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21 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Meadow Springs Recovery, LLC v. Woffordgreen2 sentences2017Meadow Springs Recovery v. Wofford, 319 Ga. App. 79, 82 (1) ( 734 SE2d 100 ) (2012). 2017Meadow Springs Recovery v. Wofford, 319 Ga. App. 79, 82 (1) ( 734 SE2d 100 ) (2012). | 2 | 2 |
Jordan v. Board of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2013“Nomenclature notwithstanding, the substance of a claim must be considered, and a party cannot do indirectly what the law does not allow to be done directly.” (Citation omitted.) Jordan v. Board of Public Safety, 253 Ga. App. 339, 343 (2) ( 559 SE2d 94 ) (2002). 2013“Nomenclature notwithstanding, the substance of a claim must be considered, and a party cannot do indirectly what the law does not allow to be done directly.” (Citation omitted.) Jordan v. Board of Public Safety, 253 Ga. App. 339, 343 (2) ( 559 SE2d 94 ) (2002). | 2 | 2 |
Rivera v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2017Dept of Transp. v. Jarvie , 329 Ga. App. 681 , 685, 766 S.E.2d 94 (2014), overruled on other grounds by Rivera , supra, 298 Ga. at 778 , n. 7 , 784 S.E.2d 775 ("Nomenclature notwithstanding, the substance of a claim must be considered, and a party cannot do indirectly what the law does not allow to be done directly.") (citation and punctuation omitted). 2017Dept of Transp. v. Jarvie , 329 Ga. App. 681 , 685, 766 S.E.2d 94 (2014), overruled on other grounds by Rivera , supra, 298 Ga. at 778 , n. 7 , 784 S.E.2d 775 ("Nomenclature notwithstanding, the substance of a claim must be considered, and a party cannot do indirectly what the law does not allow to be done directly.") (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. JARVIE Et Al.green2 sentences2017Dept of Transp. v. Jarvie , 329 Ga. App. 681 , 685, 766 S.E.2d 94 (2014), overruled on other grounds by Rivera , supra, 298 Ga. at 778 , n. 7 , 784 S.E.2d 775 ("Nomenclature notwithstanding, the substance of a claim must be considered, and a party cannot do indirectly what the law does not allow to be done directly.") (citation and punctuation omitted). 2017Dept of Transp. v. Jarvie , 329 Ga. App. 681 , 685, 766 S.E.2d 94 (2014), overruled on other grounds by Rivera , supra, 298 Ga. at 778 , n. 7 , 784 S.E.2d 775 ("Nomenclature notwithstanding, the substance of a claim must be considered, and a party cannot do indirectly what the law does not allow to be done directly.") (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Sommers Oil Co. v. Georgia Department of Agriculturegreen2 sentences2024Sommers Oil Co. v. Ga. Dept. of Agriculture, 305 Ga. App. 330, 332 ( 699 SE2d 537 ) (2010) (“Nomenclature notwithstanding, the substance of a claim must be considered, and a party cannot do indirectly what the law does not allow to be done directly.”) (citation omitted); see also Glass v. Faircloth, 363 Ga. App. 232 , 235 (1) ( 871 SE2d 69 ) (2022) (“Pleadings, motions, and orders are construed according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2024Sommers Oil Co. v. Ga. Dept. of Agriculture, 305 Ga. App. 330, 332 ( 699 SE2d 537 ) (2010) (“Nomenclature notwithstanding, the substance of a claim must be considered, and a party cannot do indirectly what the law does not allow to be done directly.”) (citation omitted); see also Glass v. Faircloth, 363 Ga. App. 232 , 235 (1) ( 871 SE2d 69 ) (2022) (“Pleadings, motions, and orders are construed according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
ODUOK v. FULTON DeKALB HOSPITAL AUTHORITY Et Al.green2 sentences2024Auth., 340 Ga. App. 205, 207 (1) ( 797 SE2d 133 ) (2017). 2024Auth., 340 Ga. App. 205, 207 (1) ( 797 SE2d 133 ) (2017). | 1 | 1 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodgreen1 sentence2013Easterwood, 507 U. S. at 664 (punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Sanders v. State, 230 Ga. App. 176, 177 (3) ( 495 SE2d 653 ) (1998). 2006Sanders v. State, 230 Ga. App. 176, 177 (3) ( 495 SE2d 653 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Casas v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Moreover, “[t]he courtis not required to instruct the jury in certain language so long as the substance of the principle is clearly stated. [Cit.]” Casas v. State, 193 Ga. App. 53, 54 ( 387 SE2d 20 ) (1989). 2005Moreover, “[t]he courtis not required to instruct the jury in certain language so long as the substance of the principle is clearly stated. [Cit.]” Casas v. State, 193 Ga. App. 53, 54 ( 387 SE2d 20 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Parker v. State, 220 Ga. App. 303, 312 (12) ( 469 SE2d 410 ) (1996); see also Kennedy v. State, 274 Ga. 396, 397 (3) ( 554 SE2d 178 ) (2001) (“a defendant waives appellate review of an allegedly improper . . . communication [during a bench conference] when, prior to verdict, defendant is aware of the communication and fails to voice an objection”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). (c) Womack also argues that he was denied the right to be present when the court excused a juror for cause. 2005Parker v. State, 220 Ga. App. 303, 312 (12) ( 469 SE2d 410 ) (1996); see also Kennedy v. State, 274 Ga. 396, 397 (3) ( 554 SE2d 178 ) (2001) (“a defendant waives appellate review of an allegedly improper . . . communication [during a bench conference] when, prior to verdict, defendant is aware of the communication and fails to voice an objection”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). (c) Womack also argues that he was denied the right to be present when the court excused a juror for cause. | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Parker v. State, 220 Ga. App. 303, 312 (12) ( 469 SE2d 410 ) (1996); see also Kennedy v. State, 274 Ga. 396, 397 (3) ( 554 SE2d 178 ) (2001) (“a defendant waives appellate review of an allegedly improper . . . communication [during a bench conference] when, prior to verdict, defendant is aware of the communication and fails to voice an objection”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). (c) Womack also argues that he was denied the right to be present when the court excused a juror for cause. 2005Parker v. State, 220 Ga. App. 303, 312 (12) ( 469 SE2d 410 ) (1996); see also Kennedy v. State, 274 Ga. 396, 397 (3) ( 554 SE2d 178 ) (2001) (“a defendant waives appellate review of an allegedly improper . . . communication [during a bench conference] when, prior to verdict, defendant is aware of the communication and fails to voice an objection”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). (c) Womack also argues that he was denied the right to be present when the court excused a juror for cause. | 1 | 1 |
Kimmel v. Stategreen2 sentences2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 | 1 | 1 |
Daniels v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Daniels v. State, 264 Ga. 259, 261 (2), fn. 4 ( 443 SE2d 622 ) (1994); Johnston v. State, 232 Ga. 268, 272 (5) ( 206 SE2d 468 ) (1974). 2000Daniels v. State, 264 Ga. 259, 261 (2), fn. 4 ( 443 SE2d 622 ) (1994); Johnston v. State, 232 Ga. 268, 272 (5) ( 206 SE2d 468 ) (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Waits v. Makowskigreen1 sentence2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Smithgreen2 sentences2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 | 1 | 1 |
Appling v. Stategreen2 sentences2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 | 1 | 1 |
Johnston v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Daniels v. State, 264 Ga. 259, 261 (2), fn. 4 ( 443 SE2d 622 ) (1994); Johnston v. State, 232 Ga. 268, 272 (5) ( 206 SE2d 468 ) (1974). 2000Daniels v. State, 264 Ga. 259, 261 (2), fn. 4 ( 443 SE2d 622 ) (1994); Johnston v. State, 232 Ga. 268, 272 (5) ( 206 SE2d 468 ) (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Williamson v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Williamson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 589 (3) ( 367 SE2d 863 ) (1988). (c) Referring to the deceased as the “victim” in the charge on aggravated assault did not amount to an improper expression of guilt of the accused under OCGA § 17-8-57. 2000See Williamson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 589 (3) ( 367 SE2d 863 ) (1988). (c) Referring to the deceased as the “victim” in the charge on aggravated assault did not amount to an improper expression of guilt of the accused under OCGA § 17-8-57. | 1 | 1 |
Herrin v. Stategreen2 sentences2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 2000The drafter of the instruction added the language “where there is no history of such event occurring in the past to provide notice of an existing condition.” The substance of the instruction is not an issue in this appeal. 2 Herrin v. State, 229 Ga. App. 260, 262 (2) ( 493 SE2d 634 ) (1997). 3 Id. 4 See Kimmel v. State, 261 Ga. 332, 334-335 (3) ( 404 SE2d 436 ) (1991). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Herrin, supra. 6 Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7 ( 517 SE2d 538 ) (1999); see also Waits v. Makowski, supra; Freeman v. Martin, supra. 7 Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 SE2d 68 | 1 | 1 |
Rojas v. Stategreen1 sentence1999We also do not find that the substance of the required warning was changed by informing Sheridan that he was entitled to “an additional chemical test,” rather than merely chemical “tests.” Id.; State v. Black, 236 Ga. App. 56 ( 510 SE2d 903 ) (1999); Rojas, 235 Ga. App. at 527 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Harrison v. State, 235 Ga. App. 78, 80 ( 508 SE2d 459 ) (1998). 1999Harrison v. State, 235 Ga. App. 78, 80 ( 508 SE2d 459 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Keller v. Stategreen2 sentences1983See Keller v. State, 245 Ga. 522 ( 265 SE2d 813 ) (1980); Brooks v. Douglas, 163 Ga. App. 224 ( 292 SE2d 911 ) (1982); Hitchcock v. Key, 163 Ga. App. 901 ( 296 SE2d 625 ) (1982). 1983See Keller v. State, 245 Ga. 522 ( 265 SE2d 813 ) (1980); Brooks v. Douglas, 163 Ga. App. 224 ( 292 SE2d 911 ) (1982); Hitchcock v. Key, 163 Ga. App. 901 ( 296 SE2d 625 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Blackburn v. Alabamagreen2 sentences1975He was asked to repeat the substance of his warnings five times, and admitted on cross examination that was all he told the defendant "to the *516 best of my recollection." However, an appellate court is not bound merely by the evidence adduced during the Jackson v. Denno hearing in determining the voluntariness of the confession, but must look to all the evidence contained in the record. [1] The Supreme Court said in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 210 (1959), "... we reject the notion that the scope of our review can be thus restricted. 1975He was asked to repeat the substance of his warnings five times, and admitted on cross examination that was all he told the defendant "to the best of my recollection.” However, an appellate court is not bound merely by the evidence adduced during the Jackson v. Denno hearing in determining the voluntariness of the confession, but must look to all the evidence contained in the record. 1 The Supreme Court said in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 210 (1959), ". . . we reject the notion that the scope of our review can be thus restricted. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. State
green
1 sentence2009But the Wright court went on to determine whether the constitutional error was harmless, noting that in order "[t]o reverse a conviction, the evidence of the defendant's election to remain silent must point directly at the substance of the defendant's defense or otherwise substantially prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. [Cit.]" Wright, supra at 594 , 651 S.E.2d 852 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Black
neutral
2 sentences1999We also do not find that the substance of the required warning was changed by informing Sheridan that he was entitled to “an additional chemical test,” rather than merely chemical “tests.” Id.; State v. Black, 236 Ga. App. 56 ( 510 SE2d 903 ) (1999); Rojas, 235 Ga. App. at 527 (1). 1999We also do not find that the substance of the required warning was changed by informing Sheridan that he was entitled to “an additional chemical test,” rather than merely chemical “tests.” Id.; State v. Black, 236 Ga. App. 56 ( 510 SE2d 903 ) (1999); Rojas, 235 Ga. App. at 527 (1). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Wilbanks v. State
green
2 sentences1989Wilbanks v. State, 165 Ga. App. 876 ( 303 SE2d 144 ) (1983). 1989Wilbanks v. State, 165 Ga. App. 876 ( 303 SE2d 144 ) (1983). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Brooks v. Douglas
green
2 sentences1983See Keller v. State, 245 Ga. 522 ( 265 SE2d 813 ) (1980); Brooks v. Douglas, 163 Ga. App. 224 ( 292 SE2d 911 ) (1982); Hitchcock v. Key, 163 Ga. App. 901 ( 296 SE2d 625 ) (1982). 1983See Keller v. State, 245 Ga. 522 ( 265 SE2d 813 ) (1980); Brooks v. Douglas, 163 Ga. App. 224 ( 292 SE2d 911 ) (1982); Hitchcock v. Key, 163 Ga. App. 901 ( 296 SE2d 625 ) (1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Hitchcock v. Key
green
2 sentences1983See Keller v. State, 245 Ga. 522 ( 265 SE2d 813 ) (1980); Brooks v. Douglas, 163 Ga. App. 224 ( 292 SE2d 911 ) (1982); Hitchcock v. Key, 163 Ga. App. 901 ( 296 SE2d 625 ) (1982). 1983See Keller v. State, 245 Ga. 522 ( 265 SE2d 813 ) (1980); Brooks v. Douglas, 163 Ga. App. 224 ( 292 SE2d 911 ) (1982); Hitchcock v. Key, 163 Ga. App. 901 ( 296 SE2d 625 ) (1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Trunnell v. Hardie
green
1 sentence1935Co., 164 Ga. 392 ( 138 S. E. 787 ), the substance of which rule was correctly charged to the jury by the judge, a verdict was authorized, if not demanded, in favor of the plaintiff on the issues as to total disability, and as to estoppel against the company to claim a forfeiture of the insurance certificate because of the alleged existence of the disability at the time of the application for its issuance. 4. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Cato v. Ætna Life Insurance green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.