substance claim in Pennsylvania

1979Once we conclude that the omitted contention is of arguable merit, our inquiry into the substance of the claim ceases and shifts to an analysis of post trial counsel’s basis for decision.” Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 278 , 372 A.2d 687, 696 (1977).

1979Once we conclude that the omitted contention is of arguable merit, our inquiry into the substance of the claim ceases and shifts to an analysis of post trial counsel’s basis for decision.” Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 278 , 372 A.2d 687, 696 (1977).

2026U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Davis, 232 A.3d 952, 955 (Pa. Super. 2020).

2026U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Davis, 232 A.3d 952, 955 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that prior ruling on procedural grounds was not “on the merits” and therefore not preclusive); see also Khalil v. Williams, 244 A.3d 830, 843-44 (Pa. Super. 2021) (claim included in post-trial motion in prior case was not addressed on merits and, therefore, not precluded in subsequent case).

2002Burke v. Buck Hotel Inc., 742 A.2d 239, 246 (Pa. Cmwlth.1999).

2002Burke v. Buck Hotel Inc., 742 A.2d 239, 246 (Pa. Cmwlth.1999).

2001Fragale v. Brigham, 741 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal denied 563 Pa. 629 , 758 A.2d 662 (2000), quoting Southard v. Temple University Hospital, 731 A.2d 603, 616 (Pa.Super.1999).

2001Fragale v. Brigham, 741 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal denied 563 Pa. 629 , 758 A.2d 662 (2000), quoting Southard v. Temple University Hospital, 731 A.2d 603, 616 (Pa.Super.1999).

2000An error in a jury charge is sufficient ground for a new trial if the charge, taken as a whole, is inadequate, unclear, or has the tendency to mislead or confuse ... a material issue. . . .” Salameh v. Spossey, 731 A.2d 649, 659 (Pa. Commw. 1999). (citations omitted) Here, Dr. Holencik raised no objection to either the court’s instructions or the jury interrogatories — neither of which included any mention of contributory negligence.

1999Salameh v. Spossey, 731 A.2d 649 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999).

2026Weinar v. Lex, 176 A.3d 907, 915-16 (Pa. Super. 2017) (footnote omitted). -5- J-A25004-25 Succinctly put, for res judicata to apply, the trial court must have “passed directly on the substance of the claim” in the prior litigation.

2026U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Davis, 232 A.3d 952, 955 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that prior ruling on procedural grounds was not “on the merits” and therefore not preclusive); see also Khalil v. Williams, 244 A.3d 830, 843-44 (Pa. Super. 2021) (claim included in post-trial motion in prior case was not addressed on merits and, therefore, not precluded in subsequent case).

2024See N.T., 6/12/2019 (P.M. session), at 38-46; N.T., 6/13/2019 (A.M session), at 119- 57; N.T., 6/13/2019 (P.M. session), at 28-43. - 17 - J-A06038-24 provided to the jury in this case, we cannot say that Rain was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object to the denial of the “Certain Testimony Subject to Special Scrutiny” instruction or his failure to request the “False in One, False in All instruction.” See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 299 (Pa. 2011) (holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions where the instructions properly explained

2024We simply note that Calderone received the substance of the instruction he requested, and, therefore, he cannot now assert prejudice. - 16 - J-S19044-23 ineffective for failing to preserve a meritless issue for appellate review,” where an issue is meritless, a petitioner “is not entitled to relief . . ..” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1115 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal citation omitted).

2024Commonwealth v. Schofield, 312 A.3d 921, 927 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2024See Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1161-62 (Pa.Super. 2017). - 12 - J-A11004-24 The following law pertains to the merits of Appellant’s challenge: Appellant must demonstrate that the sentencing court abused its discretion.

2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244 , -3- J-S37012-24 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014) (“[A]n excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.”).

2021In order to meet the timeliness exception of the PCRA as after-discovered facts, Appellant must demonstrate that the facts: (1) could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.” Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (2008).

2020Ineffectiveness claims are not properly before this Court on direct appeal, and “absent either good cause or exceptional circumstances and a waiver of [Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)] review,” such claims “must await collateral review.” Commonwealth v. Britt, 83 A.3d 198, 203 (Pa.Super. 2013).

2019Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 902 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

2018While the Court still found place for the doctrine in Pennsylvania law, it held that "the determination of paternity by estoppel should be better informed according to the actual best interests of the child, rather than by rote pronouncements grounded merely on the longevity of abstractly portrayed (and perhaps largely ostensible) parental relationships." K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 809 (Pa. 2012).

2018Justice Baer wrote: "I would abrogate the doctrine in its entirety, with the limited exception of where its invocation would preserve the status of a husband who chooses to parent a non-biological child born into an existing marriage." K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 814 .

2017Additionally, while the PCRA court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the substance of his claim, we note that subject matter jurisdiction simply requires “that the court be competent to hear the case and that the defendant be provided with a ‘formal and specific accusation of the crimes charged.’” Commonwealth v. Hatchin, 709 A.2d 405, 408 (Pa.Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 314 A.2d 270, 273 (Pa. 1974)).

2017Additionally, while the PCRA court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the substance of his claim, we note that subject matter jurisdiction simply requires “that the court be competent to hear the case and that the defendant be provided with a ‘formal and specific accusation of the crimes charged.’” Commonwealth v. Hatchin, 709 A.2d 405, 408 (Pa.Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 314 A.2d 270, 273 (Pa. 1974)).

2017See Commonwealth v . . . (~·: , Spotz. 84 A.3d 294, 315 (Pa. 2014) (explaining that the "Strickland/Pierce 'prejudic standard (l requfre[s] Appellee to show that his trial counsel's conduct had an actual ' adverse effect . on the outcome . . . of the proceedlnqs" ).

2015The trial court reasoned that “when a defendant makes a weight of the evidence claim ‘he concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the jury’s verdict.’ Commonwealth v. Rosetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191-1192 (Pa. Super. 2004).” Id.

2015The trial court reasoned that “when a defendant makes a weight of the evidence claim ‘he concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the jury’s verdict.’ Commonwealth v. Rosetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191-1192 (Pa. Super. 2004).” Id.