substance doctrine in Alabama

1985In Protective Life Insurance Co. v. Cole , 230 Ala. 450 , 161 So. 818 (1935) (on rehearing), this Court said the following: The substance of the doctrine of waiver as applied in the law of insurance is, that if the insurer, with knowledge of facts which would bar an existing primary liability, recognizes such primary liability by treating the policy as in force, he will not thereafter be allowed to plead such facts to avoid his primary liability. [Citations omitted.] 230 Ala. at 452 , 161 So. at 819 .

1985In Protective Life Insurance Co. v. Cole , 230 Ala. 450 , 161 So. 818 (1935) (on rehearing), this Court said the following: The substance of the doctrine of waiver as applied in the law of insurance is, that if the insurer, with knowledge of facts which would bar an existing primary liability, recognizes such primary liability by treating the policy as in force, he will not thereafter be allowed to plead such facts to avoid his primary liability. [Citations omitted.] 230 Ala. at 452 , 161 So. at 819 .

1949Washburn Adm’r v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 143 Ala. 485 , 38 So. 1011 ; American Ins.

1935Washburn, Adm’r, v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 143 Ala. 485 , 38 So. 1011 ; American Ins.

2018Bluemly , supra, and Love , supra. Specifically, the administration of an estate cannot be split between the probate court and the circuit court.

2018Bluemly , supra, and Love , supra. Specifically, the administration of an estate cannot be split between the probate court and the circuit court.

1993United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039 , 111 S.Ct. 709 , 112 L.Ed.2d 698 (1991).

1993United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039 , 111 S.Ct. 709 , 112 L.Ed.2d 698 (1991).

1993United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039 , 111 S.Ct. 709 , 112 L.Ed.2d 698 (1991).

1993United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039 , 111 S.Ct. 709 , 112 L.Ed.2d 698 (1991).

2013Benjamin v. State, 940 So.2d 371 (Ala.Crim.App.2005).

2005(R. 888.) In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), the United States Supreme Court stated, "[W]e conclude that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere." Beckworth sought in his requested jury instruction no. 4 to be certain that the trial court did not minimize the jury's awareness of its responsibility.

2005(R. 888.) In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), the United States Supreme Court stated, "[W]e conclude that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere." Beckworth sought in his requested jury instruction no. 4 to be certain that the trial court did not minimize the jury's awareness of its responsibility.

1996Second, writing for the Court, Justice Almon stated correctly that "Judge Kendall's order is preliminary, and appellate courts do not review preliminary orders in class actions absent compelling reasons to do so." 681 So.2d 1068 (emphasis added).

1989Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama v. Ramsey , 43 Ala. App. 496 , 193 So.2d 149 (1966).

1989Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama v. Ramsey , 43 Ala. App. 496 , 193 So.2d 149 (1966).

1986E.g., Phillips v. State , 443 So.2d 1328 , 1331-1332 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983); Lucy v. State , 340 So.2d 840 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied , 340 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1976); Stanley v. State , 57 Ala. App. 83 , 84 , 326 So.2d 148 (1976); Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 627 , 324 So.2d 336 . (1975). (i) Petitioner placed his intent in issue through his confession and lack of the intent to kill was the substance of his defense.

1986E.g., Phillips v. State , 443 So.2d 1328 , 1331-1332 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983); Lucy v. State , 340 So.2d 840 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied , 340 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1976); Stanley v. State , 57 Ala. App. 83 , 84 , 326 So.2d 148 (1976); Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 627 , 324 So.2d 336 . (1975). (i) Petitioner placed his intent in issue through his confession and lack of the intent to kill was the substance of his defense.

1986E.g., Phillips v. State , 443 So.2d 1328 , 1331-1332 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983); Lucy v. State , 340 So.2d 840 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied , 340 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1976); Stanley v. State , 57 Ala. App. 83 , 84 , 326 So.2d 148 (1976); Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 627 , 324 So.2d 336 . (1975). (i) Petitioner placed his intent in issue through his confession and lack of the intent to kill was the substance of his defense.

1986E.g., Phillips v. State , 443 So.2d 1328 , 1331-1332 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983); Lucy v. State , 340 So.2d 840 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied , 340 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1976); Stanley v. State , 57 Ala. App. 83 , 84 , 326 So.2d 148 (1976); Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 627 , 324 So.2d 336 . (1975). (i) Petitioner placed his intent in issue through his confession and lack of the intent to kill was the substance of his defense.

1986E.g., Phillips v. State , 443 So.2d 1328 , 1331-1332 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983); Lucy v. State , 340 So.2d 840 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied , 340 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1976); Stanley v. State , 57 Ala. App. 83 , 84 , 326 So.2d 148 (1976); Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 627 , 324 So.2d 336 . (1975). (i) Petitioner placed his intent in issue through his confession and lack of the intent to kill was the substance of his defense.

1986E.g., Phillips v. State , 443 So.2d 1328 , 1331-1332 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983); Lucy v. State , 340 So.2d 840 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied , 340 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1976); Stanley v. State , 57 Ala. App. 83 , 84 , 326 So.2d 148 (1976); Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 627 , 324 So.2d 336 . (1975). (i) Petitioner placed his intent in issue through his confession and lack of the intent to kill was the substance of his defense.

1986E.g., Phillips v. State , 443 So.2d 1328 , 1331-1332 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983); Lucy v. State , 340 So.2d 840 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied , 340 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1976); Stanley v. State , 57 Ala. App. 83 , 84 , 326 So.2d 148 (1976); Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 627 , 324 So.2d 336 . (1975). (i) Petitioner placed his intent in issue through his confession and lack of the intent to kill was the substance of his defense.

1977Jones v. State , 47 Ala. App. 568 , 570 , 258 So.2d 910 (1972).

1977Jones v. State , 47 Ala. App. 568 , 570 , 258 So.2d 910 (1972).

1966In Spraggins v. State, 139 Ala. 93 , 35 So. 1000 , the court held that it was reversible error to refuse the following instruction: “The court charges the jury a probability that some other person may have done the shooting is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, therefore for his acquittal.” In Pitman v. State, 148 Ala. 612 , 42 So. 993 , the court held that such a charge is proper where there is evidence pointing to one or more persons other than the defendant.

1966In Spraggins v. State, 139 Ala. 93 , 35 So. 1000 , the court held that it was reversible error to refuse the following instruction: “The court charges the jury a probability that some other person may have done the shooting is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, therefore for his acquittal.” In Pitman v. State, 148 Ala. 612 , 42 So. 993 , the court held that such a charge is proper where there is evidence pointing to one or more persons other than the defendant.

1966In Spraggins v. State, 139 Ala. 93 , 35 So. 1000 , the court held that it was reversible error to refuse the following instruction: “The court charges the jury a probability that some other person may have done the shooting is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, therefore for his acquittal.” In Pitman v. State, 148 Ala. 612 , 42 So. 993 , the court held that such a charge is proper where there is evidence pointing to one or more persons other than the defendant.

1962Perry & Son v. Harrison, 24 Ala.App. 356 , 135 So. 409 .

1962Perry & Son v. Harrison, 24 Ala.App. 356 , 135 So. 409 .

1959We have no disposition to re-examine the grounds on which that principle rests.’ ” In Oxford v. Estes, 229 Ala. 606 , 158 So. 534, 538 , this court said: “Prescription, as a bar to actions at law or in equity, is a rule of repose; aims at an end of controversies touching the title to property; fixes twenty years as the absolute limit beyond which courts will not inquire; applies to express trusts which have lain dormant, unrecognized, and unasserted for twenty years; no disabilities, such as infancy, prevent or suspend the running of the twenty-year period.

1959We have no disposition to re-examine the grounds on which that principle rests.’ ” In Oxford v. Estes, 229 Ala. 606 , 158 So. 534, 538 , this court said: “Prescription, as a bar to actions at law or in equity, is a rule of repose; aims at an end of controversies touching the title to property; fixes twenty years as the absolute limit beyond which courts will not inquire; applies to express trusts which have lain dormant, unrecognized, and unasserted for twenty years; no disabilities, such as infancy, prevent or suspend the running of the twenty-year period.

1938Bloom v. The City of Cullman, 197 Ala. 490 , 73 So. 85 ; Langley Bus Co. v. Messer, 222 Ala. 533 , 133 So. 287 ; Town of Athens v. Miller, 190 Ala. 82 , 66 So. 702 ; Demopolis Telephone Co. v. Hood, 212 Ala. 216 , 102 So. 35 .

1938Bloom v. The City of Cullman, 197 Ala. 490 , 73 So. 85 ; Langley Bus Co. v. Messer, 222 Ala. 533 , 133 So. 287 ; Town of Athens v. Miller, 190 Ala. 82 , 66 So. 702 ; Demopolis Telephone Co. v. Hood, 212 Ala. 216 , 102 So. 35 .

1938The appellants in brief state: “The substance of the inquiry in this case, and in each of said specific questions, is simply this: Are the respondents in the performance of their duties as Tax Collector and Probate Judge of Jefferson County respectively governed by the decision in the case of City of Opp v. Brogden et al., Ala.Sup., 181 So. 752 , 1 or does Act 155 of the General Acts of Alabama, 1911 (1911 General Acts of Alabama, p. 130) take the complainants from within the effects of the decision in the City of Opp v. Brogden Case?” (Italics supplied.) The appellee in brief observes: “As. s

1938The appellants in brief state: “The substance of the inquiry in this case, and in each of said specific questions, is simply this: Are the respondents in the performance of their duties as Tax Collector and Probate Judge of Jefferson County respectively governed by the decision in the case of City of Opp v. Brogden et al., Ala.Sup., 181 So. 752 , 1 or does Act 155 of the General Acts of Alabama, 1911 (1911 General Acts of Alabama, p. 130) take the complainants from within the effects of the decision in the City of Opp v. Brogden Case?” (Italics supplied.) The appellee in brief observes: “As. s

1938Bloom v. The City of Cullman, 197 Ala. 490 , 73 So. 85 ; Langley Bus Co. v. Messer, 222 Ala. 533 , 133 So. 287 ; Town of Athens v. Miller, 190 Ala. 82 , 66 So. 702 ; Demopolis Telephone Co. v. Hood, 212 Ala. 216 , 102 So. 35 .

1938Bloom v. The City of Cullman, 197 Ala. 490 , 73 So. 85 ; Langley Bus Co. v. Messer, 222 Ala. 533 , 133 So. 287 ; Town of Athens v. Miller, 190 Ala. 82 , 66 So. 702 ; Demopolis Telephone Co. v. Hood, 212 Ala. 216 , 102 So. 35 .