73 Washington opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Perronegreen2 sentences2022The trial court did not err by concluding that the warrant was supported by probable cause. 3) Warrant Particularity Wamba contends that the warrant for the seizure of his phone lacked particularity because the description in the warrant allowed for an overbroad search of the cell phone data without limitations. “ ‘The [F]ourth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution requires that a search warrant describe with particularity the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized’ ”, but the particularity requirement can be “ ‘met if the substance to be seized is described with re 2022The trial court did not err by concluding that the warrant was supported by probable cause. 3) Warrant Particularity Wamba contends that the warrant for the seizure of his phone lacked particularity because the description in the warrant allowed for an overbroad search of the cell phone data without limitations. “ ‘The [F]ourth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution requires that a search warrant describe with particularity the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized’ ”, but the particularity requirement can be “ ‘met if the substance to be seized is described with re | 2 | 26 |
State v. Maddoxgreen2 sentences2021The warrant failed to describe any particular items to be seized and, therefore, it failed to guide the executing officer’s discretion and to inform the person subject to the search what items could be seized. 3 We recognize that “[a] warrant can be ‘overbroad’ either because it fails to describe with particularity items for which probable cause exists, or because it describes, particularly or otherwise, items for which probable cause does not exist.” State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. 2014State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. | 2 | 7 |
State v. Stensongreen2 sentences2014The Fourth Amendment mandates that a search warrant describe with particularity the things to be seized.2 The purpose of this particularity requirement is "to limit the executing officer's discretion" and "to inform the person subject to the search what items the officer may seize."3 The degree of specificity required necessarily varies "according to the circumstances and the type of items involved."4 We review de novo whether a search warrant contains a sufficiently particularized description to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, but we construe the language "in a commonsense, practical manner, ra 2014To meet the particularity requirement " a search warrant must be sufficiently definite so that the officer executing the warrant can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty." State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 692 , 940 P. 2d 1239 ( 1997). | 2 | 7 |
State v. Stensongreen2 sentences2014The Fourth Amendment mandates that a search warrant describe with particularity the things to be seized.2 The purpose of this particularity requirement is "to limit the executing officer's discretion" and "to inform the person subject to the search what items the officer may seize."3 The degree of specificity required necessarily varies "according to the circumstances and the type of items involved."4 We review de novo whether a search warrant contains a sufficiently particularized description to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, but we construe the language "in a commonsense, practical manner, ra 2014To meet the particularity requirement " a search warrant must be sufficiently definite so that the officer executing the warrant can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty." State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 692 , 940 P. 2d 1239 ( 1997). | 2 | 7 |
United States v. Roy C. Blakeney (90-5664), Kenneth A. Kutnyak (90-5665), and James E. Box (90-6041)green2 sentences2018The other purpose of the particularity requirement is to eliminate "the danger of unlimited discretion in the executing officer's determination of what to seize" and to prevent the issuance of a warrant "on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact." Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 546 (citing United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1026 (6th Cir. 1991); State v. Gronlund, 356 N.W.2d 144, 146 (N.D. 1984)), 548. 6 McKee concedes there was probable cause to support issuing a warrant for sexual exploitation of a minor but asserts nothing in the Affidavit supported probable cause for dealing in the depictio 1992United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1026 (6th Cir.), certs. denied, _ U.S. _, 116 L. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. John D. Johnsongreen2 sentences2007"The underlying measure of adequacy in the description is whether given the specificity in the warrant, a violation of personal rights is likely." United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir.1976). ¶ 14 The search warrant at issue authorized seizure of any evidence supporting the suspected criminal activity of "Narcotics/Child Sex." Pl.'s Ex. 2007“The underlying measure of adequacy in the description is whether given the specificity in the warrant, a violation of personal rights is likely.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1976). ¶14 The search warrant at issue authorized seizure of any evidence supporting the suspected criminal activity of “Narcotics/Child Sex.” Pl.’s Ex. | 2 | 2 |
Stanford v. Texasgreen2 sentences2018The particularity requirement in such cases must be "accorded the most scrupulous exactitude." Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485 . 2018Per Stanford, the particularity requirement “is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the ‘things’ are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain.” 379 U.S. at 485 . | 1 | 7 |
Marron v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement provides important protection against governmental invasion of privacy because it “makes general searches . . . impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S. Ct. 74 , 72 L. 2020The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement provides important protection against governmental invasion of privacy because it “makes general searches . . . impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S. Ct. 74 , 72 L. | 1 | 5 |
State v. Besolagreen2 sentences2024“Warrants for materials protected by the First Amendment require a heightened degree of particularity.” Besola, 184 Wn.2d at 611 . 2018In such cases, the particularity requirement must be ‘accorded the most scrupulous exactitude.’” Besola, 184 Wn.2d at 611 (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 548 ). | 1 | 5 |
State v. Askhamgreen2 sentences2024The particularity requirement protects individuals from general searches and “the danger of unlimited discretion in the executing officer’s determination of what to seize.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 546 ; see also State v. Askham, 120 Wn. 2021“The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent the State from engaging in unrestricted ‘exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings’ for any evidence of any crime.” State v. Askham, 120 Wn. | 1 | 3 |
Andresen v. Marylandgreen2 sentences2021Compare United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an authorization to seize any “‘evidence of crime’” does not satisfy the particularity requirement) with Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81 , 96 S. Ct. 2737 , 49 L. 2021Compare United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an authorization to seize any “‘evidence of crime’” does not satisfy the particularity requirement) with Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-81 , 96 S. Ct. 2737 , 49 L. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Lee Cook and Jackie B. Kirkgreen2 sentences2018The other purpose of the particularity requirement is to eliminate "the danger of unlimited discretion in the executing officer's determination of what to seize" and to prevent the issuance of a warrant "on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact." Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 546 (citing United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1026 (6th Cir. 1991); State v. Gronlund, 356 N.W.2d 144, 146 (N.D. 1984)), 548. 6 McKee concedes there was probable cause to support issuing a warrant for sexual exploitation of a minor but asserts nothing in the Affidavit supported probable cause for dealing in the depictio 2018The particularity requirement prevents general searches, seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate's authorization, and the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact. ¶ 21 Warrants " 'must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.' " Perrone, 119 Wash.2d at 546 , 834 P.2d 611 (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 , 733 (5th Cir. 1981) ). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. John Spilotro Herbert Blitzstein and Joseph C. Blaskogreen2 sentences2018Warrants that describe generic categories of items are not invalid "if a more precise description of the items subject to seizure is not possible" and "a more particular description of the items to be seized is not available at the time the warrant issues." Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963 ; Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 547 . 11 RCW 9.68A.040 provides, in pertinent part: Sexual exploitation of a minor—Elements of crime—Penalty. (1) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor if the person: (a) Compels a minor by threat or force to engage in sexually explicit conduct, knowing that such conduct will 2018Because the Affidavit was not attached or incorporated by reference, our determination of the particularity requirement is limited 15 No. 73947-6-1/16 to the warrant.12 We consider"'whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which are not.'" Mann, 389 F.3d at 878 (quoting Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963 ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Kelleygreen2 sentences1997An overbroad warrant may be cured for the purposes of meeting the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment where the affidavit and the search warrant are physically attached, and the warrant expressly refers to the affidavit and incorporates it with "suitable words of reference.” Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 29 ; State v. Kelley, 52 Wn. 1997An overbroad warrant may be cured for the purposes of meeting the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment where the affidavit and the search warrant are physically attached, and the warrant expressly refers to the affidavit and incorporates it with "suitable words of reference." Riley, 121 Wash.2d at 29 , 846 P.2d 1365 ; State v. Kelley, 52 Wash.App. 581, 585 , 762 P.2d 20 (1988). | 1 | 2 |
| Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. v. Bradley Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. v. Brownlow and Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. v. Mealeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carlson v. Stairgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Barbara E. Stefonek, Cross-Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gronlundgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Joseph Schessogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arizona v. Gantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Edward William Blum, A/K/A Edward William Himes, and Nancy Roberts Blumgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reidgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rosegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Maddoxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Maddoxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Maddoxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Howard Christine, Perry Graboskygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Robert S. Halegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ralph H. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lingogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Beasongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Riley
green
2 sentences2024The particularity requirement both “limit[s] the executing officer’s discretion” and “inform[s] the person subject to the search what items the officer may seize.” State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 29 , 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). 2024The particularity requirement both “limit[s] the executing officer’s discretion” and “inform[s] the person subject to the search what items the officer may seize.” State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 29 , 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). | 15 | 1997–2024 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences2024App. 872, 878 , 86 P.3d 1224 (“The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent the State from engaging in unrestricted ‘exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings’ for any evidence of any crime.” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L. 2024App. 872, 878 , 86 P.3d 1224 (“The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent the State from engaging in unrestricted ‘exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings’ for any evidence of any crime.” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L. | 6 | 2004–2024 |
State v. Chambers
green
2 sentences2022Additionally, “[a] lesser degree of precision may satisfy the particularity requirement when a warrant authorizes the search for contraband or inherently illicit property.” State v. Chambers, 88 Wn. 2021It is true that “[a] lesser degree of precision may satisfy the particularity requirement when a warrant authorizes the search for contraband or inherently illicit property.” State v. Chambers, 88 Wn. | 6 | 2002–2022 |
State v. Manning
green
2 sentences2021Manning, 81 Wn. 2017Manning, 81 Wn. | 4 | 2005–2021 |
State Of Washington v. Say Sulin Keodara
green
2 sentences2025First, Tyson argues that the first warrant did not satisfy the particularity requirement because it did not comply with a perceived requirement in State v. Keodara, 191 Wn. 2025In Keodara, the court held that a warrant “failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement” where it authorized an extensive search of a defendant’s phone after police suspected him of assault, drug dealing, and unlawful firearm possession. 191 Wn. | 3 | 2021–2025 |
State v. Askham
green
2 sentences2024App. 872, 878 , 86 P.3d 1224 (“The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent the State from engaging in unrestricted ‘exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings’ for any evidence of any crime.” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L. 2024App. 872, 878 , 86 P.3d 1224 (“The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent the State from engaging in unrestricted ‘exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings’ for any evidence of any crime.” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L. | 3 | 2013–2024 |
Maryland v. Garrison
green
2 sentences2016The fundamental purpose of the constitutional particularity requirement is “to protect the citizen’s interest in freedom from governmental intrusion through the invasion of his privacy.” State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 34 , 511 P2d 381 (1973); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 US 332, 345 , 129 S Ct 1710 , 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009) (“[T]he central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment [is] the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.”); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 US 79, 84 , 107 S Ct 1013 , 94 L Ed 2d 72 (1987) (noting that 2016The fundamental purpose of the constitutional particularity requirement is “to protect the citizen’s interest in freedom from governmental intrusion through the invasion of his privacy.” State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 34 , 511 P2d 381 (1973); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 US 332, 345 , 129 S Ct 1710 , 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009) (“[T]he central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment [is] the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.”); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 US 79, 84 , 107 S Ct 1013 , 94 L Ed 2d 72 (1987) (noting that | 3 | 2014–2016 |
State v. Reep
neutral
2 sentences2024State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 813 , 167 P.3d 1156 (2007); see also State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 753 , 24 P.3d 1006 (“Whether a warrant meets the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1000 (2001). 2018Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 549 ; State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 813 , 167 P.3d 1156 (2007). | 2 | 2018–2024 |
State v. Reep
green
2 sentences2024State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 813 , 167 P.3d 1156 (2007); see also State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 753 , 24 P.3d 1006 (“Whether a warrant meets the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1000 (2001). 2018Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 549 ; State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 813 , 167 P.3d 1156 (2007). | 2 | 2018–2024 |
Groh v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences2018We hold the search warrant violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. "'[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.'" Groh, 540 U.S. at 559 (quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 988 n.5, 104 S. Ct. 3424 , 82 L. 2013We agree that the warrant failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement and that the invalid portions of the warrant cannot reasonably be severed. -3- No. 67678-4-1/4 The Fourth Amendment mandates that search warrants describe with particularity the things to be seized.1 The particularity requirement serves not only to prevent general searches, but also to eliminate the "danger of unlimited discretion in the executing officer's determination of what to seize"2 and to inform the person subject to the search what items may be seized.3 The degree of specificity required necessa | 2 | 2013–2018 |
Boyd v. United States
red
2 sentences2018Ed, 2d 564(1971)(citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624 - 30); State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 545 , 834 P.2d 611 (1992). "1[T]he problem [posed by the general warrant] is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.. . .[The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem] by requiring a "particular description" of the things to be seized.'" Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 , 96 S. Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976)5 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 ). [T]he Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one "particularly de 2015In Riley , the United States Supreme Court held that a warrant was required to search an individual’s cell phone because of its potential to contain extensive personal information about “ ‘the privacies of life.’” 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 , 6 S. Ct. *314 524, 29 L. | 2 | 2015–2018 |
Riley v. Cal. United States
green
2 sentences2018The advent of devices such as cell phones that store vast amounts of personal information makes the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment that much more important. 10 No. 73947-6-1/11 In Riley v. California, U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2473 , 189 L. 2018The advent of devices such as cell phones that store vast amounts of personal information makes the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment that much more important. 10 No. 73947-6-1/11 In Riley v. California, U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2473 , 189 L. | 2 | 2015–2018 |
State v. Nordlund
green
2 sentences2004The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement prevents general searches and “ ‘the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact.’ ” Nordlund, 113 Wn. 2004The fourth amendment's particularity requirement prevents general searches and "`the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact.' " Nordlund, 113 Wash.App. at 179-80 , 53 P.3d 520 (quoting State v. Perrone, 119 Wash.2d 538, 545 , 834 P.2d 611 (1992)). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Noll
green
2 sentences2003Conversely, the severability doctrine does not apply when it would be “ ‘a means for defeating the particularity requirement’ ” or “utterly inconsistent with the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 558 -59 (quoting State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 456 , 343 N.W.2d 391 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984)). 2003Conversely, the severability doctrine does not apply when it would be “ ‘a means for defeating the particularity requirement’ ” or “utterly inconsistent with the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 558 -59 (quoting State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 456 , 343 N.W.2d 391 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984)). | 2 | 1992–2003 |
Lowery v. United States
green
2 sentences2003Conversely, the severability doctrine does not apply when it would be “ ‘a means for defeating the particularity requirement’ ” or “utterly inconsistent with the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 558 -59 (quoting State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 456 , 343 N.W.2d 391 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984)). 1992"The doctrine of severability should not be allowed to become a means for defeating the particularity requirement." State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 443, 456, 343 N.W.2d 391 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984). | 2 | 1992–2003 |
State v. Corliss
green
2 sentences1994There is no expectation of privacy, however, where one party to a conversation consents to the contents being recorded, State v. Corliss, 123 Wn.2d 656, 663-64 , 870 P.2d 317 (1994); State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 197 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992), and the justification for imposing the particularity requirement is not present under these circumstances. 1994There is no expectation of privacy, however, where one party to a conversation consents to the contents being recorded, State v. Corliss, 123 Wn.2d 656, 663-64 , 870 P.2d 317 (1994); State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 197 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992), and the justification for imposing the particularity requirement is not present under these circumstances. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Salinas green | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Hinton green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Piper v. Department of Labor and Industries green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Withers green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Martines green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In re Hesselgrave neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State Of Washington v. Marc Mckee neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Diana green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Higgs green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| United States v. Richards green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Burgess green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Diaz v. Gates green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Robert Triplett, Jr. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Massachusetts v. Sheppard green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Blackburn green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Massey green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. Galpin green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Thein green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Thein green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Ollivier green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Nordlund green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Olson green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Haberman v. Washington Public Power Supply System green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.