substance claim in Texas

2026App. 2002). “‘That [the defendant] was 11 unable . . . to present his case to the extent and in the form he desired is not prejudicial where . . . he was not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury.’” Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 666 (quoting United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1398-99 (10th Cir.1991)).

2023Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 222 (quoting Ray, 178 S.W.3d at 836 ); see Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 665–66 (“That [the defendant] was unable to . . . present his case to the extent and in the form he desired is not prejudicial where, as here, he was not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury.” (quoting United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384 , 1398–99 (10th Cir. 1991)). 3 3 Compare Green v. State, 589 S.W.3d 250 , 263 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (concluding that the exclusion of self-defense evidence regarding the decedent’s earlier threat against appellant,

2026“Under both Texas and federal law, whether a claim seeks a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause turns on the substance of the claim, not artful pleading.” See id. at 131-32 .

2024Whether a claim seeks a direct benefit from the contract “turns on the substance of the claim, not artful pleading.” In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 131–32.

2026App. 2002). “‘That [the defendant] was 11 unable . . . to present his case to the extent and in the form he desired is not prejudicial where . . . he was not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury.’” Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 666 (quoting United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1398-99 (10th Cir.1991)).

2024App. 2002) ((“That [the defendant] was unable to . . . present his case to the extent and in the form he desired is not prejudicial where, as here, he was not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury.”) (quoting United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384 , 1398–99 (10th Cir. 1991))). - 10 - 04-22-00345-CR C.

2025Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tex. 2007) (“[U]nder both Texas and federal law, arbitrability turns on the substance of a claim, not artful pleading.”); United Oil & Minerals, Inc. v. Costilla Energy, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 840, 846 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (abandoning claims). 11 Masterson filed her nonsuits in conjunction with her third amended petition, where she advanced the same factual allegations in support of her claims.

2023Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tex. 2007) (holding that “arbitrability turns on the substance of a claim, not artful pleading”). 5 Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018). 6 Id. 5 the party resisting arbitration to prove an affirmative defense that precludes arbitration.7 Total neither seeks to prove an affirmative defense nor disputes the validity of the System Operating Agreement or its arbitration provision.

2025“The fact that [a defendant] was not able to present his case in the form he desired does not amount to constitutional error when he was not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury.” See Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex. Crim.

2021See Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (stating that a trial court can place reasonable restrictions on the defendant’s evidence, and that “[s]uch rules do not abridge an accused’s right to present a defense so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve’”), quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998); Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (stating that “[t]he fact that [an] appellant was not able to present his case in the form he desired does not amount to constitutional error when h

2022First, the City urges us to adopt the Thirteenth Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the Act and define “report” as “[a] disclosure of information . . . tending to directly or circumstantially prove the substance of a violation of criminal or civil law.” Castaneda v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 831 S.W.2d 501 , 503–04 (Tex. (Boyd, J., dissenting).

2016Instead, a report under the Act may be considered “any disclosure of information regarding a public servant’s employer tending to directly or circumstantially prove the substance of a violation of criminal or civil law[.]” Castaneda v. Texas Dep’t of Agric., 831 S.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

2023When “the alleged liability arises from the contract or must be determined by reference to it . . . [,] equity prevents [the non-signatory plaintiff] from avoiding [an] arbitration clause that was part of that [contract].” Jody James Farms, 547 S.W.3d at 637 . “[W]hether a claim seeks a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause turns on the substance of the claim, not artful pleading.” Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 131-32 .

2021But “when the substance of the claim arises from general obligations imposed by state law, including statutes, torts and other common law duties, or federal law,” direct[]benefits estoppel is not implicated even if the claim refers to or relates to the contract or would not have arisen “but for” the contract’s existence. 547 S.W.3d at 637 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

2019Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., L.P, 458 S.W.3d 502, 528 (Tex. 2015) (“‘[W]hen the substance of the claim arises from general obligations imposed by state law, including statutes, torts and other common law duties, or federal law,’ rather than from the contract, ‘direct benefits’ estoppel does not apply, even if the claim refers to or relates to the contract.” (quoting In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182 , 184 n.2 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding))); Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 132 .7 LFA argues that Bridgette and Gabrielle seek recovery under the account agreements and that, althou

2015“Whether a claim seeks a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause turns on the substance of the claim, not artful pleading.” 8 Id.

2021See Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (stating that a trial court can place reasonable restrictions on the defendant’s evidence, and that “[s]uch rules do not abridge an accused’s right to present a defense so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve’”), quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998); Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (stating that “[t]he fact that [an] appellant was not able to present his case in the form he desired does not amount to constitutional error when h

2016App. 1998) (op. on reh’g); see also Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 666 (exclusion of evidence is unconstitutional only if it –9– “significantly undermine[s] fundamental elements of the accused’s defense” and exclusion of evidence is not prejudicial if defendant was not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury) (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315 ).

2023“The claim must ‘depend on the existence’ of the contract” and “be unable to ‘stand independently’ without the contract.” Id. at 527–28 (quoting Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. 2006); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d at 739–40). “‘[W]hen the substance of the claim arises from general obligations imposed by state law, including statutes, torts and other common law duties, or federal law,’ rather than from the contract, ‘direct benefits’ estoppel does not apply, even if the claim refers to or relates to the contract.” Id. (quoting In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182

2023“The claim must ‘depend on the existence’ of the contract” and “be unable to ‘stand independently’ without the contract.” Id. at 527–28 (quoting Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. 2006); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d at 739–40). “‘[W]hen the substance of the claim arises from general obligations imposed by state law, including statutes, torts and other common law duties, or federal law,’ rather than from the contract, ‘direct benefits’ estoppel does not apply, even if the claim refers to or relates to the contract.” Id. (quoting In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182

2024See Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 567 .3 Here, appellant was able to attack M.R.’s credibility and by doing so, presented the substance of his defense.

2014App. 2002) (“[T]he exclusion of a defendant’s evidence will be constitutional error only if the evidence forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense. * * * That the defendant was unable to . . . present his case to the extent and in the form he desired is not prejudicial where, as here, he was not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1398-99 (10th Cir. 1991)); Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 562-63 (Tex. Cr

2024So in Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster, the Texas Supreme Court explained that the nature of the suit is determined from the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s petition, the rights asserted, and the relief sought. 276 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex. 1955).

2009See Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster , 154 Tex. 311 , 276 S.W.2d 774, 776 (1955); Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc. , 53 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Tex. 2001); Madera Prod.

2023See Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 666 ; see also Harris v. State, 152 S.W.3d 786, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. 10 ref’d) (“A defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather subject to reasonable restrictions.” (internal quotations omitted)).

2023Id. at 666 ; see also Harris v. State, 152 S.W.3d 786, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (“A defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather subject to reasonable restrictions.” (internal quotation omitted)).

2011See Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 79 (Tex.2011) (“In construing a statute, the court’s purpose is to give effect to the Legislature’s expressed intent.”) (emphasis added).

2011See Iliff v. Iliff , No. 09-0753, 2011 WL 1446725, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 15, 2011) ("In construing a statute, the court's purpose is to give effect to the Legislature's expressed intent.") (emphasis added).

2010SWEPI analogizes Eyhorn’s two contiguous applications that exceeded 640 acres combined to plaintiffs who attempt to “escape the Legislature’s statutory scheme by artful pleading.” See Murphy v. Russell, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838-39 (Tex.2005) (plaintiffs claim of battery dismissed because substance was medical malpractice claim and, therefore, statutorily required to file expert report); see also In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tex.2007) (orig. proceeding) (“[A]rbitrability turns on the substance of a claim, not artful pleading.”); Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, 221 S.W.3d 632,

2010SWEPI analogizes Eyhorn's two contiguous applications that exceeded 640 acres combined to plaintiffs who attempt to "escape the Legislature's statutory scheme by artful pleading." See Murphy v. Russell , 167 S.W.3d 835, 838-39 (Tex. 2005) (plaintiff's claim of battery dismissed because substance was medical malpractice claim and, therefore, statutorily required to file expert report); see also In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB , 235 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) ("[A]rbitrability turns on the substance of a claim, not artful pleading."); Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen 221 S.W.3d 6

2015In that case the court of appeals court, he explained that he sought damages for "the loss explained that claims must be brought on a contract if ofthe promissory note issued [to] him individually." liability must be determined by reference to the contract, and the determination of whether a party seeks the Applying a common-sense analysis, we conclude benefit of a contract turns on the substance of the claim. that Richey in substance is seeking to recover the $6.5 Id. (citing In re Weekley Homes, L.P., /80 S.W.3d I27, million owed to him under the Note and for actions 13I-32 (Tex. 2005)). flo

2013In examining whether claims are within the scope of a forum-selection clause, courts engage in a “common-sense examination of the claims and the forum-selection clauses to 4 determine if the clause covers the claims.” In re Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). “[W]hether claims seek a direct benefit from a contract turns on the substance of the claim, not artful pleading . . . . [A] claim is brought in contract if liability arises from the contract, while a claim is brought in tort if liability is derived from other general obligations imposed by law.

2015See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 617-18 (Tex.1986); Watkins v. Plummer, No. 14-08-01040-CV, 2010 WL 2195459 , at *6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 3, 2010, no pet.) (mem.op.).

2015See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617 , 617–18 (Tex. 1986); Watkins v. Plummer, No. 14–08–01040–CV, 2010 WL 2195459 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 3, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2026The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that [a]lthough a defendant obviously has a right to attempt to establish his innocence by showing that someone else committed the crime, he still must show that his proffered evidence regarding the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime charged and the alleged “alternative perpetrator.” Wiley, 74 S.W.3d at 406 ; see Michaelwicz v. State, 186 S.W.3d 601, 617 (Tex. App. —Austin 2006, pet. ref’d) (quoting United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1191 (1

2020While the trial court excluded some of Arellano’s defensive evidence, Arellano “has failed to show how the trial judge’s ruling was erroneous, much less so clearly erroneous that it violated his constitutional rights.” Wiley, 74 S.W.3d at 408 .

2025See [In re] Weekley[ Homes, L.P.], 180 S.W.3d [127,] 131–32[ (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)] (stating that arbitrability “turns on the substance of the claim, not artful pleading”); Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795 , 797–800 (Tex. 2001) (distinguishing fraudulent inducement from other fraud claims as it “presupposes that a party has been induced to enter a contract”).

2015See Weekley, 180 S.W.3d at 131-32 [**3] (stating that HN1 arbitrability ″turns on the substance of the claim, not artful pleading″); Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795, 797-800 (Tex. 2001) (distinguishing fraudulent 1 Each enrollment agreement contained the following arbitration provision: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OBLIGATION: . . .

2018We construe this allegation as a claim for negligent misrepresentation because the substance of her pleading, construed liberally, expressly or impliedly includes all elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation. 10 See Ortiz v. Collins , 203 S.W.3d 414 , 421 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) ("[W]e look to the substance of a claim to determine its nature.").

2011See id. (“Appellees emphasize that [the defendant] did not call his request a counterclaim, but we look to the substance of a claim to determine its nature, not its label.”).

2016See Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2004) (holding that the term “plea to the jurisdiction” in section 5 Shortly before we issued our stay, the trial court informed the parties in writing that it was not going to sign the Town’s proposed order granting its motion to enforce the stay or its proposed order sustaining its objections to violations of the stay. 7 51.014(a)(8) refers to the substance of the immunity argument rather than “to a particular procedural vehicle”); see also Ware v. Miller, 82 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. denied) (holdin

2007In Simons , we held the term “plea to the jurisdiction” in Section 51.014(a)(8) refers to the substance of the immunity argument rather than “to a particular’ procedural vehicle.” Id.

2011Purpose over Form Flower Mound argues that a focus on the beginning phrase of section 51.014(a) is misplaced because the statute‘s purpose ―is to allow appellate review of the substance of the challenge to the trial court‘s jurisdiction, not its form.‖ It points out that the supreme court stated in Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. 2006), that section 51.014(a)(8)‘s purpose is to allow interlocutory 3 The legislature also amended subsection (e) and added subsection (f), but these changes and additions have no effect here. 6 appellate review when a trial court denies a governmental unit

2011Purpose over Form Flower Mound argues that a focus on the beginning phrase of section 51.014(a) is misplaced because the statute’s purpose “is to allow appellate review óf the substance of the challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction, not its form.” It points out that the supreme court stated in Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex.2006), that section 51.014(a)(8)’s purpose is to allow interlocutory appellate review when a trial court denies a governmental unit’s challenge to subject matter jurisdiction and that under Long , form does not matter.

2023“The claim must ‘depend on the existence’ of the contract” and “be unable to ‘stand independently’ without the contract.” Id. at 527–28 (quoting Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. 2006); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d at 739–40). “‘[W]hen the substance of the claim arises from general obligations imposed by state law, including statutes, torts and other common law duties, or federal law,’ rather than from the contract, ‘direct benefits’ estoppel does not apply, even if the claim refers to or relates to the contract.” Id. (quoting In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182

2019Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., L.P, 458 S.W.3d 502, 528 (Tex. 2015) (“‘[W]hen the substance of the claim arises from general obligations imposed by state law, including statutes, torts and other common law duties, or federal law,’ rather than from the contract, ‘direct benefits’ estoppel does not apply, even if the claim refers to or relates to the contract.” (quoting In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182 , 184 n.2 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding))); Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 132 .7 LFA argues that Bridgette and Gabrielle seek recovery under the account agreements and that, althou

2025Instead, it is “the substance of the claim [that] controls whether the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive process and remedies and, thus, vests exclusive jurisdiction with the Division.” Id.; see Crawford, 458 S.W.3d at 926 (explaining “claimants may not recast claims to avoid statutory requirements or to qualify for statutory protections”).

2015Rather, “courts must look at the substance of the claim.” Id.

2023Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 222 (quoting Ray, 178 S.W.3d at 836 ); see Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 665–66 (“That [the defendant] was unable to . . . present his case to the extent and in the form he desired is not prejudicial where, as here, he was not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury.” (quoting United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384 , 1398–99 (10th Cir. 1991)). 3 3 Compare Green v. State, 589 S.W.3d 250 , 263 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (concluding that the exclusion of self-defense evidence regarding the decedent’s earlier threat against appellant,

2019Applying the rule described above, we observed that the substance of the instruction was “covered by the self-defense charge given,” and thus it was “simply unnecessary” and “fail[ed] to clarify the law for the jury.” Id. at 212, 214 .

2016“As long as the substance of the warnings [is] adequately communicated, the failure to give the warnings precisely as set forth in Miranda does not invalidate a subsequent confession.” Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164 , 175 n. 7 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (cit ing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360-62 , 101 S.Ct. 2806 , 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981)).

2016“As long as the substance of the warnings [is] adequately communicated, the failure to give the warnings precisely as set forth in Miranda does not invalidate a subsequent confession.” Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164 , 175 n. 7 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (cit ing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360-62 , 101 S.Ct. 2806 , 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981)).