14 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spickler v. Dubegreen2 sentences2017See Hebron Acad., Inc. v. Town of Hebron, 2013 ME 15, ¶¶ 29-30 , 60 A.3d 774 (concluding that a municipal decision denying a tax abatement request based on the applicant’s failure to meet a statute of limitations “was a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes” and barred a future declaratory judgment action concerning the tax status of the property); Spickler v. Dube, 644 A.2d 465, 467-68 (Me. 1994) (concluding that an involuntary dismissal for want of prosecution of a shareholders’ derivative suit “serve[d] as a valid final judgment for the purposes of res judicata” and barred reliti 2017See Hebron Acad., Inc. v. Town of Hebron, 2013 ME 15, ¶¶ 29-30 , 60 A.3d 774 (concluding that a municipal decision denying a tax abatement request based on the applicant’s failure to meet a statute of limitations “was a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes” and barred a future declaratory judgment action concerning the tax status of the property); Spickler v. Dube, 644 A.2d 465, 467-68 (Me. 1994) (concluding that an involuntary dismissal for want of prosecution of a shareholders’ derivative suit “serve[d] as a valid final judgment for the purposes of res judicata” and barred reliti | 2 | 2 |
Hebron Academy, Inc. v. Town of Hebrongreen2 sentences2017See Hebron Acad., Inc. v. Town of Hebron, 2013 ME 15, ¶¶ 29-30 , 60 A.3d 774 (concluding that a municipal decision denying a tax abatement request based on the applicant’s failure to meet a statute of limitations “was a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes” and barred a future declaratory judgment action concerning the tax status of the property); Spickler v. Dube, 644 A.2d 465, 467-68 (Me. 1994) (concluding that an involuntary dismissal for want of prosecution of a shareholders’ derivative suit “serve[d] as a valid final judgment for the purposes of res judicata” and barred reliti 2017See Hebron Acad., Inc. v. Town of Hebron, 2013 ME 15, ¶¶ 29-30 , 60 A.3d 774 (concluding that a municipal decision denying a tax abatement request based on the applicant’s failure to meet a statute of limitations “was a decision on the merits for res judicata purposes” and barred a future declaratory judgment action concerning the tax status of the property); Spickler v. Dube, 644 A.2d 465, 467-68 (Me. 1994) (concluding that an involuntary dismissal for want of prosecution of a shareholders’ derivative suit “serve[d] as a valid final judgment for the purposes of res judicata” and barred reliti | 2 | 2 |
State v. Reedgreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., State v. Michaud, 611 A.2d 61 (Me.1992) (trial court need not confine instructions to the exact language of the criminal code); State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984) (court has discretion to reject requested instruction if the substance of instruction is covered); State v. Weese, 424 A.2d 705 (Me.1981) (trial court need not give instruction in exact language requested by counsel). 1989State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1295 (Me.1984); 1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 30.4, at 30-10 (1987) (“[T]here is no requirement that the court use the language suggested by counsel in the instructions.”) Here, in addition to the instruction, quoted on page 2 of the Court’s opinion, the trial court specifically instructed the jury: You must not be biased against the Defendant because he has been accused of a crime, because he may have been arrested for a crime, or because he has been presented to trial for a crime. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Children of Destiny H.green1 sentence2026See In re Children of Destiny H., 2024 ME 66, ¶ 41 , 322 A.3d 1183 (quotation marks omitted). 6 [¶18] Lastly, we address the time in which one must assert an ineffective-assistance claim arising from guardianship or conservatorship proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
Mehlhorn v. Derbygreen2 sentences2019See Mehlhorn v. Derbx, 2006 ME 110 , '1 11, 905 A.2d 290 ("issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived." (quotation marks omitted)). 2019See Mehlhorn v. Derbx, 2006 ME 110 , '1 11, 905 A.2d 290 ("issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived." (quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.green1 sentence2004In Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., the Law Court only tells us that a dealer’s claim for reimbursement under §1176 simply for “all warranty parts” is — insufficient. 844 F. Supp. 819, 825 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Paradis v. Webber Hospitalgreen1 sentence2003See, e. 8., Paradis v. Webber Hospital, 409 A.2d 672, 675 (Me. 1979) (notice of claim under Maine Health Security Act). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Michaudgreen1 sentence1995See, e.g., State v. Michaud, 611 A.2d 61 (Me.1992) (trial court need not confine instructions to the exact language of the criminal code); State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984) (court has discretion to reject requested instruction if the substance of instruction is covered); State v. Weese, 424 A.2d 705 (Me.1981) (trial court need not give instruction in exact language requested by counsel). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pikegreen1 sentence1968See State v. Pike, 65 Me. 111, 116 , and State v. Rollins, 77 Me. 380, 382 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rollinsgreen1 sentence1968See State v. Pike, 65 Me. 111, 116 , and State v. Rollins, 77 Me. 380, 382 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cleveland v. Porca Company
green
2 sentences2014Plumley, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (citing Cleveland, 38 F.3d at 297 ). 7 And an employee need not sue the union in order to proceed against his employer on such a claim.ld. (citing De/Costello v. lnt'l Bhd. a/Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983)). 2013Plumley, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (citing Cleveland, 38 F.3d at 297 ). 7 And an employee need not sue the union in order to proceed against his employer on such a claim.ld. (citing De/Costello v. lnt'l Bhd. a/Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983)). | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Plumley v. Southern Container, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Plumley, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (citing Cleveland, 38 F.3d at 297 ). 7 And an employee need not sue the union in order to proceed against his employer on such a claim.ld. (citing De/Costello v. lnt'l Bhd. a/Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983)). 2013Plumley, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (citing Cleveland, 38 F.3d at 297 ). 7 And an employee need not sue the union in order to proceed against his employer on such a claim.ld. (citing De/Costello v. lnt'l Bhd. a/Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983)). | 2 | 2013–2014 |
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
green
2 sentences2014Plumley, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (citing Cleveland, 38 F.3d at 297 ). 7 And an employee need not sue the union in order to proceed against his employer on such a claim.ld. (citing De/Costello v. lnt'l Bhd. a/Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983)). 2013Plumley, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (citing Cleveland, 38 F.3d at 297 ). 7 And an employee need not sue the union in order to proceed against his employer on such a claim.ld. (citing De/Costello v. lnt'l Bhd. a/Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983)). | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Willinghan v. Town of Stonington
green
1 sentence2014Ctr., 2012 ME 54 ,~~ 26-27, 40 A.3d 955 , but the substance of the analysis in Willinghan was to the substantiation of the disability and need for reasonable accommodation, not to the interactive process itself. 847 F. Supp. 2d at 189 . 9 B. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Kezer v. Central Maine Medical Center
green
2 sentences2014Ctr., 2012 ME 54 ,~~ 26-27, 40 A.3d 955 , but the substance of the analysis in Willinghan was to the substantiation of the disability and need for reasonable accommodation, not to the interactive process itself. 847 F. Supp. 2d at 189 . 9 B. 2014Ctr., 2012 ME 54 ,~~ 26-27, 40 A.3d 955 , but the substance of the analysis in Willinghan was to the substantiation of the disability and need for reasonable accommodation, not to the interactive process itself. 847 F. Supp. 2d at 189 . 9 B. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Garrett v. Moore-Mccormack Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2009Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 271 , 114 S.Ct. 2251 , 129 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994) (stating that “the assignment of the burden of proof is a rule of substantive law”); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 , 63 S.Ct. 246 , 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942) (stating in an admiralty case that the right of the party to be free from the burden of proof “inhered in his cause of action” and “was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be considered a mere incident of a form of procedure”). [¶ 20] This jurisprudence indicates that the amendment to section 5-212(d), shifting the 2009Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 271 , 114 S.Ct. 2251 , 129 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994) (stating that “the assignment of the burden of proof is a rule of substantive law”); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 , 63 S.Ct. 246 , 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942) (stating in an admiralty case that the right of the party to be free from the burden of proof “inhered in his cause of action” and “was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be considered a mere incident of a form of procedure”). [¶ 20] This jurisprudence indicates that the amendment to section 5-212(d), shifting the | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries
green
2 sentences2009Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 271 , 114 S.Ct. 2251 , 129 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994) (stating that “the assignment of the burden of proof is a rule of substantive law”); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 , 63 S.Ct. 246 , 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942) (stating in an admiralty case that the right of the party to be free from the burden of proof “inhered in his cause of action” and “was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be considered a mere incident of a form of procedure”). [¶ 20] This jurisprudence indicates that the amendment to section 5-212(d), shifting the 2009Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 271 , 114 S.Ct. 2251 , 129 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994) (stating that “the assignment of the burden of proof is a rule of substantive law”); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 , 63 S.Ct. 246 , 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942) (stating in an admiralty case that the right of the party to be free from the burden of proof “inhered in his cause of action” and “was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be considered a mere incident of a form of procedure”). [¶ 20] This jurisprudence indicates that the amendment to section 5-212(d), shifting the | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp.
green
1 sentence2002The Levine Court noted that the principles governing former rule 7(d) were incorporated into current rule 56. 2000 ME 77 , ¥ 9 n.7, 770 A.2d at 656 . 3In unrelated cases, this court has ruled that even where the record on summary judgment is not extensive, a party's failure to provide record references is fatal to a summary judgment submission. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Watson
green
1 sentence2002The Levine Court noted that the principles governing former rule 7(d) were incorporated into current rule 56. 2000 ME 77 , ¥ 9 n.7, 770 A.2d at 656 . 3In unrelated cases, this court has ruled that even where the record on summary judgment is not extensive, a party's failure to provide record references is fatal to a summary judgment submission. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Weese
green
1 sentence1995See, e.g., State v. Michaud, 611 A.2d 61 (Me.1992) (trial court need not confine instructions to the exact language of the criminal code); State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984) (court has discretion to reject requested instruction if the substance of instruction is covered); State v. Weese, 424 A.2d 705 (Me.1981) (trial court need not give instruction in exact language requested by counsel). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.