9 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ballewgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Ballew (1973), 163 Mont. 257 , 261, 516 P.2d 1159 , 1161-62. 2019See State v. Ballew (1973), 163 Mont. 257 , 261, 516 P.2d 1159 , 1161-62. | 4 | 4 |
Fraunhofer v. Pricegreen2 sentences2010Glacier argues in the alternative that the court should have ruled on its oral motion to amend the complaint that it raised during the summary judgment hearing. ¶49 This Court has determined that “[o]f primary importance in understanding the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is the recognition that it does not render the general principles set forth in Rule 8 entirely inapplicable.” Fraunhofer v. Price, 182 Mont. 7, 14 , 594 P.2d 324, 328 (1979) (citation omitted). 2010Glacier argues in the alternative that the court should have ruled on its oral motion to amend the complaint that it raised during the summary judgment hearing. ¶49 This Court has determined that “[o]f primary importance in understanding the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is the recognition that it does not render the general principles set forth in Rule 8 entirely inapplicable.” Fraunhofer v. Price, 182 Mont. 7, 14 , 594 P.2d 324, 328 (1979) (citation omitted). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Seadergreen2 sentences2008Hauge , ¶ 11 (citing State v. Seader, 1999 MT 290, ¶ 4 , 297 Mont. 60, ¶ 4 , 990 P.2d 180, ¶ 4 ; United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)). ¶69 We noted in Hauge that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized, and that, while Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution does not use the word “particularly” in its discussion of search warrants, we have held that the Montana Constitution does impose a particularity requirement identical to t 2008Hauge , ¶ 11 (citing State v. Seader, 1999 MT 290, ¶ 4 , 297 Mont. 60, ¶ 4 , 990 P.2d 180, ¶ 4 ; United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)). ¶69 We noted in Hauge that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized, and that, while Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution does not use the word “particularly” in its discussion of search warrants, we have held that the Montana Constitution does impose a particularity requirement identical to t | 1 | 2 |
United States v. John Spilotro Herbert Blitzstein and Joseph C. Blaskogreen2 sentences2008Hauge , ¶ 11 (citing State v. Seader, 1999 MT 290, ¶ 4 , 297 Mont. 60, ¶ 4 , 990 P.2d 180, ¶ 4 ; United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)). ¶69 We noted in Hauge that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized, and that, while Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution does not use the word “particularly” in its discussion of search warrants, we have held that the Montana Constitution does impose a particularity requirement identical to t 2001Seader, ¶ 4 (citing United States v. Spilotro (9th Cir. 1986), 800 F.2d 959, 963 ). ¶12 In the instant case, Hauge argues that the phrase “anything else of value” contained within the search warrant rendered the warrant overbroad and, thus, invalid, and all evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be suppressed. ¶13 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a search warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” While Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution does not use the word “particularly,” this | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ballou v. Walker
neutral
2 sentences2021State v. Neiss, 2019 MT 125, ¶ 14 , 396 Mont. 1 , 443 P.3d 435 ; Ballou v. Walker, 2017 MT 197, ¶ 12 , 388 Mont. 283 , 400 P.3d 234 . ¶30 On appeal, Carpenter renews her argument that, while there may have been probable cause to search some material on her phone and Facebook account, the warrants authorized a search of substantially all available information and thereby rendered the warrants 10 overbroad, general warrants that violated the particularity requirement found in the Montana and federal constitutions. 2021State v. Neiss, 2019 MT 125, ¶ 14 , 396 Mont. 1 , 443 P.3d 435 ; Ballou v. Walker, 2017 MT 197, ¶ 12 , 388 Mont. 283 , 400 P.3d 234 . ¶30 On appeal, Carpenter renews her argument that, while there may have been probable cause to search some material on her phone and Facebook account, the warrants authorized a search of substantially all available information and thereby rendered the warrants 10 overbroad, general warrants that violated the particularity requirement found in the Montana and federal constitutions. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Neiss
green
2 sentences2021State v. Neiss, 2019 MT 125, ¶ 14 , 396 Mont. 1 , 443 P.3d 435 ; Ballou v. Walker, 2017 MT 197, ¶ 12 , 388 Mont. 283 , 400 P.3d 234 . ¶30 On appeal, Carpenter renews her argument that, while there may have been probable cause to search some material on her phone and Facebook account, the warrants authorized a search of substantially all available information and thereby rendered the warrants 10 overbroad, general warrants that violated the particularity requirement found in the Montana and federal constitutions. 2021State v. Neiss, 2019 MT 125, ¶ 14 , 396 Mont. 1 , 443 P.3d 435 ; Ballou v. Walker, 2017 MT 197, ¶ 12 , 388 Mont. 283 , 400 P.3d 234 . ¶30 On appeal, Carpenter renews her argument that, while there may have been probable cause to search some material on her phone and Facebook account, the warrants authorized a search of substantially all available information and thereby rendered the warrants 10 overbroad, general warrants that violated the particularity requirement found in the Montana and federal constitutions. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Richard J. Leary, and F.L. Kleinberg & Co.
green
1 sentence1999“The common theme of all descriptions of the particularity standard is that the warrant must allow the executing officer to distinguish between items that may and may not be seized.” United States v. Leary (10th Cir. 1988), 846 F.2d 592 , 600 n. 12. ¶13 The specificity required of a search warrant may vary depending on the circumstances of the case and the type of items involved. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.