 446 , 109 Sou. 617 , this Court held: "The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of' the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with them in law or estate. 15 R. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.