48 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1896–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whalen v. Ivesgreen2 sentences2005This court has opined: “Even though the plaintiffs’ motion was captioned motion for clarification, we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bower v. D’Onfro, 45 Conn. App. 543, 547-48 , 696 A.2d 1285 (1997), quoting Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn. App. 7, 16 , 654 A.2d 798 , cert, denied, 233 Conn. 905 , 657 A.2d 645 (1995). 2005This court has opined: “Even though the plaintiffs’ motion was captioned motion for clarification, we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bower v. D’Onfro, 45 Conn. App. 543, 547-48 , 696 A.2d 1285 (1997), quoting Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn. App. 7, 16 , 654 A.2d 798 , cert, denied, 233 Conn. 905 , 657 A.2d 645 (1995). | 4 | 9 |
State v. Wokomagreen2 sentences2005This court has opined: “Even though the plaintiffs’ motion was captioned motion for clarification, we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bower v. D’Onfro, 45 Conn. App. 543, 547-48 , 696 A.2d 1285 (1997), quoting Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn. App. 7, 16 , 654 A.2d 798 , cert, denied, 233 Conn. 905 , 657 A.2d 645 (1995). 2002We note that, even though the defendant’s motion was captioned “motion to clarify,” “we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bower v. D’Onfro, 45 Conn. App. 543, 547 , 696 A.2d 1285 (1997), quoting Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn. App. 7, 16 , 654 A.2d 798 , cert. denied, 233 Conn. 905 , 657 A.2d 645 (1995). | 4 | 8 |
Whalen v. Ivesgreen2 sentences2005This court has opined: “Even though the plaintiffs’ motion was captioned motion for clarification, we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bower v. D’Onfro, 45 Conn. App. 543, 547-48 , 696 A.2d 1285 (1997), quoting Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn. App. 7, 16 , 654 A.2d 798 , cert, denied, 233 Conn. 905 , 657 A.2d 645 (1995). 2002We note that, even though the defendant’s motion was captioned “motion to clarify,” “we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bower v. D’Onfro, 45 Conn. App. 543, 547 , 696 A.2d 1285 (1997), quoting Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn. App. 7, 16 , 654 A.2d 798 , cert. denied, 233 Conn. 905 , 657 A.2d 645 (1995). | 4 | 8 |
Rome v. Albumgreen2 sentences2011The court then concluded: “Under these circumstances and lacking any claim, much less analysis, of prejudice by the defendant, we will not exalt form over substance.” Id., citing Rome v. Album, 73 Conn. App. 103, 111-12, 807 A.2d 1017 (2002) (“We must look to the substance of the claim rather than the form. . . . 2011The court then concluded: “Under these circumstances and lacking any claim, much less analysis, of prejudice by the defendant, we will not exalt form over substance.” Id., citing Rome v. Album, 73 Conn. App. 103, 111-12, 807 A.2d 1017 (2002) (“We must look to the substance of the claim rather than the form. . . . | 2 | 3 |
In re Brianna F.green2 sentences2002Where a party captions its motion improperly, “we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyck O’Neal, Inc. v. Wynne, 56 Conn. App. 161, 164 , 742 A.2d 393 (1999); see In re Brianna F., 50 Conn. App. 805, 812 , 719 A.2d 478 (1998). 2002Where a party captions its motion improperly, “we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyck O’Neal, Inc. v. Wynne, 56 Conn. App. 161, 164 , 742 A.2d 393 (1999); see In re Brianna F., 50 Conn. App. 805, 812 , 719 A.2d 478 (1998). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Marragreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., State v. Marra, 195 Conn. 421 , 443-44, 489 A.2d 350 (1985) (although final charge "was not in strict compliance with ... § 54-84 [b] in that the word 'unfavorable' was not used, the substantive meaning of the statutory requirement was conveyed [by the balance of the charge]"); State v. Carrione, supra, 188 Conn. at 684 -86 , 453 A.2d 1137 (harmless error when jurors were told "to draw no legal impressions from the fact that [the defendant] did not take the stand and testify" because, immediately thereafter, they were also told "not to penalize [the defendant] for not testifying and 2016See, e.g., State v. Marra, 195 Conn. 421 , 443-44, 489 A.2d 350 (1985) (although final charge "was not in strict compliance with ... § 54-84 [b] in that the word 'unfavorable' was not used, the substantive meaning of the statutory requirement was conveyed [by the balance of the charge]"); State v. Carrione, supra, 188 Conn. at 684 -86 , 453 A.2d 1137 (harmless error when jurors were told "to draw no legal impressions from the fact that [the defendant] did not take the stand and testify" because, immediately thereafter, they were also told "not to penalize [the defendant] for not testifying and | 2 | 2 |
Bower v. D'Onfrogreen2 sentences2018See Bower v. D'Onfro , 45 Conn. App. 543 , 547, 696 A.2d 1285 (1997) ("[e]ven though the ... motion was captioned motion for clarification, we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). 2018See Bower v. D'Onfro , 45 Conn. App. 543 , 547, 696 A.2d 1285 (1997) ("[e]ven though the ... motion was captioned motion for clarification, we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Joseph Vanterpoolgreen2 sentences1974"Words which convey the substance of the warning along with the required information are sufficient." United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir.). 1974“Words which convey the substance of the warning along with the required information are sufficient.” United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir.). | 1 | 3 |
Fadner v. Commissioner of Revenue Servicesgreen2 sentences2018The plaintiff concedes that he did not specifically direct the trial court to § 52-178 but argues that his requests to ask leading questions "functionally raised" the issue. 8 It is true that our appellate *64 courts occasionally have "expressed a willingness to review claims that *77 a party did not explicitly raise to the trial court if it is clear from the record that the substance of the claim *78 was raised." State v. Santana , 313 Conn. 461 , 467, 97 A.3d 963 (2014) ; see also Fadner v. Commissioner of Revenue Services , 281 Conn. 719 , 729 n. 12, 917 A.2d 540 (2007) ; Salmon v. Dept. of 2018The plaintiff concedes that he did not specifically direct the trial court to § 52-178 but argues that his requests to ask leading questions "functionally raised" the issue. 8 It is true that our appellate *64 courts occasionally have "expressed a willingness to review claims that *77 a party did not explicitly raise to the trial court if it is clear from the record that the substance of the claim *78 was raised." State v. Santana , 313 Conn. 461 , 467, 97 A.3d 963 (2014) ; see also Fadner v. Commissioner of Revenue Services , 281 Conn. 719 , 729 n. 12, 917 A.2d 540 (2007) ; Salmon v. Dept. of | 1 | 2 |
Paula McFarland v. Joan Yukinsgreen2 sentences2025As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has observed, ‘‘[r]egardless of this clarification of the terminology, the relevant questions remain the same, and we must ask whether [counsel] labored under a conflict of interest, which was not merely hypotheti- cal, and whether that conflict adversely affected the representation (i.e., whether it was an actual conflict).’’ United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 392 (5th Cir. 2005); see also McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 706 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Mickens ‘‘changed the terminology, but not the substance’’ of test under 2025As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has observed, ‘‘[r]egardless of this clarification of the terminology, the relevant questions remain the same, and we must ask whether [counsel] labored under a conflict of interest, which was not merely hypotheti- cal, and whether that conflict adversely affected the representation (i.e., whether it was an actual conflict).’’ United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 392 (5th Cir. 2005); see also McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 706 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Mickens ‘‘changed the terminology, but not the substance’’ of test under | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ricardo M. Infantegreen2 sentences2025As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has observed, ‘‘[r]egardless of this clarification of the terminology, the relevant questions remain the same, and we must ask whether [counsel] labored under a conflict of interest, which was not merely hypotheti- cal, and whether that conflict adversely affected the representation (i.e., whether it was an actual conflict).’’ United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 392 (5th Cir. 2005); see also McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 706 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Mickens ‘‘changed the terminology, but not the substance’’ of test under 2025As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has observed, ‘‘[r]egardless of this clarification of the terminology, the relevant questions remain the same, and we must ask whether [counsel] labored under a conflict of interest, which was not merely hypotheti- cal, and whether that conflict adversely affected the representation (i.e., whether it was an actual conflict).’’ United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 392 (5th Cir. 2005); see also McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 706 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Mickens ‘‘changed the terminology, but not the substance’’ of test under | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gordongreen1 sentence2020See Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 332 Conn. 720, 763 , 212 A.3d 646 (2019) (‘‘language used in model jury instructions, although instructive in considering the adequacy of a jury instruction . . . is not binding on this court (citation omitted)). 5 Although we do not reach the substance of this claim, we note that it too was rejected in State v. Gordon, supra, 84 Conn. App. 519 . | 1 | 1 |
Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.green2 sentences2020See Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 332 Conn. 720, 763 , 212 A.3d 646 (2019) (‘‘language used in model jury instructions, although instructive in considering the adequacy of a jury instruction . . . is not binding on this court (citation omitted)). 5 Although we do not reach the substance of this claim, we note that it too was rejected in State v. Gordon, supra, 84 Conn. App. 519 . 2020See Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 332 Conn. 720, 763 , 212 A.3d 646 (2019) (‘‘language used in model jury instructions, although instructive in considering the adequacy of a jury instruction . . . is not binding on this court (citation omitted)). 5 Although we do not reach the substance of this claim, we note that it too was rejected in State v. Gordon, supra, 84 Conn. App. 519 . | 1 | 1 |
| Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Town of Southburygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Franco v. East Shore Development, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. Blakegreen | 1 | 1 |
| URBAN REDEV. COM'N OF STAMFORD v. Katsetosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Application for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Rossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Mahargreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Austingreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Denis Brody, Debtor. Carol Brody v. Denis Brodygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barker v. Wingogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United National Ins. Co. v. The Tunnel, Inc. v. Jeffrey Bernstein
green
2 sentences2022Co. v. Tunnel, Inc., 988 F.2d 351 , 354–55 (2d Cir. 1993) (The court concluded that, under New York law, an insurance policy exclusion barred coverage for injuries resulting from an assault by a nightclub bouncer, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying pleading sounded in negligence, stating: ‘‘On a motion for summary judgment the court must pierce through the pleadings and their adroit craftsmanship to get at the substance of the claim. . . . [I]t is plain that [the victim] is alleging that the bouncer intentionally struck him. 2022Co. v. Tunnel, Inc., 988 F.2d 351 , 354–55 (2d Cir. 1993) (The court concluded that, under New York law, an insurance policy exclusion barred coverage for injuries resulting from an assault by a nightclub bouncer, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying pleading sounded in negligence, stating: ‘‘On a motion for summary judgment the court must pierce through the pleadings and their adroit craftsmanship to get at the substance of the claim. . . . [I]t is plain that [the victim] is alleging that the bouncer intentionally struck him. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
McMahon v. City of Middletown
green
2 sentences2019"It is true that our appellate courts occasionally have expressed a willingness to review claims that a party did not explicitly raise to the trial court if it is clear from the record that the substance of the claim was raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McMahon v. Middletown , 181 Conn. App. 68 , 76-78, 186 A.3d 58 (2018). "[A]lthough a party need not use the term of art applicable to the claim, or cite to a particular statutory provision or rule of practice to functionally preserve a claim, he or she must have argued the underlying principles or rules at the trial court level in o 2019"It is true that our appellate courts occasionally have expressed a willingness to review claims that a party did not explicitly raise to the trial court if it is clear from the record that the substance of the claim was raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McMahon v. Middletown , 181 Conn. App. 68 , 76-78, 186 A.3d 58 (2018). "[A]lthough a party need not use the term of art applicable to the claim, or cite to a particular statutory provision or rule of practice to functionally preserve a claim, he or she must have argued the underlying principles or rules at the trial court level in o | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Katzin v. United States
green
2 sentences2019Anderson v. Semple , --- U.S. ----, 135 S. Ct. 1453 , 191 L. 2019Anderson v. Semple, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 1453 , 191 L. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Anderson v. Semple
green
2 sentences2019Anderson v. Semple , --- U.S. ----, 135 S. Ct. 1453 , 191 L. 2019Anderson v. Semple, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 1453 , 191 L. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Dyck O'Neal, Inc. v. Wynne
neutral
2 sentences2002Where a party captions its motion improperly, “we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyck O’Neal, Inc. v. Wynne, 56 Conn. App. 161, 164 , 742 A.2d 393 (1999); see In re Brianna F., 50 Conn. App. 805, 812 , 719 A.2d 478 (1998). 2002Where a party captions its motion improperly, “we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyck O’Neal, Inc. v. Wynne, 56 Conn. App. 161, 164 , 742 A.2d 393 (1999); see In re Brianna F., 50 Conn. App. 805, 812 , 719 A.2d 478 (1998). | 2 | 2002–2004 |
Holcombe v. Holcombe
green
2 sentences1998In such situations ‘we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form.’ Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn. App. 7, 16 , 654 A.2d 798 [cert. denied, 233 Conn. 905 , 657 A.2d 645 ] (1995). ‘Motions for interpretation or clarification, although not specifically described in the rules of practice, are commonly considered by trial courts and are procedurally proper.’ Holcombe v. Holcombe, 22 Conn. App. 363, 366 , 576 A.2d 1317 (1990). . . . 1998In such situations ‘we look to the substance of the claim rather than the form.’ Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn. App. 7, 16 , 654 A.2d 798 [cert. denied, 233 Conn. 905 , 657 A.2d 645 ] (1995). ‘Motions for interpretation or clarification, although not specifically described in the rules of practice, are commonly considered by trial courts and are procedurally proper.’ Holcombe v. Holcombe, 22 Conn. App. 363, 366 , 576 A.2d 1317 (1990). . . . | 2 | 1995–1998 |
Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, Illinois
green
2 sentences2025An ‘actual conflict of interest’ therefore is a term of art requiring a conflict of interest and adverse effect. . . . [T]he ‘actual conflict of interest’ required in the first prong of the court’s test requires only that the petitioner dem- onstrate a real or genuine, as opposed to a hypothetical, conflict of interest.’’ (Citation omitted.)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879 , 124 S. Ct. 303 , 157 L. 2025An ‘actual conflict of interest’ therefore is a term of art requiring a conflict of interest and adverse effect. . . . [T]he ‘actual conflict of interest’ required in the first prong of the court’s test requires only that the petitioner dem- onstrate a real or genuine, as opposed to a hypothetical, conflict of interest.’’ (Citation omitted.)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879, 124 S. Ct. 303, 157 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Discovery House, Inc. v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, Indiana
green
2 sentences2025An ‘actual conflict of interest’ therefore is a term of art requiring a conflict of interest and adverse effect. . . . [T]he ‘actual conflict of interest’ required in the first prong of the court’s test requires only that the petitioner dem- onstrate a real or genuine, as opposed to a hypothetical, conflict of interest.’’ (Citation omitted.)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879 , 124 S. Ct. 303 , 157 L. 2025An ‘actual conflict of interest’ therefore is a term of art requiring a conflict of interest and adverse effect. . . . [T]he ‘actual conflict of interest’ required in the first prong of the court’s test requires only that the petitioner dem- onstrate a real or genuine, as opposed to a hypothetical, conflict of interest.’’ (Citation omitted.)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879, 124 S. Ct. 303, 157 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Imageline, Inc. v. Xoom Inc.
green
2 sentences2025An ‘actual conflict of interest’ therefore is a term of art requiring a conflict of interest and adverse effect. . . . [T]he ‘actual conflict of interest’ required in the first prong of the court’s test requires only that the petitioner dem- onstrate a real or genuine, as opposed to a hypothetical, conflict of interest.’’ (Citation omitted.)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879 , 124 S. Ct. 303 , 157 L. 2025An ‘actual conflict of interest’ therefore is a term of art requiring a conflict of interest and adverse effect. . . . [T]he ‘actual conflict of interest’ required in the first prong of the court’s test requires only that the petitioner dem- onstrate a real or genuine, as opposed to a hypothetical, conflict of interest.’’ (Citation omitted.)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879, 124 S. Ct. 303, 157 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Robert Moss (99-1951 01-1797) and Ronald Kohn (01-1610) v. United States
green
2 sentences2025As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has observed, ‘‘[r]egardless of this clarification of the terminology, the relevant questions remain the same, and we must ask whether [counsel] labored under a conflict of interest, which was not merely hypotheti- cal, and whether that conflict adversely affected the representation (i.e., whether it was an actual conflict).’’ United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 392 (5th Cir. 2005); see also McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 706 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Mickens ‘‘changed the terminology, but not the substance’’ of test under 2025As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has observed, ‘‘[r]egardless of this clarification of the terminology, the relevant questions remain the same, and we must ask whether [counsel] labored under a conflict of interest, which was not merely hypotheti- cal, and whether that conflict adversely affected the representation (i.e., whether it was an actual conflict).’’ United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 392 (5th Cir. 2005); see also McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 706 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Mickens ‘‘changed the terminology, but not the substance’’ of test under | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2025Read together, State v. Davis, supra, 344 Conn. 122 , and Diaz are consistent with the observation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that Mickens ‘‘changed the terminology, but not the substance’’ of the test under Sullivan. 2025Read together, State v. Davis, supra, 344 Conn. 122, and Diaz are consistent with the observation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that Mickens ‘‘changed the terminology, but not the substance’’ of the test under Sullivan. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Ouellette
green
1 sentence2021The trial court’s decision with respect to whether to hold a Floyd hearing is reviewable by motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 66-7 . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ouellette, supra, 182 n.7. 5 The court concluded that res judicata did not apply to the petitioner’s due process claim because the substance of his claim was different from that on direct appeal. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Spry v. California
green
1 sentence2021We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Gonzalez, 315 Conn. 564 , 593, 109 A.3d 453 , cert. denied, 577 U.S. 843 , 136 S. Ct. 84 , 193 L. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bryant v. Meko
green
1 sentence2021We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Gonzalez, 315 Conn. 564 , 593, 109 A.3d 453 , cert. denied, 577 U.S. 843 , 136 S. Ct. 84 , 193 L. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
21st Century North American Ins. Co. v. Perez
neutral
2 sentences2019Co. v. Perez, 177 Conn. App. 802 , 819–20, 173 A.3d 64 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 995 , 175 A.3d 1246 (2018). ‘‘It is true that our appellate courts occasionally have expressed a willingness to review claims that a party did not explicitly raise to the trial court if it is clear from the record that the substance of the claim was raised.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McMahon v. Middletown, 181 Conn. App. 68 , 76–78, 186 A.3d 58 (2018). ‘‘[A]lthough a party need not use the term of art applicable to the claim, or cite to a particular statutory provision or rule of practice to funct 2019Co. v. Perez, 177 Conn. App. 802 , 819–20, 173 A.3d 64 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 995 , 175 A.3d 1246 (2018). ‘‘It is true that our appellate courts occasionally have expressed a willingness to review claims that a party did not explicitly raise to the trial court if it is clear from the record that the substance of the claim was raised.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McMahon v. Middletown, 181 Conn. App. 68 , 76–78, 186 A.3d 58 (2018). ‘‘[A]lthough a party need not use the term of art applicable to the claim, or cite to a particular statutory provision or rule of practice to funct | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Consiglio v. Transamerica Insurance Group
green
2 sentences2019Group, 55 Conn. App. 134 , 138 n.2, 737 A.2d 969 (1999). 11 The court stated that ‘‘[a]lthough [the plaintiff’s] application to vacate has been dismissed, the court will briefly review the substance of its claim, as set forth in its brief dated December 7, 2016.’’ 12 ‘‘‘The twelve Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is 2019Group, 55 Conn. App. 134 , 138 n.2, 737 A.2d 969 (1999). 11 The court stated that ‘‘[a]lthough [the plaintiff’s] application to vacate has been dismissed, the court will briefly review the substance of its claim, as set forth in its brief dated December 7, 2016.’’ 12 ‘‘‘The twelve Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is | 1 | 2019–2019 |
21st Century N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Perez
neutral
2 sentences2019Co. v. Perez, 177 Conn. App. 802 , 819–20, 173 A.3d 64 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 995 , 175 A.3d 1246 (2018). ‘‘It is true that our appellate courts occasionally have expressed a willingness to review claims that a party did not explicitly raise to the trial court if it is clear from the record that the substance of the claim was raised.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McMahon v. Middletown, 181 Conn. App. 68 , 76–78, 186 A.3d 58 (2018). ‘‘[A]lthough a party need not use the term of art applicable to the claim, or cite to a particular statutory provision or rule of practice to funct 2019Co. v. Perez, 177 Conn. App. 802 , 819–20, 173 A.3d 64 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 995 , 175 A.3d 1246 (2018). ‘‘It is true that our appellate courts occasionally have expressed a willingness to review claims that a party did not explicitly raise to the trial court if it is clear from the record that the substance of the claim was raised.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McMahon v. Middletown, 181 Conn. App. 68 , 76–78, 186 A.3d 58 (2018). ‘‘[A]lthough a party need not use the term of art applicable to the claim, or cite to a particular statutory provision or rule of practice to funct | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Dabkowski green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Munoz green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Salmon v. Department of Public Health & Addiction Services green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Wendt v. Wendt green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Taft v. Wheelabrator Putnam, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Wendt v. Wendt green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Carrione green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Santos v. Morrissey red | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Mullins green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Anders v. California green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Daley v. McClintock green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Stevenson green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Burgos green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Caporale v. C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Zadravecz v. Zadravecz green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Town of Killingly v. Wells green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Sariol green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Lopez green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Mastropetre green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.