53 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 30 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mansorgreen2 sentences2025Defendant filed motions to suppress evidence obtained from the April 2020 Pinger and TextNow war- rants, arguing that, among other things, the searches and seizures violated the heightened particularity requirement of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution announced in State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185 , 421 P3d 323 (2018) (Mansor Cite as 342 Or App 456 (2025) 463 II).2 See id. at 218 (to satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant to search a computer “must identify, as specifically as reasonably possible in the circumstances, the informa- tion to be searched for, including, if relev 2025Defendant filed motions to suppress evidence obtained from the April 2020 Pinger and TextNow war- rants, arguing that, among other things, the searches and seizures violated the heightened particularity requirement of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution announced in State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185 , 421 P3d 323 (2018) (Mansor Cite as 342 Or App 456 (2025) 463 II).2 See id. at 218 (to satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant to search a computer “must identify, as specifically as reasonably possible in the circumstances, the informa- tion to be searched for, including, if relev | 13 | 28 |
State v. Turaygreen2 sentences2025Further, the sixth category’s command to search for location information—as circumscribed by the lim- itations included in those categories, such as specific phone Cite as 338 Or App 59 (2025) 73 numbers, dates, and types of information—is sufficiently spe- cific and does not authorize “undue rummaging.” See Mansor II, 363 Or at 220 (without specificity, digital searches “raise the possibility of computer search warrants * * * sanctioning the undue rummaging that the particularity requirement was enacted to preclude” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Turay, 371 Or at 154 (command to sea 2024See, e.g., Mansor, 363 Or at 218 (explaining that warrants for digital information “must identify, as specifically as reasonably possible in the circum- stances, the information to be searched for, including, if relevant and available, the time period during which that information was created, accessed, or other- wise used”); Turay, 371 Or at 141 (explaining that the “specificity component” of the particularity requirement “gives rise to special requirements in the context of a warrant to search for digital data”). | 6 | 9 |
State v. Blackburngreen2 sentences2023Before Mansor, we had explained that a warrant authorizing a search of the physical world satisfies the specificity component of the particularity requirement if its description (1) “ ‘permits the executing officer to locate with reasonable effort the premises to be searched,’ ” id. (quot- ing Trax, 335 Or at 603 (internal quotation marks omitted)); and (2) describes “items to be seized and examined” in a way “that the officers can, ‘with reasonable effort[,] ascertain’ those items to a ‘reasonable degree of certainty,’ ” id. (quot- ing Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or at 35 ). 2019And, as relevant here, to comply with the particularity requirement, the warrant must, when read in that manner, "be sufficiently specific in describing the items to be seized and examined that the officers can, 'with reasonable effort ascertain' those items to a 'reasonable degree of certainty.' " Mansor , 363 Or. at 212 , 421 P.3d 323 (quoting State v. Blackburn/Barber , 266 Or. 28 , 35, 511 P.2d 381 (1973) ). 6 Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Oregon Supreme Court have recognized that, with regard to searches for data on cell phones or similar electronic devices, the part | 5 | 7 |
State v. Savathgreen2 sentences2024For searches of electronic devices, a warrant is specific enough to satisfy the particularity requirement if it “describe[s], with as much specificity as reasonably pos- sible under the circumstances, what investigating officers believe will be found” on the device, including, “if available and relevant, a temporal description of when the informa- tion was created, accessed, or otherwise used.” Id. at 216, 222 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 216 (“the ‘what’ is a description of the information related to the alleged crimi- nal conduct which there is probable cause to believe will be found” 2024For searches of electronic devices, a warrant is specific enough to satisfy the particularity requirement if it “describe[s], with as much specificity as reasonably pos- sible under the circumstances, what investigating officers believe will be found” on the device, including, “if available and relevant, a temporal description of when the informa- tion was created, accessed, or otherwise used.” Id. at 216, 222 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 216 (“the ‘what’ is a description of the information related to the alleged crimi- nal conduct which there is probable cause to believe will be found” | 4 | 4 |
State v. Traxgreen2 sentences2023In keeping with that purpose, the particularity requirement “exists to ‘narrow the scope of the search,’ ” so that officers search only those premises or items “ ‘for which a magistrate has found probable cause to authorize the search.’ ” Mansor, 363 Or at 212 (quoting State v. Trax, 335 Or 597, 602 , 75 P3d 440 (2003)); see also State v. Devine, 307 Or 341, 343 , 768 P2d 913 (1989) (explaining that the particularity requirement minimizes the risk of intru- sion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search). 2023In keeping with that purpose, the particularity requirement “exists to ‘narrow the scope of the search,’ ” so that officers search only those premises or items “ ‘for which a magistrate has found probable cause to authorize the search.’ ” Mansor, 363 Or at 212 (quoting State v. Trax, 335 Or 597, 602 , 75 P3d 440 (2003)); see also State v. Devine, 307 Or 341, 343 , 768 P2d 913 (1989) (explaining that the particularity requirement minimizes the risk of intru- sion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Bock (A169480)green2 sentences2025Beginning with the second com- mand, defendant argued that it “permit[ted] officers to look anywhere in the phone for any exchange of information.” As to the third command, defendant argued that it “authorized police to rummage through the entire phone on a quest to [discover] additional criminal activity that is not mentioned in the affidavit * * *.” Finally, defendant argued that the fifth command was impermissible under Bock. 310 Or App at 335 (command to search cell phone for “[a]ny evidence identify- ing the owner/user of the device” violated the particularity requirement because “the off 2025Beginning with the second command, defendant argued that it “permit[ted] officers to look any- where in the phone for any exchange of information.” As to the third command, defendant argued that it “authorized police to rummage through the entire phone on a quest to [discover] additional criminal activity that is not mentioned in the affidavit * * *.” Finally, defendant argued that the fifth command was impermissible under Bock (A169480). 310 Or App at 335 (command to search cell phone for “[a]ny evi- dence identifying the owner/user of the device” violated the particularity requirement becaus | 2 | 4 |
State v. Hargrovegreen2 sentences2025That standard requires more than the typical particularity requirement, which requires that the warrant particularly describe the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, and “allow the executing officer to identify with reasonable effort the things to be seized for which a magistrate has found probable cause.” Hargrove, 327 Or App at 442-43 . 2025That standard requires more than the typical particularity requirement, which requires that the warrant particularly describe the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, and “allow the executing officer to identify with reasonable effort the things to be seized for which a magistrate has found probable cause.” Hargrove, 327 Or App at 442-43 . | 2 | 4 |
Riley v. Cal. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021We repeat some of that summary here: “Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Oregon Supreme Court have recognized that, with regard to searches for data on cell phones or similar electronic devices, the particularity requirement takes on special sig- nificance. ‘[U]nlike most other “things” that may be seized in a search, a computer or other digital device is a repos- itory with a historically unprecedented capacity to collect and store a diverse and vast array of personal information.’ [Mansor II, 363 Or] at 208 (recognizing that a cell phone might be better viewed as a ‘place’ t 2021We repeat some of that summary here: “Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Oregon Supreme Court have recognized that, with regard to searches for data on cell phones or similar electronic devices, the particularity requirement takes on special sig- nificance. ‘[U]nlike most other “things” that may be seized in a search, a computer or other digital device is a repos- itory with a historically unprecedented capacity to collect and store a diverse and vast array of personal information.’ [Mansor II, 363 Or] at 208 (recognizing that a cell phone might be better viewed as a ‘place’ t | 2 | 4 |
State v. Devinegreen2 sentences2023In keeping with that purpose, the particularity requirement “exists to ‘narrow the scope of the search,’ ” so that officers search only those premises or items “ ‘for which a magistrate has found probable cause to authorize the search.’ ” Mansor, 363 Or at 212 (quoting State v. Trax, 335 Or 597, 602 , 75 P3d 440 (2003)); see also State v. Devine, 307 Or 341, 343 , 768 P2d 913 (1989) (explaining that the particularity requirement minimizes the risk of intru- sion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search). 2023In keeping with that purpose, the particularity requirement “exists to ‘narrow the scope of the search,’ ” so that officers search only those premises or items “ ‘for which a magistrate has found probable cause to authorize the search.’ ” Mansor, 363 Or at 212 (quoting State v. Trax, 335 Or 597, 602 , 75 P3d 440 (2003)); see also State v. Devine, 307 Or 341, 343 , 768 P2d 913 (1989) (explaining that the particularity requirement minimizes the risk of intru- sion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Goodegreen2 sentences2025Thus, our inquiry is limited to whether the warrant Cite as 342 Or App 456 (2025) 473 was “specific enough to allow an officer, with reasonable effort, to identify the place to be searched and the items to be seized.” Goode, 335 Or App at 116. 2025Thus, our inquiry is limited to whether the warrant Cite as 342 Or App 456 (2025) 473 was “specific enough to allow an officer, with reasonable effort, to identify the place to be searched and the items to be seized.” Goode, 335 Or App at 116. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cannongreen2 sentences2025We begin with defendant’s overbreadth argument, in which he relies on Cannon, where we observed that “the gravamen of an over- breadth challenge is an ‘asserted lack of probable cause’ ” and held that “probable cause must exist for each device that a warrant authorizes to be searched.” 299 Or App at 626, 629 . 2025We begin with defendant’s overbreadth argument, in which he relies on Cannon, where we observed that “the gravamen of an over- breadth challenge is an ‘asserted lack of probable cause’ ” and held that “probable cause must exist for each device that a warrant authorizes to be searched.” 299 Or App at 626, 629 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Turaygreen2 sentences2023See State v. Turay, 313 Or App 45, 63-66 , 493 P3d 1058 , rev allowed, 369 Or 69 (2021) (regarding the possi- bility of severing invalid commands from an otherwise valid warrant). 682 State v. Vesa Or App 495, 500, 447 P3d 1 , rev den, 365 Or 722 (2019). 2023The particularity requirement was enacted to preclude “undue rummaging,” and if a warrant was obtained to authorize, or was used to conduct, “undue rummaging,” evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant must be suppressed, in order to effectuate the purpose of Article I, section 9, which is to pro- tect against government conduct that “would significantly impair an individual’s interest in freedom from scrutiny, i.e., his privacy.” Mansor, 363 Or at 206-07 (internal quota- tion marks and citation omitted); see also Turay, 313 Or App at 64 (“ ‘We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtai | 2 | 2 |
Aday v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023Such an abuse of the warrant pro- cedure, of course, could not be tolerated.’ ” (Quoting Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal 2d 789, 797, 362 P2d 47, 52 (1961).)); State v. Sanger, 12 Or App 459 , 471 n 6, 506 P2d 510 (1973) (also citing Aday for that proposition). 2021If a warrant is essen- tially general, but meets the requirement of particularity as to minor items, ‘[s]uch an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.’ ”); Aday, 55 Cal 2d at 797, 362 P2d at 52 (“We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ingramgreen2 sentences2022Stated more succinctly, “[r]egarding places, the particularity requirement exists to narrow the scope of the search to those premises for which a magis- trate has found probable cause to authorize the search.” Mansor II, 363 Or at 212 (internal quotation marks omit- ted); see also State v. Ingram, 313 Or 139, 145 , 831 P2d 674 (1992) (insufficiently particular warrants require officers to employ discretion in deciding where to search, running the risk that the officers “could invade privacy interests not intended by the magistrate to be invaded and could conduct searches not supported by proba 2022Stated more succinctly, “[r]egarding places, the particularity requirement exists to narrow the scope of the search to those premises for which a magis- trate has found probable cause to authorize the search.” Mansor II, 363 Or at 212 (internal quotation marks omit- ted); see also State v. Ingram, 313 Or 139, 145 , 831 P2d 674 (1992) (insufficiently particular warrants require officers to employ discretion in deciding where to search, running the risk that the officers “could invade privacy interests not intended by the magistrate to be invaded and could conduct searches not supported by proba | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mansorgreen2 sentences2023Such state searches raise the possibility of computer 464 State v. Serrano (A173250) search warrants becoming the digital equivalent of general warrants and of sanctioning the ‘undue rummaging that the particularity requirement was enacted to preclude.’ Mansor, 279 Or App at 803 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). 2021The parties’ arguments in their briefing and at the hearing on the suppression motion were framed in light of our decision in State v. Mansor, 279 Or App 778, 801 , 381 P3d 930 (2016) (Mansor I), the controlling authority at the time, which addressed the particularity requirement in the case of a search for digital evidence on a computer. | 1 | 5 |
State v. Gaskillgreen2 sentences2025Ultimately, the objective of the particularity requirement is that “the search be as precise as the circumstances allow and that undue rummaging be avoided.” State v. Gaskill, 340 Or App 459 , 471, ___ P3d ___ (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2025More recently, in Gaskill, 340 Or App at 471-72, we held that a warrant authorizing a search for evidence that “may include, but is not limited to” 13 categories of evidence failed to describe the evidence sought with sufficient specificity, and therefore failed to satisfy the particularity requirement of Article I, section 9, noting the “lack of specificity risked undue rummaging by executing officers.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) In the instant case, our analysis of the particularity requirement focuses on concerns about the warrant’s over- breadth rather than its lack of specifici | 1 | 2 |
State v. DiMolfettogreen2 sentences2025Defendant filed motions to suppress evidence obtained from the April 2020 Pinger and TextNow war- rants, arguing that, among other things, the searches and seizures violated the heightened particularity requirement of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution announced in State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185 , 421 P3d 323 (2018) (Mansor Cite as 342 Or App 456 (2025) 463 II).2 See id. at 218 (to satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant to search a computer “must identify, as specifically as reasonably possible in the circumstances, the informa- tion to be searched for, including, if relev 2025See State v. Paye, 310 Or App 408, 415-17 , 486 P3d 808 (2021) (command to search Cite as 342 Or App 456 (2025) 487 the defendant’s computer for “[a]ny and all evidence docu- menting the [crimes of promoting prostitution and compel- ling prostitution],” to include a broad array of information such as photographs and videos of the named victim and “as-of-yet unidentified females,” satisfied the particularity requirement notwithstanding the lack of a temporal lim- itation; there was probable cause that the defendant was engaged in an ongoing enterprise, that evidence of that enterprise would be | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sagnergreen2 sentences2023Such an abuse of the warrant pro- cedure, of course, could not be tolerated.’ ” (Quoting Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal 2d 789, 797, 362 P2d 47, 52 (1961).)); State v. Sanger, 12 Or App 459 , 471 n 6, 506 P2d 510 (1973) (also citing Aday for that proposition). 2021The exception to that rule is where the warrant is essentially general but meets the particularity requirement 64 State v. Turay “as to minor items.” Sagner, 12 Or App at 471 (“Both [Aday] and United States v. Ketterman, 276 A2d 243 (DC App 1971), caution that invalid portions of a warrant will not be consid- ered severable in all circumstances. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Payegreen2 sentences2025See State v. Paye, 310 Or App 408, 415-17 , 486 P3d 808 (2021) (command to search Cite as 342 Or App 456 (2025) 487 the defendant’s computer for “[a]ny and all evidence docu- menting the [crimes of promoting prostitution and compel- ling prostitution],” to include a broad array of information such as photographs and videos of the named victim and “as-of-yet unidentified females,” satisfied the particularity requirement notwithstanding the lack of a temporal lim- itation; there was probable cause that the defendant was engaged in an ongoing enterprise, that evidence of that enterprise would be 2025See State v. Paye, 310 Or App 408, 415-17 , 486 P3d 808 (2021) (command to search Cite as 342 Or App 456 (2025) 487 the defendant’s computer for “[a]ny and all evidence docu- menting the [crimes of promoting prostitution and compel- ling prostitution],” to include a broad array of information such as photographs and videos of the named victim and “as-of-yet unidentified females,” satisfied the particularity requirement notwithstanding the lack of a temporal lim- itation; there was probable cause that the defendant was engaged in an ongoing enterprise, that evidence of that enterprise would be | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Pisanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. O'BRIENgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McDowellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reidgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Siverson v. Olsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cortman
green
2 sentences2023Although the concepts are related, they are distinct and call for distinct analysis. 128_371.indd 146 6/15/2023 7:32:04 AM Cite as 371 Or 128 (2023) 147 information that is the object of a search for digital data must be described “as specifically as reasonably possible in the circumstances,” and that description must include, so long as “relevant and available, the time period during which that information was created, accessed, or otherwise used.” Id. at 218 (emphasis added); cf. Trax, 335 Or at 603 (war- rant to search a physical place “satisfies the particularity requirement if it permits 2023Although the concepts are related, they are distinct and call for distinct analysis. 128_371.indd 146 6/15/2023 7:32:04 AM Cite as 371 Or 128 (2023) 147 information that is the object of a search for digital data must be described “as specifically as reasonably possible in the circumstances,” and that description must include, so long as “relevant and available, the time period during which that information was created, accessed, or otherwise used.” Id. at 218 (emphasis added); cf. Trax, 335 Or at 603 (war- rant to search a physical place “satisfies the particularity requirement if it permits | 5 | 1988–2023 |
State v. Massey
green
2 sentences2016Furthermore, the “objective” of the particularity requirement is that “the search be as precise as the circumstances allow and that undue rummaging be avoided.” State v. Massey, 40 Or App 211, 214 , 594 P2d 1274 , rev den, 289 Or 409 (1979). 2016Furthermore, the “objective” of the particularity requirement is that “the search be as precise as the circumstances allow and that undue rummaging be avoided.” State v. Massey, 40 Or App 211, 214 , 594 P2d 1274 , rev den, 289 Or 409 (1979). | 3 | 2016–2024 |
State v. Rose
green
2 sentences2024Specificity requires that “the search be as pre- cise as the circumstances allow and that undue rummag- ing be avoided.” State v. Rose, 264 Or App 95, 107 , 330 P3d 680 , rev den, 356 Or 400 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mansor, 363 Or at 212 (explaining that in general, a search warrant “must be sufficiently specific in describing the items to be seized and examined [so] that the officers can, ‘with reasonable effort ascertain’ those items to a ‘reasonable degree of certainty’ ” (quoting State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 35 , 511 P2d 381 (1973))). 2024Specificity requires that “the search be as pre- cise as the circumstances allow and that undue rummag- ing be avoided.” State v. Rose, 264 Or App 95, 107 , 330 P3d 680 , rev den, 356 Or 400 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mansor, 363 Or at 212 (explaining that in general, a search warrant “must be sufficiently specific in describing the items to be seized and examined [so] that the officers can, ‘with reasonable effort ascertain’ those items to a ‘reasonable degree of certainty’ ” (quoting State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 35 , 511 P2d 381 (1973))). | 3 | 2016–2024 |
State v. Friddle
green
2 sentences2024State v. Friddle, 281 Or App 130, 137 , 381 P3d 979 (2016). 2024State v. Friddle, 281 Or App 130, 137 , 381 P3d 979 (2016). | 3 | 2017–2024 |
Cota v. Field
green
2 sentences2007“A description in a warrant of the place to be searched satisfies the particularity requirement if it permits the executing officer ‘to locate with reasonable effort the premises to be searched.’ ” Id. at 603 (quoting State v. Cortman, 251 Or 566, 568-69 , 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert den, 394 US 951 (1969), and citing State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 35 , 511 P2d 381 (1973)). 2002Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: "No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." (Emphasis added.) The purpose of the particularity requirement is "to minimize the risk of intrusion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search." State v. Devine, 30 | 3 | 1988–2007 |
State v. Barton
neutral
2 sentences2025Cite as 341 Or App 689 (2025) 693 However, we agree with defendant that the war- rant failed to satisfy the particularity requirement because it was overbroad. 2025Cite as 341 Or App 689 (2025) 693 However, we agree with defendant that the war- rant failed to satisfy the particularity requirement because it was overbroad. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Curry
green
2 sentences2025State v. Curry, 336 Or App 72 , 81, 560 P3d 694 (2024). 2025State v. Curry, 336 Or App 72 , 81, 560 P3d 694 (2024). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Tidyman
green
2 sentences2024The purpose of the particularity requirement is to “guide the officer to the thing intended to be seized and to minimize the danger of unwarranted invasion of privacy by unauthorized seizures.” State v. Tidyman, 30 Or App 537, 542-43 , 568 P2d 666 , rev den, 280 Or 683 (1977). 2024The purpose of the particularity requirement is to “guide the officer to the thing intended to be seized and to minimize the danger of unwarranted invasion of privacy by unauthorized seizures.” State v. Tidyman, 30 Or App 537, 542-43 , 568 P2d 666 , rev den, 280 Or 683 (1977). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Meyers
green
1 sentence2025Further, the sixth category’s command to search for location information—as circumscribed by the lim- itations included in those categories, such as specific phone Cite as 338 Or App 59 (2025) 73 numbers, dates, and types of information—is sufficiently spe- cific and does not authorize “undue rummaging.” See Mansor II, 363 Or at 220 (without specificity, digital searches “raise the possibility of computer search warrants * * * sanctioning the undue rummaging that the particularity requirement was enacted to preclude” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Turay, 371 Or at 154 (command to sea | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Vesa
green
1 sentence2023Cite as 324 Or App 674 (2023) 687 218. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Bush green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Breedwell
green
1 sentence2022Mansor I places the burden on the defendant to prove that an affidavit was not attached or Cite as 323 Or App 172 (2022) 201 not otherwise sufficiently accompanied when the warrant was executed. 279 Or App at 790 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| United States v. Ketterman green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| West Side Sanitary District v. Land Conservation & Development Commission neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Derrah green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Bradley green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Jett v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Wyatt green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Vanornum green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Olsen green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Trax green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Reinhardt green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Delaney v. Taco Time International, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Reid neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Charmley v. Lewis neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Olson neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Mincey v. Arizona green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.