11 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maryland v. Garrisongreen2 sentences2010Cf. State v. Apalakis, 797 A.2d 440, 443 (R.I.2002) (“With respect to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional issues, however, this Court engages in a de novo review * * *.”); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 , 107 S.Ct. 1013 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (stating that the analysis of a warrant’s validity based on the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is a constitutional issue). 2010Cf. State v. Apalakis, 797 A.2d 440, 443 (R.I.2002) (“With respect to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional issues, however, this Court engages in a de novo review * * *.”); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 , 107 S.Ct. 1013 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (stating that the analysis of a warrant’s validity based on the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is a constitutional issue). | 2 | 2 |
Wayne Investment, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corporationgreen2 sentences2011Additionally, when faced with claims sounding in fraud, the First Circuit has found that "allegations based on `information and belief' . . . do not satisfy the particularity requirement unless the complaint sets forth the facts on which the belief is founded." New England Data Servs., Inc. , 829 F.2d at 288 (citing Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. , 739 F.2d 11 , 13 (1st Cir. 1984)). 2010In fraud cases, the First Circuit has found that "allegations based on `information and belief' . . . do not satisfy the particularity requirement unless the complaint sets forth the facts on which the belief is founded." New England Data Services, Inc , 829 F.2d at 288 (citing Wayne Investment, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. , 739 F.2d 11 , 13 (1st Cir. 1984)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Patrick Cahillgreen1 sentence2023“It is well settled that the raise-or-waive rule precludes us from considering at the appellate level issues not properly presented before the trial court.” State v. Andrade, 209 A.3d 1185, 1194 (R.I. 2019) (quoting State v. Cahill, 196 A.3d 744, 753 (R.I. 2018)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Justice Andradegreen1 sentence2023“It is well settled that the raise-or-waive rule precludes us from considering at the appellate level issues not properly presented before the trial court.” State v. Andrade, 209 A.3d 1185, 1194 (R.I. 2019) (quoting State v. Cahill, 196 A.3d 744, 753 (R.I. 2018)). | 1 | 1 |
Robert G. Hayduk v. Vincent T. Lannagreen1 sentence2015See Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 444 (1st Cir.1985) ("[M]ere allegations of fraud * * * are too conclusional to satisfy the particularity requirement, no matter how many times such accusations are repeated.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Apalakisgreen1 sentence2010Cf. State v. Apalakis, 797 A.2d 440, 443 (R.I.2002) (“With respect to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional issues, however, this Court engages in a de novo review * * *.”); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 , 107 S.Ct. 1013 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (stating that the analysis of a warrant’s validity based on the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is a constitutional issue). | 1 | 1 |
State v. DeLauriergreen1 sentence2010See State v. DeLaurier, 533 A.2d 1167, 1171 (R.I.1987) (“The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent exploratory searches made on mere suspicion rather than on judicially determined probable cause”). | 1 | 1 |
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc.green1 sentence2009See Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure , Civil 3d, § 1297 at 74 (2004); see also e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc. , 194 F.3d 185 , 193 (1 st Cir. 1999) (Rule 9(b) requires specification of time, place, and content of alleged false representation); Learning Express, Inc. v. Ray-Matt Enterprises, Inc. , 74 F. Supp. 2d 79 , 85 (D.Mass. 1999) (must allege specific times, dates, places, and other details of fraud in order to comply with the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b)); Guilbeault v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 84 F. Supp. 2d 263 , 269 (D.R.I. 2000) (complaint must identify t | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wilshiregreen1 sentence1987Maryland v. Garrison, — U.S. —, —, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1017 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72, 80 (1987); State v. Wilshire, 509 A.2d 444, 451 (R.I.1986). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arthur Tortorellogreen1 sentence1983See, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d at 780 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New England Data Services, Inc. v. Barry Becher
green
2 sentences2011Additionally, when faced with claims sounding in fraud, the First Circuit has found that "allegations based on `information and belief' . . . do not satisfy the particularity requirement unless the complaint sets forth the facts on which the belief is founded." New England Data Servs., Inc. , 829 F.2d at 288 (citing Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. , 739 F.2d 11 , 13 (1st Cir. 1984)). 2010In fraud cases, the First Circuit has found that "allegations based on `information and belief' . . . do not satisfy the particularity requirement unless the complaint sets forth the facts on which the belief is founded." New England Data Services, Inc , 829 F.2d at 288 (citing Wayne Investment, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. , 739 F.2d 11 , 13 (1st Cir. 1984)). | 2 | 2010–2011 |
Learning Express, Inc. v. Ray-Matt Enterprises, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009See Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure , Civil 3d, § 1297 at 74 (2004); see also e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc. , 194 F.3d 185 , 193 (1 st Cir. 1999) (Rule 9(b) requires specification of time, place, and content of alleged false representation); Learning Express, Inc. v. Ray-Matt Enterprises, Inc. , 74 F. Supp. 2d 79 , 85 (D.Mass. 1999) (must allege specific times, dates, places, and other details of fraud in order to comply with the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b)); Guilbeault v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 84 F. Supp. 2d 263 , 269 (D.R.I. 2000) (complaint must identify t | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Guilbeault v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
green
1 sentence2009See Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure , Civil 3d, § 1297 at 74 (2004); see also e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc. , 194 F.3d 185 , 193 (1 st Cir. 1999) (Rule 9(b) requires specification of time, place, and content of alleged false representation); Learning Express, Inc. v. Ray-Matt Enterprises, Inc. , 74 F. Supp. 2d 79 , 85 (D.Mass. 1999) (must allege specific times, dates, places, and other details of fraud in order to comply with the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b)); Guilbeault v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 84 F. Supp. 2d 263 , 269 (D.R.I. 2000) (complaint must identify t | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Massachusetts v. Sheppard
green
2 sentences2000Having concluded that the warrant was valid on its face, we need not address the issue of whether the good faith exception to the warrant requirement as set forth in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), is applicable to the facts of this case. 1 *1286 The defendant next challenges the propriety of the trial justice’s decision to allow the jury to take notes throughout the trial. 2000Having concluded that the warrant was valid on its face, we need not address the issue of whether the good faith exception to the warrant requirement as set forth in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), is applicable to the facts of this case. 1 *1286 The defendant next challenges the propriety of the trial justice’s decision to allow the jury to take notes throughout the trial. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Signore v. City of McKeesport, Pa.
green
1 sentence1992Under the particularity requirement of § 1983, "the plaintiff must state specifically how each defendant was personally involved in the deprivation." Jones v. State of Rhode Island, 724 F. Supp. 25 , 31 (D.R.I. 1989), (quoting DelSignore v. City of McKeesport, 680 F. Supp. 200 , 203 (W.D. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
green
2 sentences1992In Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Court held that neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 and therefore not subject to suit. 1992In Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Court held that neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 and therefore not subject to suit. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Jones v. State of RI
green
1 sentence1992Under the particularity requirement of § 1983, "the plaintiff must state specifically how each defendant was personally involved in the deprivation." Jones v. State of Rhode Island, 724 F. Supp. 25 , 31 (D.R.I. 1989), (quoting DelSignore v. City of McKeesport, 680 F. Supp. 200 , 203 (W.D. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
In the Matter of the Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc., Appeal of United States of America
green
1 sentence1984The court in that case held that the warrant did not meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement because it was “framed to allow seizure of most every sort of book or paper at the described premises, limited only by the qualification that the seized item be evidence of [illegality] * * Id. at 3 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.