substance instruction in Nebraska

2019To allow such claims would frustrate the pur- poses of the exception.”13 [7] To summarize, Johnson held that under the intentional torts exception, the State is immune from suit when the tort claim “is based on the mere fact of government employment (such as a respondeat superior claim) or on the employment relationship between the intentional tort-feasor and the gov- ernment (such as a negligent supervision or negligent hir- ing claim).”14 12 Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 , 108 S. Ct. 2449 , 101 L.

2019To allow such claims would frustrate the pur- poses of the exception.”13 [7] To summarize, Johnson held that under the intentional torts exception, the State is immune from suit when the tort claim “is based on the mere fact of government employment (such as a respondeat superior claim) or on the employment relationship between the intentional tort-feasor and the gov- ernment (such as a negligent supervision or negligent hir- ing claim).”14 12 Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 , 108 S. Ct. 2449 , 101 L.

2021To allow such claims would frustrate the purposes of the [intentional tort] exception.” 32 Johnson also quoted the reasoning of four U.S. Supreme Court justices in United States v. Shearer, 33 stating that a plaintiff 30 Johnson, supra note 25 . 31 Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 32 Johnson, supra note 25 , 270 Neb. at 322 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 33 United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 , 105 S. Ct. 3039 , 87 L.

2021To allow such claims would frustrate the purposes of the [intentional tort] exception.” 32 Johnson also quoted the reasoning of four U.S. Supreme Court justices in United States v. Shearer, 33 stating that a plaintiff 30 Johnson, supra note 25 . 31 Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 32 Johnson, supra note 25 , 270 Neb. at 322 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 33 United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 , 105 S. Ct. 3039 , 87 L.

2021To allow such claims would frustrate the purposes of the [intentional tort] exception.” 32 Johnson also quoted the reasoning of four U.S. Supreme Court justices in United States v. Shearer, 33 stating that a plaintiff 30 Johnson, supra note 25 . 31 Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 32 Johnson, supra note 25 , 270 Neb. at 322 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 33 United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 , 105 S. Ct. 3039 , 87 L.

2021To allow such claims would frustrate the purposes of the [intentional tort] exception.” 32 Johnson also quoted the reasoning of four U.S. Supreme Court justices in United States v. Shearer, 33 stating that a plaintiff 30 Johnson, supra note 25 . 31 Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 32 Johnson, supra note 25 , 270 Neb. at 322 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Sheridan, supra note 28 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 33 United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 , 105 S. Ct. 3039 , 87 L.

2017Thus, a plaintiff 123 Id. at 183, 655 N.W.2d at 873 . 124 Id. 125 Id. - 93 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports JILL B. & TRAVIS B. v. STATE Cite as 297 Neb. 57 cannot circumvent the misrepresentation exception simply through artful pleading of its claims.”126 Gall’s misstatement is essential to the parents’ claim.

2017Thus, a plaintiff 123 Id. at 183, 655 N.W.2d at 873 . 124 Id. 125 Id. - 93 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports JILL B. & TRAVIS B. v. STATE Cite as 297 Neb. 57 cannot circumvent the misrepresentation exception simply through artful pleading of its claims.”126 Gall’s misstatement is essential to the parents’ claim.

2013Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. PANGBORN 363 Cite as 286 Neb. 363 CONCLUSION Because no error was assigned to TERC’s determination that Krings’ land was nonagricultural and nonhorticultural, we affirm that portion of TERC’s order in which it so concluded.

1996Scharmann v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 247 Neb. 304 , 526 N.W.2d 436 (1995); Nichols v. Busse, 243 Neb. 811 , 503 N.W.2d 173 (1993).

1996Scharmann v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 247 Neb. 304 , 526 N.W.2d 436 (1995); Nichols v. Busse, 243 Neb. 811 , 503 N.W.2d 173 (1993).

1996Scharmann v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 247 Neb. 304 , 526 N.W.2d 436 (1995); Nichols v. Busse, 243 Neb. 811 , 503 N.W.2d 173 (1993).

1996Scharmann v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 247 Neb. 304 , 526 N.W.2d 436 (1995); Nichols v. Busse, 243 Neb. 811 , 503 N.W.2d 173 (1993).

1969This is the substance of the instruction which was approved in State v. Sullivan, 43 N. J. 209, 203 A. 2d 177 .

1969This is the substance of the instruction which was approved in State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209 , 203 A.2d 177 .

1964The rule' of law which is the basis for this contention *551 is stated in Holliday v. Patchen, supra, as follows: “When the evidence is resolved most favorably toward the existence of gross negligence and the facts thus determined, the question of whether or not they support a finding of gross negligence is one of law.” The substance of this rule is repeated in the following cases: Montgomery v. Ross, 156 Neb. 875 , 58 N. W. 2d 340 ; Robinson v. Hammes, supra; Cole v. Wentworth, 175 Neb. 325 , 121 N. W. 2d 567 .

1964The rule' of law which is the basis for this contention *551 is stated in Holliday v. Patchen, supra, as follows: “When the evidence is resolved most favorably toward the existence of gross negligence and the facts thus determined, the question of whether or not they support a finding of gross negligence is one of law.” The substance of this rule is repeated in the following cases: Montgomery v. Ross, 156 Neb. 875 , 58 N. W. 2d 340 ; Robinson v. Hammes, supra; Cole v. Wentworth, 175 Neb. 325 , 121 N. W. 2d 567 .

1964The rule' of law which is the basis for this contention *551 is stated in Holliday v. Patchen, supra, as follows: “When the evidence is resolved most favorably toward the existence of gross negligence and the facts thus determined, the question of whether or not they support a finding of gross negligence is one of law.” The substance of this rule is repeated in the following cases: Montgomery v. Ross, 156 Neb. 875 , 58 N. W. 2d 340 ; Robinson v. Hammes, supra; Cole v. Wentworth, 175 Neb. 325 , 121 N. W. 2d 567 .

1964The rule' of law which is the basis for this contention *551 is stated in Holliday v. Patchen, supra, as follows: “When the evidence is resolved most favorably toward the existence of gross negligence and the facts thus determined, the question of whether or not they support a finding of gross negligence is one of law.” The substance of this rule is repeated in the following cases: Montgomery v. Ross, 156 Neb. 875 , 58 N. W. 2d 340 ; Robinson v. Hammes, supra; Cole v. Wentworth, 175 Neb. 325 , 121 N. W. 2d 567 .

1937The controlling issue in the case is the same as in Tagge v. Gulzow, ante, p. 276, 271 N. W. 803 , decided herewith, and for reasons stated in the opinion in that case the judgment herein is Affirmed.

1934In the event of failure to comply with the formal statutory requirements, the substance of the rule, with reference to a claim for compensation as distinguished from a notice of injury, is that recovery of compensation may be permitted only “if employee’s accidental injury is latent and progressive and cannot with reasonable certainty be recognized at first as compensable, where notice is given (of claim for compensation) within six months from the time the employee acquires knowledge of a compensable disability as a result of the accident.” Flesch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 Neb. 1 .

1911Curry v. State, 5 Neb. 412 .

1911The law presumes the defendant to be innocent until he is proven guilty by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the law allows him to testify in his own behalf, and you should fairly and impartially consider his testimony together with all the other evidence in the case.” The substance of this instruction has been approved by this court in Philamalee v. State, 58 Neb. 320 ; Richards v. State, 36 Neb. 17 ; Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163 ; Johnson v. State, 34 Neb. 257 ; Davis v. State, 31 Neb. 247 .

1911The law presumes the defendant to be innocent until he is proven guilty by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the law allows him to testify in his own behalf, and you should fairly and impartially consider his testimony together with all the other evidence in the case.” The substance of this instruction has been approved by this court in Philamalee v. State, 58 Neb. 320 ; Richards v. State, 36 Neb. 17 ; Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163 ; Johnson v. State, 34 Neb. 257 ; Davis v. State, 31 Neb. 247 .

1911The law presumes the defendant to be innocent until he is proven guilty by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the law allows him to testify in his own behalf, and you should fairly and impartially consider his testimony together with all the other evidence in the case.” The substance of this instruction has been approved by this court in Philamalee v. State, 58 Neb. 320 ; Richards v. State, 36 Neb. 17 ; Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163 ; Johnson v. State, 34 Neb. 257 ; Davis v. State, 31 Neb. 247 .

1911The law presumes the defendant to be innocent until he is proven guilty by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the law allows him to testify in his own behalf, and you should fairly and impartially consider his testimony together with all the other evidence in the case.” The substance of this instruction has been approved by this court in Philamalee v. State, 58 Neb. 320 ; Richards v. State, 36 Neb. 17 ; Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163 ; Johnson v. State, 34 Neb. 257 ; Davis v. State, 31 Neb. 247 .

1911The law presumes the defendant to be innocent until he is proven guilty by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the law allows him to testify in his own behalf, and you should fairly and impartially consider his testimony together with all the other evidence in the case.” The substance of this instruction has been approved by this court in Philamalee v. State, 58 Neb. 320 ; Richards v. State, 36 Neb. 17 ; Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163 ; Johnson v. State, 34 Neb. 257 ; Davis v. State, 31 Neb. 247 .

1908The substance of this instruction was approved in Barney v. State, 49 Neb. 515 , Polin v. State, 14 Neb. 540 , Foley v. State, 2 Neb. 233 , and Maxfield v. State, 54 Neb. 45 , and we are satisfied, after an examination of all of the instructions given and those refused, that the jury were properly instructed upon the law of the case.

1908The substance of this instruction was approved in Barney v. State, 49 Neb. 515 , Polin v. State, 14 Neb. 540 , Foley v. State, 2 Neb. 233 , and Maxfield v. State, 54 Neb. 45 , and we are satisfied, after an examination of all of the instructions given and those refused, that the jury were properly instructed upon the law of the case.

1905Bush v. State, 47 Neb. 642 ; Oarrall v. State, 53 Neb. 431 .

1905Bush v. State, 47 Neb. 642 ; Oarrall v. State, 53 Neb. 431 .