foundation challenge in Utah

2018App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) (requiring appellate briefs to contain “citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved for review” (emphasis added)); see also Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 26 , 387 P.3d 1000 (stating that parties are allowed to “offer[] a[] [new] argument in support of a particular issue already preserved on appeal”); Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 63, ¶ 20 , 289 P.3d 479 (stating that “a litigant has no obligation to ‘preserve’ his citation to legal authority,” and that “if the foundation of a claim or argument is presented in a manner that allows the district court to rule on i

2018App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) (requiring appellate briefs to contain “citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved for review” (emphasis added)); see also Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 26 , 387 P.3d 1000 (stating that parties are allowed to “offer[] a[] [new] argument in support of a particular issue already preserved on appeal”); Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 63, ¶ 20 , 289 P.3d 479 (stating that “a litigant has no obligation to ‘preserve’ his citation to legal authority,” and that “if the foundation of a claim or argument is presented in a manner that allows the district court to rule on i

2013See, e.g., Gilbert v. Utah Down Syndrome Found., Inc. (In re Discipline of Gilbert), 2012 UT 81 , ¶ 14 a. 3, 301 P.3d 979 ("[Blecause the Foundation does not challenge any of the district court's factual findings, it had no marshaling obligation."); Rapela v. Green, 2012 UT 57 , ¶ 12 n. 2, 289 P.3d 428 (explaining that marshaling requirement only applies where "factfual] finding[s}" are challenged (internal quotation marks omitted)). .

2013See, e.g., Gilbert v. Utah Down Syndrome Found., Inc. (In re Discipline of Gilbert), 2012 UT 81 , ¶ 14 a. 3, 301 P.3d 979 ("[Blecause the Foundation does not challenge any of the district court's factual findings, it had no marshaling obligation."); Rapela v. Green, 2012 UT 57 , ¶ 12 n. 2, 289 P.3d 428 (explaining that marshaling requirement only applies where "factfual] finding[s}" are challenged (internal quotation marks omitted)). .

2013We cannot be said to be deciding cases under the rule of law where our gate keeping for appellate decision making is so haphazardly marked. 78 See , e.g., Gilbert v. Utah Down Syndrome Found., Inc. (In re Discipline of Gilbert), 2012 UT 81 , ¶ 14 n.3, 301 P.3d 979 (“[B]ecause the Foundation does not challenge any of the district court’s factual findings, it had no marshaling obligation.”); Rapela v. Green, 2012 UT 57 , ¶ 12 n.2, 289 P.3d 428 (explaining that marshaling requirement (continued...) 44 Cite as: 2013 UT 42 JUSTICE LEE, dissenting significant distinction between “pure” and “hybrid”

2013We cannot be said to be deciding cases under the rule of law where our gate keeping for appellate decision making is so haphazardly marked. 78 See , e.g., Gilbert v. Utah Down Syndrome Found., Inc. (In re Discipline of Gilbert), 2012 UT 81 , ¶ 14 n.3, 301 P.3d 979 (“[B]ecause the Foundation does not challenge any of the district court’s factual findings, it had no marshaling obligation.”); Rapela v. Green, 2012 UT 57 , ¶ 12 n.2, 289 P.3d 428 (explaining that marshaling requirement only applies where “fact[ual] finding[s]” are challenged (internal quotation marks omitted)). 79 See In re Discipl

2024Orton has pointed to nothing in the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct or our case law that suggests a judge’s mere knowledge of an inapplicable statutory increase in a 20220119-CA 12 2024 UT App 140 State v. Orton sentence creates a foundation for a claim of bias, prejudice, or partiality.

2020Counsel stated that, as a result of his discussion with the director, he learned for the first time that this therapy technique “could give grounds for the recantation of the recantation, and also . . . might have led to the allegations becoming much more violent and much more pronounced as the 4 A written motion to exclude the forensic interviewer was never submitted. 6 Cite as: 2020 UT 48 Opinion of the Court years have gone on.” Arguing that the “therapy may have led to possible contamination of the [child’s] testimony,” counsel requested a continuance to acquire his own expert witness to r

2015Thus, if we determine that society’s interest in establishing consistent statewide standards outweighs other considerations, we grant no discretion to the trial court, and we review the mixed question for correctness.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); cf. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 697–98 (1996) (although fact-intensive reasonable suspicion or probable cause determinations “will seldom be a useful precedent for another [case],” the Supreme Court reviews these mixed questions for correctness because “de novo review tends to unify precedent and will come closer to providing la

1986Inexplicably in that context, Wood restated the “Utah rule” on enhancement, citing to Woolley, Ward, and General Oil as the foundation for the rule. 22 Utah 2d at 319, 452 P.2d at 873 .

1911As an exhibit, it was properly received in evidence, and within the discretion of the court submitted to the jury; and there appears to be nothing on which to furnish a foundation for the claim that injury had been done or the discretion of the court abused by this procedure.” This same court reaffirmed, tbe doctrine here announced iu the case of State v. Lindquist, 110 Minn. 12 , 124 N. W. 215 .

1911As an exhibit, it was properly received in evidence, and within the discretion of the court submitted to the jury; and there appears to be nothing on which to furnish a foundation for the claim that injury had been done or the discretion of the court abused by this procedure.” This same court reaffirmed, tbe doctrine here announced iu the case of State v. Lindquist, 110 Minn. 12 , 124 N. W. 215 .

1911Co., 23 Nev. 70 , 42 Pac. 583 ; in Washington, Coyle v. Seattle Electric Co., 31 Wash. 181 , 71 Pac. 733 ; Burnham v. Spokane Mer.

1911Co., 23 Nev. 70 , 42 Pac. 583 ; in Washington, Coyle v. Seattle Electric Co., 31 Wash. 181 , 71 Pac. 733 ; Burnham v. Spokane Mer.

1911The Montana Statutes contain a similar provision (volume 2, Code of Mont. 1895, sec. 2122), and in Territory v. Doyle, 7 Mont. 245 , . 14 Pac, 671 , it was held not to be error for thel jury to take with them on retiring to their room for deliberation an account book belonging to the accused.

1911The Montana Statutes contain a similar provision (volume 2, Code of Mont. 1895, sec. 2122), and in Territory v. Doyle, 7 Mont. 245 , . 14 Pac, 671 , it was held not to be error for thel jury to take with them on retiring to their room for deliberation an account book belonging to the accused.

1911Bank v. Deuprey, 66 Cal. 170 [ 4 Pac. 1173 ], and cases cited), and, if the order as entered is not the order as made, the minutes may be corrected so as to make them speak the truth (Garoutte v. Haley, 104 Cal. 497 [ 38 Pac. 194 ], and cases cited); but subject to these exceptions the order is reviewable only on appeal, and, the decision of the trial court having been once made after regular submission of the motion, its power is exhausted — it is functus officio.”' In tbe second case it was said: “The foundation of this rule is that the modes in which a decision may be reviewed are prescribe

1911Bank v. Deuprey, 66 Cal. 170 [ 4 Pac. 1173 ], and cases cited), and, if the order as entered is not the order as made, the minutes may be corrected so as to make them speak the truth (Garoutte v. Haley, 104 Cal. 497 [ 38 Pac. 194 ], and cases cited); but subject to these exceptions the order is reviewable only on appeal, and, the decision of the trial court having been once made after regular submission of the motion, its power is exhausted — it is functus officio.”' In tbe second case it was said: “The foundation of this rule is that the modes in which a decision may be reviewed are prescribe

1911Bank v. Deuprey, 66 Cal. 170 [ 4 Pac. 1173 ], and cases cited), and, if the order as entered is not the order as made, the minutes may be corrected so as to make them speak the truth (Garoutte v. Haley, 104 Cal. 497 [ 38 Pac. 194 ], and cases cited); but subject to these exceptions the order is reviewable only on appeal, and, the decision of the trial court having been once made after regular submission of the motion, its power is exhausted — it is functus officio.”' In tbe second case it was said: “The foundation of this rule is that the modes in which a decision may be reviewed are prescribe

1911Co., 23 Nev. 70 , 42 Pac. 583 ; in Washington, Coyle v. Seattle Electric Co., 31 Wash. 181 , 71 Pac. 733 ; Burnham v. Spokane Mer.

1911Co., 23 Nev. 70 , 42 Pac. 583 ; in Washington, Coyle v. Seattle Electric Co., 31 Wash. 181 , 71 Pac. 733 ; Burnham v. Spokane Mer.

1901It certainly does not further the salutary effect of the rule that neither party will be aided by the courts, or satisfy as to its impartiality, to exclude proof of some of the facts essential to show the entire transaction, and thus exhibit its illegality* merely because they are offered by a particeps criminis against whom a prima facie case is made by one equally corrupt, who has gained an advantage by presenting to the court garbled and partial proofs, which suppress part -of the truth, and impose a mutilated state of facts upon the court in place of the real transaction.” So, in Inhabitan

1891Pattison v. Richards, 22 Barb. 143 ; Barhyte v. Hughes, 33 Barb. 320 ; MacDougall v. Maguire, 35 Cal. 274 . “ Claims of damages from torts, when attempted to be enforced against causes for damages also arising from other torts, have, as a rule, been rejected; ” and courts have adopted or assumed, as a general principle, that such cross-demand can never arise from the transaction set forth by the plaintiff as the foundation of the claim, especially when the trespasses or torts are separate and distinct from each other, and not connected with the transaction, foundation, or subject of the action

1891Pattison v. Richards, 22 Barb. 143 ; Barhyte v. Hughes, 33 Barb. 320 ; MacDougall v. Maguire, 35 Cal. 274 . “ Claims of damages from torts, when attempted to be enforced against causes for damages also arising from other torts, have, as a rule, been rejected; ” and courts have adopted or assumed, as a general principle, that such cross-demand can never arise from the transaction set forth by the plaintiff as the foundation of the claim, especially when the trespasses or torts are separate and distinct from each other, and not connected with the transaction, foundation, or subject of the action

1891Pattison v. Richards, 22 Barb. 143 ; Barhyte v. Hughes, 33 Barb. 320 ; MacDougall v. Maguire, 35 Cal. 274 . “ Claims of damages from torts, when attempted to be enforced against causes for damages also arising from other torts, have, as a rule, been rejected; ” and courts have adopted or assumed, as a general principle, that such cross-demand can never arise from the transaction set forth by the plaintiff as the foundation of the claim, especially when the trespasses or torts are separate and distinct from each other, and not connected with the transaction, foundation, or subject of the action