particularity requirement in Tennessee

2020The warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.” United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1981). -34- Meeks, 867 S.W.2d at 371; see State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 326 (Tenn. 2005) (stating that a search warrant “must contain a particular description of the items to be seized”); State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 296 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that in order to satisfy the particularity requirement, the warrant “must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.” O

2015“To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.” Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 296 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2011App. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Lea -5- v. State, 181 Tenn. 378 , 181 S.W.2d 351, 352 (1944) (noting that the place to “be searched should be designated with sufficient accuracy to prevent the officer from searching the premises of one person under a warrant directed against those of another”); State v. Bass, 153 Tenn. 162 , 281 S.W. 936, 937 (1926) (concluding that the particularity requirement is met by a description which particularly points to a “definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others”).

2011App. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Lea -5- v. State, 181 Tenn. 378 , 181 S.W.2d 351, 352 (1944) (noting that the place to “be searched should be designated with sufficient accuracy to prevent the officer from searching the premises of one person under a warrant directed against those of another”); State v. Bass, 153 Tenn. 162 , 281 S.W. 936, 937 (1926) (concluding that the particularity requirement is met by a description which particularly points to a “definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others”).

2021“To pass the particularity test, the actors should be identified and the substance of each allegation should be pled.” Id. (citing Strategic Capital Res., Inc. v. Dylan Tire Indus., LLC, 102 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).

2018Strategic Capital Res., Inc. v. Dylan Tire Indus., LLC, 102 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

2020The warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.” United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1981). -34- Meeks, 867 S.W.2d at 371; see State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 326 (Tenn. 2005) (stating that a search warrant “must contain a particular description of the items to be seized”); State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 296 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that in order to satisfy the particularity requirement, the warrant “must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.” O

2003To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant “ ‘must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.’ ” State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 371 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)).

2019The particularity requirement will be satisfied when the description “particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others[] and enables the officer to locate the place to be searched with reasonable certainty without leaving it to his discretion.” State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Hatchett v. State, 346 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tenn. 1961); State v. Cannon, 634 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tenn. Crim.

2015The particularity requirement is met when the description “particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others, and enables the officer to locate the place to be searched with reasonable certainty without leaving it to his discretion.” State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993).

2019The particularity requirement will be satisfied when the description “particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others[] and enables the officer to locate the place to be searched with reasonable certainty without leaving it to his discretion.” State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Hatchett v. State, 346 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tenn. 1961); State v. Cannon, 634 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tenn. Crim.

2011State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Hatchett v. State, 346 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tenn. 1961); State v. Cannon, 634 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tenn. Crim.

2019The particularity requirement will be satisfied when the description “particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others[] and enables the officer to locate the place to be searched with reasonable certainty without leaving it to his discretion.” State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Hatchett v. State, 346 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tenn. 1961); State v. Cannon, 634 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tenn. Crim.

2011State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Hatchett v. State, 346 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tenn. 1961); State v. Cannon, 634 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tenn. Crim.

2011App. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Lea -5- v. State, 181 Tenn. 378 , 181 S.W.2d 351, 352 (1944) (noting that the place to “be searched should be designated with sufficient accuracy to prevent the officer from searching the premises of one person under a warrant directed against those of another”); State v. Bass, 153 Tenn. 162 , 281 S.W. 936, 937 (1926) (concluding that the particularity requirement is met by a description which particularly points to a “definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others”).

2011App. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Lea -5- v. State, 181 Tenn. 378 , 181 S.W.2d 351, 352 (1944) (noting that the place to “be searched should be designated with sufficient accuracy to prevent the officer from searching the premises of one person under a warrant directed against those of another”); State v. Bass, 153 Tenn. 162 , 281 S.W. 936, 937 (1926) (concluding that the particularity requirement is met by a description which particularly points to a “definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others”).

2004Garrett on the Bells Road in Madison County” met the particularity requirement); Webb v. State, 173 Tenn. 518 , 121 S.W.2d 550, 552 (1938) (holding that “the description in the warrant meets the requirements of the statute ... [by stating] ‘the dwelling house of said Joe Webb, on the Andersonville Pike, Knox County, Tennessee.’ ”); see also Feagins v. State, 596 S.W.2d 108, 111-12 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979); State v. Nelson, No. 01C01-9505-CC-00127, 1996 WL 233987 , at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Nashville, May, 9, 1996), perm, app. denied (Oct. 28, 1996).

2004Garrett on the Bells Road in Madison County” met the particularity requirement); Webb v. State, 121 S.W2d 550, 552 (Tenn. 1938) (holding that “the description in the warrant meets the requirements of the statute . . . [by stating] ‘the dwelling house of said Joe Webb, on the Andersonville Pike, Knox County, Tennessee.’”); see also Feagins v. State, 596 S.W.2d 108, 111-12 (Tenn. Crim.

2004Garrett on the Bells Road in Madison County” met the particularity requirement); Webb v. State, 173 Tenn. 518 , 121 S.W.2d 550, 552 (1938) (holding that “the description in the warrant meets the requirements of the statute ... [by stating] ‘the dwelling house of said Joe Webb, on the Andersonville Pike, Knox County, Tennessee.’ ”); see also Feagins v. State, 596 S.W.2d 108, 111-12 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979); State v. Nelson, No. 01C01-9505-CC-00127, 1996 WL 233987 , at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Nashville, May, 9, 1996), perm, app. denied (Oct. 28, 1996).

2004Garrett on the Bells Road in Madison County” met the particularity requirement); Webb v. State, 173 Tenn. 518 , 121 S.W.2d 550, 552 (1938) (holding that “the description in the warrant meets the requirements of the statute ... [by stating] ‘the dwelling house of said Joe Webb, on the Andersonville Pike, Knox County, Tennessee.’ ”); see also Feagins v. State, 596 S.W.2d 108, 111-12 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979); State v. Nelson, No. 01C01-9505-CC-00127, 1996 WL 233987 , at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Nashville, May, 9, 1996), perm, app. denied (Oct. 28, 1996).

2003To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant “ ‘must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.’ ” State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 371 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)).

1998To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant “ ‘must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.’” State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)).

2021“To pass the particularity test, the actors should be identified and the substance of each allegation should be pled.” Id. (citing Strategic Capital Res., Inc. v. Dylan Tire Indus., LLC, 102 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).

2014The trial court dismissed Schwartz’s fraud claim after finding that it failed to meet the specificity requirement of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9.02, which states that “the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” “To pass the particularity test, the actors should be identified and the substance of each allegation should be pled.” Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bank, 221 S.W.3d 32, 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

2020The warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.” United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1981). -34- Meeks, 867 S.W.2d at 371; see State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 326 (Tenn. 2005) (stating that a search warrant “must contain a particular description of the items to be seized”); State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 296 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that in order to satisfy the particularity requirement, the warrant “must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.” O

2019A. Particularity Requirement The particularity requirement serves two purposes, it “protects the accused from being subjected to an unreasonable search and/or seizure” and “‘prevent[s] the officer from searching the premises of one person under a warrant directed against those of another.’” State v. Vanderford, 980 S.W.2d 390, 404 (Tenn. Crim.

2019App. 1997) (quoting Squires v. State, 525 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See, e.g., S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 585 (noting that the “proposed group of ‘family members,’ which could include fathers, mothers, siblings, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, grandparents, cousins, and others, is . . . too amorphous a category” to satisfy the particularity requirement).

2019See, e.g., S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 585 (noting that the “proposed group of ‘family members,’ which could include fathers, mothers, siblings, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, grandparents, cousins, and others, is . . . too amorphous a category” to satisfy the particularity requirement).

2019Further, many family-based social groups will have trouble qualifying as “socially distinct,” a requirement that contemplates that the applicant’s proposed group be “set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the society in some significant way.” M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 238 (“In other words, if the common immutable characteristic were known, those with the characteristic in the society in question would be meaningfully distinguished from those who do not have it.”).

2014This Court recently stated that particularity requires reference to “a single or specific person, thing, group class, occasion, etc., rather than to others or all.” Diggs v. Lasalle Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 387 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).

2011State v. Mack, 188 S.W.3d 164, 172 (Tenn. Crim.

2005This motion fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 7.02(1) requiring that motions “state with particularity the grounds therefor.” See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 572 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tenn.1978); see also Davis v. Tenn. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 315 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (The particularity requirement in Rule 7.02(1) “obliges parties to inform the court what relief they want and to give the court enough information to process the motion correctly.”).

2005This motion fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 7.02(1) requiring that motions “state with particularity the grounds therefor.” See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 572 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tenn.1978); see also Davis v. Tenn. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 315 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (The particularity requirement in Rule 7.02(1) “obliges parties to inform the court what relief they want and to give the court enough information to process the motion correctly.”).