particularity requirement in Delaware

2024This Court previously had considered digital search warrants in Bradley v. State, 51 A.3d 423 (Del. 2012) and Fink, 817 A.2d 781 , but not as applied to the particularity requirement. 82 Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 287-89. 19 warrant application and affidavit only contained probable cause to support a search for physical communications in the form of letters, notes, and books, the warrant allowed for a sweeping search of “any and all data” stored on “any personal computer,” “any digital or optical device,” “any cellular telephone,” and “any digital camera.”83 In Wheeler, we recognized that the vast a

2024This Court previously had considered digital search warrants in Bradley v. State, 51 A.3d 423 (Del. 2012) and Fink, 817 A.2d 781 , but not as applied to the particularity requirement. 82 Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 287-89. 19 warrant application and affidavit only contained probable cause to support a search for physical communications in the form of letters, notes, and books, the warrant allowed for a sweeping search of “any and all data” stored on “any personal computer,” “any digital or optical device,” “any cellular telephone,” and “any digital camera.”83 In Wheeler, we recognized that the vast a

2025I. 1, ¶ 116-122. 30 D.I. 10, p. 5-8. 6 (2) the defendant knew or believed that the representation was false or made the representation with a reckless indifference to the truth; (3) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff acted in justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff was injured by its reliance.”31 To meet the factual requirements of this particularity standard, “a complaint must allege: (1) the time, place, and contents of the false representation; (2) the identity of the person making the representation; and

2022Thus, Buyer has satisfied the particularity standard in pleading the first four fraudulent inducement elements. 71 See ABRY, 891 A.2d at 1051 (“These financial statements were represented and warranted in the Agreement and were therefore intended to induce the Buyer to sign the Agreement and close the sale to purchase the Company.”). 26 The last element of a fraudulent inducement claim that Buyer must plead is damages.72 The fraud claims track and duplicate the breach of contract allegations.

2023I, § 6. 3 stringent requirement than the Fourth Amendment in that it requires the warrant to “describe the things or persons sought as particularly as possible.” 11 There are two primary objectives of the warrant requirement: (1) to eliminate searches that are not based on probable cause, and (2) to ensure that “those searches deemed necessary [are] as limited as possible[,]” to prevent “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”12 The particularity requirement is the mechanism that ensures the proper scope of a search.13 Pursuant to Delaware law, the warrant must describe things to be s

2023Search warrants seeking information stored on electronic devices, such as cell phones, “call for particular sensitivity given the ‘enormous potential for privacy violations’ that ‘unconstrained searches of cell phones’ pose.”24 The places or things to be searched or seized must be stated with particularity in the warrant affidavit.25 To satisfy the particularity requirement for cell phones, search warrants “must describe what the investigating officers believe will be found on electronic devices with as much specificity as possible under the circumstances.” 26 As to the timeframe of the warran

2021See Emerald P’rs v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999) (“Issues not briefed are deemed waived.”). 14 1) a false representation, usually one of fact, made by the defendant; 2) the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the representation was false, or was made with reckless indifference to the truth; 3) an intent to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting; 4) the plaintiff’s action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation; and 5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance. 54 Under Chancery Court Rule 9(b), “[i]n all averments of fraud . . . t

2019Pl.’s Countercls. at 1-2, 9-13 (Dec. 17, 2018) (D.I. 19) [hereinafter, “Brightstar’s Br.”]. -20- * and (iii) preclusion by preemption by the already-asserted contract claims; ® Delaware’s economic loss doctrine.® To state a claim for fraud, one must allege: (1) a false representation, usually one of fact; (2) the defrauder’s knowledge or belief that the representation was false, or was made with reckless indifference to the truth; (3) an intent to induce the claimant to act or to refrain from acting; (4) the claimant’s action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation; a

2024Assuming, without deciding, that the Court would permit a new warrant, the State still failed to articulate sufficient probable cause that would pass constitutional muster. 40 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 662 (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004)). 41 Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particu

2024Assuming, without deciding, that the Court would permit a new warrant, the State still failed to articulate sufficient probable cause that would pass constitutional muster. 40 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 662 (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004)). 41 Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particu

2025I. 1, ¶ 116-122. 30 D.I. 10, p. 5-8. 6 (2) the defendant knew or believed that the representation was false or made the representation with a reckless indifference to the truth; (3) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff acted in justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff was injured by its reliance.”31 To meet the factual requirements of this particularity standard, “a complaint must allege: (1) the time, place, and contents of the false representation; (2) the identity of the person making the representation; and

2025I. 1, ¶ 116-122. 30 D.I. 10, p. 5-8. 6 (2) the defendant knew or believed that the representation was false or made the representation with a reckless indifference to the truth; (3) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff acted in justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff was injured by its reliance.”31 To meet the factual requirements of this particularity standard, “a complaint must allege: (1) the time, place, and contents of the false representation; (2) the identity of the person making the representation; and

2019Pl.’s Countercls. at 1-2, 9-13 (Dec. 17, 2018) (D.I. 19) [hereinafter, “Brightstar’s Br.”]. -20- * and (iii) preclusion by preemption by the already-asserted contract claims; ® Delaware’s economic loss doctrine.® To state a claim for fraud, one must allege: (1) a false representation, usually one of fact; (2) the defrauder’s knowledge or belief that the representation was false, or was made with reckless indifference to the truth; (3) an intent to induce the claimant to act or to refrain from acting; (4) the claimant’s action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation; a

2017He repeatedly alleges that he relied, but does not adequately allege how he relied. “[C]onclusory allegation[s] that [p]laintiffs were in fact deceived by the acts, omissions and conduct described in this complaint and relied thereon to their detriment is glaringly insufficient to meet the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).”96 65 Id. at 33 (“Defendant engaged in significant public offerings every gear from 2014 to 2016.”). 66 906 A.2d at 209 (Del.

2024The warrant also must satisfy the particularity requirement, which is fundamental and performs its own work in protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures.63 To pass constitutional muster, the warrant itself must describe the things to be seized and the places to be searched with particularity such that “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”64 A warrant that fails to conform with the particularity requirement is unconstitutional.65 Insufficiently particular warrants fall into two categories.66 The first such category is a general warrant, which allo

2024Assuming, without deciding, that the Court would permit a new warrant, the State still failed to articulate sufficient probable cause that would pass constitutional muster. 40 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 662 (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004)). 41 Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particu

2023I, § 6. 3 stringent requirement than the Fourth Amendment in that it requires the warrant to “describe the things or persons sought as particularly as possible.” 11 There are two primary objectives of the warrant requirement: (1) to eliminate searches that are not based on probable cause, and (2) to ensure that “those searches deemed necessary [are] as limited as possible[,]” to prevent “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”12 The particularity requirement is the mechanism that ensures the proper scope of a search.13 Pursuant to Delaware law, the warrant must describe things to be s

2023I, § 6. 3 stringent requirement than the Fourth Amendment in that it requires the warrant to “describe the things or persons sought as particularly as possible.” 11 There are two primary objectives of the warrant requirement: (1) to eliminate searches that are not based on probable cause, and (2) to ensure that “those searches deemed necessary [are] as limited as possible[,]” to prevent “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”12 The particularity requirement is the mechanism that ensures the proper scope of a search.13 Pursuant to Delaware law, the warrant must describe things to be s

2023In Taylor, we rejected the idea that identifying a difference between an overbroad warrant, which can be narrowed through limited suppression, and a general warrant, where all evidence obtained thereby must be suppressed); State v. Calhum, 2022 WL 18635494 , *4 (Del. Super. Apr. 6, 2022) (citing Taylor, 260 A.3d at 617) (quoting Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 393 ) (same). 89 Id. at A036-37 (Approved Search Warrant (Pink iPhone)). 30 smartphone as the place to search would be enough to satisfy the particularity requirement because “[t]he search could have been limited to smartphone data tied specifically

2023Search warrants seeking information stored on electronic devices, such as cell phones, “call for particular sensitivity given the ‘enormous potential for privacy violations’ that ‘unconstrained searches of cell phones’ pose.”24 The places or things to be searched or seized must be stated with particularity in the warrant affidavit.25 To satisfy the particularity requirement for cell phones, search warrants “must describe what the investigating officers believe will be found on electronic devices with as much specificity as possible under the circumstances.” 26 As to the timeframe of the warran

2023And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police . . . . 54 The Fourth Amendment prohibits general warrants that allow “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings,” and addresses this problem by requiring a ‘particular description’ of the things to be seized.55 In order for a search warrant to be deemed constitutional, it must conform to this particularity requirement.56 And “[t]he Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents.”57 Article I § 6 of the Delaware State Constitution provides a similar guar

2017No. 1605009135 January 23, 2017 warrant abhorred by the colonists as “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” By contrast, a warrant that is simply overly broad “‘describe[s] in both specific and general terms what is to be seized,’ but it authorizes the seizure of items as to which there is no probable cause.”13 “[W]arrants, in order to satisfy the particularity requirement, must describe what investigating officers believe will be found on electronic devices with as much ”14 “[G]eneric classifications in a specificity as possible under the circumstances warrant are accept

2026Generally, “[t]he particularity required by Rule 9(g) is met when the defendant is put on notice as to the general nature of the special damage being asserted so that he may proceed to investigate the details of the claim by the discovery processes available to him.”10 The purpose of the particularity requirement is to give defendants the opportunity to “take full advantage of their rights under the discovery [r]ules, [so] they will not be taken by surprise at trial and . . . afforded every opportunity to prepare to meet the plaintiff’s charge of special damage.”11 Further, “[u]pon service of

2026Generally, “[t]he particularity required by Rule 9(g) is met when the defendant is put on notice as to the general nature of the special damage being asserted so that he may proceed to investigate the details of the claim by the discovery processes available to him.”10 The purpose of the particularity requirement is to give defendants the opportunity to “take full advantage of their rights under the discovery [r]ules, [so] they will not be taken by surprise at trial and . . . afforded every opportunity to prepare to meet the plaintiff’s charge of special damage.”11 Further, “[u]pon service of

2025Co., W.L.L. v. Trading Block Hldgs., Inc., 17 N.E.3d 715, 722 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 21 N.E.3d 719 (Ill. 2014)).79 The particularity requirement “directs a shareholder to express his purpose with sufficient particularity so that the reason for the inspection can be ascertained by the corporation, but that minute detail of purpose is not required.” Pagett v. Westport Precision, Inc., 845 A.2d 455, 463 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). paragraphs (a)(1) and (b)(4) of Section 220 are consistent with the corresponding provisions of the Model Act). 79 See also Parsons v. Jefferson–Pilot Corp., 426 S.

2025There is nothing intrinsically suspect about corporate insiders participating in a 151 E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 70-74, 83, 98, 350-55, 358-60, 366; see also In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1182 (Del. 2015) (noting that “each director has a right to be considered individually”); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Deriv.

2025General and overbroad warrants Both the United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution require a warrant to “be supported by probable cause and describe the places and things to be searched with particularity.”13 “To pass constitutional muster, the warrant itself must describe the things to be seized and the places to be searched with particularity such that ‘nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.’” 14 A warrant that fails to satisfy the particularity requirement is unconstitutional.15 9 Sisson, 883 A.2d at 876 (internal quotation marks and citation o

2025General and overbroad warrants Both the United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution require a warrant to “be supported by probable cause and describe the places and things to be searched with particularity.”13 “To pass constitutional muster, the warrant itself must describe the things to be seized and the places to be searched with particularity such that ‘nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.’” 14 A warrant that fails to satisfy the particularity requirement is unconstitutional.15 9 Sisson, 883 A.2d at 876 (internal quotation marks and citation o

2025At trial, the minor testified to countless other incidents of unspeakable sexual abuse.67 The minor admitted that when she had spoken to the detectives in earlier interviews about things that occurred with Hudson, she did not tell them everything because she was afraid.68 SECOND MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF In his Second Motion, Hudson sets forth a singular claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.69 He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective “for failing to raise a Motion to Suppress because a warrant in the case was a general warrant and violated the tenets of the Fourth Amendmen

2025Co., W.L.L. v. Trading Block Hldgs., Inc., 17 N.E.3d 715, 722 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 21 N.E.3d 719 (Ill. 2014)).79 The particularity requirement “directs a shareholder to express his purpose with sufficient particularity so that the reason for the inspection can be ascertained by the corporation, but that minute detail of purpose is not required.” Pagett v. Westport Precision, Inc., 845 A.2d 455, 463 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). paragraphs (a)(1) and (b)(4) of Section 220 are consistent with the corresponding provisions of the Model Act). 79 See also Parsons v. Jefferson–Pilot Corp., 426 S.

2025Co., W.L.L. v. Trading Block Hldgs., Inc., 17 N.E.3d 715, 722 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 21 N.E.3d 719 (Ill. 2014)).79 The particularity requirement “directs a shareholder to express his purpose with sufficient particularity so that the reason for the inspection can be ascertained by the corporation, but that minute detail of purpose is not required.” Pagett v. Westport Precision, Inc., 845 A.2d 455, 463 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). paragraphs (a)(1) and (b)(4) of Section 220 are consistent with the corresponding provisions of the Model Act). 79 See also Parsons v. Jefferson–Pilot Corp., 426 S.

2025At trial, the minor testified to countless other incidents of unspeakable sexual abuse.67 The minor admitted that when she had spoken to the detectives in earlier interviews about things that occurred with Hudson, she did not tell them everything because she was afraid.68 SECOND MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF In his Second Motion, Hudson sets forth a singular claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.69 He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective “for failing to raise a Motion to Suppress because a warrant in the case was a general warrant and violated the tenets of the Fourth Amendmen

2025I. 1, ¶ 116-122. 30 D.I. 10, p. 5-8. 6 (2) the defendant knew or believed that the representation was false or made the representation with a reckless indifference to the truth; (3) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff acted in justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff was injured by its reliance.”31 To meet the factual requirements of this particularity standard, “a complaint must allege: (1) the time, place, and contents of the false representation; (2) the identity of the person making the representation; and

2024Assuming, without deciding, that the Court would permit a new warrant, the State still failed to articulate sufficient probable cause that would pass constitutional muster. 40 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 662 (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004)). 41 Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particu

2024Assuming, without deciding, that the Court would permit a new warrant, the State still failed to articulate sufficient probable cause that would pass constitutional muster. 40 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 662 (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004)). 41 Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particu

2024See id. at 2212 . 79 Id. at 2218 . 80 Id at 2217.

2024See id. at 2212 . 79 Id. at 2218 . 80 Id at 2217.

2024The warrant also must satisfy the particularity requirement, which is fundamental and performs its own work in protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures.63 To pass constitutional muster, the warrant itself must describe the things to be seized and the places to be searched with particularity such that “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”64 A warrant that fails to conform with the particularity requirement is unconstitutional.65 Insufficiently particular warrants fall into two categories.66 The first such category is a general warrant, which allo