substance rule in Iowa

2026See id. at 232–37 (“The question of a challenge for juror bias may be considered preserved based on the theory that the substance of the claim, rather than its label, controls. . . . [Additionally,] deliberate lying by a juror in voir dire may strongly suggest the 2 In Estrada’s motion for a new trial, he cites Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(9).

2024See id. (“The question of a challenge for juror bias may be considered preserved based on the theory that the substance of the claim, rather than its label, controls.”).

2015See Lee v. State, 815 N.W.2d 731, 739 (Iowa 2012) (“We will not exalt form over substance when the objectives of our error preservation rules have been met.”); Griffin Pipe Prods.

2015See Lee v. State, 815 N.W.2d 731, 739 (Iowa 2012) (“We will not exalt form over substance when the objectives of our error preservation rules have been met.”); Griffin Pipe Prods.

2023See State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Iowa 2003); see also State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 2002) (finding that signing a written guilty plea that clearly states the substance of the rule requirements is sufficient to properly inform the defendant).

2020“Substantial compliance with rule 2.8(2)(d) is mandatory . . . .” State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016). “[R]egardless of whether the information is imparted through a colloquy or a written plea, the defendant must be made aware of the substance of rule 2.24(3)(a).” Id. at 681 ; see also State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 2002) (per curiam) (stating a written guilty plea that clearly states the substance of the rule requirements is sufficient to properly inform the defendant).

2016Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at 680-81 ; see also State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 411 (Iowa 2015) (“[T]he district court, with the defendant’s consent, may waive the in- court colloquy otherwise required by [rule] 2.8(2)(b).”).

2016Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at 680-81 ; see also State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 411 (Iowa 2015) (“[T]he district court, with the defendant’s consent, may waive the in- court colloquy otherwise required by [rule] 2.8(2)(b).”).

2020“Substantial compliance with rule 2.8(2)(d) is mandatory . . . .” State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016). “[R]egardless of whether the information is imparted through a colloquy or a written plea, the defendant must be made aware of the substance of rule 2.24(3)(a).” Id. at 681 ; see also State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 2002) (per curiam) (stating a written guilty plea that clearly states the substance of the rule requirements is sufficient to properly inform the defendant).

2020“Substantial compliance with rule 2.8(2)(d) is mandatory . . . .” State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016). “[R]egardless of whether the information is imparted through a colloquy or a written plea, the defendant must be made aware of the substance of rule 2.24(3)(a).” Id. at 681 ; see also State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 2002) (per curiam) (stating a written guilty plea that clearly states the substance of the rule requirements is sufficient to properly inform the defendant).

2023See State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Iowa 2003); see also State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 2002) (finding that signing a written guilty plea that clearly states the substance of the rule requirements is sufficient to properly inform the defendant).

2022In any event, we proceed to the merits. 5 The mother also contends termination was not in the best interests of the children because an additional six months would “be enough time to reunify.” 6 In determining best interests, our primary considerations are “the child[ren]’s safety,” “the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren],” and “the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116 (2)).

2012F.D.I.C., 224 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2000) (“ ‘It is the substance of the claim and not the language used in stating it which controls’ whether the claim is barred by an FTCA exception.” (citation omitted)).

2000In re A.G., 558 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa 1997).

1995See State v. Freeman, 267 N.W.2d 69, 70-71 (Iowa 1978) (stating there is no error in denying an instruction where the substance of the instruction is included in another instruction).

1995See State v. Freeman, 267 N.W.2d 69, 70-71 (Iowa 1978) (stating there is no error in denying an instruction where the substance of the instruction is included in another instruction).

1994Compare Hollinrake v. Monroe County, 433 N.W.2d 696 (Iowa 1988) (a disability discrimination claim based on the substance of a rule enacted by the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy must be challenged under the judicial review procedures of chapter 17A; the ICRC did not have authority to hear the challenge as a civil rights action) with Jew v. University of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1987) (sexual harassment claim by associate professor may be pursued under chapter 601A; chapter 17A did not provide the exclusive means to challenge the University's action).

1985This court adopted the substance of these factors and applied them to defense services, except for the last one, in Parrish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Iowa 1978) (" `In determining a reasonable attorney fee, generally the time necessarily spent, the nature and extent of the service, the amount involved [or, as here, the possible punishment involved], the difficulty of handling and importance of issues, responsibility assumed and the results obtained, *205 as well as the standing and experience of the attorney in the profession should be considered.' " (Citations omitted.)).

1985This court adopted the substance of these factors and applied them to defense services, except for the last one, in Parrish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Iowa 1978) (“ ‘In determining a reasonable attorney fee, generally the time necessarily spent, the nature and extent of the service, the amount involved [or, as here, the possible punishment involved], the difficulty of handling and importance of issues, responsibility assumed and the results obtained, as well as the standing and experience of the attorney in the profession should be considered.’ ” (Citations omitted.)).