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40 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1928–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hernandez v. Barbo MacHinery Co.green2 sentences1999See Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106 , 957 P2d 147 (1998) (a trial court does not err by refusing to give a requested instruction if the substance of that instruction “was covered fully by other jury instructions given by the trial court”). 1999See Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106 , 957 P2d 147 (1998) (a trial court does not err by refusing to give a requested instruction if the substance of that instruction “was covered fully by other jury instructions given by the trial court”). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Quinngreen2 sentences2026“The substance of the warnings, not the exact words, determines whether the warnings are adequate.” State v. Quinn, 112 Or App 608, 616 , 831 P2d 48 , rev den, 313 Or 627 (1992). 2026“The substance of the warnings, not the exact words, determines whether the warnings are adequate.” State v. Quinn, 112 Or App 608, 616 , 831 P2d 48 , rev den, 313 Or 627 (1992). | 1 | 2 |
Hills v. Shawgreen2 sentences1928In Emerson v. Lumbermen’s Hospital Assn., 100 Or. 472 ( 198 Pac. 231 ), this court said: “The doctrine enunciated by the precedents is, that if a regularly licensed physician with reasonable diligence employs the skill of which he is possessed in treating a surgical case, he is not liable for an error of judgment, and the fact that an unfortunate result follows, is not in any way evidence of neglect.” In Lehman v. Knott, 100 Or. 59 ( 196 Pac. 476 ), this court said: “ * * Improper treatment by a surgeon might be due to an error in judgment of a skillful surgeon honestly and carefully exercised 1928In Emerson v. Lumbermen’s Hospital Assn., 100 Or. 472 ( 198 Pac. 231 ), this court said: “The doctrine enunciated by the precedents is, that if a regularly licensed physician with reasonable diligence employs the skill of which he is possessed in treating a surgical case, he is not liable for an error of judgment, and the fact that an unfortunate result follows, is not in any way evidence of neglect.” In Lehman v. Knott, 100 Or. 59 ( 196 Pac. 476 ), this court said: “ * * Improper treatment by a surgeon might be due to an error in judgment of a skillful surgeon honestly and carefully exercised | 1 | 2 |
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Department of Human Resourcesgreen2 sentences2017In assessing whether those rules exceeded the statutory authority of the director, we assess whether the substance of the rule, “though within the scope of the agency’s or official’s general authority, departed from a legal standard expressed or implied in the particular law being administered, or contravened some other applicable statute.” Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 565, 573 , 687 P2d 785 (1984); see also Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 549 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (“[A] rule created within a statutory scheme cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit sta 2017In assessing whether those rules exceeded the statutory authority of the director, we assess whether the substance of the rule, “though within the scope of the agency’s or official’s general authority, departed from a legal standard expressed or implied in the particular law being administered, or contravened some other applicable statute.” Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 565, 573 , 687 P2d 785 (1984); see also Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 549 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (“[A] rule created within a statutory scheme cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit sta | 1 | 2 |
State v. Meyergreen2 sentences2016See State v. Meyer, 183 Or App 536, 541-42 , 53 P3d 940 (2002) (concluding that “it is unnecessary to identify a particular procedural mechanism by which defendant was authorized or required to make his challenge” because defendant “fairly put before the trial court the substance of his challenge to the citation”). 2016See State v. Meyer, 183 Or App 536, 541-42 , 53 P3d 940 (2002) (concluding that “it is unnecessary to identify a particular procedural mechanism by which defendant was authorized or required to make his challenge” because defendant “fairly put before the trial court the substance of his challenge to the citation”). | 1 | 2 |
Wills v. PETROSgreen2 sentences1976From Wills v. Petros et al, 225 Or 122, 126 , 357 P2d 394 (1960) we quote the following: "The right of a litigant to have his theory of the case presented to the jury is unquestioned, but it is not error for the trial court to refuse to give a requested instruction even though the refused instruction constitutes an accurate statement of the law when the substance of the instruction given can be found in any other instructions given. * * *” We have carefully examined the other assignments of error and believe they are without merit and need no further comment in this opinion. 1976From Wills v. Petros et al, 225 Or 122, 126 , 357 P2d 394 (1960) we quote the following: "The right of a litigant to have his theory of the case presented to the jury is unquestioned, but it is not error for the trial court to refuse to give a requested instruction even though the refused instruction constitutes an accurate statement of the law when the substance of the instruction given can be found in any other instructions given. * * *” We have carefully examined the other assignments of error and believe they are without merit and need no further comment in this opinion. | 1 | 2 |
Florida v. Powellgreen2 sentences2026It is not a “talismanic incantation.” California v. Prysock, 453 US 355, 359 , 101 S Ct 2806 , 69 L Ed 2d 696 (1981); see also Florida v. Powell, 559 US 50, 60 , 130 S Ct 1195 , 175 L Ed 2d 1009 (2010) (the Court “has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed”). 2026It is not a “talismanic incantation.” California v. Prysock, 453 US 355, 359 , 101 S Ct 2806 , 69 L Ed 2d 696 (1981); see also Florida v. Powell, 559 US 50, 60 , 130 S Ct 1195 , 175 L Ed 2d 1009 (2010) (the Court “has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed”). | 1 | 1 |
Van Der Hout v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2025See van der Hout, 251 Or at 438-39 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lockwoodgreen1 sentence2025See Lockwood, 43 Or App at 646 (explaining that “it would be anomalous to hold that the justification statutes allow the application of physical force, but not the threat to apply such force”). | 1 | 1 |
Duckworth v. Eagangreen1 sentence2017Rather, the inquiry is simply “whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.” Duckworth, 492 US at 203 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Quinn, 112 Or App at 616 (“The substance of the warnings, not the exact words, determines whether the warnings are adequate.”). | 1 | 1 |
Garrison v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2017In assessing whether those rules exceeded the statutory authority of the director, we assess whether the substance of the rule, “though within the scope of the agency’s or official’s general authority, departed from a legal standard expressed or implied in the particular law being administered, or contravened some other applicable statute.” Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 565, 573 , 687 P2d 785 (1984); see also Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 549 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (“[A] rule created within a statutory scheme cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit sta 2017In assessing whether those rules exceeded the statutory authority of the director, we assess whether the substance of the rule, “though within the scope of the agency’s or official’s general authority, departed from a legal standard expressed or implied in the particular law being administered, or contravened some other applicable statute.” Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 565, 573 , 687 P2d 785 (1984); see also Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 549 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (“[A] rule created within a statutory scheme cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit sta | 1 | 1 |
Schlip v. Oregon Fish & Wildlife Commissiongreen1 sentence2015See Schlip, 75 Or App at 469 (“To begin exempting the specific business at which the challenged rules are directly aimed and which they are intended to regulate would be inconsistent with the purpose of the rule.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wyattgreen1 sentence2008Specifically, the “failure to object to the particular sanction imposed by the judge or, in the alternative, to argue for some other sanction, fails to preserve a claim on appeal that the judge erred in failing to consider the availability of a less onerous sanction.” Id. at 343 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Peiffer v. Hoytgreen1 sentence2005Id. at 499 (Wollheim, J. concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| Springfield Education Ass'n v. Springfield School District No. 19green | 1 | 1 |
| COST SECURITY v. Real Estate Agencygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rogelis v. Pettisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hendgen v. Forest Grove Community Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arnold v. Mundygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Butz v. Economougreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hotelling v. Walthergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mears v. Nevada
green
2 sentences1969Camacho v. United States, 407 F2d 39 (9th Cir 1969); United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F2d 697 (2d Cir 1968); Tucker v. United States, 375 F2d 363, cert den 389 US 888 , 88 S Ct 128 , 19 L Ed2d 189 (8th Cir 1967). 1969Camacho v. United States, 407 F.2d 39 (9th Cir.1969); United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.1968); Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363 , cert. den. 389 U.S. 888 , 88 S.Ct. 128 , 19 L.Ed.2d 189 (8th Cir.1967). | 2 | 1969–1969 |
California v. Prysock
green
2 sentences2026It is not a “talismanic incantation.” California v. Prysock, 453 US 355, 359 , 101 S Ct 2806 , 69 L Ed 2d 696 (1981); see also Florida v. Powell, 559 US 50, 60 , 130 S Ct 1195 , 175 L Ed 2d 1009 (2010) (the Court “has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed”). 2026It is not a “talismanic incantation.” California v. Prysock, 453 US 355, 359 , 101 S Ct 2806 , 69 L Ed 2d 696 (1981); see also Florida v. Powell, 559 US 50, 60 , 130 S Ct 1195 , 175 L Ed 2d 1009 (2010) (the Court “has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed”). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Loper v. Brakel
green
1 sentence2025Cite as 343 Or App 445 (2025) 463 As for the substance of the instruction that was given, the parties do not appear to have been concerned with its specific wording—instead arguing over whether it was appropriate to give any instruction—and the Supreme Court similarly seems to have been concerned only with its gist. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Barajas
green
2 sentences2022Cf. State v. Barajas, 247 Or App 247, 251 , 268 P3d 732 (2011) (reasoning that for the purpose of preserva- tion we do not require a party to keep making an argument that the trial court has already rejected). 14 State v. Zielinski Proceeding to the substance of our analysis, in assessing harmlessness, we consider how the case was tried and the extent to which the disputed evidence was or was not emphasized by the parties and central to their theo- ries of the case. 2022Cf. State v. Barajas, 247 Or App 247, 251 , 268 P3d 732 (2011) (reasoning that for the purpose of preserva- tion we do not require a party to keep making an argument that the trial court has already rejected). 14 State v. Zielinski Proceeding to the substance of our analysis, in assessing harmlessness, we consider how the case was tried and the extent to which the disputed evidence was or was not emphasized by the parties and central to their theo- ries of the case. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Simon
green
1 sentence2022Simon, 294 Or App at 849 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
McNeil v. Geico Casualty Co., Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2022Cite as 319 Or App 458 (2022) 461 the insurance contract and to fix a typographical error in the statutory claim. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Mitchell v. the Timbers
green
1 sentence2021Second, because the plaintiff had served the original complaint on the registrant within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, Mitchell, 163 Or App at 314 , the correct defendant (the registrant) was on notice within the statute 210 Lemus v. Potter Our decision in Vergara is to the same effect. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Warren
green
1 sentence2020Because an allegation of the basis for joinder is required, Carr, 6 Or at 134 ; Dale, 8 Or at 231 ; Warren, 364 Or 105, 121-22 , the failure to include such an allegation when charging multiple acts or crimes, is not a defect in form. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Haji
green
1 sentence2020Similarly, Bouvier’s defines “form,” in part, as, “[t]he model of an instrument or legal proceeding, containing the substance and the principle terms to be used in accordance with the laws.” Cite as 366 Or 384 (2020) 449 allegations. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Carr
green
1 sentence2020Because an allegation of the basis for joinder is required, Carr, 6 Or at 134 ; Dale, 8 Or at 231 ; Warren, 364 Or 105, 121-22 , the failure to include such an allegation when charging multiple acts or crimes, is not a defect in form. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Dale
green
1 sentence2020Because an allegation of the basis for joinder is required, Carr, 6 Or at 134 ; Dale, 8 Or at 231 ; Warren, 364 Or 105, 121-22 , the failure to include such an allegation when charging multiple acts or crimes, is not a defect in form. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bernard v. Board of Dental Examiners
green
1 sentence2018Bernard , 2 Or. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Farris
green
2 sentences2018Kelly Farris , 229 Or. 209 , 219, 367 P.2d 387 (1961), as stating the substance of that standard. 2018Kelly Farris , 229 Or. 209 , 219, 367 P.2d 387 (1961), as stating the substance of that standard. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Miller v. Employment Division
green
2 sentences2017In assessing whether those rules exceeded the statutory authority of the director, we assess whether the substance of the rule, “though within the scope of the agency’s or official’s general authority, departed from a legal standard expressed or implied in the particular law being administered, or contravened some other applicable statute.” Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 565, 573 , 687 P2d 785 (1984); see also Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 549 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (“[A] rule created within a statutory scheme cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit sta 2017In assessing whether those rules exceeded the statutory authority of the director, we assess whether the substance of the rule, “though within the scope of the agency’s or official’s general authority, departed from a legal standard expressed or implied in the particular law being administered, or contravened some other applicable statute.” Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 565, 573 , 687 P2d 785 (1984); see also Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 549 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (“[A] rule created within a statutory scheme cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit sta | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Managed Healthcare Northwest, Inc. v. Department of Consumer & Business Services
neutral
2 sentences2017Thus, where the issue is whether “an otherwise valid rule * * * conflicts with clearly stated statutory policy,” a court must “examine the applicable statutory wording in its context to determine the legislature’s intent.” Managed Healthcare Northwest v. DCBS, 338 Or 92, 95-96 , 106 P3d 624 (2005). 2017Thus, where the issue is whether “an otherwise valid rule * * * conflicts with clearly stated statutory policy,” a court must “examine the applicable statutory wording in its context to determine the legislature’s intent.” Managed Healthcare Northwest v. DCBS, 338 Or 92, 95-96 , 106 P3d 624 (2005). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2009Id. at_, 129 S Ct at 2539 . 2009Id. at_, 129 S Ct at 2539 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Corona green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Miller v. Grants Pass Irrigation District green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Bopp neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Williams green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Williams green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Freeman v. Hewit green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Dodson green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Deaton v. State Accident Insurance Fund green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| State v. Woods neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Criswell v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Benjamin George Tucker v. United States green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| United States v. Joseph Vanterpool green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Robert Camacho v. United States green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Hogan v. Mason Motor Co. green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Robbins v. Irwin green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Riley v. Good neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Williams v. Ragan green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Morgan v. Johns neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Barber v. Motor Investment Co. green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| State Ex Rel. Stevenson v. Tufly green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Emerson v. Lumbermen's Hospital Ass'n green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Lehman v. Knott green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Langford v. Jones green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.