particularity requirement in Pennsylvania

2025“Because the particularity requirement in Article I, Section 8 is more stringent than in the Fourth Amendment, if the warrant is satisfactory under the Pennsylvania Constitution it will also be satisfactory under the federal Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2014).

2024“Because the particularity requirement in Article I, Section 8 is more stringent than in the Fourth Amendment, if the warrant is satisfactory under - 10 - J-A24003-23 the Pennsylvania Constitution it will also be satisfactory under the federal Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2014).

2023We also note that there is a strict particularity requirement in Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that “a warrant must describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible.” Commonwealth v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1989); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 205(2) (requiring all search warrants to “identify specifically the property to be seized”); id. at 205(3) (requiring all search warrants to “name or describe with particularity the person or place to be searched”).

2023We also note that there is a strict particularity requirement in Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that “a warrant must describe the items as specifically as is reasonably possible.” Commonwealth v. Grossman, . . . 555 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1989); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 205(2) (requiring all search warrants to “identify specifically the property to be seized”); id. at 205(3) (requiring all search warrants to “name or describe with particularity the person or place to be searched”).

2026“This Court has recognized that the particularity component subsumes two distinct, although often related, concepts.” Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 716 (Pa. Super. 2023).

2024In his motion to suppress, Appellant argued that the warrant for the search of his phone was not drafted with sufficient particularity to pass constitutional muster because it encompassed items for which there was no probable cause. -8- J-A24003-23 Recently, in Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 716 (Pa. Super. 2023), this Court explained that the particularity requirement for a warrant subsumes two distinct types of challenge to a warrant’s validity.

2024The particularity requirement “prohibits a warrant that is not particular enough and a warrant that is overbroad.” Young, 287 A.3d at 919-20 (citations omitted).

2024The particularity requirement, thus, prohibits the issuance of a search warrant “that is not particular enough and a warrant that is overbroad.” Young, 287 A.3d at 919-20 (citations omitted).

2021This particularity requirement is meant to ensure that a search will be “carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).

1991“This requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored ... and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers [of the United States Constitution] intended to prohibit.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 , 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1017 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72, 80 (1987).

2024Id. (citation omitted).

2021See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 816 A.2d 282, 292 (Pa.Super. 2003) (cleaned up) (distinguishing prior cases, which found noncompliance with the particularity requirement, based upon “[t]he language ‘or other materials,’ . . . follow[ing] the specific items ‘assets’ and ‘paraphernalia,’ all of which must be related to . . . the sale - 10 - J-S33012-21 or use of cocaine . . . which the police clearly had probable cause to believe had occurred at the residence within 24 to 36 hours preceding execution of the warrant.”).

2023See In re Estate of Schofield, 477 A.2d 473 , 477 (Pa. 1984) (“In satisfaction of the particularity requirement we have required that two conditions must always be met: the pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense, and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge.” (citing Bata v. Central- Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 224 A.2d 174 , 179 (Pa. 1966)).

2023See In re Estate of Schofield, 477 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. 1984) (“In satisfaction of the particularity requirement we have required that two conditions must always be met: the pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense, and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge.” (citing Bata v. Central- Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 224 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1966)).

2023See In re Estate of Schofield, 477 A.2d 473 , 477 (Pa. 1984) (“In satisfaction of the particularity requirement we have required that two conditions must always be met: the pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense, and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge.” (citing Bata v. Central- Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 224 A.2d 174 , 179 (Pa. 1966)).

2023See In re Estate of Schofield, 477 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. 1984) (“In satisfaction of the particularity requirement we have required that two conditions must always be met: the pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense, and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge.” (citing Bata v. Central- Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 224 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1966)).

2021Commonwealth v. Dougalewicz, 113 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

2020Commonwealth v. Dougalewicz, 113 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

2025Today, however, the “modern development of the personal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person’s private affairs, and accordingly makes the particularity requirement that much more important.” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009).

2025Today, however, the “modern development of the personal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person’s private affairs, and accordingly makes the particularity requirement that much more important.” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009).

2023Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1081-82 (Pa. 2017).

2023Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1081-82 (Pa. 2017) (paragraph break added).

2026Regarding the particularity requirement, we have explained: While it is impossible to establish precisely what degree of particularity is required to sufficiently allege fraud, it is well- settled that the following two conditions must always be met: “The pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense[,] and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge.” Youndt v. First Nat’l Bank of Port Allegany, 868 A.2d 539, 544-45 (Pa. Super. 2005).

2026Id. at 1267-68. “[A]t the very least[,] a plaintiff must set forth the exact statement or actions [the] plaintiff alleges constitute the fraudulent - 14 - J-A23035-25 misrepresentations.” Youndt, 868 A.2d at 545 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022It is the government’s duty to serve the search warrant on the suspect, and the warrant must contain, either on its face or by attachment, a sufficiently particular description of what is to be seized.” United States v. Wecht, 619 F.Supp.2d 213, 228 (W.D.

2022It is the government’s duty to serve the search warrant on the suspect, and the warrant must contain, either on its face or by attachment, a sufficiently particular description of what is to be seized.” United States v. Wecht, 619 F.Supp.2d 213 , 228 (W.D.

2021Accord Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (citing Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988, n.5 (1984) (“[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.”)); Grossman, 555 A.2d at 899 (“The more rigorous Pennsylvania constitutional provision requires no less.”).

2021Pacheco, 227 A.3d at 372 n.18. 23 The Superior Court held expressly that Appellant waived any claim that the Section 5773 orders were overbroad, see Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 227 A.3d at 370 n.13 [J-2-2021] - 36 The Fourth Amendment “specifies only two matters that must be ‘particularly describ[ed]’ in the warrant: ‘the place to be searched’ and ‘the person or things to be seized.’” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006).

2021Accord Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (citing Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988, n.5 (1984) (“[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.”)); Grossman, 555 A.2d at 899 (“The more rigorous Pennsylvania constitutional provision requires no less.”).

2019See Kyles, 40 F.3d at 524 (“agents had no reason to believe [the bedroom] was a separate residence: it had neither its own access from the outside, its own doorbell, nor its own mailbox. [Kyle’s mother’s] statement that [Kyle] was the only person with a key to the room did not, by itself, elevate the bedroom to the status of a separate residential unit”).7 We therefore apply the federal rule that a warrant for a single family residence authorizes a search of the entire residence regardless of whether the areas to be searched belong to the subject of the warrant and hold the search warrant at i

2019See Kyles, 40 F.3d at 524 . [J-39-2019] - 15 Indeed, this Court has already explored the contours of this more stringent particularity requirement through an analysis pursuant to Edmunds, in a similar context in Waltson.

2018Id. ; see also Commonwealth v. Belenky , 777 A.2d 483 , 487 (Pa. Super. 2001) (concluding search conducted at "4251 Frankford Avenue" pursuant to a search warrant for "4252 Salem Street" was valid "where there was no ambiguity about the location where the criminal activity occurred, as well as no question that probable cause for the search existed at the location that was searched").

2018See Commonwealth v. Irvin, 134 A.3d 67, 74-75 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding, inter alia, an incorrect name and date of a trash pull on an affidavit of probable cause does not offend the finding of probable cause nor the particularity requirement). 13 Aside from the incontrovertibly reliable tip, the description of the phone to be seized was especially specific in that it identified the exact telephone number and type of the phone.