substance claim in California

2025(See Samara, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 326–327.) As mentioned ante, claim preclusion requires (inter alia) “ ‘a second suit’ ” involving “ ‘the same cause of action . . . after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.’ ” (Samara, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 326 .) “A judgment is on the merits . . . ‘if the substance of the claim is tried and determined . . . .’ (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Judgment, § 313, p. 864.)” (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 77 .) Similarly, issue preclusion requires “ ‘final adjudication . . . of an identical issue . . . actually litig

2025(See Samara, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 326–327.) As mentioned ante, claim preclusion requires (inter alia) “ ‘a second suit’ ” involving “ ‘the same cause of action . . . after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.’ ” (Samara, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 326 .) “A judgment is on the merits . . . ‘if the substance of the claim is tried and determined . . . .’ (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Judgment, § 313, p. 864.)” (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 77 .) Similarly, issue preclusion requires “ ‘final adjudication . . . of an identical issue . . . actually litig

2023(See Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 784 (Wells); Tokerud, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 ; Shuffer v. Board of Trustees (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 208, 216 (Shuffer).) This follows the Restatement, which explains that a judgment in favor of the defendant will not bar a later action by the plaintiff on the same claim, when the prior judgment is based upon the plaintiff’s agreement or election to “a nonsuit (or voluntary dismissal) without prejudice . . .” (Rest.2d, Judgments, § 20(1)(b).) In contrast, claim preclusion does apply to bar a later action after the voluntary

2023(See Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 784 (Wells); Tokerud, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 ; Shuffer v. Board of Trustees (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 208, 216 (Shuffer).) This follows the Restatement, which explains that a judgment in favor of the defendant will not bar a later action by the plaintiff on the same claim, when the prior judgment is based upon the plaintiff’s agreement or election to “a nonsuit (or voluntary dismissal) without prejudice . . .” (Rest.2d, Judgments, § 20(1)(b).) In contrast, claim preclusion does apply to bar a later action after the voluntary

2023(See Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 784 (Wells); Tokerud, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 ; Shuffer v. Board of Trustees (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 208, 216 (Shuffer).) This follows the Restatement, which explains that a judgment in favor of the defendant will not bar a later action by the plaintiff on the same claim, when the prior judgment is based upon the plaintiff’s agreement or election to “a nonsuit (or voluntary dismissal) without prejudice . . .” (Rest.2d, Judgments, § 20(1)(b).) In contrast, claim preclusion does apply to bar a later action after the voluntary

2023(See Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 784 (Wells); Tokerud, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 ; Shuffer v. Board of Trustees (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 208, 216 (Shuffer).) This follows the Restatement, which explains that a judgment in favor of the defendant will not bar a later action by the plaintiff on the same claim, when the prior judgment is based upon the plaintiff’s agreement or election to “a nonsuit (or voluntary dismissal) without prejudice . . .” (Rest.2d, Judgments, § 20(1)(b).) In contrast, claim preclusion does apply to bar a later action after the voluntary

2017The judicial obligation "to interpret police policies for purposes of ... section 17004.7 does not give us the supervisory power to dictate good *826 (or bad) law enforcement tactics." ( McGee v. City of Laguna Beach (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 537 , 548, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 506 ( McGee ); see also Ketchum v. State of California (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 957 , 969, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 ( Ketchum ) ["We decline to abandon our role as judges and legislate police policy by dictating the elements of the pursuit policy"].) Ramirez challenges the adequacy of the City's policy under subdivision (c)(5) and (6) of sect

2017The judicial obligation "to interpret police policies for purposes of ... section 17004.7 does not give us the supervisory power to dictate good *826 (or bad) law enforcement tactics." ( McGee v. City of Laguna Beach (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 537 , 548, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 506 ( McGee ); see also Ketchum v. State of California (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 957 , 969, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 ( Ketchum ) ["We decline to abandon our role as judges and legislate police policy by dictating the elements of the pursuit policy"].) Ramirez challenges the adequacy of the City's policy under subdivision (c)(5) and (6) of sect

1997Code, § 351; see Huddleston v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 689 [108 S.Ct. at p. 1501].) The preponderance standard is also consistent with the rule stated in Evidence Code section 115 that “Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” When the evidence of the Marin County crimes was presented, the court instructed the jury to consider it “solely on the matter of the state of mind involved in the commission of the offenses” and not as “evidence of the defendant’s character or as any evidence that he is inclined to commit c

1997Code, § 351; see Huddleston v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 689 [108 S.Ct. at p. 1501].) The preponderance standard is also consistent with the rule stated in Evidence Code section 115 that “Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” When the evidence of the Marin County crimes was presented, the court instructed the jury to consider it “solely on the matter of the state of mind involved in the commission of the offenses” and not as “evidence of the defendant’s character or as any evidence that he is inclined to commit c

1997Code, § 351; see Huddleston v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 689 [108 S.Ct. at p. 1501].) The preponderance standard is also consistent with the rule stated in Evidence Code section 115 that “Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” When the evidence of the Marin County crimes was presented, the court instructed the jury to consider it “solely on the matter of the state of mind involved in the commission of the offenses” and not as “evidence of the defendant’s character or as any evidence that he is inclined to commit c

1997Code, § 351; see Huddleston v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 689 [108 S.Ct. at p. 1501].) The preponderance standard is also consistent with the rule stated in Evidence Code section 115 that “Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” When the evidence of the Marin County crimes was presented, the court instructed the jury to consider it “solely on the matter of the state of mind involved in the commission of the offenses” and not as “evidence of the defendant’s character or as any evidence that he is inclined to commit c

1993“The judgment is on the merits if the substance of the claim is tried and determined . . . .” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, § 217, p. 655; Estate of Gump (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 582, 608 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 ].) A judgment “which is rendered after a trial of the issues of fact” is a judgment on the merits. (7 Witkin, supra, Judgment, § 218, p. 655.) Here, a contested hearing on the allegations of the petition was heard over five court days, after which the juvenile court rendered a decision concluding those allegations had not been sustained; the resulting order dismissing the petiti

1993“The judgment is on the merits if the substance of the claim is tried and determined . . . .” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, § 217, p. 655; Estate of Gump (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 582, 608 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 ].) A judgment “which is rendered after a trial of the issues of fact” is a judgment on the merits. (7 Witkin, supra, Judgment, § 218, p. 655.) Here, a contested hearing on the allegations of the petition was heard over five court days, after which the juvenile court rendered a decision concluding those allegations had not been sustained; the resulting order dismissing the petiti

1991This requirement is derived from the fundamental policy of the doctrine, which gives stability to judgments after the parties have had a fair opportunity to litigate their claims and defenses. [Citations.] [][] The judgment is on the merits if the substance of the claim is tried and determined, no matter how wrongly it is decided.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, § 217, pp. 654-655, italics added; accord Smith v. Smith (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 203, 209 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 492 ], [postdivorce ruling that divorce decree was res judicata on status of retirement benefits as community pr

1991This requirement is derived from the fundamental policy of the doctrine, which gives stability to judgments after the parties have had a fair opportunity to litigate their claims and defenses. [Citations.] [][] The judgment is on the merits if the substance of the claim is tried and determined, no matter how wrongly it is decided.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, § 217, pp. 654-655, italics added; accord Smith v. Smith (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 203, 209 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 492 ], [postdivorce ruling that divorce decree was res judicata on status of retirement benefits as community pr

1987(See In re Lara, supra, 731 F.2d 1455 at pp. 1458-1463; Winnett v. Roberts (1986) 179 Cal. App.3d 909, 919 [ 225 Cal. Rptr. 82 ]; Garcia v. Wetzel, supra, 159 Cal. App.3d 1093 at pp. 1099-1100 (dis. opn. of White, P.J.); Comment, The Usury Exemption: Should It Apply to Real Estate Brokers Making Loans?, supra, 26 Santa Clara L.Rev. 403, passim ; Note, In re Lara: The Ninth Circuit Places Statutory Meaning in Doubt (1985) 15 Golden Gate L.Rev. 99, 109-112.) The substance of such a requirement is largely circuitous, if not casuistical, because acting in a licensed capacity is defined as acting f

1987(See In re Lara, supra, 731 F.2d 1455 at pp. 1458-1463 ; Winnett v. Roberts (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 909, 919 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 82 ]; Garcia v. Wetzel, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d 1093 at pp. 1099-1100 (dis. opn. of White, P. J.); Comment, The Usury Exemption: Should It Apply to Real Estate Brokers Making Loans?, supra, 26 Santa Clara L.Rev. 403, passim; Note, In re Lara: The Ninth Circuit Places Statutory Meaning in Doubt (1985) 15 Golden Gate L.Rev. 99, 109-112.) The substance of such a requirement is largely circuitous, if not casuistical, because acting in a licensed capacity is defined as acting for

1986We find that the substance of the required warnings was given." ( Id., at p. 377; see also California v. Prysock (1981) 453 U.S. 355 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 696 , 101 S.Ct. 2806 ].) In Tasby v. United States (8th Cir.1971) 451 F.2d 394 , the defendant was advised only that an attorney would be appointed "`at the proper time.'" ( Id., at p. 398.) The Seventh Circuit panel agreed this admonition, "even though a slight deviation from the Miranda prescription, [did] not negate the over-all effectiveness of the warning" and affirmed the convictions. ( Id., at pp. 398-399.) Finally, we turn to the language of

1986We find that the substance of the required warnings was given." ( Id., at p. 377; see also California v. Prysock (1981) 453 U.S. 355 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 696 , 101 S.Ct. 2806 ].) In Tasby v. United States (8th Cir.1971) 451 F.2d 394 , the defendant was advised only that an attorney would be appointed "`at the proper time.'" ( Id., at p. 398.) The Seventh Circuit panel agreed this admonition, "even though a slight deviation from the Miranda prescription, [did] not negate the over-all effectiveness of the warning" and affirmed the convictions. ( Id., at pp. 398-399.) Finally, we turn to the language of

2022The certificate requirements of section 1237.5 are to “be applied in a strict manner.” (People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1098 .) To determine whether an appeal challenging a post-no contest plea sentence requires examining the substance of the claim on appeal: “the crucial issue is what the defendant is challenging, not the time or manner in which the challenge is made.” (People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 63 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 656 .) In other words, the question “is whether a challenge to the sentence is in subs

2016Code, § 1237.5.) Courts must apply these rules “in a strict manner.” (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098 .) When determining whether a certificate of probable cause is required, courts look to the substance of the error being challenged, not the time at which the hearing was conducted or the manner in which the challenge is made.

1969(People v. Gregg (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 389, 390-396 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 920 ]; People v. Gonzales (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 286, 288-291 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 578 ]; People v. Spencer (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 97, 102-105 [ 294 P.2d 997 ]; and People v. Cabrellis (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 681, 685-688 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 795 ].) On the other hand, in People v. Leyva (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 469 ], the court observed, “An essential ingredient of the offense with which the defendant was charged was his knowledge of the marijuana character of the article allegedly possessed by him. [Citation.] His plea of not

1969(People v. Gregg (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 389, 390-396 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 920 ]; People v. Gonzales (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 286, 288-291 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 578 ]; People v. Spencer (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 97, 102-105 [ 294 P.2d 997 ]; and People v. Cabrellis (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 681, 685-688 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 795 ].) On the other hand, in People v. Leyva (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 469 ], the court observed, “An essential ingredient of the offense with which the defendant was charged was his knowledge of the marijuana character of the article allegedly possessed by him. [Citation.] His plea of not

2022(Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1563 ; Sabek, Inc. v. Engelhard Corp. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 992, 997 ; U.S. v. Balin (1992 7th Cir.) 977 F.2d 270 , 276.) “Direct estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a fact which was already determined against it in ‘a decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on the merits but does not preclude all further action on the remainder of the claim; issues common to both parts of the claim are precluded, even though new issues remain to be decided.’ [Citation.] Consider, as an example, a civil case for l

2022“A judgment or adjudication is on the merits if the substance of the claim or issue is tried and determined.” (Parkford, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 227 [neither claim nor issue preclusion applied where appeal in first action was dismissed as moot]; Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 77 [trial court’s ruling based on laches was not a judgment on the merits].) “‘A prior adjudication of an issue in another action may be deemed “sufficiently firm” to be accorded preclusive effect based on the following factors: (1) whether the decision was not avowedly tentative; (2) whether the

2022(People v. Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 355, 358.) We review whether such an error was harmless under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , which requires reversal unless a reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.

2019(See Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [reversal required unless the reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not affect the jury’s verdict].) C.

2022The certificate requirements of section 1237.5 are to “be applied in a strict manner.” (People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1098 .) To determine whether an appeal challenging a post-no contest plea sentence requires examining the substance of the claim on appeal: “the crucial issue is what the defendant is challenging, not the time or manner in which the challenge is made.” (People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 63 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 656 .) In other words, the question “is whether a challenge to the sentence is in subs

2009Although Ward also involved a proceeding subsequent to entry of the plea, the “determinative factor” in that case was “the substance of the error being challenged, not the time at which the hearing was conducted.” (Ribero, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 63.) We concluded that a contrary holding would “invite such motions [to withdraw the plea] as a matter of course, and would be wholly contrary to the purpose of section 1237.5.” (Id. at p. 64.) In the present case, defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to the assistance of counsel at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea plainly does

2017The judicial obligation "to interpret police policies for purposes of ... section 17004.7 does not give us the supervisory power to dictate good *826 (or bad) law enforcement tactics." ( McGee v. City of Laguna Beach (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 537 , 548, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 506 ( McGee ); see also Ketchum v. State of California (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 957 , 969, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 ( Ketchum ) ["We decline to abandon our role as judges and legislate police policy by dictating the elements of the pursuit policy"].) Ramirez challenges the adequacy of the City's policy under subdivision (c)(5) and (6) of sect

2017The judicial obligation "to interpret police policies for purposes of ... section 17004.7 does not give us the supervisory power to dictate good *826 (or bad) law enforcement tactics." ( McGee v. City of Laguna Beach (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 537 , 548, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 506 ( McGee ); see also Ketchum v. State of California (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 957 , 969, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 ( Ketchum ) ["We decline to abandon our role as judges and legislate police policy by dictating the elements of the pursuit policy"].) Ramirez challenges the adequacy of the City's policy under subdivision (c)(5) and (6) of sect

2015(People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 910 [“court should give the substance of CALJIC No. 2.20 in every criminal case, although it may omit factors that are inapplicable under the evidence”]; People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883 [“the substance of the instruction set forth as CALJIC No. 2.20 should . . . always be given”].) In this case, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to give CALJIC No. 2.20 or an equivalent instruction, but the error was harmless.

2014The court shall inform the jury in all cases that the jurors are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact submitted to them and of the credibility of the witnesses." 7 CALCRIM No. 226 largely tracks the language of CALJIC No. 2.20 concerning the factors that a jury may consider in assessing the witnesses' credibility. 12 under the evidence may be omitted, the paragraphs alerting the jury to the bearing on the credibility of a witness of the 'existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive' and the attitude of the witness 'toward the action in which he testified or toward th

2014(People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1054-1055 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) As we have explained, while the jurors were not instructed with the exact words of CALCRIM No. 121, they nevertheless received the substance of that instruction through CALJIC Nos. 1.00 and 1.03, the trial 21 On this record, it is not even clear that the inclusion of the language about giving a note to the bailiff in the event of an error in the translation would have made any difference in the timing of the jury’s notification because it is not clear any of the jurors perceived any error at

1987(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 831 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) The former instructions containing other portions of CALJIC No. 2.01 were said to establish the principle that circumstantial evidence must be inconsistent with any other hypothesis.

2012(Taylor v. Kentucky, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 485 .) We followed Taylor in People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th 43 (Hawthorne), to conclude that so long as the court’s instructions to the jury express the substance of the presumption of innocence, it will satisfy the dictates of due process.

2012(Taylor v. Kentucky, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 485 .) We followed Taylor in People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th 43 (Hawthorne), to conclude that so long as the court‘s instructions to the jury express the substance of the presumption of innocence, it will satisfy the dictates of due process.