7 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1898–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
King v. Gorczykgreen1 sentence2026On one hand, the Vermont Administrative Procedures Act promotes rulemaking and its accompanying public scrutiny when the actions of a state agency affecting members of the public begin to gel into the type of fixed and reliable procedures that advance beyond the direct statutory mandate and on which there should be some review and public process. 3 V.S.A. § 800; see also King v. Gorczyk, 2003 VT 34 , ¶¶ 17–20 (holding that VAPA has different obligations between rules and practices and procedural 6 Plaintiff has indicated that the State has not issued such a declaratory ruling. | 1 | 1 |
In re Mahar Conditional Use Permit (Mary Lahiff, Carolyn Hallock, Susan Harritt and William Butler, Appellants)green1 sentence2025Page 5 of 7 Therefore, Mr. Palmer should have filed a motion affirmatively claiming and satisfying the burden of establishing party status with either his notice of appeal or Statement of Questions. “[T]he party seeking party status had the burden to assert this claim and … the purpose of placing the burden on the appellant [is] … to preserve judicial resources and avoid situations in which the Environmental Division begins to engage its resources in evaluating the substance of a claim, only to discover many months into the process that the appellant lacks party status.” In re Mahar Conditiona | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ariegwegreen1 sentence2023See Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶ 155 (concluding that defendant was not deprived of right to speedy trial where absence of prejudice outweighed length of delay, reasons for delay, and assertion of right). ¶ 49. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCaffreygreen1 sentence2019In determining whether a statutory exception is an element or a defense, the “question is whether the exception is so incorporated with the substance of the clause defining the offense, as to constitute a material part of the description of the acts, omissions, or other ingredients which constitute the offense.” State v. Bevins, 70 Vt. 574, 577 , 41 A. 655 , 656 (1898) (quotation omitted); see also State v. McCaffrey, 69 Vt. 85, 90 , 37 A. 234 , 235-36 (1896) (reciting that statutory “exceptions must be negatived” by State “only where they are descriptive of the offense, or define it”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Verizon Wireless Barton Permit
green
1 sentence2025Page 5 of 7 Therefore, Mr. Palmer should have filed a motion affirmatively claiming and satisfying the burden of establishing party status with either his notice of appeal or Statement of Questions. “[T]he party seeking party status had the burden to assert this claim and … the purpose of placing the burden on the appellant [is] … to preserve judicial resources and avoid situations in which the Environmental Division begins to engage its resources in evaluating the substance of a claim, only to discover many months into the process that the appellant lacks party status.” In re Mahar Conditiona | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Bevins
green
1 sentence2019In determining whether a statutory exception is an element or a defense, the “question is whether the exception is so incorporated with the substance of the clause defining the offense, as to constitute a material part of the description of the acts, omissions, or other ingredients which constitute the offense.” State v. Bevins, 70 Vt. 574, 577 , 41 A. 655 , 656 (1898) (quotation omitted); see also State v. McCaffrey, 69 Vt. 85, 90 , 37 A. 234 , 235-36 (1896) (reciting that statutory “exceptions must be negatived” by State “only where they are descriptive of the offense, or define it”). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Fraser v. Sleeper
green
1 sentence2019“Provisions that make an excuse or exception to the definition, particularly those principally within the knowledge of the defendant, are defenses.” Fraser, 2007 VT 78, ¶ 11 . ¶ 100. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.
green
1 sentence1951Slayton v. Davis & Erwin, 85 Vt 87, 89, 90, 81 A 232; Parker v. Bowen, supra, 118; Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt 481, 490, 1 A2d 817 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Hagar v. Brainerd
neutral
1 sentence1911Thus in Hagar v. Brainerd, 44 Vt. 294 , two counts in trespass qua. clau. were joined with one in case. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
United States v. Cook
green
1 sentence1898The rule as given by the latter writer, ib., ¶ 512, § 5, is as follows: “Exceptions in a statute other than that creating the offense, need not be alleged in the indictment.” The clearest statement of the rule brought to our notice, is the one by Clifford, Justice, in U. S. v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168 : “The only real question in the case is, whether the exception is so incorporated with the substance of the clause defining the offense, as to constitute a material part of the description of the acts, omissions, or other ingredients which constitute the offense; such an offense must be accurately and | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.