particularity requirement in Ohio

2026“The common theme of all descriptions of the particularity standard is that the warrant must allow the executing officer to distinguish between items that may and may not be seized.” United States v. Leary (C.A. 10, 1988), 846 F.2d 592, 600, fn. 12 .

2025“The common theme of all descriptions of the particularity standard is that the warrant must allow the executing officer to distinguish between items that may and may not be seized.” United States v. Leary (C.A. 10, 1988), 846 F.2d 592, 600, fn. 12 .

2025“The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches.” Id.

2021As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the purpose of the particularity requirement for search warrants is “to prevent general searches” and to ensure “that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 , 107 S.Ct. 1013 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987).

2026United States v. Otero (C.A. 10, 2009), 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 . “(A) search warrant is not to be assessed in a hypertechnical manner (and need not satisfy the) ‘(t)echnical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings.’ ” United States v. Srivastava (C.A. 4, 2008), 540 F.3d 277, 289 , quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).

2025United States v. Otero (C.A. 10, 2009), 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 . “(A) search warrant is not to be assessed in a hypertechnical manner (and need not satisfy the) ‘(t)echnical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings.’ ” United States v. Srivastava (C.A. 4, 2008), 540 F.3d 277, 289 , quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).

2025The Court also explained that “[a] search warrant that includes broad 13 categories of items to be seized may nevertheless be valid when the description is ‘as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.’” Id. at ¶ 80, quoting Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001). {¶31} In determining the search warrant failed the particularity requirement, the Court noted that the detective testified at the suppression hearing as to the details of the records and documents he expected to be stored on the defendant’s computer.

2018Craw also argues that the warrant’s description of the items to be seized is defective because the search warrant does not specifically authorize law enforcement officers to seize methamphetamine. {¶30} “A search warrant that includes broad categories of items to be seized may nevertheless be valid when the description is ‘“‘as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.’”’” Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2015-Ohio-1565 , at ¶ 80, quoting Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.2001), quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1

2018See Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2013"The Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity prevents 'a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.' " State v. Young, 146 Ohio App.3d 245, 256 , quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). {¶ 11} Defendant contends the particularity requirement was violated in this instance because the warrant described the entire building instead of the individual booths operated by defendant.

2026Id. “‘Warrants that fail to describe the items to be seized with as much specificity as the government’s knowledge and the circumstances allow are “invalidated by their substantial failure to specify as nearly as possible the distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be seized.”’” Id., quoting Castagnola at ¶ 80 , quoting United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1987). {¶36} The application of these principles is particularly nuanced in the context of digital evidence. “‘The modern development of the personal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array of

2015There are myriad factors, all of which are driven by the nature or character of the item to be seized and searched. 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, Section 4.6(a). {¶ 74} Moreover, “[t]he modern development of the personal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person’s private affairs, and accordingly makes the particularity requirement much more important.” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir.2009).

2026As a result, “a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988, fn. 5 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984).

2026As a result, “a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988, fn. 5 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984).

2024This particularity requirement affords the State an opportunity to prepare its case and the trial court the ability to “rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of the merits.” Id., quoting Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 (1988). {¶39} Watterson’s motion makes only passing references to the fact that she took a breathalyzer test and fails to mention the Ohio Administrative Code.

2015This particularity requirement for a Franks allegation is compounded when a defendant asserts it via a motion to suppress, which must “state the motion’s legal and factual bases with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the issues to be decided.” State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54 (1994), syllabus; see also City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 (“The prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the challenge in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of

2025See State v. Bugno, 2022-Ohio-2008 , ¶ 33-34 (7th Dist.) (explaining that a supporting affidavit may be read together with, and considered a part of, a warrant that otherwise lacks particularity “if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant”), citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-558 (2004); United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 470-471 (4th Cir. 2006); see also State v. Craw, 2018-Ohio-1769, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment requires particularity in the warrant, not the supporting documents, but ack

2025See State v. Bugno, 2022-Ohio-2008 , ¶ 33-34 (7th Dist.) (explaining that a supporting affidavit may be read together with, and considered a part of, a warrant that otherwise lacks particularity “if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant”), citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-558 (2004); United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 470-471 (4th Cir. 2006); see also State v. Craw, 2018-Ohio-1769, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment requires particularity in the warrant, not the supporting documents, but ack

2018Craw also argues that the warrant’s description of the items to be seized is defective because the search warrant does not specifically authorize law enforcement officers to seize methamphetamine. {¶30} “A search warrant that includes broad categories of items to be seized may nevertheless be valid when the description is ‘“‘as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.’”’” Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2015-Ohio-1565 , at ¶ 80, quoting Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.2001), quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1

2016The court further recognized, however, that "[a] search warrant that includes broad categories of items to be seized may nevertheless be valid when the description is ' " 'as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.' " ' " Id. at ¶ 80, quoting Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.2001), quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1988), quoting United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985). {¶ 33} Under the facts of Castagnola, the defendant, Castagnola, admitted to a law enforcement official that he had damaged

2018Craw also argues that the warrant’s description of the items to be seized is defective because the search warrant does not specifically authorize law enforcement officers to seize methamphetamine. {¶30} “A search warrant that includes broad categories of items to be seized may nevertheless be valid when the description is ‘“‘as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.’”’” Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2015-Ohio-1565 , at ¶ 80, quoting Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.2001), quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1

2016The court further recognized, however, that "[a] search warrant that includes broad categories of items to be seized may nevertheless be valid when the description is ' " 'as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.' " ' " Id. at ¶ 80, quoting Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.2001), quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1988), quoting United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985). {¶ 33} Under the facts of Castagnola, the defendant, Castagnola, admitted to a law enforcement official that he had damaged

1996See, e.g., Gaskins, 74 Ohio St.3d at 149 , 656 N.E.2d at 1283 , stating that Gaskins “claimed [in his petition that] he was fifteen at the time of conviction * * *.” Finally, appellee’s motion to dismiss could not have been treated as a return because it did not contain a sworn statement concerning Harris’s age at the time of the offenses or properly authenticated documents establishing such age.

1996See, e.g., Gaskins, 74 Ohio St.3d at 149 , 656 N.E.2d at 1283 , stating that Gaskins “claimed [in his petition that] he was fifteen at the time of conviction * * *.” Finally, appellee’s motion to dismiss could not have been treated as a return because it did not contain a sworn statement concerning Harris’s age at the time of the offenses or properly authenticated documents establishing such age.

2019Baker v. Conlan, 66 Ohio App.3d 454, 458 , 585 N.E.2d 543 (1st Dist.1990).

2019Baker v. Conlan, 66 Ohio App.3d 454, 458 , 585 N.E.2d 543 (1st Dist.1990).

2023“The very nature of the questions presented 5 requires a case-by-case fact-driven analysis.” State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2015-Ohio- 1565, ¶ 32. {¶12} “The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches.

2017Therefore, the particularity issue is implicit in a probable-cause argument." (Citations omitted.) State v. Castagnola , 145 Ohio St. 3d 1 , 2015-Ohio-1565 , 46 N.E.3d 638 , ¶ 70. {¶ 89} There are two aspects of the particularity requirement.

2026This particularity requirement ensures that both “the prosecutor and court are placed on notice of those issues to be heard and decided by the court.” State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58 (1994). {¶17} We review de novo whether a motion to suppress comports with Crim.R. 47.

2015This particularity requirement for a Franks allegation is compounded when a defendant asserts it via a motion to suppress, which must “state the motion’s legal and factual bases with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and the court on notice of the issues to be decided.” State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54 (1994), syllabus; see also City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 (“The prosecutor must know the grounds of the challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court must know the challenge in order to rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly dispose of

2025See State v. Bugno, 2022-Ohio-2008 , ¶ 33-34 (7th Dist.) (explaining that a supporting affidavit may be read together with, and considered a part of, a warrant that otherwise lacks particularity “if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant”), citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-558 (2004); United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 470-471 (4th Cir. 2006); see also State v. Craw, 2018-Ohio-1769, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment requires particularity in the warrant, not the supporting documents, but ack

2015To reiterate, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “[N]o Warrants shall issue * * * [except those] particular ly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” “[T]he presumptive rule against warrantless searches applies "with equal force to searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in the warrant.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 , 124 S.Ct. 1284 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). {¶ 73} We cannot overstate the variety and complexity of the considerations that a neutral and detached officer must make when determining whether th

2026Instead, the question is whether the language used provides sufficient notice to the state.’” Mishler at ¶ 13 , quoting State v. Codeluppi, 2014-Ohio-1574, ¶ 13 . {¶23} On appeal, Harris has not explained how her second motion to suppress met the particularity requirement under Crim.R. 47.

2026See State v. Codeluppi, 2014-Ohio-1574, ¶ 8-9 ; State v. Clark, 2024-Ohio-1869, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); State v. Moore, 2017-Ohio-7024, ¶ 36 (11th Dist.). {¶18} When officers execute a search without a warrant, the State must shoulder the burden of explaining why the search was nevertheless “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

2020Under this exception, evidence is not barred where officers act in “objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate,” but the warrant is “ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.” State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 , 544 N.E.2d 640 , paragraph three of the syllabus, following Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 .

2005"Given that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did not comply with that requirement was valid." Groh, 540 U.S. at 563 ; Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 ("a warrant may be so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize * * * the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid"); George, 975 F.2d at 77 (warrant limiting the scope of items to be seized by reference to a broad criminal statute "is so unconstitutionally broad that no reasonably well-tr

2015However, the specific evidence sought must be clearly stated: “As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S.Ct. 74 , 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). “[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), fn. 5. {¶ 90} Having determined that the search warrant lacked particularity and was therefore invalid, we must now consider

2015However, the specific evidence sought must be clearly stated: “As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S.Ct. 74 , 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). “[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), fn. 5. {¶ 90} Having determined that the search warrant lacked particularity and was therefore invalid, we must now consider