13 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Calderogreen2 sentences2010See State v. Caldero, 109 Idaho 80, 84 , 705 P.2d 85, 89 (Ct. App. 1985). 2010See State v. Caldero, 109 Idaho 80, 84 , 705 P.2d 85, 89 (Ct. App. 1985). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Ortega-Jimenezgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g, United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 , 699– 700 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 534 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2008); Rodriguez v. Beninato, 469 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ortega-Jimenez, 232 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000). 2017See, e.g, United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 , 699– 700 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 534 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2008); Rodriguez v. Beninato, 469 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ortega-Jimenez, 232 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Wakergreen2 sentences2017See, e.g, United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 , 699– 700 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 534 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2008); Rodriguez v. Beninato, 469 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ortega-Jimenez, 232 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000). 2017See, e.g, United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 , 699– 700 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 534 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2008); Rodriguez v. Beninato, 469 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ortega-Jimenez, 232 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000). | 2 | 2 |
No. 05-2748green2 sentences2017See, e.g, United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 , 699– 700 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 534 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2008); Rodriguez v. Beninato, 469 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ortega-Jimenez, 232 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000). 2017See, e.g, United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 , 699– 700 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 534 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2008); Rodriguez v. Beninato, 469 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ortega-Jimenez, 232 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.green2 sentences2017See, e.g, United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 , 699– 700 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 534 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2008); Rodriguez v. Beninato, 469 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ortega-Jimenez, 232 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000). 2017See, e.g, United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684 , 699– 700 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 534 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2008); Rodriguez v. Beninato, 469 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ortega-Jimenez, 232 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2000). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Weimergreen2 sentences2010The specific evil that the particularity requirement guards against “is the „general warrant‟ abhorred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person‟s belongings.” Weimer, 133 Idaho at 449 , 988 P.2d at 223 . 2010The specific evil that the particularity requirement guards against “is the „general warrant‟ abhorred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person‟s belongings.” Weimer, 133 Idaho at 449 , 988 P.2d at 223 . | 1 | 3 |
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Leonard Charles Dancy, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellantgreen1 sentence2002United States v. Dancy, 947 F.2d 1232, 1234 (5th Cir.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshiregreen2 sentences1999The specific evil that the particularity requirement guards against “is the ‘general warrant’ abhorred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 (1971). 1999The specific evil that the particularity requirement guards against “is the ‘general warrant’ abhorred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
Witt v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1991See Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165 , 722 P.2d 474 (1986). 1991See Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165 , 722 P.2d 474 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. O'KEEFE
green
2 sentences2011O’Keefe, 143 Idaho at 285 , 141 P.3d at 1154 . 2011O’Keefe, 143 Idaho at 285 , 141 P.3d at 1154 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
DeRushé v. State
green
1 sentence2010In DeRushé, the Supreme Court held that this particularity requirement did not mandate the level of detail there urged by the petitioner, but the Court reiterated that the rule required “reasonable particularity.” Id. at 601, 200 P.3d at 1150 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Schanefelt
green
2 sentences2006Schanefelt, 115 Idaho at 130 , 765 P.2d at 155 . 2006Schanefelt, 115 Idaho at 130 , 765 P.2d at 155 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Company
green
1 sentence2005Indeed, a court “will be unable to shape narrowly-tailored relief if [it] do[es] not know what distinctive combination of ingredients deserves protection.” Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 381 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Yurman Design, Inc. Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Paj, Inc., Doing Business as Prime Art & Jewel, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
green
1 sentence2005Thus, the particularity requirement assists the court in “winnowing out claims that are overbroad as a matter of law.” Yurman, 262 F.3d at 117 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Fignani v. City of Lewiston
green
2 sentences1987Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266 , 561 P.2d 1299 (1977); Fignani v. City of Lewiston, 94 Idaho 196 , 484 P.2d 1036 (1971). 1987Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266 , 561 P.2d 1299 (1977); Fignani v. City of Lewiston, 94 Idaho 196 , 484 P.2d 1036 (1971). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Scafco Boise, Inc. v. Rigby
green
2 sentences1987The Supreme Court described their supplemental brief as “consist[ing] largely of a rearguing of [the defendants’] case.” Id. at 433 , 566 P.2d at 382 . 1987The Supreme Court described their supplemental brief as “consist[ing] largely of a rearguing of [the defendants’] case.” Id. at 433 , 566 P.2d at 382 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co.
green
2 sentences1987Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266 , 561 P.2d 1299 (1977); Fignani v. City of Lewiston, 94 Idaho 196 , 484 P.2d 1036 (1971). 1987Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266 , 561 P.2d 1299 (1977); Fignani v. City of Lewiston, 94 Idaho 196 , 484 P.2d 1036 (1971). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.