substance instruction in Oklahoma

1923Carden v. Humble, 76 Okla. 165 , 184 Pac. 104 .

1923Carden v. Humble, 76 Okla. 165 , 184 Pac. 104 .

2005As we stated in Turrentine v. State, 1998 OK CR 44, ¶ 12 , 965 P.2d 985, 989 , "[t]hat post-conviction counsel raises the claims in a different posture than that raised on direct appeal is not grounds for reasserting the claims under the guise of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

2005As we stated in Turrentine v. State, 1998 OK CR 44, ¶ 12 , 965 P.2d 985, 989 , "[t]hat post-conviction counsel raises the claims in a different posture than that raised on direct appeal is not grounds for reasserting the claims under the guise of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

1998Co., 54 Okla. 680 , 154 P. 651 (1916) (per curiam), as referring to the substance of a claim or defense, different from purely procedural or technical grounds.

1998Co., 54 Okla. 680 , 154 P. 651 (1916) (per curiam), as referring to the substance of a claim or defense, different from purely procedural or technical grounds.

1997Unfortunately in Allen's case, the exclusion of Dr. Murphy cut out the heart of Allen's defense, leaving only Allen himself to claim he was insane without any kind of expert evidence to support his personal assertions. [14] 918 P.2d 384 (Okl.Cr.1996). [15] 831 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okl.Cr.1992). [16] Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). [17] Id., 484 U.S. at 415 , 108 S.Ct. at 656 . [1] The trial court reversed its decision to allow Appellant to represent himself finding that it would delay the trial, that Appellant's conduct had been totally disruptive thus far

1997Moreover, the court in Buchbinder concluded that the defendant was able to present a great deal of mental health evidence and "was not deprived of the substance of his defense...." Id. at 916 .

1997Moreover, the court in Buchbinder concluded that the defendant was able to present a great deal of mental health evidence and "was not deprived of the substance of his defense....” Id. at 916 .

1997Unfortunately in Allen's case, the exclusion of Dr. Murphy cut out the heart of Allen's defense, leaving only Allen himself to claim he was insane without any kind of expert evidence to support his personal assertions. [14] 918 P.2d 384 (Okl.Cr.1996). [15] 831 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okl.Cr.1992). [16] Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). [17] Id., 484 U.S. at 415 , 108 S.Ct. at 656 . [1] The trial court reversed its decision to allow Appellant to represent himself finding that it would delay the trial, that Appellant's conduct had been totally disruptive thus far

1997Unfortunately in Allen’s case, the exclusion of Dr. Murphy cut out the heart of Allen's defense, leaving only Allen himself to claim he was insane without any kind of expert evidence to support his personal assertions. . 918 P.2d 384 (Okl.Cr.1996). . 831 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okl.Cr.1992). .

1997Unfortunately in Allen's case, the exclusion of Dr. Murphy cut out the heart of Allen's defense, leaving only Allen himself to claim he was insane without any kind of expert evidence to support his personal assertions. [14] 918 P.2d 384 (Okl.Cr.1996). [15] 831 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okl.Cr.1992). [16] Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). [17] Id., 484 U.S. at 415 , 108 S.Ct. at 656 . [1] The trial court reversed its decision to allow Appellant to represent himself finding that it would delay the trial, that Appellant's conduct had been totally disruptive thus far

1997Unfortunately in Allen's case, the exclusion of Dr. Murphy cut out the heart of Allen's defense, leaving only Allen himself to claim he was insane without any kind of expert evidence to support his personal assertions. [14] 918 P.2d 384 (Okl.Cr.1996). [15] 831 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okl.Cr.1992). [16] Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). [17] Id., 484 U.S. at 415 , 108 S.Ct. at 656 . [1] The trial court reversed its decision to allow Appellant to represent himself finding that it would delay the trial, that Appellant's conduct had been totally disruptive thus far

1975“An affirmative waiver of these requirements must be reflected in the record prior to the acceptance of a plea of guilty.” However, we further note this Court’s language in Cobbler v. State, Okl.Cr., 521 P.2d 838 (1974), the progeny of Smith, supra, wherein in pertinent part it reads: “In the first paragraph of the Syllabus in Peterson v. State, Okl.Cr., 473 P.2d 293 , we stated: “ ‘The words of the Miranda warning do not constitute a ritualistic formula which must be repeated without variation in order to be effective, but words which convey the substance of the warning along with the require

1974In the first paragraph of the Syllabus in Peterson v. State, Okl.Cr., 473 P.2d 293 , we stated: “The words of the Miranda warning do not constitute a ritualistic formula which must be repeated without variation in order to be effective, but words which convey the substance of the warning along with the required information are sufficient.” We are of the opinion that the same holds true as to the procedure to be followed, as outlined in Smith v. Oklahoma City, supra, and hold that the trial court in the instant case, substantially complied with this procedure.

1974We believe that the trial court should follow the rule and the directives of Smith v. Oklahoma City, supra, in order to avert a direct or collateral attack; however, in order to meet constitutional standards promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States and made obligatory on the States by the 14th Amendment, it is sufficient if the record affirmatively reflects that the defendant knowingly and intelligently entered a plea of guilty, with full knowledge of the nature and consequence of such plea and waived his right to a jury trial and/or the right to be represented by counsel.

1973The court also feels compelled to point out at this particular juncture that the Reese case, supra, has been modified somewhat by later holdings in Tice v. State, Okl.Cr., 478 P.2d 916 (1970), and Peterson v. State, Okl.Cr., 473 P.2d 293 (1970), wherein we held the words of the Miranda warning do not constitute a ritualistic formula which must be repeated without variation in order to be effective, but words which convey the substance of the warning along with the required information are sufficient.

1970The warnings given by Detective Norton clearly said that if defendant ‘could not afford an attorney that one would be provided for her’ and that she had the ‘right to have her attorney present during any statements she wished to make.’ The warnings given clearly conveyed the substance of the warnings required by Miranda.” Defendant’s second contention is that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on the testimony of experts and relies for reversal or modification on Toms v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 60 , 239 P.2d 812 and Daggs v. State, Okl.Cr., 317 P.2d 279 .

1970The warnings given by Detective Norton clearly said that if defendant ‘could not afford an attorney that one would be provided for her’ and that she had the ‘right to have her attorney present during any statements she wished to make.’ The warnings given clearly conveyed the substance of the warnings required by Miranda.” Defendant’s second contention is that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on the testimony of experts and relies for reversal or modification on Toms v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 60 , 239 P.2d 812 and Daggs v. State, Okl.Cr., 317 P.2d 279 .

1970It is well settled that “the ‘words of Miranda do not constitute a ritualistic formula which must be repeated without variation in order to be effective’ and that ‘words which convey the substance of the warning along with the required information are sufficient.’ ” United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir.1968); United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.1968).

1970The warnings given by Detective Norton clearly said that if defendant ‘could not afford an attorney that one would be provided for her’ and that she had the ‘right to have her attorney present during any statements she wished to make.’ The warnings given clearly conveyed the substance of the warnings required by Miranda.” Defendant’s second contention is that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on the testimony of experts and relies for reversal or modification on Toms v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 60 , 239 P.2d 812 and Daggs v. State, Okl.Cr., 317 P.2d 279 .

1965We accepted the substance of this rule in Hembree v. Southard, Okl., 339 P.2d 771 , cited by plaintiff, involving inspection and testing of a used automobile before sale.

1949Jur. 355 , sec. 94: “The courts frequently apply the rule that when an exception appears in (or, as it is sometimes expressed, is ‘incorporated in’ or ‘contained in’ or ‘forms a necessary part of’) the enacting clause of a statute, the party relying upon the statute must allege facts showing that the case at hand does not fall within the exception.” In the case of Bailey Trading Co. v. Levy, 72 Cal. A. 339, 237 P. 408 , this rule was discussed and applied in answering the question as to the sufficiency of the petition in that case as follows: “In construing the complaint to determine what the

1945Standard Theaters Corporation v. Hughes, 185 Okla. 377 , 91 P. 2d 1058 .

1945Standard Theaters Corporation v. Hughes, 185 Okla. 377 , 91 P. 2d 1058 .

1942Howard v. Davis, 40 Okla. 86 , 136 P. 401 .

1942Howard v. Davis, 40 Okla. 86 , 136 P. 401 .

1928In the ease of Ghitty v. Glllett, 46 Okla. 724 , 148 Pac. 1048 , this court discusses with much detail the circumstances under which heirs in this state may be called upon to answer for the debts of their ancestors, and states the substance of the rule as follows: “Where a claim against the estate of a deceased person does not accrue or become enforceable until after the administration of the estatel has been closed, and all the property has been distributed and passed into the hands of the heirs, its collection may be enforced by a direct action, in the district court, against the heirs of th

1928In the ease of Ghitty v. Glllett, 46 Okla. 724 , 148 Pac. 1048 , this court discusses with much detail the circumstances under which heirs in this state may be called upon to answer for the debts of their ancestors, and states the substance of the rule as follows: “Where a claim against the estate of a deceased person does not accrue or become enforceable until after the administration of the estatel has been closed, and all the property has been distributed and passed into the hands of the heirs, its collection may be enforced by a direct action, in the district court, against the heirs of th

1928In the ease of Ghitty v. Glllett, 46 Okla. 724 , 148 Pac. 1048 , this court discusses with much detail the circumstances under which heirs in this state may be called upon to answer for the debts of their ancestors, and states the substance of the rule as follows: “Where a claim against the estate of a deceased person does not accrue or become enforceable until after the administration of the estatel has been closed, and all the property has been distributed and passed into the hands of the heirs, its collection may be enforced by a direct action, in the district court, against the heirs of th

1928In the ease of Ghitty v. Glllett, 46 Okla. 724 , 148 Pac. 1048 , this court discusses with much detail the circumstances under which heirs in this state may be called upon to answer for the debts of their ancestors, and states the substance of the rule as follows: “Where a claim against the estate of a deceased person does not accrue or become enforceable until after the administration of the estatel has been closed, and all the property has been distributed and passed into the hands of the heirs, its collection may be enforced by a direct action, in the district court, against the heirs of th

1928The leases being limited to one year, it might be impossible to cultivate the land were some latitude not permitted.” In the case of Flynt v. Hastings, 122 Okla. 60 , 252 Pac. 33 , this court announced the rule as follows: “The rule governing the validity of agricultural leases, executed under circumstances such as these presented here, is as follows: The lease, if executed during the existence of a prior valid lease, to be valid, must be made for (1) a fair rental; (2) near the termination of the existing lease; (3) it must not extend the term more than five years from the date of the last le

1928The leases being limited to one year, it might be impossible to cultivate the land were some latitude not permitted.” In the case of Flynt v. Hastings, 122 Okla. 60 , 252 Pac. 33 , this court announced the rule as follows: “The rule governing the validity of agricultural leases, executed under circumstances such as these presented here, is as follows: The lease, if executed during the existence of a prior valid lease, to be valid, must be made for (1) a fair rental; (2) near the termination of the existing lease; (3) it must not extend the term more than five years from the date of the last le

1923The defendants in error in meeting the contention of the plaintiff in error call attention to the construction of said act of Congress in the following cases: In Mullen v. Noah, 64 Okla. 181 , 166 Pac. 742 , the court stated' in the syllabus as follows: “A valid lease for agricultural purposes of a restricted Choctaw Indian’s surplus allotment may be made during the existence of a prior valid lease, provided it is made for a fair rental, near the termination of the existing lease, and it does not extend the term more than five years from the date of the new lease.” In Mullen v. Carter, 68 Okla

1923The defendants in error in meeting the contention of the plaintiff in error call attention to the construction of said act of Congress in the following cases: In Mullen v. Noah, 64 Okla. 181 , 166 Pac. 742 , the court stated' in the syllabus as follows: “A valid lease for agricultural purposes of a restricted Choctaw Indian’s surplus allotment may be made during the existence of a prior valid lease, provided it is made for a fair rental, near the termination of the existing lease, and it does not extend the term more than five years from the date of the new lease.” In Mullen v. Carter, 68 Okla

1923The defendants in error in meeting the contention of the plaintiff in error call attention to the construction of said act of Congress in the following cases: In Mullen v. Noah, 64 Okla. 181 , 166 Pac. 742 , the court stated' in the syllabus as follows: “A valid lease for agricultural purposes of a restricted Choctaw Indian’s surplus allotment may be made during the existence of a prior valid lease, provided it is made for a fair rental, near the termination of the existing lease, and it does not extend the term more than five years from the date of the new lease.” In Mullen v. Carter, 68 Okla

1923The defendants in error in meeting the contention of the plaintiff in error call attention to the construction of said act of Congress in the following cases: In Mullen v. Noah, 64 Okla. 181 , 166 Pac. 742 , the court stated' in the syllabus as follows: “A valid lease for agricultural purposes of a restricted Choctaw Indian’s surplus allotment may be made during the existence of a prior valid lease, provided it is made for a fair rental, near the termination of the existing lease, and it does not extend the term more than five years from the date of the new lease.” In Mullen v. Carter, 68 Okla

1923The defendants in error in meeting the contention of the plaintiff in error call attention to the construction of said act of Congress in the following cases: In Mullen v. Noah, 64 Okla. 181 , 166 Pac. 742 , the court stated' in the syllabus as follows: “A valid lease for agricultural purposes of a restricted Choctaw Indian’s surplus allotment may be made during the existence of a prior valid lease, provided it is made for a fair rental, near the termination of the existing lease, and it does not extend the term more than five years from the date of the new lease.” In Mullen v. Carter, 68 Okla