substance claim in Colorado

2025Co. of Colo., 2018 CO 59, ¶ 20 (the substance of the claim controls, not the appellation applied by the litigant); see also People v. Sharp, 2019 COA 133, ¶ 35 (defendant could not avoid his evidentiary burden “simply by repackaging his newly discovered evidence claim as one for ineffective assistance of counsel”); City of Aspen v. Kinder Morgan, Inc., 143 P.3d 1076, 1079 (Colo. App. 2006) (party could not “avoid implicating the ratemaking jurisdiction of the [Public Utilities Commission] by recharacterizing its claims on appeal”); Bodimetric Health Servs, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 4

2017Id. at 1078-79 (“We are not bound by the form in which the plaintiff asserts its claim, but rather it is the facts alleged and the relief requested that decide the substance of a claim, which in turn is determinative of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” (quoting City of Boulder v. Pub.

2025Co. of Colo., 996 P.2d 198, 203 (Colo. App. 1999) (“We are not bound by the form in which the plaintiff asserts its claim, but rather it is the facts alleged and the relief requested that decide the substance of a claim, which in turn is determinative of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.”). ¶ 34 The complaint merely refers to the Act to explain, as background, that “developers and/or landowners may acquire a ‘vested’ right to develop the real estate property in a PUD consistent with the site plan approved for that PUD” and that a vested property right lasts for three years unless e

2025Co. of Colo., 996 P.2d 198, 203 (Colo. App. 1999) (“We are not bound by the form in which the plaintiff asserts its claim, but rather it is the facts alleged and the relief requested that decide the substance of a claim, which in turn is determinative of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.”). ¶ 34 The complaint merely refers to the Act to explain, as background, that “developers and/or landowners may acquire a ‘vested’ right to develop the real estate property in a PUD consistent with the site plan approved for that PUD” and that a vested property right lasts for three years unless e

2018Hutchinson v. Hutchinson , 149 Colo. 38 , 367 P.2d 594 , 596 (1961) ("The substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls.

2018Hutchinson v. Hutchinson , 149 Colo. 38 , 367 P.2d 594 , 596 (1961) ("The substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls.

2019Id. at 266 . ¶ 50 But Quezada-Caro’s reliance on Nunez is misplaced.

2014People v. Numez, 841 P.2d 261, 265 (Colo.1992). . 120 Here, Bruno's counsel tendered the following theory of defense instruction: [Bruno] did not have the criminal intent to commit any of the crimes he is accused of. [Bruno] did not have the criminal intent to commit the crime of filing a false instrument, Affidavit of Adverse Possession, his intent was to comply with Colorado Revised Statute § 3841-108, Evidence of Adverse Possession. [Bruno] did not have the criminal intent to commit the crime of filing a false instrument, Limited Power of Attorney, his intent was to comply with Colorado Rev

1998See Brown v. Central City Opera House Ass’n, 36 Colo-App. 334, 542 P.2d 86 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 372 , 553 P.2d 64 (1976)(the substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls).

1998See Brown v. Central City Opera House Ass'n, 36 Colo.App. 334 , 542 P.2d 86 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 372 , 553 P.2d 64 (1976)(the substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls).

1998See Brown v. Central City Opera House Ass’n, 36 Colo-App. 334, 542 P.2d 86 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 372 , 553 P.2d 64 (1976)(the substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls).

1998See Brown v. Central City Opera House Ass'n, 36 Colo.App. 334 , 542 P.2d 86 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 372 , 553 P.2d 64 (1976)(the substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls).

2016See id.

2016See id.

2010Under modern rules of pleading, courts look to the "essence of a claim regardless of how it is denominated." Bainbridge, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty Co., 159 P.8d 748, 755 (Colo.App.2006); see also Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 149 Colo. 38, 41 , 867 P.2d 594 , 596 (1961) ("The substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls."); Skef-field Services Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 718 (Colo.App.2009) ("the claim's substance rather than [its] appellation ... controls").

2010Under modern rules of pleading, courts look to the "essence of a claim regardless of how it is denominated." Bainbridge, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty Co., 159 P.3d 748, 755 (Colo.App.2006); see also Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 149 Colo. 38, 41 , 367 P.2d 594, 596 (1961) ("The substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls."); Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 718 (Colo.App.2009) ("the claim's substance rather than [its] appellation . . . controls").

1998See Brown v. Central City Opera House Ass’n, 36 Colo-App. 334, 542 P.2d 86 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 372 , 553 P.2d 64 (1976)(the substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls).

1998See Brown v. Central City Opera House Ass'n, 36 Colo.App. 334 , 542 P.2d 86 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 372 , 553 P.2d 64 (1976)(the substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant is what controls).

2006Comm'n, supra, 58 P.3d at 50 . "[IIt is the facts alleged and the relief requested that decide the substance of a claim, which in turn is determinative of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction." Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub.

2005Comm’n, supra, 58 P.3d at 50 . “[I]t is the facts alleged and the relief requested that decide the substance of a claim, which in turn is determinative of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub.

2026Historical Considerations ¶ 41 Finally, we turn to historical considerations, looking to “settled and established practice.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 32 (2023) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)) (noting that such a practice has long been a source of authority in interpreting the Constitution). ¶ 42 “Historical accounts of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 reveal that the Founders engaged in very little discussion about the meaning or scope to be given to the President’s pardoning authority.” Abrams, 689 A.2d at 29 (Terry, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte Grossma

2026Historical Considerations ¶ 41 Finally, we turn to historical considerations, looking to “settled and established practice.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 32 (2023) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)) (noting that such a practice has long been a source of authority in interpreting the Constitution). ¶ 42 “Historical accounts of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 reveal that the Founders engaged in very little discussion about the meaning or scope to be given to the President’s pardoning authority.” Abrams, 689 A.2d at 29 (Terry, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte Grossma

2026Historical Considerations ¶ 41 Finally, we turn to historical considerations, looking to “settled and established practice.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 32 (2023) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)) (noting that such a practice has long been a source of authority in interpreting the Constitution). ¶ 42 “Historical accounts of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 reveal that the Founders engaged in very little discussion about the meaning or scope to be given to the President’s pardoning authority.” Abrams, 689 A.2d at 29 (Terry, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte Grossma

2026Historical Considerations ¶ 41 Finally, we turn to historical considerations, looking to “settled and established practice.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 32 (2023) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)) (noting that such a practice has long been a source of authority in interpreting the Constitution). ¶ 42 “Historical accounts of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 reveal that the Founders engaged in very little discussion about the meaning or scope to be given to the President’s pardoning authority.” Abrams, 689 A.2d at 29 (Terry, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte Grossma

2025See, e.g., Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, ¶ 37 .

2025Compare Barry v. Bally Gaming, Inc., 2013 COA 176, ¶ 8 (“In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), a district court examines the substance of the claim based on the facts alleged and the relief requested.”), with Hemmann Mgmt.

2025Co. of Colo., 2018 CO 59, ¶ 20 (the substance of the claim controls, not the appellation applied by the litigant); see also People v. Sharp, 2019 COA 133, ¶ 35 (defendant could not avoid his evidentiary burden “simply by repackaging his newly discovered evidence claim as one for ineffective assistance of counsel”); City of Aspen v. Kinder Morgan, Inc., 143 P.3d 1076, 1079 (Colo. App. 2006) (party could not “avoid implicating the ratemaking jurisdiction of the [Public Utilities Commission] by recharacterizing its claims on appeal”); Bodimetric Health Servs, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 4

2025Co. of Colo., 2018 CO 59, ¶ 20 (the substance of the claim controls, not the appellation applied by the litigant); see also People v. Sharp, 2019 COA 133, ¶ 35 (defendant could not avoid his evidentiary burden “simply by repackaging his newly discovered evidence claim as one for ineffective assistance of counsel”); City of Aspen v. Kinder Morgan, Inc., 143 P.3d 1076, 1079 (Colo. App. 2006) (party could not “avoid implicating the ratemaking jurisdiction of the [Public Utilities Commission] by recharacterizing its claims on appeal”); Bodimetric Health Servs, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 4

2025Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc., 176 P.3d 856, 858 (Colo. App. 2007) (“The purpose of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) 11 is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a claim or claims upon which relief can be granted.”). ¶ 26 In any event, Coronado-Arrascue’s argument also fails because the unambiguous language of section 13-17-201 and section 13-16-113(2) provides that an award of fees and costs is mandatory regardless of whether a complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

2025See People v. Knoeppchen, 2019 COA 34, ¶¶ 7, 27 (considering the substance of the defendant’s postconviction challenge to the restitution order to conclude that his challenge was cognizable as an illegal manner claim), overruled on other grounds by Weeks, ¶ 47 n.16.

2025See People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding that substance of postconviction motion controls how it is designated).

2025Co. of Colo., 2018 CO 59, ¶ 20 (the substance of the claim controls, not the appellation applied by the litigant); see also People v. Sharp, 2019 COA 133, ¶ 35 (defendant could not avoid his evidentiary burden “simply by repackaging his newly discovered evidence claim as one for ineffective assistance of counsel”); City of Aspen v. Kinder Morgan, Inc., 143 P.3d 1076, 1079 (Colo. App. 2006) (party could not “avoid implicating the ratemaking jurisdiction of the [Public Utilities Commission] by recharacterizing its claims on appeal”); Bodimetric Health Servs, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 4

2018Levine v. Katz, 167 P.3d 141, 144 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[I]t is the facts alleged and the relief requested that decide the substance of a claim, which in turn is determinative of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted). ¶ 23 Thus, the probate court’s jurisdiction to conduct a hearing regarding a possible breach of Mr. Black’s fiduciary duties and to enter the hearing order (which, we note, did not unwind the transaction) was based not on Rule 60 but on the court’s authority to monitor fiduciaries over whom it has obtained jurisdiction.

2017We will not permit a party to circumvent the jurisdiction of the PUC simply by including a demand for jury trial in the complaint. 6 Nor are we persuaded by DRC’s reliance on Great Western Sugar Co. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 661 P.2d 684, 690 (Colo. App. 1982).

2012See, eg., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 , 122 S.Ct. 992 , 152 LEd.2d 1 (2002) ("The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim."); LaFond v. Basham, 683 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo.App.1984) ("A pleading in Colorado need only serve notice of the claim asserted, . since the substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant controls." (citations omitted)).

2012See, eg., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 , 122 S.Ct. 992 , 152 LEd.2d 1 (2002) ("The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim."); LaFond v. Basham, 683 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo.App.1984) ("A pleading in Colorado need only serve notice of the claim asserted, . since the substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant controls." (citations omitted)).

2012See, eg., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 , 122 S.Ct. 992 , 152 LEd.2d 1 (2002) ("The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim."); LaFond v. Basham, 683 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo.App.1984) ("A pleading in Colorado need only serve notice of the claim asserted, . since the substance of the claim rather than the appellation applied to the pleading by the litigant controls." (citations omitted)).