16 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Arvle Edgar Medlingreen2 sentences2001“When law enforcement officers grossly exceed the scope of a search warrant in seizing property, the particularity requirement is undermined and a valid warrant is transformed into a general warrant thereby requiring suppression of all evidence seized under that warrant.” U.S. v. Medlin (Medlin II), 842 F.2d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1988). 2001"When law enforcement officers grossly exceed the scope of a search warrant in seizing property, the particularity requirement is undermined and a valid warrant is transformed into a general warrant thereby requiring suppression of all evidence seized under that warrant." U.S. v. Medlin (Medlin II), 842 F.2d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1988). | 2 | 2 |
Cendant Corp. v. Sheltongreen2 sentences2010E.D.N.Y. 2008) (‘The particularity requirement of Rule 9[b] applies only if actual, as opposed to constructive, fraud is alleged.’); Cendant Corp. v. Shelton, 474 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380 (D. 2009E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The particularity requirement of Rule 9[b] applies only if actual, as opposed to constructive, fraud is alleged.”); Cendant Corp. v. Shelton, 474 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380 (D. | 2 | 2 |
Rosales v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc.green2 sentences2010Conn. 2007) (‘Courts have not applied Rule 9[b] to claims of constructive, rather than actual, fraud.’); Rosales v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1489, 1498 (D. 2009Conn. 2007) (“Courts have not applied Rule 9[b] to claims of constructive, rather than actual, fraud.”); Rosales v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1489, 1498 (D. | 2 | 2 |
Groh v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2022See State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332, 339 , 806 P.2d 986 (1991) ("where a warrant fails to describe the area to be searched with sufficient particularity, that defect can be cured by the accompanying affidavit if the affidavit is attached to the warrant and the warrant incorporates the affidavit by reference"); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 , 124 S. Ct. 1284 , 157 L. 2014The Court emphasized that this particularity requirement was well-established, and went on to emphasize that “even a cursory reading of the warrant in this case—perhaps just a glance—would have revealed a glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer would have known was constitutionally fatal.” 540 U.S. at 564 . | 1 | 2 |
Palmer v. Browngreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 901 , 752 P.2d 685 (1988) (holding that an appellant's petition did not allege fraud with sufficient particularity). 2026See, e.g., Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 901 , 752 P.2d 685 (1988) (holding that an appellant's petition did not allege fraud with sufficient particularity). | 1 | 1 |
State v. LeFortgreen2 sentences2022See State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332, 339 , 806 P.2d 986 (1991) ("where a warrant fails to describe the area to be searched with sufficient particularity, that defect can be cured by the accompanying affidavit if the affidavit is attached to the warrant and the warrant incorporates the affidavit by reference"); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 , 124 S. Ct. 1284 , 157 L. 2022See State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332, 339 , 806 P.2d 986 (1991) ("where a warrant fails to describe the area to be searched with sufficient particularity, that defect can be cured by the accompanying affidavit if the affidavit is attached to the warrant and the warrant incorporates the affidavit by reference"); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 , 124 S. Ct. 1284 , 157 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Fostergreen2 sentences2001See U.S. v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 849-50 (10th Cir. 1996). 2001See U.S. v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 849-50 (10th Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dyegreen2 sentences2001See State v. Dye, 250 Kan. 287, 293 , 826 P.2d 500 (1992). 2001See State v. Dye, 250 Kan. 287, 293 , 826 P.2d 500 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Reedgreen2 sentences1992See State v. Reed, 248 Kan. 792 , 811 P.2d 1163 (1991) (reversal of district court’s invalidation of K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 21-4603(3)(a) as violative of separation of powers doctrine); State v. Zirkle, 15 Kan. 1992See State v. Reed, 248 Kan. 792 , 811 P.2d 1163 (1991) (reversal of district court’s invalidation of K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 21-4603(3)(a) as violative of separation of powers doctrine); State v. Zirkle, 15 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. McFeeters
green
2 sentences2026App. 2d 45, 48-49 , 362 P.3d 603 (2015), this court held that to satisfy the particularity requirement of the statute, a district 5 court's findings "'must be distinct rather than general, with exactitude of detail, especially in description or stated with attention to or concern with details'" and the district court must "explicitly address how the public's safety would be jeopardized or how the offender's welfare would not be served by imposition of the intermediate sanctions." (Emphases added.) In State v. Duran, 56 Kan. 2022As addressed above, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716 and K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3716 both permit the district court to revoke probation without previously imposing a graduated intermediate sanction if "the court finds and sets forth with particularity the reasons for finding that the safety of members of the public will be jeopardized or that the welfare of the offender will not be served by such sanction." (Emphasis added.) To satisfy this particularity requirement, the district court's findings "must be distinct rather than general, with exactitude of detail, especially in description or stated with | 4 | 2018–2026 |
State v. Clapp
green
2 sentences2024The Kansas Supreme Court has held: "The particularity requirement . . . is not met when an appellate court must imply the district court's reasons for finding that the safety of members of the public will be jeopardized or that the welfare of the offender will not be served by the bypassed intermediate sanction." State v. Clapp, 308 Kan. 976 , Syl. ¶ 4, 425 P.3d 605 (2018). 2020The court must give "distinct rather than general" reasons "with exactitude of detail." State v. Clapp, 308 Kan. 976 , Syl. ¶ 4, 425 P.3d 605 (2018). | 2 | 2020–2024 |
State v. Ervin
green
1 sentence2026Jail Time Credit Lastly, Warren seeks an additional eight days of jail time credit in his 2023 case based on State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287 , 566 P.3d 481 (2025). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Duran
green
2 sentences2026App. 2d 45, 48-49 , 362 P.3d 603 (2015), this court held that to satisfy the particularity requirement of the statute, a district 5 court's findings "'must be distinct rather than general, with exactitude of detail, especially in description or stated with attention to or concern with details'" and the district court must "explicitly address how the public's safety would be jeopardized or how the offender's welfare would not be served by imposition of the intermediate sanctions." (Emphases added.) In State v. Duran, 56 Kan. 2026App. 2d 1268, 1275 , 445 P.3d 761 (2019), this court emphasized that particularized findings are more than generalized findings that the defendant is not amenable to probation. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Huskey
green
1 sentence2024Rather, when a statute requires particularized findings "'it must be distinct rather than general, with exactitude of detail, especially in description or 6 stated with attention to or concern with details.'" 308 Kan. at 989-90 (quoting State v. Huskey, 17 Kan. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Gordon
neutral
2 sentences2022He cites State v. Gordon, 221 Kan. 253, 259 , 559 P.2d 312 (1977), which held that "a search warrant directed against a multiple occupancy structure generally will be held invalid if it fails to describe the particular room or subunit to be searched with sufficient definiteness to preclude a search of other units." But Hillard's reliance on Gordon is misplaced because 1310 S. Meridian Street is not a multiple occupancy structure—that is, it is not "'a structure divided into more than 44 one occupancy unit such as a hotel, apartment house, or similar multiunit dwelling.'" 221 Kan. at 259 . 2022He cites State v. Gordon, 221 Kan. 253, 259 , 559 P.2d 312 (1977), which held that "a search warrant directed against a multiple occupancy structure generally will be held invalid if it fails to describe the particular room or subunit to be searched with sufficient definiteness to preclude a search of other units." But Hillard's reliance on Gordon is misplaced because 1310 S. Meridian Street is not a multiple occupancy structure—that is, it is not "'a structure divided into more than 44 one occupancy unit such as a hotel, apartment house, or similar multiunit dwelling.'" 221 Kan. at 259 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Patterson
green
1 sentence2022To satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, "'the search warrant must describe the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity to permit the executing officer to locate the same from the face of the warrant.'" Patterson, 304 Kan. at 275 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Stanford v. Texas
green
2 sentences1992Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 , 13 L. 1992Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 , 13 L. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Zirkle
green
1 sentence1992See State v. Reed, 248 Kan. 792 , 811 P.2d 1163 (1991) (reversal of district court’s invalidation of K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 21-4603(3)(a) as violative of separation of powers doctrine); State v. Zirkle, 15 Kan. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Ludger Vance Clement
green
2 sentences1992In United States v. Clement, 747 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1984), the search warrant described the premises to be searched as “ ‘apartment of Vance Clements, No. 4 at 3300 Irvine Avenue.’ ” 747 F.2d at 461 . 1992In United States v. Clement, 747 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1984), the search warrant described the premises to be searched as “ ‘apartment of Vance Clements, No. 4 at 3300 Irvine Avenue.’ ” 747 F.2d at 461 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Grimsley
green
1 sentence1992App. 2d 441 , 808 P.2d 1387 (1991), we applied K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 21-4603(4)(a) without expressly discussing the particularity requirement. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Kyles
green
1 sentence1992The court said: “Under these circumstances, there was little probability that the wrong place would be searched, and there was no violation of the particularity requirement.” 513 So. 2d at 270 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.