substance instruction in Maryland

1914It is also sometimes designated as *8 the apportionment rule, and is thus stated in Smith’s Estate, 140 Pa. 344 : ‘It is well settled in this State that, when the stock of a corporation is by the will of a decedent given in trust, and the income thereof for the use of a beneficiary for life, with remainder over, the surplus dividends, which have accumulated in the life time of the testator but which are not divided until after his death, belong to the corpus of his estate, whilst the dividends of earnings made after his death are income, and payable to the life tenant no matter whether the div

1914This statement of the rule is the substance of the doctrine as laid down in Earp’s Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 , one of the earliest and leading cases on the subject in this country.

2018We review whether a trial court abused its discretion in declining to offer a jury instruction using "well-defined standards." Cost v. State , 417 Md. 360 , 368, 10 A.3d 184 (2010). *142 A trial court is required to give a proposed jury instruction when: (1) the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) the evidence supports giving the instruction; and (3) the substance of the instruction is not otherwise fairly covered by instructions that are given.

2018We review whether a trial court abused its discretion in declining to offer a jury instruction using "well-defined standards." Cost v. State , 417 Md. 360 , 368, 10 A.3d 184 (2010). *142 A trial court is required to give a proposed jury instruction when: (1) the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) the evidence supports giving the instruction; and (3) the substance of the instruction is not otherwise fairly covered by instructions that are given.

2018Preston v. State , 444 Md. 67 , 81-82, 118 A.3d 902 (2015).

2018Preston v. State , 444 Md. 67 , 81-82, 118 A.3d 902 (2015).

2014Id.

2013Ultimately, the Thompson Court concluded that, although the pattern flight instruction constituted a correct statement of Maryland law, Id. at 303 , 901 A.2d 208 , and the substance of the instruction was not covered in the other instructions that were given by the court, Id. at 308 , 901 A.2d 208 , the trial court abused its discretion by providing the flight instruction under the circumstances presented.

2013Ultimately, the Thompson Court concluded that, although the pattern flight instruction constituted a correct statement of Maryland law, Id. at 303 , 901 A.2d 208 , and the substance of the instruction was not covered in the other instructions that were given by the court, Id. at 308 , 901 A.2d 208 , the trial court abused its discretion by providing the flight instruction under the circumstances presented.

2013Ultimately, the Thompson Court concluded that, although the pattern flight instruction constituted a correct statement of Maryland law, Id. at 303 , 901 A.2d 208 , and the substance of the instruction was not covered in the other instructions that were given by the court, Id. at 308 , 901 A.2d 208 , the trial court abused its discretion by providing the flight instruction under the circumstances presented.

2007Case law under a particular common law principle is not a legitimate basis for judicially inserting an exception in a statute dealing with a different legal principle. 20 Finally, the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Dixon concerning the accountant-client privilege cannot be reconciled with this Court’s earlier decision in In re Special Investigation No. 236, supra, 295 Md. 573 , 458 A.2d 75 . 21 Accordingly, that portion of Dixon v. Bennett, 72 Md.App. at 638-643 , 531 A.2d at 1327-1329 , relating to the accountant-client privilege, is overruled.

2007Case law under a particular common law principle is not a legitimate basis for judicially inserting an exception in a statute dealing with a different legal principle. 20 Finally, the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Dixon concerning the accountant-client privilege cannot be reconciled with this Court’s earlier decision in In re Special Investigation No. 236, supra, 295 Md. 573 , 458 A.2d 75 . 21 Accordingly, that portion of Dixon v. Bennett, 72 Md.App. at 638-643 , 531 A.2d at 1327-1329 , relating to the accountant-client privilege, is overruled.

2007Case law under a particular common law principle is not a legitimate basis for judicially inserting an exception in a statute dealing with a different legal principle. 20 Finally, the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Dixon concerning the accountant-client privilege cannot be reconciled with this Court’s earlier decision in In re Special Investigation No. 236, supra, 295 Md. 573 , 458 A.2d 75 . 21 Accordingly, that portion of Dixon v. Bennett, 72 Md.App. at 638-643 , 531 A.2d at 1327-1329 , relating to the accountant-client privilege, is overruled.

2007Case law under a particular common law principle is not a legitimate basis for judicially inserting an exception in a statute dealing with a different legal principle. 20 Finally, the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Dixon concerning the accountant-client privilege cannot be reconciled with this Court’s earlier decision in In re Special Investigation No. 236, supra, 295 Md. 573 , 458 A.2d 75 . 21 Accordingly, that portion of Dixon v. Bennett, 72 Md.App. at 638-643 , 531 A.2d at 1327-1329 , relating to the accountant-client privilege, is overruled.

2006“It is a misconception of res judicata to assume that the doctrine does not come into operation if a court has not passed on the ‘merits’ in the sense of the ultimate substantive issues of a litigation.” Id. (citation omitted).

2005That duty undoubtedly may be an onerous one, but the performance of it in a substantial *199 manner is inseparable from the exercise of the important authority conferred.” Id. at 481-82 , 56 S.Ct. at 912 .

2005That duty undoubtedly may be an onerous one, but the performance of it in a substantial *199 manner is inseparable from the exercise of the important authority conferred.” Id. at 481-82 , 56 S.Ct. at 912 .

2005This principle was made clear by this Court in Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100 , 387 A.2d 762 (1978), in which we stated: “[Wjhen a penal act contains an exception so incorporated with the substance of the clause defining the offense as to constitute a material part of the description of the acts, omission or other ingredients which constitute the offense, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the offense charged is not within the exception.

2005This principle was made clear by this Court in Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100 , 387 A.2d 762 (1978), in which we stated: “[Wjhen a penal act contains an exception so incorporated with the substance of the clause defining the offense as to constitute a material part of the description of the acts, omission or other ingredients which constitute the offense, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the offense charged is not within the exception.

1999In a number of decided cases it has been held that so long as the function of notice is met by the filing of a paper indicating an intention to appeal, the substance of the rule has been complied with.” Id. at 387-88 , 550 A.2d 959 .

1999In a number of decided cases it has been held that so long as the function of notice is met by the filing of a paper indicating an intention to appeal, the substance of the rule has been complied with.” Id. at 387-88 , 550 A.2d 959 .

1997Co. and Blanco , we noted, however, that, as an “exception” to that general rule, Maryland common law allowed *521 evidence of subsequent remedial measures to be admitted as “ ‘circumstantial proof that the applicable standard of care had not been met at the time of the occurrence in question.’ ” 317 Md. at 298 , 563 A.2d at 398 , quoting again from McLain, supra, at 410. 7 The Wilson Court observed, in a footnote, that “the general common law rule” excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures had been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 407, that the question of whether Maryland should

1997Co. and Blanco , we noted, however, that, as an “exception” to that general rule, Maryland common law allowed *521 evidence of subsequent remedial measures to be admitted as “ ‘circumstantial proof that the applicable standard of care had not been met at the time of the occurrence in question.’ ” 317 Md. at 298 , 563 A.2d at 398 , quoting again from McLain, supra, at 410. 7 The Wilson Court observed, in a footnote, that “the general common law rule” excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures had been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 407, that the question of whether Maryland should

1992Myers v. Estate of Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124, 132 , 560 A.2d 59 , cert, denied, 317 Md. 640 , 566 A.2d 101 (1989).

1992Myers v. Estate of Alessi, 80 Md.App. 124, 132 , 560 A.2d 59 , cert, denied, 317 Md. 640 , 566 A.2d 101 (1989).

1987We believe, however, it is a better practice to prepare *7 or dictate a statement specifically addressed to those purposes, since such a statement "helps to insure accurate fact finding with respect to any alleged violation and provides an adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence.” Id. (quoting Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 , 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985)).

1987We believe, however, it is a better practice to prepare *7 or dictate a statement specifically addressed to those purposes, since such a statement "helps to insure accurate fact finding with respect to any alleged violation and provides an adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence.” Id. (quoting Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 , 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985)).

1984Although such judgments are often described as ‘on the merits’ or as ‘operating as an adjudication on the merits,’ *244 that terminology is not used here in the statement of the general rule because of 'its possibly misleading connotations." (Emphasis added.) Illustrative of such misleading connotations is De Crosta, 41 N.Y.2d at 1101 , 364 N.E.2d at 1130 , 396 N.Y.S.2d at 359 , in which the Court of Appeals of New York held that where a judgment dismissing an action is based upon a statute of limitations, “the judicial decision is on the merits....”

1984Although such judgments are often described as ‘on the merits’ or as ‘operating as an adjudication on the merits,’ *244 that terminology is not used here in the statement of the general rule because of 'its possibly misleading connotations." (Emphasis added.) Illustrative of such misleading connotations is De Crosta, 41 N.Y.2d at 1101 , 364 N.E.2d at 1130 , 396 N.Y.S.2d at 359 , in which the Court of Appeals of New York held that where a judgment dismissing an action is based upon a statute of limitations, “the judicial decision is on the merits....”

1980The ultimate question posed by the case was whether the State had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife Mackall was found to have carried with the deliberate purpose of injuring the victim was a dirk knife, a bowie knife, a switchblade knife or any other dangerous and deadly weapon other than "a penknife without switchblade.” The Court said, in citing Howes v. State, 141 Md. 532 , 119 A. 297 (1922) as authority for its conclusions: The teachings contained in the comprehensive discussion in Howes may be fairly summarized thus: when a penal act contains an exception so incorporat

1980The ultimate question posed by the case was whether the State had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife Mackall was found to have carried with the deliberate purpose of injuring the victim was a dirk knife, a bowie knife, a switchblade knife or any other dangerous and deadly weapon other than "a penknife without switchblade.” The Court said, in citing Howes v. State, 141 Md. 532 , 119 A. 297 (1922) as authority for its conclusions: The teachings contained in the comprehensive discussion in Howes may be fairly summarized thus: when a penal act contains an exception so incorporat

1975Under the circumstances then, it is apparent to us and should have been made apparent to appellant, that his right to counsel as an indigent is limited to the attorney appointed by the Public Defender, Conway, supra; that since he cannot afford his own counsel and is not entitled under such circumstances to other publicly provided counsel, the continuance requested was not justified; and, that his adamant rejection of his assigned attorney even when faced with proceeding with the trial, “indicates . . . [an] *275 inclination to waive representation . . . .” Forthwith the court should then have

1949And so, in the circumstances of a ‘particular situation,’ assignment of counsel may be ‘essential to the substance of a hearing’ as part of the due process which the Fourteenth Amendment exacts from a State which imposes sentence. * * * Such need may exist whether an accused contests a charge against him or pleads guilty. *612 “The rationale of this application of due process was first expounded in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 , 58 S. Ct. 55 , 77 L.

1949And so, in the circumstances of a ‘particular situation,’ assignment of counsel may be ‘essential to the substance of a hearing’ as part of the due process which the Fourteenth Amendment exacts from a State which imposes sentence. * * * Such need may exist whether an accused contests a charge against him or pleads guilty. *612 “The rationale of this application of due process was first expounded in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 , 58 S. Ct. 55 , 77 L.

1949And so, in the circumstances of a ‘particular situation,’ assignment of counsel may be ‘essential to the substance of a hearing’ as part of the due process which the Fourteenth Amendment exacts from a State which imposes sentence. * * * Such need may exist whether an accused contests a charge against him or pleads guilty. *612 “The rationale of this application of due process was first expounded in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 , 58 S. Ct. 55 , 77 L.

1942The decision turned upon the fact that in the particular situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel was essential to the substance of a hearing.” We quote in the case of Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U. S. 329 , 61 S. Ct. 572, 574 , 85 L.

1942The decision turned upon the fact that in the particular situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel was essential to the substance of a hearing.” We quote in the case of Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U. S. 329 , 61 S. Ct. 572, 574 , 85 L.

1914It is also sometimes designated as *8 the apportionment rule, and is thus stated in Smith’s Estate, 140 Pa. 344 : ‘It is well settled in this State that, when the stock of a corporation is by the will of a decedent given in trust, and the income thereof for the use of a beneficiary for life, with remainder over, the surplus dividends, which have accumulated in the life time of the testator but which are not divided until after his death, belong to the corpus of his estate, whilst the dividends of earnings made after his death are income, and payable to the life tenant no matter whether the div

1914It was argued that the doctrine of Earp’s Appeal hasi been shaken, if not modified, by the decision in Boyer’s Appeal, 224 Pa. 144 , but any such idea is effectually dispelled by the very recent case In re Stokes’ Estate, 87 Atl.

1914It was argued that the doctrine of Earp’s Appeal hasi been shaken, if not modified, by the decision in Boyer’s Appeal, 224 Pa. 144 , but any such idea is effectually dispelled by the very recent case In re Stokes’ Estate, 87 Atl.