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20 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Steele v. United States No. 1green2 sentences2025The particularity requirement mandates that "the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and A-1399-24 28 identify the place intended [to be searched]." State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 611 (2009) (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)). 2025The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent "general" and "wide - ranging exploratory searches." Ibid. (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). | 9 | 9 |
Maryland v. Garrisongreen2 sentences2026The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent "general" and "wide-ranging exploratory searches." Marshall, 199 N.J. at 611 (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). 2025The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent "general" and "wide - ranging exploratory searches." Ibid. (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). | 5 | 8 |
State v. Ratushnygreen2 sentences2009The overarching lesson of the weight of both our own and other authority is straightforward: when confronted with a multi-family dwelling, the particularity requirement of the warrant clause is satisfied if the warrant “eontain[s] as specific a description of the particular area to be searched as the nature of the circumstances reasonably permit.” Ratushny, supra, 82 N.J.Super. at 506 , 198 A.2d 131 (emphasis supplied). 2009The overarching lesson of the weight of both our own and other authority is straightforward: when confronted with a multi-family dwelling, the particularity requirement of the warrant clause is satisfied if the warrant “eontain[s] as specific a description of the particular area to be searched as the nature of the circumstances reasonably permit.” Ratushny, supra, 82 N.J.Super. at 506 , 198 A.2d 131 (emphasis supplied). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2026The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent "general" and "wide-ranging exploratory searches." Marshall, 199 N.J. at 611 (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). 2025The particularity requirement mandates that "the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and A-1399-24 28 identify the place intended [to be searched]." State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 611 (2009) (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)). | 2 | 10 |
State v. De Simonegreen2 sentences2016See De Simone, supra, 60 N.J. at 321-22 , 288 A.2d 849 . 2016See De Simone, supra, 60 N.J. at 321-22 , 288 A.2d 849 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Hector Feliciano(074395)green2 sentences2023A. In nearly identical language, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Both constitutions state that warrants must be supported by probable cause and must describe with particularity “the place to be searched” and the “things to be seized.” The particularity requirement was designed to repudiate “general warrants known as writs of assistance” that “officers of the Crown had” used to “bedevil[] the colonists.” State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 366 (2016) (quoting Stan 2020"The particularity requirement, in general, mandates that a warrant sufficiently describe the place to be searched so 'that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.'" State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 366 (2016) (quoting Marshall, 199 N.J. at 611 ); see also Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) (same). | 2 | 2 |
Berger v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2024The use of open-ended, general warrants has been condemned as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power," Boyd v. United States, A-1578-22 11 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (internal quotation omitted), and "was a motivating factor behind the Declaration of Independence," Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967). 2022The compelled disclosures of all prospective contents of electronic communications in a subscriber's social media account on an ongoing basis for more than four weeks authorizes multiple intrusions into private communications based on a single showing of probable cause, and therefore is contrary to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment under Berger, 388 U.S. at 59 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2019The affidavit states that the search was to be conducted by the officers who actually conducted the surveillance, who "knew the specific property for which the warrant was issued." Ibid.; see also Wright, 61 N.J. at 149 (explaining that an officer's "own knowledge is a very relevant factor" in determining whether the particularity requirement's purpose—preventing entry into property that officers have "no authority to invade"—is violated). 2009The State also relies on this Court’s opinion in Wright and argues that the particularity requirement was satisfied in the present case by the reference in the warrant to the unit to which Daniels had “possession, custody, control, or access.” In Wright, supra, the affidavit in support of the warrant outlined that the police had observed four known drug users enter and leave the premises. 61 N.J. at 148 , 293 A.2d 380 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Danielsgreen2 sentences2009For that reason, the particularity requirement in the warrant clause commands that “the place to be searched shall be particularly described.” Ibid. 2009For that reason, the particularity requirement in the warrant clause commands that "the place to be searched shall be particularly described." Ibid. | 1 | 2 |
Boyd v. United Statesred1 sentence2024The use of open-ended, general warrants has been condemned as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power," Boyd v. United States, A-1578-22 11 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (internal quotation omitted), and "was a motivating factor behind the Declaration of Independence," Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Stanford v. Texasgreen2 sentences2023A. In nearly identical language, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Both constitutions state that warrants must be supported by probable cause and must describe with particularity “the place to be searched” and the “things to be seized.” The particularity requirement was designed to repudiate “general warrants known as writs of assistance” that “officers of the Crown had” used to “bedevil[] the colonists.” State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 366 (2016) (quoting Stan 2023The requirement served to “prevent . . . ‘wide-ranging exploratory searches.’” Ibid. (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of Wilksgreen2 sentences2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n 2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n 2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n 2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched" (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E. 2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct.2006) (stating that "particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grovesgreen2 sentences2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n 2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n | 1 | 1 |
Olivas v. Stategreen2 sentences2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n 2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched" (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E. 2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct.2006) (stating that "particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n | 1 | 1 |
Henry v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 91 , 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1020 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 , 80 S.Ct. 168, 170-71 , 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 137-38 (1959). 2000See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 91 , 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1020 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 , 80 S.Ct. 168, 170-71 , 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 137-38 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Muldowneygreen2 sentences1998See Muldowney, supra, 60 N.J. at 600 , 292 A.2d 26 (noting that a warrant is sufficiently definite if the “officer executing it can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty.”); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-80 , 96 S.Ct 2737, 2748 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 627, 642-43 (1976) (holding that a warrant authorizing a search for evidence relevant to the crime of false pretense regarding a specified lot in a real estate development satisfied the particularity test). 4 Exclusion of the Deputy Medical Examiner’s Supplemental Report Dr. Clayton, the Deputy Medical Examiner, performe 1998See Muldowney, supra, 60 N.J. at 600 , 292 A.2d 26 (noting that a warrant is sufficiently definite if the “officer executing it can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty.”); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-80 , 96 S.Ct 2737, 2748 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 627, 642-43 (1976) (holding that a warrant authorizing a search for evidence relevant to the crime of false pretense regarding a specified lot in a real estate development satisfied the particularity test). 4 Exclusion of the Deputy Medical Examiner’s Supplemental Report Dr. Clayton, the Deputy Medical Examiner, performe | 1 | 1 |
Andresen v. Marylandgreen2 sentences1998See Muldowney, supra, 60 N.J. at 600 , 292 A.2d 26 (noting that a warrant is sufficiently definite if the “officer executing it can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty.”); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-80 , 96 S.Ct 2737, 2748 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 627, 642-43 (1976) (holding that a warrant authorizing a search for evidence relevant to the crime of false pretense regarding a specified lot in a real estate development satisfied the particularity test). 4 Exclusion of the Deputy Medical Examiner’s Supplemental Report Dr. Clayton, the Deputy Medical Examiner, performe 1998See Muldowney, supra, 60 N.J. at 600 , 292 A.2d 26 (noting that a warrant is sufficiently definite if the “officer executing it can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty.”); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-80 , 96 S.Ct 2737, 2748 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 627, 642-43 (1976) (holding that a warrant authorizing a search for evidence relevant to the crime of false pretense regarding a specified lot in a real estate development satisfied the particularity test). 4 Exclusion of the Deputy Medical Examiner’s Supplemental Report Dr. Clayton, the Deputy Medical Examiner, performe | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gomezgreen1 sentence1996When determining whether a warrant complies with the particularity requirement, “[t]he standard ... is one of practical accuracy rather than technical nicety.” United States v. Gomez, 42 F.R.D. 347, 347 (S.D.N.Y.1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bisaccia
green
2 sentences2019Thus, we are convinced, as the Court was in Bisaccia, that the State did not violate the particularity requirement because "[t]he place searched was undeniably the place as to which A-5031-16T4 22 probable cause had been made out," "was in fact the place the warrant was meant to describe," and the "error" did not "taint the justice of the search." 58 N.J. at 592 . 2019Thus, we are convinced, as the Court was in Bisaccia, that the State did not violate the particularity requirement because "[t]he place searched was undeniably the place as to which A-5031-16T4 22 probable cause had been made out," "was in fact the place the warrant was meant to describe," and the "error" did not "taint the justice of the search." 58 N.J. at 592 . | 2 | 1985–2019 |
State v. Smith
green
1 sentence2026In other words, a CI's tip is one factor among others to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis: [T]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. [Ibid. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith, 155 N.J. at 93 ).] "The particularity req | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Sheehan
green
1 sentence2020We find defendant's arguments the court erred by rejecting his request for an evidentiary hearing or for a Franks hearing to be without sufficient merit 7 We note the drawing showed stairs leading from the first floor of the main residence to the floor above. 8 Because we find there is no evidence the main residence consisted of separate living units, it is unnecessary that we decide whether the search was otherwise lawful because the alleged "multiple-unit character of the premises [was] not known or [was] not reasonably apparent to the officer[s] applying for and executing the warrant." Shee | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re Larsen
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 269, 86 A.3d 710 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Turner v. United States
neutral
2 sentences2016That court observed that if the description “avoids these dangers, it may comply with the particularity requirement even though it does not specify the physical location of the place to be surveilled.” Ibid. 2016“To satisfy the particularity requirement,” the panel continued, “the description of the place to be searched must not be so broad as to allow the search of places for which probable cause to search has not been demonstrated, or so vague that an executing officer might mistakenly search a place for which authorization was not granted.” Ibid. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Romeo
green
2 sentences2009Because “the fundamental requirement of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness[,]” State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 206 , 203 A.2d 23 (1964), “[t]he description of the premises [to be searched] requires no more than ‘practical accuracy.’ ” Daniels, supra, 46 N.J. at 437 , 217 A.2d 610 (quotations omitted). 2009Because “the fundamental requirement of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness[,]” State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 206 , 203 A.2d 23 (1964), “[t]he description of the premises [to be searched] requires no more than ‘practical accuracy.’ ” Daniels, supra, 46 N.J. at 437 , 217 A.2d 610 (quotations omitted). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Commonwealth v. Toledo
green
2 sentences2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n 2009The particularity requirement will be met by including the correct address of the building and by naming the individual whose apartment is to be searched” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Toledo, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 688, 693 , 849 N.E.2d 1281 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (stating that “particularity of the description must be sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort so that there is no reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched which is n | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Marron v. United States
green
2 sentences1978As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. [ 275 U. S. at 196 , 48 S. Ct. at 76 , 72 L. 1978As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. [ 275 U. S. at 196 , 48 S. Ct. at 76 , 72 L. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, Etc.
green
1 sentence1976Del. 1973): * * * The particularity requirement may be considered as having two prongs: first, particularity of description so that a person attempting to exercise a subpoena may in good faith know what he is being asked to produce; and second, particularity of breadth so that a person in complying with a subpoena in good faith is not harassed or oppressed to the point that he experiences an unreasonable business detriment. [at 1132] See also, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, etc., supra, 391 F. Supp. at 999-1000 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.