particularity requirement in Texas

2011Nothing in the record about this particular search shows that officers ran afoul of the purpose of the particularity requirement by failing to present the affidavit to appellant at the time of the search. 3 See Long, *759 132 S.W.3d at 447 (“The constitutional objectives of requiring a ‘particular’ description of the place to be searched include: 1) ensuring that the officer searches the right place; 2) confirming that probable cause is, in fact, established for the place de: scribed in the warrant; 3) limiting the officer’s discretion and narrowing the scope of his search; 4) minimizing the d

2011Nothing in the record about this particular search shows that officers ran afoul of the purpose of the particularity requirement by failing to present the affidavit to appellant at the time of the search.3 See Long, 132 S.W.3d at 447 (“The constitutional objectives of requiring a „particular‟ description of the place to be searched include: 1) ensuring that the officer searches the right place; 2) confirming that probable cause is, in fact, established for the place described in the warrant; 3) limiting the officer‟s discretion and narrowing the scope of his search; 4) minimizing the danger of

2026See Villegas v. State, No. 04-22-00688-CR, 2023 WL 8103183 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 22, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (recognizing that “[t]he particularity requirement is intended to protect people from ‘general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings’”); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (recognizing that the particularity requirement is to ensure that a search conducted by law enforcement be “carefully tailored to its justifications”)).

2020The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his powers to search.” Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 874 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004)); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of

2011"In determining whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court must inquire whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items are to be seized.” Porath v. State, 148 S.W.3d 402, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir.1995)); see also Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321, 337 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“The items to be seized must be described with sufficient particularity such that the executing officer is left with no discretion to decid

1999The blood-spattered tennis shoes seized in the search were included within the description in the affidavit as "clothing to include footwear" and "clothing with blood." "In testing whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court must inquire whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items are to be seized." United States v. Kimbrough , 69 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Layne , 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir. 1995).

2020IV (emphasis added).5 The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004); see also Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 874-75 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) (describing additional rationales, to include “ensuring that the officer searches the right place, . . . limiting the officer’s discretion and narrowing the scope of his 5 Appellant notes that the courts have found a right of privacy with respect

2020The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his powers to search.” Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 874 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004)); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of

2020IV (emphasis added).5 The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004); see also Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 874-75 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) (describing additional rationales, to include “ensuring that the officer searches the right place, . . . limiting the officer’s discretion and narrowing the scope of his 5 Appellant notes that the courts have found a right of privacy with respect

2020The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his powers to search.” Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 874 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004)); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of

2011"In determining whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court must inquire whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items are to be seized.” Porath v. State, 148 S.W.3d 402, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir.1995)); see also Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321, 337 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“The items to be seized must be described with sufficient particularity such that the executing officer is left with no discretion to decid

2011"In determining whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court must inquire whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items are to be seized.” Porath v. State, 148 S.W.3d 402, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir.1995)); see also Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321, 337 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“The items to be seized must be described with sufficient particularity such that the executing officer is left with no discretion to decid

2013Porath v. State, 148 S.W.3d 402, 410 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321, 337 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“The items to be seized must be described with sufficient particularity such that the executing officer is left with no discretion to decide what may be seized.”) (citing Winkfield v. State, 792 S.W.2d 727, 731 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref’d)).

2011"In determining whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court must inquire whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items are to be seized.” Porath v. State, 148 S.W.3d 402, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir.1995)); see also Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321, 337 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“The items to be seized must be described with sufficient particularity such that the executing officer is left with no discretion to decid

2011"In determining whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court must inquire whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items are to be seized.” Porath v. State, 148 S.W.3d 402, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir.1995)); see also Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321, 337 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“The items to be seized must be described with sufficient particularity such that the executing officer is left with no discretion to decid

2011"In determining whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court must inquire whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items are to be seized.” Porath v. State, 148 S.W.3d 402, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir.1995)); see also Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321, 337 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“The items to be seized must be described with sufficient particularity such that the executing officer is left with no discretion to decid

2016The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement both prevents general searches and “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 , 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1292 (2004) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 , 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482 (1977)).

2016The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement both prevents general searches and “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 , 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1292 (2004) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 , 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482 (1977)).

2015See Connell Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. Leak, 967 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.); Land v. AT & S Transp., Inc., 947 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ). 22 issue have agreed that the lack of particularity in a sanctions order may constitute harmless error, and have found that subsequently-rendered findings of fact and conclusions of law may be considered to satisfy the particularity requirement.

2009Cf. id. (citing Land v. AT & S Transp., Inc., 947 S.W.2d 665, 666-67 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ)). 2 We also observe that, as Cohen emphasizes, chapter 9 does not contain a particularity requirement like rule 13. 3 Although Riley, who is incarcerated, has proceeded pro se at all stages of this case, he is bound by the same procedural standards as parties represented by attorneys.

2015See Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (finding no abuse of discretion where the sanctions order “did not list the particulars of the good cause” supporting sanctions, because “[i]n her findings, the trial judge specified the conduct upon which she was basing the sanctions”); Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 356 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (“While we do not condone the practice of using findings of fact and conclusions of law to satisfy section 10.005, we conclude that the findings and conclusions supplied t

2006See Mattly, 19 S.W.3d at 896 ; Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).

2015See Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (finding no abuse of discretion where the sanctions order “did not list the particulars of the good cause” supporting sanctions, because “[i]n her findings, the trial judge specified the conduct upon which she was basing the sanctions”); Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 356 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (“While we do not condone the practice of using findings of fact and conclusions of law to satisfy section 10.005, we conclude that the findings and conclusions supplied t

2003See University of Texas at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350 , 356 n. 24 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied); Gorman v. Gorman, 966 S.W.2d 858, 867-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see also GTE Comm. Sys.

2011The “manifest purpose” of the particularity requirement is to prevent general searches; this “requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 , 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1016 , 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987); see Allen, 625 F.3d at 839 (“[T]he magistrate judge’s signature on the affidavit reduces the concern that he did not agree to the scope of the search as defined and limited therein.”).

2011The “manifest purpose” of the particularity requirement is to prevent general searches; this “requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 , 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1016 (1987); see Allen, 625 F.3d at 839 (“[T]he magistrate judge‟s signature on the affidavit reduces the concern that he did not agree to the scope of the search as defined and limited therein.”).

2015See Sell, 390 S.W.3d at 624 ; Rudisell, 89 S.W.3d at 238 .

2012See Rudisell, 89 S.W.3d at 237 . (internal citations omitted).

2020A warrant with “indiscriminate sweep” is “constitutionally intolerable.” Stanford v. Tex., 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965).

2015So long as the warrant incorporates by reference a sufficiently specific affidavit, the affidavit becomes a part of the warrant, and the affidavit can then supply the particularity necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.16 Moreover, 13 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)). 14 Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 874 (quoting Long v. State, 132 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. Crim.

2006Rudisell v. Paquette , 89 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); see Murphy , 965 S.W.2d at 710 (“One purpose of the Rule 13 particularity requirement is to justify the imposition of the sanctions and to give some evidence the sanctions were carefully weighed and imposed ‘in an appropriate manner when justified by the circumstances.’”).

2000See Murphy 965 S.W.2d at 710 .

2006See Mattly , 19 S.W.3d at 896 ; Gaspard v. Beadle , 36 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).

2006See Mattly, 19 S.W.3d at 896 ; Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).

2006The purpose of the particularity requirement is three-fold: it “(1) ensures that the trial court is held accountable and adheres to the standard of the rule; (2) requires the trial court to reflect carefully on its order before imposing sanctions; (3) informs the offending party of the particular conduct warranting sanction, for the purpose of deterring similar conduct in the future; and (4) enables the appellate court to review the order in light of the particular findings made by the trial court.” Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C. , 178 S.W.3d 398, 411 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,

2006The purpose of the particularity requirement is three-fold: it “(1) ensures that the trial court is held accountable and adheres to the standard of the rule; (2) requires the trial court to reflect carefully on its order before imposing sanctions; (3) informs the offending party of the particular conduct warranting sanction, for the purpose of deterring similar conduct in the future; and (4) enables the appellate court to review the order in light of the particular findings made by the trial court.” Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 411 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, p

2004See id. at 448 (“ 'Obedience to the particularity requirement both in drafting and executing a search warrant is therefore essential to protect against the centuries-old fear of general searches and seizures.'") (quoting United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 926 , 102 S.Ct. 1971 , 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982)). .

2004App. 2004). 11: See id. at 448 (“‘Obedience to the particularity requirement both in drafting and executing a search warrant is therefore essential to protect against the centuries-old fear of general searches and seizures.’”) (quoting United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1257 (D.C.

2003See University of Texas at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350 , 356 n. 24 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied); Gorman v. Gorman, 966 S.W.2d 858, 867-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see also GTE Comm. Sys.

2003See University of Texas at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350 , 356 n. 24 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied); Gorman v. Gorman, 966 S.W.2d 858, 867-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see also GTE Comm. Sys.

2009Cf. id. (citing Land v. AT & S Transp., Inc., 947 S.W.2d 665, 666-67 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ)). 2 We also observe that, as Cohen emphasizes, chapter 9 does not contain a particularity requirement like rule 13. 3 Although Riley, who is incarcerated, has proceeded pro se at all stages of this case, he is bound by the same procedural standards as parties represented by attorneys.

1991Corp. v. Curry, 819 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.App.—San Antonio, 1991, orig. proceeding), a mandamus proceeding in which we held that a Rule 13 order was defective because it failed to comply with the particularity requirement.

2024Alvarez’s claims improperly ignore the flexible nature of the particularity standard, which “var[ies] according to the crime being investigated, the item being searched, and the types of items being sought.” Id. (citing Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 ).

2024Alvarez’s claims improperly ignore the flexible nature of the particularity standard, which “var[ies] according to the crime being investigated, the item being searched, and the types of items being sought.” Id. (citing Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 ).

2018Powell, 306 S.W.3d at 765 .

2013Marron v. U.S., 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S.Ct. 74 , 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927); see also State v. Powell, 306 S.W.3d 761 , 765-66 & n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (discussing Marrón).

2016Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at 727 .

1999The blood-spattered tennis shoes seized in the search were included within the description in the affidavit as "clothing to include footwear" and "clothing with blood." "In testing whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court must inquire whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably know what items are to be seized." United States v. Kimbrough , 69 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Layne , 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir. 1995).

2015So long as the warrant incorporates by reference a sufficiently specific affidavit, the affidavit becomes a part of the warrant, and the affidavit can then supply the particularity necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.16 Moreover, 13 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)). 14 Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 874 (quoting Long v. State, 132 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. Crim.

2013Marron v. U.S., 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S.Ct. 74 , 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927); see also State v. Powell, 306 S.W.3d 761 , 765-66 & n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (discussing Marrón).

2015The intermediate courts of appeals are divided on whether error may be waived. 4 Campos, 879 S.W.2d at 70 .

1999Hosp., Inc., 879 S.W.2d 67, 70-71 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1994, writ denied) (abating the appeal to allow the trial court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law stating particulars for sanctions order otherwise deficient under Rule 13); Bloom v. Graham, 825 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (trial court's failure to specify good cause warranting sanctions harmless where record otherwise indicates good cause exists); Powers v. Palacios, 771 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (sanctions order’s failure to comply with the particularity requirement

2015State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

1991Moreover, it precludes governmental intrusion into vehicles of visitors or other travelers who may have unwittingly moved or parked their cars in an area being scanned for contraband.” Barnett, 788 S.W.2d at 574 .

2012Id. at 135–36; see also Alexander v. Alexander, 956 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (“We agree with the courts requiring that the appellant object to a lack of particularity in the trial court before raising the complaint on appeal.”); Land v. AT&S Transp., Inc., 947 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ) (holding same); McCain v. NME Hosps., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) (“The record does not show that appellants objected to the trial court’s failure to be more specific about good cause or its particulars.

2000Alexander v. Alexander, 956 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); Land v. AT & S Transp., Inc., 947 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no writ); Campos v. Ysleta Gen.

2004See id. at 448 (“ 'Obedience to the particularity requirement both in drafting and executing a search warrant is therefore essential to protect against the centuries-old fear of general searches and seizures.'") (quoting United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 926 , 102 S.Ct. 1971 , 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982)). .

2004See id. at 448 (“ 'Obedience to the particularity requirement both in drafting and executing a search warrant is therefore essential to protect against the centuries-old fear of general searches and seizures.'") (quoting United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 926 , 102 S.Ct. 1971 , 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982)). .