particularity requirement in Massachusetts

2002See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971), modified by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 298 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989). “[I]t both defines and limits the scope of the search and seizure, thereby protecting individuals from general searches, which was the vice of the pre-Revolution writs of assistance.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Pope, 354 Mass. 625, 629 (1968).

2001Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). “[I]t both defines and limits the scope of the search and seizure, thereby protecting individuals from general searches . . .” Commonwealth v. Pope, 354 Mass. 625, 629 (1968).

2026Our appellate courts "make no distinction between art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment in [their] analysis [of the particularity requirement]." Commonwealth v. Walsh, 409 Mass. 644 - 645 (1991) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 566 (2007) (" Our cases do not distinguish between the statutory requirement of particularity, as set forth in G.

2025"The dual purposes of the particularity requirement are ' ( l) to protect individuals from general searches and (2) to provide the Commonwealth the opportunity to demonstrate, to a reviewing court, that the scope of the officers' authority to search was properly limited."' Commonwealth v. Perry, 489 Mass. 436 ,459 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 566-567 (2007).

2025The particularity requirement " both defines and limits the scope of the search and seizure." Commonwealth v. Pope, 354 Mass. 625, 629 (1968).

2002See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971), modified by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 298 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989). “[I]t both defines and limits the scope of the search and seizure, thereby protecting individuals from general searches, which was the vice of the pre-Revolution writs of assistance.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Pope, 354 Mass. 625, 629 (1968).

1999The particularity requirement was enunciated in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), and is meant to limit the discretion of the officer executing the search warrant.

1980The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution requires both that “the cause or foundation of [warrants must be] previously supported by oath or affirmation” and that the warrant contain “a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure . . . with the formalities prescribed by the laws.” The pa

2025The purpose of this particularity requirement is "to prevent general searches." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). "[T]he requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." Id.

2025The purpose of this particularity requirement is "to prevent general searches." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). "[T]he requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." Id.

2016See Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. 482, 488-489 (1976).

2011Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. 482, 488-89 (1976).

2013The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Similarly, art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires warrants to be “accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure.” This particularity requirement “both defines and limits the scope of the search and seizure, thereby protecting individuals from general searches, which was the vice of the pre-Revolution writs of assistance.” Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 8 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v

2007See Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 7 (2002) (“particularity requirement [of art. 14] serves as a safeguard against general exploratory rummaging by the police through a person’s belongings”); Commonwealth v. Guaba, 417 Mass. 746, 753-755 (1994) (art. 14’s implicit requirement that warrant be present at search scene serves to guide police to permissible scope of search and to put occupant of premises on notice of authority to search and reasons for search).

1999The particularity requirement is designed to prohibit “wide-ranging exploratory searches.” Commonwealth v. Carrasco, 405 Mass. 316, 323 (1989), quoting Maryland v. Garrison, supra. “[T]he scope of a warrant authorizing the search of a particularly described residence includes any automobiles, owned or controlled by the owner of such residence, which are located within the curtilage of the premises at the time the warrant is executed.” Commonwealth v. Signorine, 404 Mass. 400, 403 (1989).

1995By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Commonwealth v. Carrasco, 405 Mass. 316, 323 (1989), quoting from Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84 .

2013The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Similarly, art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires warrants to be “accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure.” This particularity requirement “both defines and limits the scope of the search and seizure, thereby protecting individuals from general searches, which was the vice of the pre-Revolution writs of assistance.” Commonwealth v. Balicki, 436 Mass. 1, 8 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v

2002See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971), modified by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 298 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989). “[I]t both defines and limits the scope of the search and seizure, thereby protecting individuals from general searches, which was the vice of the pre-Revolution writs of assistance.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Pope, 354 Mass. 625, 629 (1968).

2004That rule is in keeping with the well-established principle that ‘except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is “unreasonable” unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.’ ” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 988 n.5 (1984), quoting from Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528-529 (1967).

1985The Supreme Court agreed, and held that “the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-988 (1984).

2026L. c. 276, §§ 1, 2, as well as constitutional." Commonwealth v. Treadwell, 402 Mass. 355,358 (1988).

2025Police officers must either obtain a second warrant, satisfying the particularity clause, see Hall, 366 Mass. at 800 , or establish the existence of exigent circumstances and the impracticality of obtaining a warrant, see Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 683-684 (2010).

2025See id. at 799-800 .[13] The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has focused on the limiting principle in the particularity clause, stating, "In determining the permissible scope of a search that has been authorized by a search warrant, . . . we must look to the place that the magistrate judge who issued the warrant intended to be searched . . . ." United States v. Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2012).

2025Police officers must either obtain a second warrant, satisfying the particularity clause, see Hall, 366 Mass. at 800 , or establish the existence of exigent circumstances and the impracticality of obtaining a warrant, see Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 683-684 (2010).

2025Id. at 799-800 . [16] The dissent also cites United States v. Evans, 320 F.2d 482, 483 (6th Cir. 1963), in support of reversal.

2025See id. at 799-800 .[13] The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has focused on the limiting principle in the particularity clause, stating, "In determining the permissible scope of a search that has been authorized by a search warrant, . . . we must look to the place that the magistrate judge who issued the warrant intended to be searched . . . ." United States v. Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2012).

2025Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d at 211-212 .

2025Defining the permissible parameters of time for a CSLI search that is justified by probable cause is a "fact-intensive inquiry, and must be resolved based on the particular facts of each case." Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 549 (2019), quoting Holley, supra at 522.

2025See United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2015) (invalidating search under particularity clause because "when the agents searched Apartment 1 rather than Apartment 2, they searched an apartment that the magistrate judge did not authorize them to search"); United States v. Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d 206, 215 (2d Cir. 2012) ("there can be no doubt that a search warrant for one apartment in a building does not permit the police to enter apartments other than the one specified in their warrant"). [13] The dissent contends that Hall, 366 Mass. at 791 , is distinguishable because "th

2023Compare Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461 , 473-474 & n.12 (2000) (where defendant did not raise in motion to suppress, or accompanying affidavit, issue whether search for weapon was outside curtilage of apartment, such issue was waived), with Commonwealth v. Douglas, 472 Mass. 439 , 444 n.5 (2015) (Commonwealth's contention that motions to suppress should have been dismissed for failure to comply with particularity requirement of rule 13 [a] [2] was waived because of Commonwealth's failure to file motion before 14 suppression hearing for denial of suppression motions or for more particular

2023Compare Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461 , 473-474 & n.12 (2000) (where defendant did not raise in motion to suppress, or accompanying affidavit, issue whether search for weapon was outside curtilage of apartment, such issue was waived), with Commonwealth v. Douglas, 472 Mass. 439 , 444 n.5 (2015) (Commonwealth's contention that motions to suppress should have been dismissed for failure to comply with particularity requirement of rule 13 [a] [2] was waived because of Commonwealth's failure to file motion before 14 suppression hearing for denial of suppression motions or for more particular

2018Compare Commonwealth v. Lopes , 455 Mass. 147 , 155, 157-158, 914 N.E.2d 78 (2009).

2018Compare Commonwealth v. Lopes , 455 Mass. 147 , 155, 157-158, 914 N.E.2d 78 (2009).

2018See Commonwealth v. Molina , 476 Mass. 388 , 394 (2017).

2016The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded in United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1097 (2009), that review after the fact of the reasonableness of a given search satisfied the particularity requirement, but acknowledged that such review "may be problematic" in some contexts.

2016The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded in United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1097 (2009), that review after the fact of the reasonableness of a given search satisfied the particularity requirement, but acknowledged that such review “may be problematic” in some contexts.