substance claim in Michigan

2025“This determination should be based on the substance of the rule involved and the timing of plaintiff’s actions, plaintiff’s obvious gamesmanship or lack thereof, and thus plaintiff’s reliance or lack of reliance on the rules as they existed at the time he made the pertinent decisions in this case, and any other pertinent factors in the individual case.” Id.

2023Id.

2025See Cove Creek Condo Assoc v Vistal Land & Home Dev, LLC, 330 Mich App 679 , 713; 950 NW2d 502 (2019) (“Although [Ollig v Eagles, 347 Mich 49 ; 78 NW2d 553 (1956)] involved equitable estoppel rather than promissory estoppel, the substance of the claim controls, not its label.”) (internal footnote omitted).

2025See Cove Creek Condo Assoc v Vistal Land & Home Dev, LLC, 330 Mich App 679 , 713; 950 NW2d 502 (2019) (“Although [Ollig v Eagles, 347 Mich 49 ; 78 NW2d 553 (1956)] involved equitable estoppel rather than promissory estoppel, the substance of the claim controls, not its label.”) (internal footnote omitted).

2023Thus, it remains true that a condition of the premises is deemed open and obvious if it is “reasonable to expect that an average person with ordinary intelligence would have discovered it upon casual inspection[.]” Id. at ___; slip op at 39-40 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022Id. at 484 .

2021Claims of “independent wrongdoing” by the purchasing entity, id. at 724 , such as “post-purchase actions” of the successor bank, Benson, 673 F3d at 1209 , for which neither the FDIC nor the failed bank could be “held legally responsible to pay or otherwise resolve the asserted claim,” are not subject to the FIRREA’s administrative exhaustion requirement, American Nat’l Ins Co v FDIC, 642 F3d 1137, 1142-1144 ; 395 US App DC 316 (2011).9 But when a claim “is functionally, albeit not formally, against” the failed bank or the FDIC as receiver, 12 USC 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) applies.

2021Claims of “independent wrongdoing” by the purchasing entity, id. at 724 , such as “post-purchase actions” of the successor bank, Benson, 673 F3d at 1209 , for which neither the FDIC nor the failed bank could be “held legally responsible to pay or otherwise resolve the asserted claim,” are not subject to the FIRREA’s administrative exhaustion requirement, American Nat’l Ins Co v FDIC, 642 F3d 1137, 1142-1144 ; 395 US App DC 316 (2011).9 But when a claim “is functionally, albeit not formally, against” the failed bank or the FDIC as receiver, 12 USC 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) applies.

2021Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 204 ; 920 NW2d 148 (2018).

2021In answering this question, the focus must be “on the substance of a claim rather than its form” to determine “the actor responsible for the alleged wrongdoing.” Farnik, 707 F3d at 722-723 .

2021Claims of “independent wrongdoing” by the purchasing entity, id. at 724 , such as “post-purchase actions” of the successor bank, Benson, 673 F3d at 1209 , for which neither the FDIC nor the failed bank could be “held legally responsible to pay or otherwise resolve the asserted claim,” are not subject to the FIRREA’s administrative exhaustion requirement, American Nat’l Ins Co v FDIC, 642 F3d 1137, 1142-1144 ; 395 US App DC 316 (2011).9 But when a claim “is functionally, albeit not formally, against” the failed bank or the FDIC as receiver, 12 USC 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) applies.

2021Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 204 ; 920 NW2d 148 (2018).

2019Kurr, 253 Mich App at 327 .

2016See In re Traub Estate, 354 Mich 263, 278-279 ; 92 NW2d 480 (1958); Wilcox v Moore, 354 Mich 499, 504 ; 93 NW2d 288 (1958).

2016See In re Traub Estate, 354 Mich 263, 278-279 ; 92 NW2d 480 (1958); Wilcox v Moore, 354 Mich 499, 504 ; 93 NW2d 288 (1958).

2013Hughes, 525 US at 445 .

2010Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 206 Mich App 74, 76 ; 520 NW2d 344 (1994).

2010Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 206 Mich App 74, 76 ; 520 NW2d 344 (1994).

2008Adams, supra at 710-711 , 742 N.W.2d 399 .

2005Indeed, as noted in Local 1064, RWDSU AFL-CIO v Ernst & Young, 449 Mich 322 , 327 n 10; 535 NW2d 187 (1995), “[i]t is well accepted that in ruling on a statute of limitations defense the court may look behind the technical label that [a] plaintiff attaches to a cause of action to the substance of the claim asserted.” Particularly instructive by analogy is the case of Crown Technology Park v D&N Bank, FSB, 242 Mich App 538 ; 619 NW2d 66 (2000).

2005Indeed, as noted in Local 1064, RWDSU AFL-CIO v Ernst & Young, 449 Mich 322 , 327 n 10; 535 NW2d 187 (1995), “[i]t is well accepted that in ruling on a statute of limitations defense the court may look behind the technical label that [a] plaintiff attaches to a cause of action to the substance of the claim asserted.” Particularly instructive by analogy is the case of Crown Technology Park v D&N Bank, FSB, 242 Mich App 538 ; 619 NW2d 66 (2000).

2003In essence, denial of counsel of choice is a denial of the manner in which a defense will be presented, not a denial of the substance of the defense itself, and, therefore, closer analytically to a denial of the right of self-representation, Faretta, supra, which mandates automatic reversal, Fulmi *94 nante, supra at 310 , citing McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168 , 177-178 n 8; 104 S Ct 944 ; 79 L Ed 2d 122 (1984).

2003“Obtaining reversal for violation of such a right [to counsel of one’s choice] does not require a showing of prejudice to the defense, since the right reflects constitutional protection of the defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding.” Flanagan v United States, 465 US 259, 268 ; 104 S Ct 1051 ; 79 L Ed 2d 288 (1984).

2003“Obtaining reversal for violation of such a right [to counsel of one’s choice] does not require a showing of prejudice to the defense, since the right reflects constitutional protection of the defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding.” Flanagan v United States, 465 US 259, 268 ; 104 S Ct 1051 ; 79 L Ed 2d 288 (1984).

2003In essence, denial of counsel of choice is a denial of the manner in which a defense will be presented, not a denial of the substance of the defense itself, and, therefore, closer analytically to a denial of the right of self-representation, Faretta, supra, which mandates automatic reversal, Fulmi *94 nante, supra at 310 , citing McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168 , 177-178 n 8; 104 S Ct 944 ; 79 L Ed 2d 122 (1984).

2003In essence, denial of counsel of choice is a denial of the manner in which a defense will be presented, not a denial of the substance of the defense itself, and, therefore, closer analytically to a denial of the right of self-representation, Faretta, supra, which mandates automatic reversal, Fulmi *94 nante, supra at 310 , citing McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168 , 177-178 n 8; 104 S Ct 944 ; 79 L Ed 2d 122 (1984).

1995The panel explained: "[I]t is not necessary that we determine which of those three limitation periods applies because the complaint was brought within three years, the shortest of those periods." [8] Id. at 448-449 . [9] Id. at 449-451 . [10] It is well accepted that in ruling on a statute of limitations defense the court may look behind the technical label that plaintiff attaches to a cause of action to the substance of the claim asserted.

1995The panel explained: "[I]t is not necessary that we determine which of those three limitation periods applies because the complaint was brought within three years, the shortest of those periods." [8] Id. at 448-449 . [9] Id. at 449-451 . [10] It is well accepted that in ruling on a statute of limitations defense the court may look behind the technical label that plaintiff attaches to a cause of action to the substance of the claim asserted.

1995E.g., Seebacher v Fitzgerald, Hodgman, Cawthorne & King, PC, 181 Mich App 642 ; 449 NW2d 673 (1989); Barnard v Dilley, 134 Mich App 375 ; 350 NW2d 887 (1984).

1995E.g., Seebacher v Fitzgerald, Hodgman, Cawthorne & King, PC, 181 Mich App 642 ; 449 NW2d 673 (1989); Barnard v Dilley, 134 Mich App 375 ; 350 NW2d 887 (1984).

1995E.g., Seebacher v Fitzgerald, Hodgman, Cawthorne & King, PC, 181 Mich App 642 ; 449 NW2d 673 (1989); Barnard v Dilley, 134 Mich App 375 ; 350 NW2d 887 (1984).

1995E.g., Seebacher v Fitzgerald, Hodgman, Cawthorne & King, PC, 181 Mich App 642 ; 449 NW2d 673 (1989); Barnard v Dilley, 134 Mich App 375 ; 350 NW2d 887 (1984).

1993A utility’s decision to enter into a long-term gas contract was determined to be reasonable and prudent and therefore recoverable even though the market later changed and the price in the contract wound up being much higher in Attorney General v Public Service Comm, 161 Mich App 506, 517 ; 411 NW2d 469 (1987).

1993A utility’s decision to enter into a long-term gas contract was determined to be reasonable and prudent and therefore recoverable even though the market later changed and the price in the contract wound up being much higher in Attorney General v Public Service Comm, 161 Mich App 506, 517 ; 411 NW2d 469 (1987).

1990Anderson, supra. Here we depart somewhat from the Aeree rule.

1990Anderson, supra . [35] Here we depart somewhat from the Acree rule.