particularity requirement in North Carolina

2026Our Supreme Court has held that “in pleading actual fraud[,] the particularity requirement is met by alleging time, place[,] and content of the fraudulent representation, identity of the person making the representation[,] and what was obtained as a result of the fraudulent acts or representations.” Terry, 302 N.C. at 85 . 56.

2026Ct. Oct. 18, 2021) (“With respect to the Rule 9(b) standard, because the Chapter 75 claim is premised on deceptive conduct, the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applies.”); cf. Value Health Sols., Inc., 2019 NCBC LEXIS 70 , at *27 (“In pleading actual fraud, the particularity requirement is met by alleging time, place, and content of the fraudulent representation, identity of the person making the representation and what was obtained as a result of the fraudulent acts or representations.” (quoting Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 85 (1981) (emphasis added))); Hale v. MacLeod, 294 N.C.

2025App. 740, 744 , 619 S.E.2d 907, 910 (2005). “[T]he penalty for non-compliance with the particularity requirement is waiver of the grounds, and, where no grounds are stated, the appeal is abandoned.” Wade v. Carolina Brush Mfg.

2017It is well established that "the portion of Rule 701 requiring appellant to state with particularity the grounds for appeal may not be waived by the Full Commission." Roberts v. Wal-Mart, Inc. , 173 N.C.App. 740 , 744, 619 S.E.2d 907 , 910 (2005). "[T]he penalty for non-compliance with the particularity requirement is waiver of the grounds, and where no grounds are stated, the appeal is abandoned." Wade v. Carolina Brush Mfg.

2018On appeal, this Court vacated the Commission's decision and held that "the penalty for non-compliance with the particularity requirement is waiver of the grounds [for appeal], and, where no grounds are stated, the appeal is abandoned." Id . at 249, 652 S.E.2d at 715 (citation omitted).

2015Thus, "the penalty for non-compliance with the particularity requirement is waiver of the grounds, and, *516 where no grounds are stated, the appeal is abandoned." Id. at 249 , 652 S.E.2d at 715 .

2021Dismissal of a claim for failure to plead with particularity is proper where “no facts whatsoever setting forth the time, place, or specific individuals who purportedly made the misrepresentations[.]” Coley v. Bank, 41 N.C.

2021Dismissal of a claim for failure to plead with particularity is proper where “no facts whatsoever setting forth the time, place, or specific individuals who purportedly made the misrepresentations[.]” Coley v. Bank, 41 N.C.

2000The very nature of constructive fraud defies specific and concise allegations and the particularity requirement may be met by alleging facts and circumstances “(1) which created the relation of trust and confidence, and (2) [which] led up to and surrounded the consummation of the transaction in which [plaintiff] is alleged to have taken advantage of his position of trust to the hurt of [defendant].” Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 85 , 273 S.E.2d 674, 679 (1981) (quoting Rhodes v. Jones, 232 N.C. 547 , 548- 49, 61 S.E.2d 725, 725 )).

2000The very nature of constructive fraud defies specific and concise allegations and the particularity requirement may be met by alleging facts and circumstances “(1) which created the relation of trust and confidence, and (2) [which] led up to and surrounded the consummation of the transaction in which [plaintiff] is alleged to have taken advantage of his position of trust to the hurt of [defendant].” Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 85 , 273 S.E.2d 674, 679 (1981) (quoting Rhodes v. Jones, 232 N.C. 547 , 548- 49, 61 S.E.2d 725, 725 )).

1986The particularity requirement does not necessarily guard against the initial entry into the home, but in light of the Fourth Amendment's policy to keep searches limited, it operates primarily to prevent "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 , reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 , 92 S.Ct. 26 , 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971); Steagald v. United States, supra .

1986The particularity requirement does not necessarily guard against the initial entry into the home, but in light of the Fourth Amendment's policy to keep searches limited, it operates primarily to prevent "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 , reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 , 92 S.Ct. 26 , 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971); Steagald v. United States, supra .

2022Thus, “a pleading is sufficiently particular ‘if, upon a liberal construction of the whole pleading, the charge of fraud might be supported by proof of the alleged constitutive facts.’ ” Provectus Biopharm., Inc., 2018 NCBC LEXIS 101 at *63 (quoting Carver v. Roberts, 78 N.C.

2020Thus, “a pleading is sufficiently particular ‘if, upon a liberal construction of the whole pleading, the charge of fraud might be supported by proof of the alleged constitutive facts.’ ” Provectus Biopharm., Inc., 2018 NCBC LEXIS 101 , at *63 (quoting Carver v. Roberts, 78 N.C.

2016Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC, 189 N.C.App. 601 , 609, 659 S.E.2d 442 , 449 (2008) (citation omitted); see also Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77 , 85, 273 S.E.2d 674 , 678 (1981) ("[I]n pleading actual fraud the particularity requirement [imposed by N.C.R.

2016Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC, 189 N.C.App. 601 , 609, 659 S.E.2d 442 , 449 (2008) (citation omitted); see also Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77 , 85, 273 S.E.2d 674 , 678 (1981) ("[I]n pleading actual fraud the particularity requirement [imposed by N.C.R.

2026For a UDPTA claim, “[p]roof of fraud necessarily constitutes a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive trade practices.” Sutton v. Driver, 211 N.C.

2025See United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 992 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005).

2025See United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 992 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005).

2025See United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 992 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005).

2025See United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 992 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005).

2025See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (holding that a search warrant should be as limited as possible to avoid “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.)” “A search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, as well as the activities and objects which are the subjects of the proposed search.” Brooks v. Taylor Tobacco Enterprises, Inc., 298 N.C. 759, 762 (1997) (internal quotations -9- STATE V.

2023Terry, 302 N.C. at 85 ; N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(b) (“In all averments of fraud, duress or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”) An alleged misrepresentation must be “definite and specific.” Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 139 (1974). -14- VALUE HEALTH SOLS., INC.

2017For the Riders' fraud claim to survive summary judgment, Hodges' conduct must satisfy all the elements of fraud: "(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact; (2) reasonably calculated to deceive; (3) made with the intent to deceive; (4) which does in fact deceive; (5) resulting in damage to the injured party." Forbis , 361 N.C. at 526 -27 , 649 S.E.2d at 388 (quotation omitted). "[A]ny reliance on the allegedly false representations must be reasonable." Id . at 527, 649 S.E.2d at 388 (citation omitted). *89 Under Rule 9(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, "[i]n

2017For the Riders' fraud claim to survive summary judgment, Hodges' conduct must satisfy all the elements of fraud: "(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact; (2) reasonably calculated to deceive; (3) made with the intent to deceive; (4) which does in fact deceive; (5) resulting in damage to the injured party." Forbis , 361 N.C. at 526 -27 , 649 S.E.2d at 388 (quotation omitted). "[A]ny reliance on the allegedly false representations must be reasonable." Id . at 527, 649 S.E.2d at 388 (citation omitted). *89 Under Rule 9(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, "[i]n

2013To meet the particularity requirement, courts do not require “perfect and complete specificity.” Hudgins v. Wagoner, 204 N.C.

2013App. 480, 487 , 694 S.E.2d 436, 443 (2010) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to plead the exact “place” where the misrepresentation was made did not defeat the claim).

2012App. 589, 597 , 439 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1994)). {52} When pleading actual fraud, “the particularity requirement is met by alleging time, place and content of the fraudulent representation, identity of the person making the representation and what was obtained as a result of the fraudulent acts or representations.” Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. at 85 , 273 S.E.2d at 678 . {53} In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that: Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff that they would perform their obligations under the Employment Agreement, Asset Purchase Agreement and loan documents and that the performance

2012Under the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), “[m]ere generalities and conclusory allegations of fraud will not suffice.” Allran v. Branch Bank & Trust Corp., 2011 NCBC 21 ¶ 31 (N.C.

2011App. 390, 391 , 226 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1976)). {33} The particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) means that a plaintiff must specifically allege the time, place and content of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment, and the identity of the person who concealed the information.

2011See Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 85 , 273 S.E.2d 674, 678 (1981). {34} As to the portion of Plaintiff’s claims alleging fraud by affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, the Court finds that the Complaint contains no specific allegations about the identity of speakers or the time and place where the fraudulent statements were made. {35} Instead, Plaintiff generally alleges in the Complaint that Defendants “misrepresented the value of the property . . . [and] misrepresented that properties in the Cannonsgate development were good investments.” Compl. ¶ 28. {36} Plaintiff has failed to